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Abstract 
 Anishinaabeg Peoples maintained sovereignty via peoplehood in the context of Settler 
colonial programs intended to confine and ultimately eliminate Indigenous sovereignty and 
identity. Although scholars have usually considered the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries—defined by confinement, dispossession, and marginalization—as the nadir of Indian 
history, I explore the persistence of Anishinaabe sovereignty. Eschewing race and nationhood, 
ways of thinking embedded in Western European epistemologies, I rely on “peoplehood,” a 
theory developed by American Indian Studies scholars, to articulate Ojibwe sovereignty.  
Anishinaabeg, like many of the names Native Americans use to identify themselves, means “the 
people.” Inherent in peoplehood is sovereignty, which can be understood as a matrix of living 
relationships with language, land, sacred history, ceremonial cycles, and kinship. Looking west 
from the center of the expansive Anishinaabewaki homeland, I use as case studies the Lac Courte 
Oreilles People in Wisconsin, the St. Peter’s or Peguis People in Manitoba, and the Turtle 
Mountain People in North Dakota. These three Anishinaabe Peoples allow me to consider 
Anishinaabe peoplehood in a variety of contexts that not only span colonial state borders but also 
reserve and reservation boundaries. My dissertation explores peoplehood through the themes of 
treaty making, economic continuity and change, the question of who belongs as one of the 
People, rights to the land and its resources, nation-building politics, and the continued 
importance of treaties and reserved rights. By focusing on the period between 1854 and 1954, a 
period that scholars generally consider dark days of degeneration and dependency, I suggest an 
alternative configuration for how scholars understand the relationships between United States 
and Canadian policies and Indigenous peoples in a period of confinement and attempted erasure. 
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An examination of western Anishinaabewaki reveals not a narrative of decline but rather one of 
dynamic sovereignty.
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Chapter 1 
Wayeshkad1 
 Nearly nine hundred years ago, the Anishinaabeg began a journey west from the eastern 
edge of Turtle Island. They continued west until they found the land that Gitchi Manitou, the 
Creator, had made for them—a land with clear blue waters teeming with fish and shores lined 
with manoomin or wild rice. In 1936, several hundred years after the first ancestors arrived, on 
the southern edge of Anishinaabewaki or the Anishinaabe homeland where mitigoog or forests 
spread out into mashkoden or prairies, LeRoy Kaskisto, my grandfather, was born in a tarpaper 
house on the Lac Courte Oreilles ishkonigan or reservation.   
 Superficially, my grandfather’s story and my family’s story demonstrates the success of 
Settler colonial goals to erase Indigenous Peoples. My grandfather’s family left Lac Courte 
Oreilles before the 1940s to work in the logging industry in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. 
The state of Wisconsin acquired his grandmother’s allotment to build a hydroelectric dam that 
flooded much of the ishkonigan. They never became farmers like federal policies such as the 
Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887 and other assimilation programs intended, but my 
grandfather grew up speaking only English—his mother learned not to speak the Ojibwe 
language at the Hayward Indian School ten miles from Lac Courte Oreilles—and he later 
participated in federal relocation programs, where he found a job as a welder in Chicago. He 
learned that Ojibwe was not an identity to raise one’s children to be. My mother, although 
enrolled, grew up with little understanding of what it meant to be Anishinaabe. My sisters and I 
are ineligible to enroll. There are no new generations of Ojibweg in our family, which is what the 
                                                 
1 At first or in the beginning. Department of American Indian Studies, University of Minnesota, Ojibwe People’s 
Dictionary, http://ojibwe.lib.umn.edu/, accessed Mar. 1, 2016.  
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federal government wanted when it implemented the first reservation more than one hundred and 
fifty years ago.  
 And yet my grandfather has struggled against erasure. I grew up hearing stories my 
mother never heard. He brought his grandchildren home to the reservation. He collected copies 
of census materials, birth and death certificates, letters, photographs, ancestry.com comment 
threads, local histories, grave rubbings, and whatever scraps of information that confirmed his 
ancestors’ and descendants’ ties to the Anshinaabe People. When my grandfather pulls out the 
photocopies of federal documents and writes notes in the margins, when he talks about people 
and places, the records document not only dispossession but also persistence. Despite everything, 
nindanishinaabewimin: we are Anishinaabeg.2  
 There are countless stories of Ojibweg like my grandfather, stories of persistence and 
strength in the midst of colonial destruction. This dissertation argues that, between 1854 and 
1954, Anishinaabeg Peoples maintained sovereignty via peoplehood in the face of Settler 
colonial programs intended to confine and ultimately erase Indigenous sovereignty and identity.3 
Scholars have generally considered the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—defined by 
confinement, dispossession, and marginalization—as the nadir of American Indian history. 
                                                 
2 Anishinaabeg is the plural of Anishinaabe, just as Ojibweg is the plural of Ojibwe. Anishinaabe and Ojibwe are 
both names that the People call themselves, and so I use the term interchangeably. Anishinaabe may also include the 
Potawatomi and Odawa, but I will note if and when I mean to include all three. Additionally, some Anishinaabeg 
refer to themselves as Saulteaux, and the federal government’s official designation in the United States is Chippewa 
and in Canada it is Ojibway. I try to use the name that the People in question most frequently use for themselves.  
3 I will discuss Settler colonialism in more depth below, but I use “Settler” throughout as a more precise term than 
“white” or “non-Indian.” According to historian Adam Baker, Settler society “is founded on co-opted land and 
resources.” Individual Settlers benefit from this appropriation, living on stolen land and enjoying the privilege of 
their status in Settler society. While not inherently colonial, Settlers often participate in colonial actions by engaging 
in systems of power and hegemonic control.  “The Contemporary Reality of Canadian Imperialism: Settler 
Colonialism and the Hybrid Colonial State,” American Indian Quarterly 33 (Summer 2009): 325-51. See also 
Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of Genocide Research 33 (2006): 
387-409.  
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However, considering this period from Anishinaabeg perspectives reveals the continuity of 
Anishinaabeg sovereignty. The activism of the second half of the twentieth century did not 
emerge or re-emerge suddenly or surprisingly from the 1950s. It comprised part of a sustained 
expression of peoplehood, which continuously enacted Anishinaabeg sovereignty.  
 Looking west from the center of the expansive Anishinaabe homeland 
(Anishinaabewaki), I use as case studies the Lac Courte Oreilles People in Wisconsin, the St. 
Peter’s and later Peguis People in Manitoba, and the Turtle Mountain People in North Dakota. 
The Treaty of La Pointe, negotiated between Ojibweg and U.S. officials in 1854, created the Lac 
Courte Oreilles ishkonigan as well as nearly a dozen additional ishkonigan in Wisconsin, 
Minnesota, and Michigan, to protect the aki (land) and its resources for future generations. The 
St. Peter’s Reserve followed in 1871, and the Turtle Mountain Reservation in 1882. These three 
Anishinaabeg Peoples allow me to consider Anishinaabe people in a variety of contexts that not 
only span colonial state borders but also reserve and reservation boundaries. The St. Peter’s 
Reserve no longer existed by 1907, although the People continued, and the four to six thousand 
Turtle Mountain men and women spilled over the two-township ishkonigan. Throughout the 
following century, these Anishinaabeg Peoples re-imagined Anishinaabewaki within a new 
landscape of Settler borders and maintained an expansive, active sovereignty through a network 
of living relationships that stretched beyond ishkoniganan.  
Indigenous Peoplehood  
 The dynamic sovereignty evidenced among the Lac Courte Oreilles, Turtle Mountain, 
and St. Peter’s Peoples demands a reconsideration of the language scholars use to discuss 
Indigenous nations and communities. Existing scholarship tends to use ‘race,’ ‘tribe,’ or ‘nation’ 
to frame the conversation. This terminology evolved along a trajectory that highlights underlying 
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Settler colonial power relationships and limits understandings of Indigenous sovereignty within 
Settler frameworks.   
 ‘Indian’ as race crystalized during the mid-nineteenth century via reserve and reservation 
polices. Racialized conceptions define Indianness as an inherited, biological blood-based set of 
characteristics divorced from a political identity, or sovereignty. In Canada, the Indian Act, first 
established in 1876, inserted biology into definitions of Indianness, defining Indian as a “male 
person of Indian blood reputed to belong to a particular band.”4 At the same time, the Indian Act 
defied biology, as Indian women who married non-Indian men legally lost their Indianness and 
non-Indian women who married Indian men became status Indians.5 The act distinguished 
‘Indian’ as separate from ‘person,’ with person defined as “an individual other than Indian.”6 By 
the early twentieth century, Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) officials deployed ‘Indian’ as a 
racial category marked by biological difference and linked to negative stereotypes in their daily 
administration.7 In the United States, an 1846 court case, United States v. Rogers, marked a shift 
from seeing Indigenous Peoples as political entities to a race, which erased the sovereignty 
inherent in political categorizations. William Rogers murdered Jacob Nicholson, both described 
in court documents as “white men and not Indians.”8 Rogers articulated an identity as both a 
member of the Cherokee People and a white man, but the Supreme Court declared that one could 
not be both. Cherokee and white were mutually exclusive, and the court positioned race, not 
                                                 
4 An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians, S.C., 1876, c. 18.  
5 Additionally, enfranchisement policies considered not blood quantum but behavioral aspects such as education and 
military service. However, officials often fell back on blooded language to support these categories. Robin Jarvis 
Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 46-47.  
6 Indian Act, 1876.  
7 Officials blamed the lack of “progress” on innate racial qualities. Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye, 126. 
8 United States v. Rogers, 1846 U.S. Lexis 413.  
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political or social identity, as the determining factor of Indianness.9 Allotment policies in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries further racialized the Indian, linking blood quantum to 
competency.10 Although legal status as an Indian in both the United States and Canada carries 
obviously political consequences—access to land and services, for instance—the use of race to 
mark Indianness dissolves the political dimension of Indian identity in biology and blood, which 
limits understandings of sovereignty.  
 One of the early scholars to critically engage race and Indianness was historian Nancy 
Shoemaker. Shoemaker traces the use of “red” by both Indians and Settlers to explore racial 
identity. She posits that Indian people began to see skin color as a way of categorizing 
themselves for one of two reasons: either to differentiate themselves from Europeans who saw 
themselves as “white” and slaves defined as “black” or to indicate innate differences that derived 
from origin stories that defined southeastern Indians as red people. Shoemaker remains aware of 
the social relationships that shaped these discussions and sees race more as a socially constructed 
                                                 
9 Bethany R. Berger, “‘Power Over this Unfortunate Race’: Race, Power, and Indian Law in the United States v. 
Rogers,” William and Mary Law Review 45:5 (2004): 1957-2003; David Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and 
the U.S. Supreme Court: The Masking of Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997), 38-50. Berger also 
points out that the shift was part of the development of the science of ethnology. Similarly, Mark Rifkin argues that 
anthropological studies of kinship actually boil down to biopolitics. Rifkin, “Making Peoples into Populations: The 
Racial Limits of Tribal Sovereignty,” in Theorizing Native Studies, edited by Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 149-187.  
 For more on the historical development of race in the United States, see Ian F. Haney López, White By 
Law: The Legal Construction of Race (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Cheryl I. Harris, “Whiteness 
as Property,” Harvard Law Review 106:8 (Jun 1993): 1707-1791; John Wood Sweet, Bodies Politic: Negotiating 
Race in the American North, 1730-1830 (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2003). On the subject of 
blood as a construction of race, see, Kevin Noble Maillard, “The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of Native 
American Ancestry from Racial Purity Law,” Michigan Journal of Race and Law 351 (2007): 351-386; Daniel J. 
Sharfstein, “Crossing the Color Line: Racial Migration and the One-Drop Rule, 1600-1860,” Minnesota Law Review 
91 (2007): 592-656.  
10 As historian Melissa Meyer shows, these categories were often manipulated to expedite the transfer of land from 
Indigenous to Settler hands, but they nonetheless reified ideas of race and blood. Melissa L. Meyer, The White Earth 
Tragedy: Ethnicity and Dispossession at a Minnesota Anishinaabe Reservation, 1889-1920 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994). Some scholars argue that the Indian Reorganization Act further entrenched biology above 
political or cultural identities by encouraging Native nations to use blood quantum to determine membership under 
new constitutions. William T. Hagan, “Full Blood, Mixed Blood, Generic, and Ersatz: The Problem of Indian 
Identity,” Arizona and the West 27:4 (Winter 1985), 309-326.  
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metaphor than real biologically-based difference. Shoemaker, however, underemphasizes the 
role of concepts such as land and sacred history in defining difference, fitting southeastern 
Indians’ views into Euro-American patterns of social construction, which marginalizes 
Indigenous views of their own identity that are essential to defining sovereignty.  
 Even as they problematize the racialization of Native Americans, scholars continue to 
subsume the political dimension of sovereignty in discussions of race. Cherokee sociologist Eva 
Garroutte presents Indigenous identity in the United States and Canada as a racial identity. 
Rather than accepting the racialization at face value, however, Garroutte deconstructs more than 
two centuries of policies and practices.11 Combining archival and ethnographic research, 
Garroutte explores intersecting legal, biological, cultural, and personal forms of constructing 
Indian identity. Garroutte proposes an alternative definition of Indianness based on both being 
and doing: “individuals belong to those communities because they carry the essential nature that 
binds them to The People and because they are willing to behave in ways that the communities 
define as responsible.”12 This definition raises more question than it resolves, for “the essential 
nature” of what makes a People remains contested both in Garroutte’s work and in Indian 
communities. Her focus remains on individual rather than group identity, and although her study 
intersects with issues of federal recognition, Garroutte’s work leaves unanswered a central 
question: what is at stake in these conversations about race? As Garroutte’s historical review 
reveals without acknowledging, the language of ‘race’ covered a more fundamental contest for 
power in Settler society. Rejecting blood quantum and insisting on Indigenous definitions of 
belonging was not just about race; it implicated sovereignty and the right to self-governance.  
                                                 
11 Eva Garroutte, Real Indians: Identity and the Survival of Native America (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2003).  
12 Garroutte, Real Indians, 134 (emphasis original).  
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 Anthropologist Circe Sturm connects race and political identity in her study of the 
Cherokee Nation. Sturm exposes “blood” as a social construct.13 She demonstrates the historic 
process of racializing Cherokee identity, through both Settler and Cherokee actions. Sturm 
explores the political dimension to the discourse on race. The Cherokee used race in nation-
building. Through their own racialization, Sturm argues, the Cherokee learned that Euroamerican 
ideas of nation intertwined with and were defined by race. Previously, according to Sturm, the 
Cherokee based their political community on “culture, kinship, language, and religious 
worldview,” but in the nineteenth century they mobilized racial ideologies to establish an identity 
as a modern nation.14 Sturm problematizes these ideologies by assessing the multifaceted ways in 
which blood functioned as a metaphor for culture.15 Cherokee continued to define both race and 
nation in terms of culture, kinship, language, and religion. Sturm contributes an understanding of 
Cherokee identity that includes political community. The Cherokee adopted United States racial 
ideology to promote their autonomy.16 By explaining the links between race and nation-building, 
                                                 
13 Circe Sturm, Blood Politics: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002).  
14 A subset of scholarship on nationalism looks at how race and nationalism intertwine, concluding that nearly all 
nations promote homogenizing racial ideologies. In the United States, race, class, and gender ideologies shifted and 
spread through colonial and capitalist expansion. Storm argues that Cherokee and other Indigenous nationalisms 
replicated these dominant racial ideologies, although Sturm goes on to demonstrate that the Cherokee shaped these 
ideologies in turn and Cherokee ideas of race linked to culture fail to match dominant American understandings. 
Sturm, Blood Politics, 43, 17; Brackette Williams, “A Class Act: Anthropology and the Race to Nation across the 
Ethnic Terrain,” Annual Review of Anthropology (1989): 401-444; Ana Maria Alonso, “The Politics of Space, Time 
and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism, and Ethnicity,” Annual Review of Anthropology 231:1 (1994): 379-
405; Carol A. Smith, “The symbolics of blood: mestizaje in the Americas,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and 
Power 3:4 (1997): 483-509.  
15 Race and the language of bloodedness existed in tension with lived Cherokee experience, what Sturm calls 
“common sense” vs. “good sense.” “Good sense” included factors such as appearance, language, religion, and 
residence to define Cherokee, collapsing race and culture so “traditional" and “full-blooded" became 
interchangeable. Sturm is drawing on Antonio Gramsci. Sturm, Blood Politics, 21-23; Antonio Gramsci, Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith 
(New York: International Publishers, 1999), 198-199.  
16 Sturm's second book, Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-First Century, builds 
on her earlier work. In Becoming Indian, Sturm discusses the phenomenon of “racial shifting," where those who 
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Sturm acknowledges the underlying question of sovereignty that Garroutte overlooked, 
demonstrating how static notions of race limit understandings of sovereignty.17  
 In addition to ‘race,’ ‘tribe’ has also been used as a framework to discuss Indigenous 
political and social identities. In the 1970s, amidst public transnational Indigenous activism, 
Flathead author and scholar D’Arcy McNickle used the persistence of Native American group 
identity, what he calls tribalism, to call for increased self-determination.18 McNickle pointed out 
that, in 1973, Native Peoples in the United States and Canada owned more land than in 1830, 
which McNickle identified as a low point in Native American history.19 Although McNickle 
catalogued destructive colonial policies and land loss, his underlying theme highlighted 
Indigenous persistence. He argued that Native Americans remained Native American because 
they actively chose an Indigenous identity, both as individuals and as communities. For 
                                                                                                                                                             
previously identified as non-Indian shift to identifying as Indian. In this volume, she addresses the negative political 
and cultural consequences of racial shifting and its implications for Cherokee sovereignty and the question of Indian 
sovereignty more generally. Circe Sturm, Becoming Indian: The Struggle over Cherokee Identity in the Twenty-First 
Century (Santa Fe: School for Advanced Research Press, 2011).  
17 Sturm’s work connects to the growing discourse of American Indian nationalism, depicting nation as a tool that 
Indigenous Peoples used to promote their sovereignty. For many scholars, nation promised to restore the political 
dimensions to Indigenous group identity, creating an opening to address sovereignty. The discussion about Native 
nationalism extends throughout American Indian Studies, particularly in literary studies. See, for example, Jace 
Weaver, Craig S. Womack, and Robert Warrior, American Indian Literary Nationalism (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1991); Robert Warrior, Tribal Secrets: Recovering American Indian Intellectual Traditions 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995); Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “The American Indian Fiction Writers: 
Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, the Third World, and First Nation Sovereignty,” Why I Can’t Read Walter Stegner 
and other Essays: A Tribal Voice (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996); Jace Weaver, That the People 
Might Live: Native American Literatures and Native American Community (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997); Craig S. Womack, Red on Red: Native American Literary Separatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1999); Daniel Heath Justice, Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Lisa Brooks, The Common Pot: The Recovery of Native Space in the 
Northeast (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
18 According to historian Peter Iverson, McNickle influenced American Indian studies through his work at the 
Newberry Library. McNickle’s message reflected Iverson's call for a continuing story of Native American history. 
Peter Iverson, “American Indian History as a Continuing Story,” The Historian 66:3 (Fall 2004): 524-531. D’Arcy 
McNickle, Native American Tribalism: Indian Survivals and Renewals (New York: Published for the Institute of 
Race Relations by Oxford University Press, 1973). Four years earlier, in 1969, Vine Deloria, Jr., published his 
treatise advocating for sovereignty and self-governance. Deloria, Custer Died For Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988).  
19 McNickle, Native American Tribalism, 16-19.  
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McNickle, tribalism was inherently a political identity, for it existed in resistance against a long 
history of colonial dispossession and marginalization. McNickle identified the political nature of 
Indigenous group identity, both internally and externally, but his use of tribe and tribalism 
remains entangled in Eurocentric terminology that undermines Indigenous sovereignty by 
“otherizing” Indigenous Peoples.20 
  ‘Tribe’ places Native Americans on the “primitive” end of an evolutionary 
anthropological model and freezes Native Peoples like the Anishinaabeg in the past.21 As 
Kenyan activist and academic Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o explains, “Tribe—with its clearly pejorative 
connotation of the primitive and the premodern—is contrasted with nation, which connotes a 
more positive sense of arrival at modern.”22 Admission to this status as a modern nation comes 
with political benefits, such as self-determination and sovereignty.23 As anthropologist Raymond 
                                                 
20 Some scholars continue to prefer tribalism as a framework. Brian Hosmer and Larry Nesper, for instance, 
advocate for “the rehabilitation of the term ‘tribal’ where we foreground the implicit political plurality and 
interdependence of tribes.” Brian Hosmer and Larry Nesper, eds., Tribal Worlds: Critical Studies in American 
Indian Nation Building (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2013), 1. Terms such as “tribal nationhood,” 
although they intend to acknowledge that Indigenous Peoples developed their own expressions of nationhood 
independent from Euroamerican norms, risk diminishing Indigenous sovereignty as they qualify it. Instead of 
modifying Euroamerican concepts to fit Indigenous expressions of sovereignty, I prefer to find a language that 
originates in Indigenous perspectives, and peoplehood—derived from many Indigenous Peoples’ understanding of 
themselves as The People—provides that framework.  
21 Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins (New York: Macmillan, 1969). Moreover, tribal designations, 
imposed by anthropologists and government bureaucrats, formed part of U.S. and Canadian colonial systems of 
control, denying Indian Peoples’ flexible networks of social relationships. Gray Whaley, Oregon and the Collapse of 
Illahee: U.S. Empire and the Transformation of an Indigenous World, 1792-1859 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010), 11.  
22 Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, “The Myth of Tribe in African Politics,” Transition 201 (2009): 16-23. Similarly, 
anthropologist Morton H. Fried explores the problems with ‘tribe,’ which he exposes as an ambiguous social 
construct applied in varied and inconsistent contexts. Morton Fried, The Notion of Tribe (Menlo Park, California: 
Cummings Publishing Company, 1975), 1-8.  
23 This impulse, for instance, has led to the preferred terminology of ‘First Nations’ in Canada, although the term 
has no legal definition. ‘Indian’ and ‘Aboriginal’ carry legal definitions in Canadian law. Canada, Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada, http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014642/1100100014643, accessed Jan. 14, 
2016. Much of the scholarship in the United States centers on the legal history surrounding Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia and Worcester v. Georgia, in which the Supreme Court defined Indigenous Peoples as “domestic dependent 
nations.” The term both implies a sovereign status above a state and imposes limits on that sovereignty that 
subordinate Indigenous Peoples to the United States. Numerous authors discuss these cases. Most useful for me have 
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Fogelson explains, “In earlier eras, when American Indians were still regarded as possessing 
considerable autonomy, military power, and political might, the term ‘nation’ was frequently 
applied to Native American politics. When the balance of power shifted and Native Americans 
were considered as dependent nations or wards of the U.S. government, the term ‘tribe’ became 
more widespread.”24 The term ‘Indian nation,’ which scholars and Native communities 
increasingly prefer, is not merely a description but a political act. ‘Nation,’ however—like ‘tribe’ 
and ‘race’—remains bound by Euro-American epistemologies and therefore an imperfect 
framework for addressing dynamic sovereignty.  
 ‘Nation’ remains a challenging term to define. It connotes both a physical, bounded place 
and political institutions as well as ideology and identity. Scholars define nations as modern 
creations, taking shape in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and distinct from previous 
forms of organization.25 In 1983, in the context of the Cold War and anticolonial struggles across 
the globe, political historian Benedict Anderson identified nations as “an imagined political 
community” mythically constructed through national memory enacted in everyday life.26 
                                                                                                                                                             
been the following: Edward Valandra, Not Without Our Consent: Lakota Resistance to Termination, 1950-59 
(Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006), 44-45, 107-108; Rennard Strickland, “The Tribal Struggle 
for Indian Sovereignty: The Story of the Cherokee Cases,” in Indian Law Stories, edited by Carole Goldberg, Kevin 
K. Washburn, and Philip P. Frickey (New York: Foundation Press, 2011), 61-80; Charles F. Wilkinson, American 
Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1987).  
24 Raymond D. Fogelson, “Perspectives on Native American Identity,” in Studying Native America: Problems and 
Prospects, edited by Russell Thornton (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998), 51.  
25 Major nationalism scholars including Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm, and Ernest Gellner identify this 
modernist timeline for the origin of nations. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin 
and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1790: 
Programme, Myth, Reality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).  
26  Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6-7. French scholar Ernst Renan, often credited with founding national 
studies, attempted to define nation in 1882 following the French Revolution. Renan rejected geographic borders, 
ethnic or religious identity, and political affiliation as the basis of nationhood. Instead, he referred to the nation as “a 
soul, a spiritual principle” rooted in both in history and memory and the present “will to perpetuate the value of the 
heritage that one has received in an undivided form.” In other words, he defined nation as collective memory, an 
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Anderson traces the origins of imagined communities to print capitalism, which allowed 
individual readers to become citizens by imagining themselves in a common community united 
by “steady, solid simultaneity throughout time.”27 “[N]ation-ness,” according to Anderson, has 
become “virtually inseparable from political consciousness.”28 He believes that all nationalism 
since the nineteenth century assumes one of three modular forms established in Europe and the 
United States, such as the “citizen-republic idea” of the United States.29 Under Anderson’s 
definition, any American Indian nations would exist as imitations or re-imaginings of Euro-
American nations.  
 Relying on dominant definitions of nationalism, scholars of American Indian history 
often seek to explain the existence of modern Indian nations.30 Occasionally, this means falling 
back on a progressive, evolutionary model of development from band to tribe to nation. For 
instance, in an otherwise excellent study, historian Peter Iverson traces Diné development along 
a standard trajectory from amorphous roaming kinship groups to band to tribe to nation, the last 
                                                                                                                                                             
undeniably nebulous construct. Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Becoming National: A Reader, ed. Geoff Eley 
and Ronald Grigor Suny, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 18, 42.  
27 Post-colonial scholar Homi K. Bhabha challenges this static idea of the nation. While he agrees with Anderson 
that the nation is a construct, he focuses on the multiple layers of narration that expose the falsely stable, whole 
vision of the nation described by Anderson. In Nation and Narration, he writes that “despite the certainty with 
which historians speak of the 'origins' of nation as a sign of the 'modernity' of society, the cultural temporality of the 
nation inscribes a much more transitional social reality.” Nationalism, according to Bhabha, in inherently 
ambivalent. Anderson, Imagined Communities, 63; Homi K. Bhabha, Nation and Narration (New York: Routledge, 
1990), 1.  
28 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 135.  
29 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 135.  
30 I hope to move away from the idea that Native nations did not exist until Europeans named them. The Ojibwe and 
other Native Peoples pre-existed Europeans. See, for example, Joshua Piker, Okfuskee: A Creek Indian Town in 
Colonial America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Patricia Kay Galloway, Choctaw Genesis, 1500-
1700 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995).  
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phase of which he associates with the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and newly-created 
Western-style tribal councils.31  
 Anthropologist John H. Moore provided an early critique of the band-tribe-nation 
approach. Moore challenges the traditional scholarly use of both ‘tribe’ and ‘nation,’ which 
impose a falsely static identity on Indigenous Peoples and the popular anthropological notion 
that interacting with “superior” nations drives progressive change. Moore redefines nation as a 
social institution underwritten by organically organized people. He describes a process of birth, 
death, and rebirth in which “the people and their culture” remain constant.32 Moore portrays 
nation as a process, a cyclical ethnogenesis in which change functions as a creative force. 
Similarly, historian Jeffrey Shepherd uses Hualapai history to challenge the evolutionary band-
tribe-nation model. He points out that Hualapai tribal institutions developed organically before 
the IRA.33 The Hualapai change, but they change in Hualapai ways, for Hualapai reasons, and 
according to a distinctly Hualapai pattern. 
 Studies of Native nationhood or nationalism challenge the dominant narrative of North 
American history that erases or marginalizes Native peoples, demonstrating instead a long 
history of sovereignty and strength of community. In the introduction of a recent collection of 
essays on the theme of Indian nations, historian Brian Hosmer and anthropologist Larry Nesper 
reflected that the conversation about nationhood both historically and in modern tribal politics 
“signifies the revitalization and reimagination of Indigenous political, economic, and cultural 
                                                 
31 Peter Iverson, Diné: A History of the Navajos (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002). Other 
examples include Galloway, Choctaw Genesis; Piker, Okfuskee.  
32 John H. Moore, The Cheyenne Nation: A Social and Demographic History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1987), 14. (emphasis original) 
33 Jeffrey P. Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation: A History of the Hualapai People (Tucson: University of Arizona 
Press). 
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life.”34 Kahnawake scholar and activist Gerald Taiaiake Alfred theorizes Indigenous nationalism 
as a political act, proposing an alternative to hegemonic political institutions “in a conscious 
effort to re-discover a set of values and political principles.”35 He challenges the newest 
generation of Natives to “generate and sustain a social and political discourse that is respectful of 
the wisdom embedded within our traditions; we must find answers from within those traditions, 
and present them in ways that preserve the integrity of our languages and communicative styles. 
Most importantly, as writers and thinkers, we should be answerable to our nations and 
communities.”36 Although Alfred remains skeptical of the ways that both nation and sovereignty 
remain entangled in Settler power structures, he and other scholars have turned to nationhood to 
advocate for Indigenous sovereignty.37  
 Nation served as a tool of Settler colonialism. Settler governments in the United States 
and Canada imagined easily legible Indian nation-states with centralized governments and single 
male leaders out of decentralized, layered identities, providing the legal basis for land cessions 
through treaties.38 Indian communities, however, also used nationhood as a tool for their own 
                                                 
34 Hosmer and Nesper, Tribal Worlds, 3.  
35 Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of 
Native Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).  
36 Taiaiake Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2009). Audra Simpson applies this call to Kahnawake history in “Paths Toward a Mohawk Nation: Narratives of 
Citizenship and Nationhood in Kahnawake,” in Political Theory and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, edited by 
Duncan Ivison, Paul Patton, and Will Sanders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 113–36. 
37 Some examples include: John Moore, The Cheyenne Nation; Galloway, Choctaw Genesis; Maureen Konkle, 
Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals and the Politics of History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004); Andrew H. Fisher, Shadow Tribe: The Making of Columbia River Indian Identity (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2010); Malinda Lowery, Lumbee Indians in the Jim Crow South: Race, Identity and the 
Making of a Nation (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010); David Chang, The Color of the Land: 
Race, Nation, and the Politics of Landownership in Oklahoma, 1832-1929 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2010); Noenoe Silva, Aloha Betrayed: Native Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Charles Wilkinson, The People Are Dancing Again: The History of the 
Siletz Tribe of Western Oregon (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010).  
38 Whaley, Oregon and the Collapse of Illahee, 11-12.  
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purposes. The late arrival for nationhood does not mean that Indigenous nations were simply a 
reaction to external pressures. As Kanaka Maoli historian Noenoe K. Silva demonstrates, 
nationalism offered a “strategic accommodation” for Native Hawaiians. Nationhood and 
nationalism took shape around the contours of Indigenous concepts such as love for the land.39 
 Aware of the politicized context, scholars of Indigenous peoples actively contest the 
Euro-centric view of nationhood established by Anderson.40 The idea of nation is a Euro-
American creation, linked to the Enlightenment and the rise of capitalism in the nineteenth 
century.41 Of course, people around the world had their own ways of relating to each other 
outside of this limited Western definition.42 Historian David Chang proposes the following 
definition of nation: “a group of people that has a sense of itself as set apart from all others by 
                                                 
39 Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 11.  Similarly, historian Jeffrey Shepherd uses Hualapai history to challenge the idea that 
nationhood is a non-Indigenous process. Jeffrey P. Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation: A History of the Hualapai 
People. 
40 Using ethnohistorical practices that combine historical and anthropological methods, John Moore suggested a 
model for defining Indian nations, what he calls tribal nations, that includes citizenship, territory, political unity, and 
a shared language. Rather than fitting the Cheyenne to Eurocentric definitions of nation, he adjusts nation to 
Cheyenne understandings of group organization and makes nation a tool for understanding Indigenous experiences. 
Moore draws scholarly attention beyond the centralized nation-state. However, by adding ‘tribal’ to ‘nation,’ Moore 
concedes that Indian nations are something different, which suggests an underlying incompatibility with the term 
‘nation.’ Moore, Cheyenne Nation.  
41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. 
42 In addition to race and nation as discussed thus far, scholars have engaged with alternative configurations for 
understanding Native American group identity. Anthropologist Morris Foster describes a “process of community 
maintenance and change” among the Comanche. Political and economic forces worked to divide them, but the 
Comanche preserved their social unity through innovative adaptations of public, face-to-face interactions such as 
powwows, peyote gatherings, and church meetings. Foster’s approach avoids essentializing the Comanche and 
allows for change, but he reduces being Comanche to a social identity without considering the lived reality of 
sovereignty. Historian Andrew Fisher takes a more political approach in describing the self-identified Columbia 
River Tribe or Mid-Columbia River Tribe as a “shadow tribe” that exists beyond state institutions. Fisher argues that 
the circumstances of Settler colonialism created this shadow tribe, who collectively “honor a common heritage of 
ancestral connection to the Columbia, resistance to the reservation system, devotion to cultural tradition, and 
detachment from the institution of federal control and tribal governance.” The Columbia River People became a 
shadow tribe with a separate, and inherently political, identity rooted in history, culture, and place. Fisher’s 
configuration illuminates how Indigenous Peoples organized beyond state institutions and in ways that look very 
little the Euro-American idea of a nation, which suggests that nation is inadequate to explain Indigenous sovereign 
identities. Morris Foster, Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community (Tucson: University 
of Arizona Press, 1991); Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 5, 251.  
  
15 
 
some combination of factors” that might include history, language, religion, artistic tradition, 
ancestry, and homeland, among others. Nationalism, in turn, comes from a feeling of common 
purpose for the future.43 Chang’s definition seems timeless, able to describe social and political 
organizations at any point in the past.44 These alternative, Indigenous-focused models of 
nationhood demonstrate the discomfort with Settler constructions of sovereignty and power. 
 ‘Nation,’ however, remains laden with specific connotations that resist these efforts to 
redefine. Chang, for instance, incorporates Anderson’s idea of “imagined communities” into his 
descriptions, but he overlooks the temporally-bound nature of Anderson’s understanding of 
nation, as well as its unavoidable link to print-capitalism.45 Nation means something more 
specific than most scholars of Native nationhood recognize, and it fixes Indigenous sovereignty 
within Settler colonial paradigms. 
 Eschewing race or nationalism, ways of thinking embedded in Western epistemologies, I 
rely on ‘peoplehood’ to articulate Anishinaabeg sovereignty. Peoplehood is a theory developed 
by American Indian studies scholars to reframe Indigenous sovereignty. In Custer Died for Your 
Sins, Vine Deloria, Jr., used ‘peoplehood’ to present an alternative to Euro-American concepts of 
belonging.46 Cherokee anthropologist, and good friend of Deloria, Robert K. Thomas employed 
the term to “transcend the notions of statehood, nationalism, gender, ethnicity, and sectarian 
                                                 
43 Chang, The Color of the Land; Moore, Cheyenne Nation. Historian Brian Hosmer and anthropologist Larry 
Nesper propose a similarly broad definition: “nationhood is concrete and imagined, constantly in motion, and 
contested in multiple ways and from numerous directions. It is accomplishment and aspiration, something described 
and lived, as well as a product of history.” Hosmer and Nesper, Tribal Worlds, 2.  
44 Similarly, anthropologist Christina Gish Hill considers nationhood and sovereignty without “the political 
machinations of the nation-state.” She identifies kinship as a sociopolitical process that the Cheyenne strategically 
mobilized for political and economic ends—in other words, a conduit for sovereignty. Hill, “Kinship as a Strategy 
for Maintaining Indigenous Sovereignty,” in Tribal Worlds, edited by Brian Hosmer and Larry Nesper (Buffalo: 
SUNY Press, 2013), 65-110. 
45 Anderson, Imagined Communities.  
46 Deloria, Custer Died for your Sins, 180.  
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membership” by focusing instead on Indigenous definitions of community.47 He identifies 
language, religion, land, and sacred history as the set of relationships that “tells you who you are 
and why you must survive as a people.”48 Surviving as a People is sovereignty, which Thomas 
situates within Indigenous relationships.  
 Tom Holm, J. Diane Pearson, and Ben Chavis developed a theoretical framework using 
Thomas’s definition of peoplehood, what they term the “peoplehood matrix.” The four basic 
elements of this model are language, sacred history, place or territory, and the ceremonial cycle. 
These features do not exist in isolation but rather “intertwine, interpenetrate, and interact.”49 The 
term represents what Taiaiake Alfred calls the core of Indigenous identity. Institutions, beliefs, 
and practices around the core may alter, but the center remains stable and influences the 
character of change.50 This matrix of living relationships comprise and mobilize sovereignty.  
                                                 
47 Robert K. Thomas, “Language and Culture: Persistence, Change and Dissolution of Tribal Society,” in American 
Indian Tribes in the 21st Century (Chicago: Native American Education Services, Inc., 1986), 71; Thomas Holm, J. 
Diane Pearson, and Ben Chavis, “Peoplehood: A Model for the Extension of Sovereignty in American Indian 
Studies,” Wicazo Sa Review 18:1 (Spring 2003): 11. 
48 Robert K. Thomas, “Language and Culture,” 71. Scholars of Native nationalism have attempted to integrate this 
relational definition into Native nationhood. Moore’s criteria of citizenship, territory, political unity, and language 
parallels Sturm’s culture, kinship, language, and religion. These efforts, however, cannot succeed in uncoupling 
nation from its Eurocentric, nineteenth-century origins and instead further suggest the need for an alternative 
Indigenous framework. Similarly, political theorist Partha Chatterjee provides a decolonization critique of Benedict 
Anderson's limited idea of nation. He discusses anticolonial nationalism in India, which he argues was not based on 
the European models Anderson proposed and in fact existed in direct opposition to such models. He contends that 
anticolonial nationalism was more than a political movement that takes place in external institutions of statecraft. In 
fact, anticolonial nationalism predates the political action of the 1970s. Chatterjee distinguishes between material 
and spiritual aspects of nationalism. While the material aspects are external manifestations, the spiritual realm of 
nationalism encompasses the “marks of cultural identity.” “In this, its true and essential domain,” argues Chatterjee, 
“the nation is already sovereign, even when the state is in the hands of the colonial power.” Partha Chatterjee, 
“Whose Imagined Community?” in Mapping the Nation, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 1996), 5-6.  
49 Holm, Pearson, and Chavis, “Peoplehood,” 13. J. Diane Pearson uses peoplehood as a framework for her study of 
Nez Perce survival in the late nineteenth century. Pearson, The Nez Perces in the Indian Territory: Nimiipuu 
Survival (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008).  
50 Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors. Several studies demonstrate the effectiveness of this perspective, 
although they may or may not rely on Alfred directly. Linda Tuhiwai Smith makes a similar point in Decolonizing 
Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books Ltd: 1999). Critiquing Western notions of 
authenticity, she suggests that Indigenous peoples’ stable core consists of genealogical and spiritual relationships 
with place while at the same time insisting that Natives can “recreate themselves and still claim to be indigenous” 
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 Peoplehood provides an Indigenous framework for understanding the historical nature of 
Indigenous sovereignty. Anishinaabeg, like many of the names Native Americans use to identify 
themselves, means “the people.” Turtle Mountain Ojibwe legal scholar Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik 
Stark explains that “the word for sovereignty in Anishinaabemowin is Anishinaabe.”51 
Anishinaabeg, sovereignty, and peoplehood cannot be separated. Peoplehood reflects 
Anishinaabeg understandings of themselves as encoded in their language. Inherent in peoplehood 
is sovereignty, which can be understood as a matrix of living relationships with language, land, 
sacred history, ceremonial cycle, and, I add, kinship.52 Sovereignty derives neither from territory 
nor the political centralization of the Western nation-state but from relationships.53 Privileging 
Ojibwe language, land use, oral tradition, and ways of understanding the past illuminates these 
relationships, which persisted within the context of colonialism. Peoplehood redefines 
sovereignty beyond Settler colonial constructs and restores Indigenous sovereignty where it 
belongs: within the People. Peoplehood empowers the Indigenous relationships that it honors, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(74). In American Indians and the Marketplace, Brian Hosmer demonstrates that while the political forms among 
the Menominee shifted dramatically in the early twentieth century, tribes’ definitions of leadership remained 
remarkably consistent over several centuries. Similarly, David Chang’s Color of the Land argues that, although 
Creeks in Oklahoma split into two opposing interest groups, they nonetheless continued to define themselves around 
a core value of communal land use.  
51 Jill Doerfler, Nigaanwewidam James Sinclair, and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, eds., Centering Anishinaabeg 
Studies: Understanding the World Through Stories (East Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 2013), xxiv. 
52 Sovereignty, as American Studies scholar Tom Holm suggests, “is inherent in being a distinct people.” Holm, 
Pearson, Chavis, “Peoplehood”: 17. Christina Gish Hill similarly notes that kinship was missing from the 
peoplehood matrix for the Cheyenne. However, Hill sees kinship as the relationship that linked the four factors 
together, essentially the arrows in Holm, Pearson, and Chavis’s matrix. Kinship, according to Hill, is explicitly 
political, while she describes the four aspects of the peoplehood matrix as cultural. I position kinship within the 
matrix, for all five factors serve as conduits for sovereignty. Hill, “Kinship as an Assertion of Sovereign Native 
Nationhood,” 86.  
53 Work by scholars such as Moore, Sturm, and Hill—as well as the scholarship of colonized people around the 
world, exemplified by Chatterjee—anticipates the relational nature of sovereignty expressed by peoplehood. By 
remaining bound to Western ideas of nation, however, Indigenous perspectives are subordinated to Settler colonial 
frameworks.  
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revealing the unbroken nexus of sovereignty that has sustained the Anishinaabeg and other 
Indigenous Peoples. 
 Peoplehood positions sovereignty as essential to understanding Native American history. 
Historians of Native America tend to draw a false distinction between culture and politics. This 
habit derives from a pattern initiated by anthropologists who focused exclusively on cultural 
traits. The cumulative effect of such studies has been to trap real Indian people in the past, 
seeming, in the words of Vine Deloria, Jr., “to drift into a timeless mist” that essentializes their 
culture and denies change.54 Political action has no role in this narrative, either in the past or the 
present. In reality, however, Native people’s reason for existence is not merely cultural.55 
According to Maureen Konkle, “it is also political—about government, boundaries, authority 
over people and territory.”56 It is also possible to emphasize politics over culture. Both, however, 
play mutually reinforcing roles in Native history and, indeed, in human history in general. 
Deloria articulates a vision of sovereignty that comprises not only political powers but also 
                                                 
54 Deloria, Custer Died for Your Sins, 17. Within the fields of Native American history and anthropology, focusing 
on culture has led to static notions of Indianness incompatible with change. Anthropologist Edward H. Spicer 
reduced the incredible diversity of the hundreds of Indigenous Peoples on Turtle Island to “fewer than half a dozen, 
perhaps no more than three or four, ways of life, or that is to say distinctive cultures, in all the reservations of the 
United States and Canada.” As anthropologist Morris Foster explains, ‘culture’ focuses on aspects such as language 
and belief system and refers to “human conceptions and conceptual frameworks.” The relationships between culture 
and sovereignty remains unclear. I do not intend to critique culture or cultural studies more broadly. Work by 
scholars such as Marshall Sahlins and Clifford Geertz in historical agency and public meaning, respectively, has 
contributed to Native American studies in many ways. Within the context of Native American studies, however, and 
in the specific case of Native American group identity, ‘culture’ as an organizing approach essentializes Indigenous 
Peoples and actually furthers Settler colonial goals of erasure by decoupling Indigenous Peoples from their inherent 
sovereignty, a process that Chickasaw scholar Jodi Byrd address in The Transit of Empire. Given the reality of 
continued Settler colonialism, it seems irresponsible to focus on culture at the expense of sovereignty. Foster, Being 
Comanche, 7, 20, 177 n19; Spicer, Perspectives in American Indian Culture Change (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1961), 21; Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities: Structure in the Early History of 
the Sandwich Islands Kingdom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1981); Sahlins, Islands of History 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 
1973); Byrd, The Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2011).  
55 For example, Foster in Being Comanche seems to dismiss political identification in favor of social.  
56 Konkle, Writing Indian Nations: 27.  
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“cultural integrity.”57 Peoplehood integrates both political and cultural aspects of community 
within the relational framework of sovereignty. It allows for both continuity and change—
change that is more than a reaction to the external pressures of colonization.58 Redefining 
sovereignty as derived from relationships, peoplehood offers a more holistic view of the 
Anishinaabe People that positions Anshinaabeg at the heart of their own dibaajimowinan 
(history). 
Centering Anishinaabeg Dibaajimowinan59  
 Peoplehood situates sovereignty within an Indigenous framework, which allows me to 
tell Anishinaabe history from Anishinaabeg perspectives. The scholarship on Anishinaabe 
history is rich and varied.60 Anishinaabeg intellectuals have contributed extensively to this field. 
                                                 
57 Vine Deloria, Jr., “Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty,” in Native American Sovereignty, edited 
by John Wunder (New York: Garland Publishing, 1999), 113-114.   
58 The idea of peoplehood operating around a stable core, to borrow Alfred’s terminology, may seem essentializing. 
However, because the peoplehood matrix conceives of its constitutive elements as relationships, it allows for 
flexibility and adaptation. No language remains unchanged through all of time. Expecting an Indigenous language to 
remain static projects Setter misconceptions onto Indigenous Peoples. Paige Raibmon explores the problematic 
binary view of Native Americans in the U.S. and Canada in Authentic Indians: Episodes of Encounter from the Late-
Nineteenth-Century Northwest Coast (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005).  
59 Dibaajimowin means narratives, stories, or histories. Doerfler, Sinclair, and Stark, Centering Anishinaabeg 
Studies, xviii.   
60 A small sampling includes Cary Miller, Ogimaag: Anishinaabe Leadership, 1760-1845 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2010); Chantal Norrgard, “From Berries to Orchards: Tracing the History of Berrying and 
Economic Transformation among Lake Superior Ojibwe,” The American Indian Quarterly 33 (2008): 33-61; Carol 
Devens, Countering Colonization: Native American Women and Great Lakes Missions, 1630-1900. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992; Ronald N. Satz, “‘Tell Those Gray Haired Men What They Should Know’: 
The Hayward Indian Congress of 1934,” The Wisconsin Magazine of History (Spring 1994): 196-224; Ronald N. 
Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights: The Reserved Rights of Wisconsin’s Chippewa Indians in Historical Perspective 
(Madison: Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters, 1991); Larry Nesper, The Walleye War: The Struggle 
for Ojibwe Spearfishing and Treaty Rights (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); Meyer, The White Earth 
Tragedy; Patty Loew, Indian Nations of Wisconsin: Histories of Endurance and Renewal (Madison: Wisconsin 
Historical Society Press, 2001), R. David Edmunds, Enduring Nations: Native Americans in the Midwest (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 2008); Chantal Norrgard, Seasons of Change: Labor, Treaty Rights, and Ojibwe 
Nationhood (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Eric Redix, The  Murder of Joe White: Ojibwe 
Leadership and Colonialism in Wisconsin (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014); Brenda Child, My 
Grandfather’s Knocking Sticks: Ojibwe Family Life and Labor on the Reservation (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 2014); Anton Treuer, Warrior Nation: A History of the Red Lake Ojibwe (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 2015).  
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Anishinaabeg have written their own history since the mid-nineteenth century, with well-known 
works by George Copway and William Whipple Warren.61 Copway and Warren articulate a 
methodology that future generations of Anishinaabeg scholars have embraced, centering 
Anishinaabeg perspectives and experiences. Both Ojibweg relied on oral tradition. Warren, born 
in 1825 on Mooningwanekaaning-minis (Madeline Island) at the center of the Ojibwe world to 
an Ojibwe mother and American fur trader father, set out to record the history of his People in 
the 1840s. Warren’s History of the Ojibway People provides “an account of the principal events 
which have occurred to the Ojibway within the past five centuries, as obtained from the lips of 
their old men and chiefs who are the repositories of the traditions of the tribe.”62 Similarly, in 
The Traditional History and Characteristic Sketches of the Ojibway Nation, Mississaugas 
Ojibwa Copway acknowledges the old men as “repositories of the history of the ancestors” and 
relies on these elders as his primary source.63 Copway and Warren use oral tradition to critique 
the dominant narrative presented by missionaries and travelers. Warren believes that, despite 
numerous volumes on Indian people written by non-Indians, the available information remained 
“mainly superficial” and often incorrect.64 He removes the veneer of expertise that white scholars 
claim and privileges the spoken authority of Anishinaabe elders. As he presents an Ojibwe 
                                                 
61 William Whipple Warren, History of the Ojibwe People, edited by Theresa Schenck (1885; reprint St. Paul: 
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2009); for George Copway, see The Traditional History and Characteristic 
Sketches of the Ojibway Nation (London: Charles Giplin, 1850) and Recollections of a Forest Life: Or the Life and 
Travels of Kah-Ge-Ga-Gah-Bowh or George Copway, Chief of the Obijibway Nation (1851; reprint, Whitefish, MT: 
Kessinger Publishing, 2010). Jane Johnston Schoolcraft, or Bamawewagezhikaquay, from a prominent Caribou 
doodem family and wife of early Office of Indian Affairs official Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, was an Ojibwe writer—
perhaps the earliest Native American writer. She wrote at least fifty poems in Ojibwemowin and English, as well as 
oral tradition and songs. Robert Dale Parker, The Sound the Stars Made Rushing Through the Sky: The Writings of 
Jane Johnston Schoolcraft (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007); Konkle, Writing Indian Nations, 
162-180.  
62 Warren, History of the Ojibway People, 7.  
63 Copway, Traditional History, 28.  
64 Warren, History of the Ojibway People, 72-73.  
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perspective, Warren conveys the importance of place, explaining the origin of place names and 
the stones behind the settlement of a land where “the bones of their ancestors [were] sprinkled 
through the soil.”65 He organizes his narrative more often by place than by time, and he provides 
few dates because his sources were not interested in chronology. By insisting on the validity of 
oral sources and the centrality of clan relationships and place, Warren reframes the Settler 
narrative of Anishinaabe history, which by the 1850s already privileged white progress and 
marginalized Indian perspectives.66 
 Non-Ojibweg scholars present the mid-nineteenth century as a period when Indian 
nations collapsed under Settler colonial pressure. For instance, historian Pekka Hämäläinen 
describes the powerful and expansive Comanche empire as “demolished” by 1877 because of 
American efforts toward “massive national consolidation.”67 Legal scholar Charles Wilkinson 
called the period from the 1890s to the early 1950s the “all-time low” and the “nadir” of 
American Indian experience.68 This narrative allows for resurgence in the 1960s, but the years 
between 1850 and 1950 remain associated with destruction and decline.69 Settlers’ 
                                                 
65 Warren, History of the Ojibway People, 3, 27.  
66 Contemporary Anishinaabeg scholars must likewise write against a Settler tradition that marginalizes 
Anishinaabeg peoples and tells stories of cultural decay. See, for example, Harold Hickerson, The Chippewa and 
Their Neighbors: A Study in Ethnohistory (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Edmund Jefferson 
Danziger, The Chippewas of Lake Superior (1979; reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1990). 
67 Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 361.  
68 Charles Wilkinson, Blood Struggle: The Rise of Modern Indian Nations (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), xiv, 
100. Other works that follow a similar trajectory include the following: Richard White, The Middle Ground: 
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1991); James Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from 
Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Robert Utley, The Last Days of 
the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004); Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian 
Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Elliott West, The Last Indian War: 
The Nez Perce Story (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
69 Legal historian Charles Wilkinson, for instance, argues that the push for self-determination emerged from the 
fight against termination policy. Paul Rosier and Dan Cobb make similar connections to termination. Many 
Indigenous activists made this connection in their own speeches and writings. For example, Leonard Peltier, Turtle 
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encroachments on territory and sovereignty were realities with which Native peoples had to 
struggle.70 As Anishinaabeg history demonstrates, however, the process of Settler colonialism in 
the United States and Canada remained incomplete. The Anishinaabeg did not rise and fall, only 
to reemerge and rebuild in the second half of the twentieth century. They persisted and thrived; 
they continued to articulate and defend their sovereignty. 
 Since the 1980s, Ojibwe writers have presented narratives of persistence and 
adaptation.71 Gerald Vizenor (White Earth) began the task of reclaiming Anishinaabe history.72 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mountain and Dakota activist currently in prison for the murder of federal agents, links his own awakening as an 
advocate for his People to the fight against termination at Turtle Mountain in the 1950s. Wilkinson, Blood Struggle; 
Daniel M. Cobb, Native American Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2008); Paul Rosier, Serving their Country: American Indian Politics and Patriotism in 
the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Leonard Peltier, Prison Writings: My Life Is 
My Sundance (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 80.  
70 Ostler, Plains Sioux, 1-13.  
71 Non-Ojibwe scholars also address themes of adaptation and survival. In Authentic Indians, for instance, Raibmon 
challenges the binary constructions that make change see inimical to Indianness. Philip Deloria address the theme of 
change and modernity as well. Rose Stremlau details how Cherokee kinship networks facilitated adaptation to 
changing colonial land policies. Raibmon, Authentic Indians; Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2004); Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family: Kinship and the Allotment of an 
Indigenous Nation (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011); For economic adaptation 
specifically, see Eric Meeks, “The Tohono O’odham, Wage Labor, and Resistant Adaptation, 1900-1930,” Western 
Historical Quarterly 34:4 (Winter 2003): 469-489; Brian Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: 
Persistence and Innovation among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920 (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1999); Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the 
Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Steven High, “Native Wage Labor 
and Independent Production during the ‘Era of Irrelevance’” Labor/LeTrevail 37 (Spring 1996): 243-64. This shift 
aligns with a broader shift in Native American historian, known as New Indian history. New Indian history produced 
more Native-centered histories that moved away from narratives of decline. Scholars advocated for a reimagining of 
Indigenous social and political experiences, a focus on Indian-Indian relationships, the study of pre-Columbian 
communities, and a call for scholarship to enter the twentieth-century. The following articles provide a brief 
overview of the historiographical development: Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr. “The Political Context of a New Indian 
History,” Pacific Historical Review 40:3 (1971): 357-382; R. David Edmunds, “Native Americans, New Voices: 
American Indian History, 1895-1995,” The American Historical Review 100:3 (1995): 717-740; Nicolas G. 
Rosenthal, “Beyond the New Indian History: Recent Trends in the Historiography on the Native Peoples of North 
America,” History Compass 4:5 (2006): 962-974.  
72 After Warren and his contemporaries, few Ojibwe authors followed. Several published memoirs over the next 
century, but the overwhelming majority of scholarship on the Ojibwe came from white anthropologists and 
historians. Examples of Ojibwe autobiography and memoir include Andrew J. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and 
Chippewa Indians of Michigan: A Grammar of Their Language, and Personal and Family History of the Author 
(Ypsilanti, Michigan: The Ypsilantian Job Printing House, 1887) and John Rogers, Red World and White: Memories 
of a Chippewa Boyhood (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1957). Early and mid-twentieth century works by 
white scholars include Frances Densmore, Chippewa Customs (1929; reprint St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society 
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Vizenor, better known as a poet, novelist, and critic, contributes a framework for understanding 
Anishinaabeg persistence and adaptation.73 He coined the term survivance, which evokes “an 
active sense of presence over absence, deracination, and oblivion; survivance is the continuance 
of stories, not a mere reaction, however pertinent.”74 Vizenor continues to explain that stories of 
survivance are “renunciations of dominance, detractions, obtrusions, the unbearable sentiments 
of tragedy, and the legacy of victimry.”75 Red Lake historian Brenda Child cautions, “It is 
impossible to overemphasize the personal toll of dispossession and reservation poverty on 
American Indian lives. ‘Survival’ rarely felt like freedom or sovereignty to Indigenous people.”76 
While honoring the trauma inflicted by Settler colonialism, the Indigenous theory of survivance 
illuminates the ongoing pattern of adaptation and active—not merely reactive—survival of the 
Anishinaabeg people that continues with each new generation. Through this Ojibwe framework, 
my dissertation emulates the adaptive, Indigenous strategy of resistance that advanced 
Anishinaabeg peoplehood in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 1979); M. Inez Hilger, Chippewa Child Life and its Cultural Background (1951; reprint, St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 1992); Sonia Bleeker, The Chippewa Indians, Rice Gatherers of the Great Lakes (New 
York: Morrow, 1955); Robert William Dunning, Social and Economic Change among the Northern Ojibwa 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959); Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Religion and the Midewiwin (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1968). Historical writings by Anishinaabeg reemerged in the late twentieth century. 
The first of these were not written by historians. Gail Guthrie Valaskakis (Lac du Flambeau) worked in media and 
communications and wrote about Anishinaabe identity, also in the 1980s. Wub-e-ke-niew (Red Lake), unaffiliated 
with academia entirely, wrote his polemical justification of Ojibwe sovereignty, We Have the Right to Exist: A 
Translation of Aboriginal Indigenous Thought, in 1995.  
73 Vizenor’s earlier work critiqued Settler colonial histories of Ojibweg. He advocated for Ojibwe history that, 
rooted in imagination and creation, envisioned the “past as a lived event.” Vizenor, The People Named the 
Chippewa: Narrative Histories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 19.  
74 Gerald Vizenor, ed., Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 2008), 1.  
75 Vizenor, Survivance, 1.  
76 Child, My Grandfather’s Knocking Sticks, 3.  
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 Recent works by Ojibweg authors carry on the narrative of survivance. Bad River scholar 
Patty Loew refers to this process as endurance and renewal.77 Brenda Child’s brief but syncretic 
history of Ojibweg in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan demonstrates how women, especially 
female elders, managed “to hold things together” during the reservation era and into cities in the 
1960s and 1970s.78 Child addresses the challenges imposed by Settler colonialism, but she 
simultaneously shows the strength and continuity of the Ojibweg. For instance, amidst the flu 
epidemic in the 1910s, Ojibwe sacred and medicinal traditions created the Jingle Dress, given to 
the People in a dream, which spread through Anishinaabewaki in both the United States and 
Canada by the 1920s.79 An understanding of Anishinaabe peoplehood can help to illuminate the 
social, cultural, and political relationships that made survival possible, relating back to the idea 
of sovereignty so important to modern Anishinaabeg.  
 Anishinaabeg scholars from a range of disciplines recently came together to propose a 
common methodology for approaching Anishinaabeg studies. Nearly two dozen Anishinaabeg-
focused scholars, many of Anishinaabe descent, advocate for an approach to Anishinaabeg pasts, 
presents, and futures rooted in stories. Stories, according to editors Jill Doerfler (White Earth), 
Nigaanwewidam James Sinclair (St. Peter’s), and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark (Turtle 
Mountain), “are like maps, or perhaps instructions, that teach us how to navigate the past, 
present, and future.”80 The collected articles consider Anishinaabeg-centered scholarship’s 
radical possibilities to promote mino-bimaadiziwin, the good life, among Anishinaabeg People, 
and they document a continuous history of Anishinaabeg adaptation and survival both in their 
                                                 
77 Loew, Indian Nations of Wisconsin.  
78 Brenda Child, Holding Our World Together: Ojibwe Women and the Survival of Community (New York: Viking, 
2012), 62.  
79 Child, Holding Our World Together, 92-95.  
80 Doerfler, Sinclair, and Stark, Centering Anishinaabeg Stories, xviii.  
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contents and in their existence as a counterpoint to mainstream epistemologies.81 Stories and 
storytelling offer a framework that, when coupled with a peoplehood paradigm, allows me to re-
imagine dynamic Anishinaabeg pasts.82 I am fortunate that Anishinaabe men and women have 
taken an active role in preserving and sharing their own stories and in producing scholarship. I 
use this literature as a basis for approaching Settler archives from an Anishinaabe perspective.83 
Privileging Anishinaabeg stories and ways of knowing challenges dominant narratives that 
marginalize Indigenous Peoples, demonstrating instead a long and evolving history of 
sovereignty and survival that is, in itself, an act of resistance against Settler colonial control.  
 The Anishinaabeg present an ideal community to study peoplehood. They claimed a truly 
extensive homeland in the early nineteenth century. Anishinaabe borders included nearly all of 
the Great Lakes watershed, crossing the Mississippi to the west, and extending into the northern 
                                                 
81 Doerfler, Sinclair, and Stark, Centering Anishinaabeg Stories, xvii-xviii.  
82 Two additional works rooted in this Anishinaabe methodology have helped to me re-imagine Settler legal 
constructs in Anishinaabeg terms. Nawush Anishinaabek First Nation legal scholar John Borrows, who masterfully 
weaves stories into his analyses, demonstrates how throughout the history of colonialism in Canada, Indigenous 
peoples enacted and adapted traditions to defend against Settler legal attacks. Borrows documents the very 
continuous sovereignty I uncover, and his concept of Ojibwe inaakonigewin or law rooted in stories and living 
relationships has influenced how I understand Anishianabeg peoplehood. Additionally, Chantal Norrgard connects 
Anishinaabe labor and treaty rights via lived relationships into a framework of resistance that likewise shaped my 
understanding of the sovereignty inherent to Anishinaabe peoplehood. John Borrows, Recovering Canada: The 
Resurgence of Indigenous Law (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002); Borrows, Drawing Out Law: A 
Spirit’s Guide (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 2.  
83 The foundations of Settler colonialism rest on eliminating Indigenous Peoples through displacement or 
incorporation, and archives, both the physical locations and the metaphorical space of publicly-constructed 
knowledge, provide a powerful tool in this process. Archives are not merely passive receptacles of neutral, fully-
formed and self-contained truth. They take part in constructing knowledge at national, regional, and local levels, 
often but not always in service of the state. Every choice—from what and who was recorded and what merited 
preservation to how that information is organized and explained and who has access to it—is deeply implicated in 
processes of power and possession. Although scholars (especially in Indigenous studies) have begun to expose and 
challenge the veneer of objectivity, archives continue to present a sense of authoritative truth that masks the role of 
colonialism and inscribes Settler colonial power relationships, denying the legitimacy of Indigenous knowledge and 
assimilating Native narratives into nation-building, Settler discourses. See, for example, Melissa Adams-Campbell, 
Ashley Glassburn Falzetti, and Courtney Rivard, “Indignity and the Work of Settler Archives,” Settler Colonial 
Studies 5:2 (2015): 109-116; Ashley Glassburn Falzetti, “Archiving Absence: the Burden of History,” Settler 
Colonial Studies 5:2 (2015): 128-144; Gayatri Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the 
Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (London: Macmillan, 1988). 
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plains of what is now Canada. They organized daily life around family groups and kinship 
networks, but the decentralization and geographical diffusion only emphasize the peoplehood 
that united them. Moreover, the Great Lakes region, with its diverse and shifting population, 
offers the perfect setting for such a study. Historians and anthropologists have demonstrated the 
flexibility of Ojibwe social relationships in the period from 1854 to 1954, actively shaping 
colonial contexts and maintaining a strong but fluid Ojibwe identity.84  
 Works on Anishinaabe history tend to focus on a single reservation or region and time 
period. Few scholars consider the political, economic, social, and cultural ties that united the 
Anishinaabeg as a People. For instance, anthropologist Laura Peers and historians Rebecca 
Kugel and Melissa Meyer structure their studies around a single historic band or reservation.85 
Historian Cary Miller discusses Ojibwe political organization with a broad geographic scope in 
the period before 1850, she remains within the confines of the United States.86 My dissertation 
uses the Turtle Mountain, Lac Courte Oreilles, and St. Peter’s Peoples as case studies but seeks 
to move beyond typical regional constraints and reframe western Anishinaabewaki as a site of 
dynamic adaptation and persistence.  
                                                 
84 For instance, anthropologist Laura Peers describes how Canadian Ojibweg fluidly blended their social practices 
with the plains environment they encountered on the western edges of Anishinaabewaki. Historian Rebecca Kugel 
examines the persistence of White Earth Ojibwe leadership from 1825 to 1898 as ogimaag (leaders) defended 
Anishinaabe land and political autonomy and despite deep divisions over strategies. Melissa Meyer discusses how 
White Earth Ojibweg defined their own membership and influenced the policy of the Settler government even as 
allotment dispossessed them of their land and lumber. Peers, Ojibwa of Western Canada: 1780 to 1870 (St. Paul: 
Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1994); Rebecca Kugel, To Be the Main Leaders of Our People: A History of 
Minnesota Ojibwe Politics (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1998); Meyer, The White Earth Tragedy.  
85 Several works published in the past several years emphasize this trend: Anton Treuer and Brenda Child’s Red 
Lake histories, Eric Redix’s study of leadership at Lac Courte Oreilles, and Jill Doerfler’s examination of identity at 
White Earth. Chantal Norrgard’s labor history focuses on communities on the United States shores of Lake Superior. 
Treuer, Warrior Nation; Child, My Grandfather’s Knocking Sticks; Redix, The Murder of Joe White; Norrgard, 
Seasons of Change.  
86 Miller, Ogimaag.  
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 Little scholarship exists on these three Peoples. Historian Sarah Carter addresses St. 
Peter’s in two separate articles, one on St. Peter’s agricultural practices in the nineteenth century 
and one on the 1907 surrender agreement.87 This dissertation situates the St. Peter’s People in a 
longer and broader context. Lac Courte Oreilles historian Eric Redix’s recent study of leadership 
at Lac Courte Oreilles in the nineteenth century has been invaluable in understanding the several 
communities that comprise Lac Courte Oreilles, especially the non-ishkonigan community of 
Rice Lake, and the contested history of leadership following the 1854 treaty.88 Redix’s work with 
Anishinaabemowin and Anishinaabeg readings of nineteenth century treaties likewise provided a 
foundation for my work. The final episode in Redix’s book, the 1894 murder of Joe White and 
the trial of his murderers, occurs in the middle of my study. I hope to contextualize the narrative 
of loss and dislocation that Redix relates, an integral layer of the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s 
history, within the continuing trajectory of Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty.89 Finally, Turtle 
Mountain legal scholar Keith Richotte’s dissertation on Turtle Mountain constitutionalism 
remains one of the few studies of the Turtle Mountain People.90 Richotte covers an expansive 
                                                 
87 Sarah Carter, “St. Peter’s and the Interpretation of the Agriculture of Manitoba’s Aboriginal People,” Manitoba 
History 18 (Autumn 1989): 46-52; Carter, “‘They Would Not Give Up One Inch of It’: The Rise and Demise of St. 
Peter’ Reserve, Manitoba,” in Indigenous Communities and Settler Colonialism, edited by Zoe Laidlaw and Alan 
Lester (Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 73-193. The only other published work focusing on St. 
Peter’s is a community and family history written by Albert Edward Thompson, Peguis descendent and former 
chief. Albert Edward Thompson, Chief Peguis and His Descendants (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1973).  
88 Redix, The Murder of Joe White.  
89 Several other studies touch on the Lac Courte Oreilles in conversation with other Ojibwe Peoples in Wisconsin 
and Minnesota. Norrgard, Child, Walleye War. See also James W. Oberly, “Tribal Sovereignty and Natural 
Resources: the Lac Courte Oreilles Experience,” in Buried Roots and Indestructible Seeds: The Survival of 
American Indian Life in Story, History, and Spirit, edited by Mark A. Lindquist and Martin Zanger (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1994); Charlie Otto Rasmussen, Where the River is Wide: Pahquahwong and the 
Chippewa Flowage (Odanah: Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission Press, 1998).  
90 Richotte, “‘We the Indians of the Turtle Mountain Reservation…’: Rethinking Tribal Constitutionalism Beyond 
Colonialist/Revolutionary Dialectic,” unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2009. Other works 
that focus on Turtle Mountain include the following: Gregory Scott Camp, “The Turtle Mountain Plains-Chippewas 
and Métis, 1797-1935” (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1987); John M. Shaw, “’In Order That Justice May 
Be Done’: The Legal Struggle of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa, 1795-1905,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Arizona, 
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sweep of history, from time immemorial through the 1990s, although the main body of his work 
begins in the 1890s. Richotte demonstrates the continuous if contested self-governance of the 
Turtle Mountain People, and he centers Turtle Mountain men and women as the drivers and 
shapers of change. My dissertation seeks to connect the Turtle Mountain People to other 
Anishinaabeg Peoples across Settler borders while maintaining a focus on Anishinaabeg men and 
women and the relationships that comprised the People.  
 By starting with the creation of reserves and reservations in the 1850s and continuing into 
the 1950s, I connect the reservation present with a longer narrative of change and continuity that 
spans colonial borders.91 My dissertation, while by no means claiming to offer a complete picture 
of the Anishinaabeg, seeks to unite seemingly disparate reservation communities within a larger 
framework of peoplehood that can serve as a lens for studying a wide range of topics in Ojibwe 
history. My geographical framework is Anishinaabewaki.92 Looking across this colonial divide 
                                                                                                                                                             
2004); Charlie White Weasel, Pembina and Turtle Mountain Ojibway (Chippewa) History (Canada: self- published, 
1994); Gregory S. Camp, “Working Out Their Own Salvation: The Allotment of Land in Severalty and the Turtle 
Mountain Chippewa Band, 1870-1920,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 14:1 (1990): 19-38; 
Gregory S. Camp, “The Dispossessed: The Ojibwa and Métis of Northwest North Dakota,” North Dakota History: 
Journal of the Northern Plains 67:1 (2000): 62-79; James H. Howard, “The Turtle Mountain ‘Chippewa,’” The 
North Dakota Quarterly (Spring 1956): 37- 46; David P. Delorme, “’Emancipation’ and the Turtle Mountain 
Chippewa,” The American Indian Magazine 7 (Spring 1954): 11-20.  
91 The available tribal histories on the Ojibwe reflect a more static tradition. Edmund Danziger provides one of the 
only tribal histories. His work is fragmentary, focusing on the reservation era with only a superficial discussion of 
the pre-reservation period, and Danziger makes no attempt to connect traditional Anishinaabe understandings of 
themselves as a people to the present. Not to mention, Danziger’s study stops at the border. Edmund Danziger, The 
Chippewas of Lake Superior (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979). For a critique of Danziger, see James 
A. Clifton, “The Tribal History: An Obsolete Paradigm,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal 3 (1979): 
81-100.   
92 Few works encompass Anishinaabe territory on both sides of the U.S.-Canadian border. Richard White includes 
the Ojibwe in his borderlands milieu, but they comprise only one of many tribes. White is less interested in what this 
history has to say about the Anishinaabe past in particular and more interested in a general understanding of Native 
and Euro-American interaction. White, The Middle Ground. More recently, Red Cliff historian Michael Witgen 
refocuses White’s middle ground through an Anishinaabe lens, looking at Anishinaabe power throughout the Great 
Lakes region. He uses Anishinaabewaki as his setting, and he demonstrates that the Great Lakes region, defined by 
diverse and layered Anishinaabe social relationships, remained Anishinaabe territory through the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012). Similarly, Turtle Mountain legal scholar Heidi 
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redirects the focus away from European and North American imperial centers and borders, 
reconfiguring the Great Lakes and Northern Plains not as peripheral borderlands but as an 
Indigenous center.  
 My dissertation picks up where Red Cliff historian Michael Witgen ends his narrative of 
Anishinaabewaki.93 Witgen leaves the Anishinaabeg, the dominant power in the transnational 
Great Lakes region, in the early nineteenth century as they negotiated their first land cession 
treaties with the United States and Canada. Witgen identifies it as a transitional moment, when 
Settler colonial nation-states constrained the power of an expanding Anishinaabewaki by tying it 
to limited landholdings within the sovereign United States and Canada.94 “No longer would 
Anishinaabe peoples mobilize political power across a shared and infinitely expandable land 
base,” Witgen contends.95 I argue, however, that even with Anishinaabewaki broken into 
reserves and reservations, Anishinaabeg relational networks—made visible through the 
theoretical framework of peoplehood—remained conduits for political power or, more 
                                                                                                                                                             
Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark considers the Ojibweg’s struggles over land boundaries with the United States and Canada. 
She offers a framework for understanding Ojibwe geopolitics in a world of multiple borders. Stark limits her focus 
to nineteenth century treaty-making and external performances of Ojibwe nationalism while I am more interested in 
internal relationships, but her analysis demonstrates how paying attention to the borderland context of the 
Anishinaabe helps to explain their layered identities. Both Witgen and Stark conclude their studies in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. 
93 Beginning with an expanding People and carrying through the reservation era into the twentieth century, I 
reconfigure the traditional narrative associated with Indigenous power in the eighteenth and nineteenth century that 
end with confinement and decline. In his narrative of the rise and fall of the Comanche empire, historian Pekka 
Hämäläinen ends with a dramatic, emotional scene: Comanche warriors confined within the roofless walls of an ice 
house, scrambling for scraps of raw meat tossed over a wall by U.S. soldiers. The tragic, dehumanizing image 
emphasizes the message of decline. In his conclusion, Hämäläinen acknowledges that the Comanche People 
endured, but the tendency to end narratives of Indigenous power with defeat rather than continuing on to endurance 
and renewal conforms to dominant narratives of Vanishing Indians and obscures the continuity that enabled survival 
and contradicts what Anishinaabeg know about their own history. Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire, 341-342.  
94 Witgen’s methodology is also significant. Witgen interrogates French sources, exposing how French claims to 
power and empire were often no more than rhetoric. He reads against French claims to power over Native Peoples, 
an approach that is also useful when looking at U.S. and Canadian archival documents in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 356-357.  
95 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 357.  
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accurately, sovereignty.96 Anishinaabewaki was no longer infinitely expandable, but considering 
western Anishinaabewaki moving forward from this period of transition in the mid-nineteenth 
century allows the historian to observe continuity in the midst of change. I look west from the 
center of a far-reaching homeland, conceiving of supposedly isolated reserves and reservations 
as part of an expansive Anishinaabe world connected by relationships and elastic social 
networks—the land, language, sacred history, ceremonial cycle, and kinship that comprise 
Anishinaabe peoplehood.97 
 Throughout my dissertation, I privilege Ojibwe knowledge. My overarching approach for 
this project is decolonization. Seminole scholar Susan Miller formulates a method of 
decolonization that she calls the “Indigenous paradigm.”98 Her approach contains four principles: 
indigenousness, sovereignty, colonization, and decolonization. Sovereignty accepts the notion of 
indigenous political, economic, and cultural authority over their own lands and people. 
Colonization insists on the recognition that Indigenous peoples, including in the United States, 
exist in a state of continued colonialism. Decolonization, meanwhile, means not an ahistorical 
effort to return to an idealized past but rather reinvigorating Indigenous worldviews and 
incorporating them into a modern context. Jeffrey Shepherd explains the project of 
decolonization as “[m]ore than a critique of the West or an illumination of victimization.” 
                                                 
96 Witgen and I define sovereignty differently. Witgen sees sovereignty as inseparable from the centralized nation-
state, but I prefer to think of Anishinaabe sovereignty as Stark does: an inherent part of Anishinaabeg. This 
definition of sovereignty matches with contemporary legal understandings. David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina 
Lomawaima, for instance, define sovereignty as inherent “powers of self-government, self-definition, self-
determination, and self-education,” which can conceivable take many Indigenous forms. Witgen, An Infinity of 
Nations, 356. David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty and 
Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001).  
97 Here I draw on Pacific scholar Epeli Hau’ofa’s description of Oceana as “sea of islands.” Epeli Hau’ofa, “Our 
Sea of Islands,” The Contemporary Pacific 6:1 (Spring 1994): 147-161.  
98 Susan Miller, “Native America Writes Back: The Origins of the Indigenous Paradigm in Historiography,” Wicazo 
Sa Review 23:2 (Fall 2008): 9-28.  
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Rather, it re-centers the historical narrative on Native communities, for “decolonization points to 
the struggles of Indigenous peoples to reclaim lands, traditions, and a sense of collective 
purpose. It seeks a place of healing from historical trauma and violence while at the same time 
carving a space for indigineity in the modern world.”99 In many ways, the work of scholars like 
Miller, Noenoe Silva, and Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Angela Waziyatawin Wilson, and Devon 
Mihesuah focuses on the production of knowledge, which is essential to relationships of 
power.100 Thus, my study of the Ojibwe seeks to reconceptualize the history of the Great Lakes 
region in order to reconstruct an Ojibwe paradigm, and peoplehood provides the framework to 
facilitate that shift.  
 Centering Anishinaabeg means centering Anishinaabeg voices and sources. An 
Anishinaabe methodology rooted in stories and survivance allows me to read Anishinaabeg 
presence in Settler archives, such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs records in the National 
Archives and Records Administration of the United States and its local branches as well as the 
Department of Indian Affairs records housed in Ottawa.101 As Ojibweg scholars since William 
W. Warren have advocated, I draw on oral histories to contextualize archival sources within 
Anishinaabeg frameworks. Fortunately, Anishinaabeg communities have made an effort to 
                                                 
99 Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation, 9.  
100 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books Ltd: 
1999); Devon Abbott Mihesuah and Angela Cavender Wilson, editors, Indigenizing the Academy: Transforming 
Scholarship and Empowering Communities (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); Angela Wazyatawin 
Wilson, Remember This!: Dakota Decolonization and the Eli Taylor Narratives (Lincoln, University of Nebraska 
Press, 2004). Western and Indigenous scholars agree about the production of knowledge and its relationship to 
power relationships. See, for example, Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: An Introduction (New 
York: Random House, 1978); Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978); Antonio Gramsci, 
Prison Notebooks (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992).  
101 For a full list of archival sources, see bibliography.  
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preserve elders’ wisdom.102 Additionally, oral histories exist in the archives through 
anthropologists’ records and oral history initiatives such as the Works Progress Administration at 
Bad River in Wisconsin. I opened my dissertation with my family’s history, and, wherever 
possible, I fold my family’s stories into the narrative that follows. I integrate a technique that 
Malinda Lowery calls autoethnography, “a method of exploring one’s own relationship to one’s 
research that begins with questioning how culture and society have affected one’s experiences.” 
Lowery incorporates vignettes from her relatives’ pasts throughout her work, “allowing a 
Lumbee way of seeing the world to enter the more conventional narrative of political history.”103 
Including the personal stories alongside evidence that historians are more used to encountering 
legitimizes and normalizes autoethnography as an interpretive evidentiary tool. Incorporating 
this method furthers a larger theoretical framework of decolonization. 
 Decolonization, combined with the peoplehood matrix, encourages an approach that 
privileges Anishinaabemowin. Even peoplehood provides a generic term that in its breadth dulls 
the distinct details of what it means to be Anishinaabe. Language remains absolutely essential to 
Ojibwe understandings of themselves. Anishinaabeg scholars including Thomas Peacock say that 
Anishinaabemowin is what, at its core, sets the Ojibwe apart. As a central aspect of Anishinaabe 
                                                 
102 Just a few of the numerous examples include Sara Balbin, James R. Bailey, and Thelma Nayquonabe, eds., Spirit 
of the Ojibwe: Images of Lac Courte Oreilles Elders (Duluth: Holy Cow! Press, 2012); Anton Treuer, ed., Living 
our Language: Ojibwe Tales and Oral Histories (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001); Thompson, 
Chief Peguis and His Descendants; Vi Chalmers, Mary-Rose Olson, and Moses Bigness, , eds., “Manitoba Elders,” 
Manitoba Indian Cultural Education Center, 1981; Edward Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book: The Voice of the 
Ojibway (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). I also conducted a limited number of interviews with 
family members and acquaintances at Lac Courte Oreilles and in Winnipeg. See bibliography.  
103 Lowery, Lumbee Indians, 1; Bauer, We Were All Like Migrant Workers Here: Work, Communty, and Memory on 
California’s Round Valley Reservation, 1850-1941 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2009); Jennifer 
Denetdale, Reclaiming Diné History: The Legacies of Navajo Chief Manuelito and Juanita (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 2007). Ned Blackhawk uses a similar technique in Violence over the Land. Unlike Lowery, he 
confines his personal experiences to an epilogue. I prefer the more integrated approach modeled by Lowery. Ned 
Blackhawk, Violence over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2006). 
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definitions of self, language demands critical attention. Silva demonstrates the benefits of a 
language-focused analysis in her study of the Kanaka Maoli, in which she draws extensively on 
Kanaka sources to reinterpret the history of Hawaiian colonization. Additionally, she avoids 
many of the dangers inherent to terms like ‘nationalism’ and ‘peoplehood’ by replacing them 
with Kanaka words that are more than mere approximations of the concepts she discusses. I rely 
on Anishinaabe words and phrases that articulate Anishinaabe ways of knowing. Using 
ishkonigan instead of reserve or reservation, for instance, helps to convey Anishinaabe 
understandings of land and the alliances or treaties they made with Settlers. Ishkonigan derives 
from the verb to save or to leave, and ishkonigan literally means “that which we have saved or 
left for ourselves,” highlighting the fact that reserves and reservations derived not from the 
United States, British, or Canadian governments but from Anishianabeg relationships with the 
land—relationships that remain unbroken today.104 Incorporating Anishinaabemowin expresses 
more clearly the uniquely Anishinaabe understanding of themselves as a People and represents 
an act of resistance to Settler colonial erasure.105  
Unsettling Settler Narratives 
 This dissertation has implications for understanding United States, Canadian, and North 
American history more broadly. It challenges the dominant Settler narratives that underwrite 
Settler colonial hegemony and illuminates United States and Canadian colonialism and 
imperialism. I use the language of Settler colonialism, which, briefly defined, refers to the 
process of colonialism based on the removal and eventual elimination of Indigenous Peoples to 
                                                 
104 Ojibwe People’s Dictionary, ojibwe.lib.umn.edu, accessed Jun. 3, 2015.  
105 I have chosen not to italicize Anishinaabe words but to treat them the same as English words. This is, in part, an 
anti-colonial act, for the words are not foreign to the region I discuss nor the Peoples who are at the center of my 
narrative.  
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gain access to land and resources.106 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
United States was an empire—expanding, displacing, and occupying.107 The United States 
pursued expansion in Cuba, Hawaii, Latin America, and South Asia—and in the Great Lakes.108 
In the final decade of my study, the United States continued its imperial history through 
interventionist policies in Southeast Asia and Latin America and often applied the same rhetoric 
to reservations.109 Canada, entangled in British empire, fulfilled its own imperial ambitions 
                                                 
106 Patrick Wolfe defines Settler colonialism in his foundational essay, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of 
the Native.” The literature on Settler colonialism disagrees about some of the particulars. While Wolfe argues that 
Settler colonialism is not always genocidal, historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz equates Settler colonialism with 
“genocidal policy.” Hixon uses the term “ethnic cleansing” instead of genocide. Some scholars, such as Adam 
Barker emphasize that Settler colonialism involved not just elites but rather individuals throughout Settler society. 
Walter Hixon argues that Settler colonialism must be understood “from the bottom up,” although all levels of the 
state were involved. Others, such as historian Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz hold the United States accountable. This leads 
to questions about whiteness and Settler colonialism. Huanani-Kay Trask uses the term “Settlers of color” to 
integrate Asian Settlers in Hawaii into discussions about Settler colonialism. In addition to race, scholars have also 
pointed out the need to consider intersecting systems of power such as patriarchy and capitalism. Finally, there is a 
concern among scholars that settler colonial studies de-centers or even displaces Indigenous studies, reinscribing 
Settler colonial relations and gaining legitimacy through the work of Settler scholars. Mark Rifkin, for instance, 
marginalizes Indigenous people in his discussion of “Settler common sense.” I see the framework of Settler 
colonialism as a tool to illuminate Indigenous resistance. Indigenous Peoples like the Ojibweg experienced 
dispossession and attempts to eliminate their existence as distinct Peoples. In order to understand these experiences 
and the continuous history of resistance and survivance, one must reveal the lie of Indigenous disappearance that 
underwrites Settler colonialism. Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal of 
Genocidal Research (Dec. 2006): 387-409; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, An Indigenous Peoples’ History of the United 
States (Boston: Beacon Press, 2014), 6; Walter L. Hixon, American Settler Colonialism: A History (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 1; Lorenzo Veracini, “Introducing Settler Colonial Studies,” Settler Colonial Studies 1:1 
(2011): 2-3; Mark Rifkin, Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American 
Renaissance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); Haunani-Kay Trask, “Settlers of Color and 
‘Immigrant’ Hegemony: ‘Locals’ in Hawaii,” Amerasia Journal 26:2 (2000): 1-24; Sunera Thobani, Exalted 
Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).  
107 Walter Nugent, Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).  
108 For examples of the United States’ long history as a global empire, see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: 
Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Michael 
Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); Emily S. Rosenberg, Spreading 
the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); 
Richard Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul 
Wolfowitz (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010).  
109 Westad, Global Cold War. Dan Cobb connects the rhetoric of U.S. Cold War imperialism with domestic policy 
regarding Native Americans in Native American Activism in Cold War America, and he demonstrates how Indian 
activists in turn shaped policy discussions. Paul Rosier depicts termination as an extension of Cold War “liberation” 
discourses in “‘They Are Ancestral Homelands’: Race, Place, and Politics in Cold War Native America, 1945-
1961,” Journal of American History 92 (Mar 2006): 1300-1326. He writes, “For Native Americans the Cold War 
started on the reservation, in their own under-developed countries.” In other words, reservations became another 
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internally as they sought to occupy, physically and politically, their mapped borders.110 
American and Canadian sovereignty remained dependent upon “acquisition, displacement, and 
settlement” of Native peoples and their land, which calls into question the moral exceptionalism 
that fueled their imperialism and led to the subjugation of Indigenous populations around the 
world that continues today.111 Most studies of imperialism in North America present imperialism 
as a nineteenth century phenomenon, and the dominant public narratives in U.S. and Canadian 
mask continued Settler colonialism.112  
 Examining relationships between Settler states and Anishinaabeg Peoples through the 
1950s, it becomes clear that United States and Canadian colonialism is not a nineteenth century 
phenomenon. Rather, Settler colonialism continued into the mid-twentieth century and beyond. 
The United States’ role as a colonizer did not end in 1890 with Lakota defeat after the massacre 
at Wounded Knee, and this history was not confined to the West of the Mississippi.113 Canada’s 
less overtly violent interactions with First Nations were no more benign.114 Both the United 
States and Canada pursued policies of limiting Native sovereignty and land bases, and Ojibweg 
                                                                                                                                                             
Cold War battlefield. He extends this argument in Serving Their Country. He frames American global expansion as 
an extension of colonial policies developed in “Indian Country,” and he compares Americanization programs to “a 
simmering cold war, by which I mean, broadly speaking, a sustained and ritualized practice of ideological conflict,” 
thus linking American imperialism at home and abroad (6, 9).  
110 Jill St. Germain, Broken Treaties: United States and Canadian Relations with the Lakotas and the Plains Cree, 
1968-1885 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009).  
111 Nugent, Habits of Empire, xiv.  
112 Historian Margaret D. Jacobs addresses these masking narratives in the United States and Australia in White 
Mother to a Dark Race: Settler Colonialism, Maternalism, and the Removal of Indigenous Children in the American 
West and Australia, 1880-1940 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), 1-20. The invisibility of Settler 
colonialism is part of its epistemic violence. Invisibility is as much a myth as the disappearance of Indigenous 
Peoples. To the Ojibwe and other Indigenous Peoples, Settler colonialism has always been visible, and ignoring the 
lived reality of these experiences in the everyday lives of Indigenous men and women unintentionally privileges 
Settler perspectives and reinscribes the power relationships of Settler colonialism. An Ojibwe-centric approach 
rooted in Indigenous systems of knowledge makes it impossible not to see Settler colonialism.  
113 West, The Last Indian War; White, Middle Ground; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire; Utley, The Last Days of 
the Sioux Nation.  
114 Roger Nichols, Indians in the United States and Canada: A Comparative History (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1999); Paige Raibmon, Authentic Indians.  
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in the Great Lakes region continued to live that colonial reality throughout the twentieth century 
as Settlers encroached on their reserved lands. Understanding the persistent Settler colonialism 
of the United States and Canada is essential to understanding American history more 
generally.115 The history of nineteenth and twentieth century North America cannot be told 
without Indigenous Peoples such as the Anishinaabeg.116 
 Using Anishinaabewaki as my geographical framework unsettles Settler geographies. 
Here, my work intersects with borderlands scholarship. Borderlands as a field developed nearly a 
century ago from the work of Herbert E. Bolton, who sought to integrate the Spanish colonial 
period into the narrative of American expansion.117 Beginning with Bolton, this scholarship has 
featured prominently—if not always dynamically—the indigenous population.118 Almost 
coincident with the rise of “new” Western history and its attention to race, class, and gender, as 
well as the rhetoric of conquest, borderlands—and Southwestern borderlands especially—
reemerged as a dynamic field; these narratives, however, continued to focus on Euro-American 
power and to marginalize Native nations as reactionary.119 Recently, scholars such as Brian 
                                                 
115 Barker, “The Contemporary Reality of Canadian Imperialism,” 347.  
116 In 2012, historian James Merrell reviewed colonial scholarship and demonstrated how far colonial American 
historians have yet to come in incorporating Indigenous scholarship and perspectives into their research. There is no 
comparable article for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but the pattern among mainstream historians is likely 
the same. James H. Merrell, “Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians,” William and Mary Quarterly 
69:3 (Jul. 2012): 451-512.  
117 Herbert E. Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1921).  
118 For instance, ethnohistorian Jack Forbes’ Apache, Navaho, and Spaniard (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1960) and anthropologist Edward Spicer’s Cycles of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United 
States on the Indians of the Southwest (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1962) emphasize Natives as integral to 
understanding the borderlands, although these works were often overshadowed by the broader field of Western 
American history.  
119 See, for instance, Patricia Nelson Limerick, Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New 
York: Norton, 1987); Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, 
and the Peoples in between in North American History,” American Historical Review 104 (Jun 1999): 814-841. As 
the title of the article suggests, Adelman and Aron position Native peoples as “in between” Euro-American empires.   
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DeLay and Pekka Hämäläinen have combined Native American history with a Southwest 
borderlands perspective to reconfigure the way historians think about empire and nation.120 My 
study will contribute to the small but growing number of works on Indians and the U.S.-
Canadian border, which remains incomplete without an understanding of how Native peoples 
like the Ojibwe shaped and were shaped by the boundary.121  
More importantly, peoplehood redirects the focus away from the European and American 
imperial centers and borders to Indigenous centers and borders—in this case, the Ojibwe.122 
Borders were just as important for the Ojibwe. Borderlands were not borderless lands, and Euro-
American borders were not the ones competing for recognition. Indian borders mattered, too. In 
the Southwest, for instance, Juliana Barr proves that “Indian nations’ borders defined the limits 
of Spanish imperialism.”123 Long before the arrival of Europeans in the seventeenth century, the 
Great Lakes region was a transnational space.124 The Ojibwe shared their borders with many 
                                                 
120 DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire. 
121 Nichols, Indians in the United States and Canada; Theodore Binnema, Common and Contested Ground: A 
Human and Environmental History of the Northwestern Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001); 
Sheila McManus, The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands; 
Sterling Evans, ed., The Borderlands of the American and Canadian Wests: Essays on Regional History of the 
Forty-ninth Parallel (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008); Michel Hogue, The Line Which Separates: 
Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2015).  
122 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 3-10. Centering Anishinaabeg rather than federal policy, which of course shaped 
Anishinaabeg experiences, emphasizes commonalities. Although U.S. and Canadian policies often differed and 
occasionally contradicted each other, the Ojibweg experienced Settler colonialism in much the same way—via 
policies designed to erase and replace to benefit Settler expansion. An Anishinaabe-centered narrative challenges 
both United States and Canadian exceptionalism. 
123 Juliana Barr, “Geographies of Power: Mapping Indian Borders in the ‘Borderlands’ of the Early Southwest,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 68 (Winter 2011): 5.  
124 Transnationalism is a useful perspective for understanding Ojibwe history and Indigenous history more 
generally. Nationhood often form the center of Indigenous scholarship. Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, for instance, asserts 
that scholars of American Indian studies should focus their work to promote “the indigenous principles of 
sovereignty and nationhood” (14). Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, “American Indian Studies: An Overview—Keynote 
Address at the Native Studies Conference, Yale University, Feb 5, 1998,” Wicazo Sa Review 14:2 (1998): 14-20. 
See also Duane Champagne, “In Search of Theory and Method in American Indian Studies,” American Indian 
Quarterly 31:3 (2007): 353. Hence, many Native American scholars remain skeptical of transnationalism, which 
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people: Odawa, Potawatomi, Menominee, Haudenosaunee, Fox and Sac, not to mention Euro-
American Settler communities. Literary scholar Chadwick Allen argues that Indigenous people 
have always “move[d] through space and time, through landscapes and generations, cross[ed] 
borders, infiltrate[d] languages, cultures, and communities.”125 The borderlands context of their 
homeland was not a challenge but rather integral to their sense of community. Too many 
histories cast First Nations as reactionary, responding to circumstances entirely beyond their 
control or even understanding.126 A closer examination of Ojibweg responses reveals that, while 
colonial pressures introduced rapid and ultimately threatening changes, the Ojibwe were not 
always a step behind. Drawing on the strength of their peoplehood, the Anishinaabe met the 
forces of colonialism not as victims but as equals. Moreover, the continued existence of an 
Ansishinaabewaki that spanned the U.S.-Canadian border complicates understandings of United 
                                                                                                                                                             
seeks to challenge the nation-state as the primary scale of historical analysis. In fact, transnationalism often 
highlights the very borders it seeks to traverse. According to Joseph Bauerkeper and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, 
indigenous transnationalism emphasizes “the linkages, conversations, cross-references, and movement of ideas, 
practices, and obligations between indigenous nations,” webs of relationships that “facilitate—rather than 
undermine—the ongoing production and maintenance of Native nations and their relationships with one another and 
with other polities” (8). A transnational perspective reaffirms indigenous nationhood, emphasizing the continuing 
effects of Settler nation-states, and moves away from the privileging Western conceptions of the nation-state in the 
production of knowledge. Bauerkemper and Stark, “The Trans/National Terrain of Anishinaabe Law and 
Diplomacy,” Journal of Transnational American Studies 4 (2012): 1-21. For more on transnational theory in 
American studies, see Richard White, “The Naturalization of Nature,” Journal of American History 86:3 (Dec 
1999): 976-986; Rachel Adams, Continental Divides: Remapping the Cultures of North America (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009); Nicholas De Genova, Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and “Illegality” in 
Mexican Chicago (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); Sterling Evans, Bound in Twine: The History and 
Ecology of the Henequen-Wheat Complex for Mexico and the American and Canadian Plains, 1880-1950 (College 
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007). For more on how transnational perspectives benefit Native American 
studies, see Robert Warrior, “The Native American Scholar: Toward a New Intellectual Agenda,” Wicazo Sa Review 
14:2 (Fall 1999): 46-54; Daniel Heath Justice, Our Fire Survives the Storm: A Cherokee Literary History 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Reyna K. Ramirez, Native Hubs: Culture, Community, and 
Belonging in Silicon Valley and Beyond (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007); Shari M. Huhndorf, Mapping the 
Americas: The Transnational Politics of Contemporary Native Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009).  
125 Chadwick Allen, “A Transnational Native American Studies? Why Not Studies That Are Trans-Indigenous?” 
Journal of Transnational American Studies 4 (2012): 1. In other words, Indigenous studies are inherently “trans-,” 
and more than just transnational from the perspective of Settler nation-states.  
126 See, for example Claudio Saunt, A New Order of Things: Property, Power, and the Transformation of the Creek 
Indians, 1733-1816 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Even Peter Iverson’s Diné, which is an otherwise 
excellent book with a resonant Native voice, has a tendency to cast Diné political developments as largely external.  
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States and Canadian nation-building.127 Discussing the myriad ways in which Anishinaabeg men 
and women undermined, avoided, and shaped federal policies contradicts the expansionist, 
nation-building narratives that support U.S. and Canadian colonial hegemony.128 
Dibaajimowin (Narrative)  
 In the middle of the nineteenth century, the Anishinaabeg continued the westward 
expansion begun by their chibimoodaywin (migration). The borders of Anishianabewaki, the 
Ojibwe homeland, included nearly all of the Great Lakes watershed crossing the Mississippi 
River to the west and extending into the northern plains of what is now Canada. The Ojibweg 
organized daily life around family groups and doodem or clan networks, but the diversity and 
mobility of the region highlights not only the ways in which people moved apart but also how 
they came together. To make sense of such a dispersed, localized People, I focus on three 
specific regions—Lac Courte Oreilles in the interior of Anishinaabewaki; the Pembina and 
Pillager Peoples along the western borders; and a group of Saulteaux along the Red River to the 
north in what is now Manitoba.  
 For nearly three centuries, explorers, anthropologists, and historians have misread the 
layered identities of Anishinaabeg as signs of disunity. Anthropologists classified the Ojibweg as 
                                                 
127 Most scholars who address the United States and Canada rely on a comparative approach. Historian Roger 
Nichols focuses on federal-Indian relationships in both the United States and Canada, discussing each nation’s 
policies separately and assessing similarities and differences. Nichols concludes that, especially after the early 
nineteenth century, the U.S. and Canada pursued parallel land policy and assimilation goals. Nichols, Indians in the 
United States and Canada: A Comparative History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998). Paige Raibmon’s 
Authentic Indians is a notable exception. Raibmon uses the theme of labor, as well as a focus on Indigenous 
People’s experiences, to explore Indigenous exploitation and resistance in both the United States and Canada. 
Settler colonial scholarship works to highlight similarities across national borders. A recent collection 
edited by Zoe Laidlaw and Alan Lester includes scholarship on the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
and South Africa. Zoe Laidlaw and Alan Lester, eds., Indigenous Communities and Settler Colonialism 
(Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Canadian scholars Corey Snelgrove, Rita Kaur Dhamoon, and 
Jeff Corntassel also highlight the international nature of settler colonial scholarship in “Unsettling Settler 
Colonialism: The Discourse and Politics of Settlers, and Solidarity with Indigenous Nations,” Decolonization: 
Indigeneity, Education, and Society (2014): 1-32. 
128 In a broad way, then, this research illuminates how distant rural areas and non-state actors can shape state power. 
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an acephalous (headless) or band-level society, implying that the diffusion of Ojibwe families 
meant that the Ojibweg recognized no boundaries in territory or membership.129 Relying on 
seemingly scientific labels, scholars present the Ojibweg and similarly decentralized Peoples as 
weaker and less stable than the highly centralized Euro-American ideal of the nation-state.130 
From an Anishinaabe perspective, however, flexibility signified not disjointedness but rather the 
lived relationships that made them a distinct People, strengthening rather than atomizing 
community ties.131 Individual Ojibweg developed a layered sense of belonging, what Taiaiake 
Alfred calls nested identities.132 For the Ojibwe, family, band, clan, and Anishinaabe 
community—and, eventually, reserve or reservation—intersected without imposing a hierarchy 
of belonging.133 Anishinaabeg, the People, is who they were from ethnogenesis, or the moment 
that Gitchi Manitou lowered Anishinaabe, the first man, to the Earth.134 Movement, expansion, 
and nested identities facilitated, rather than interfered with, this overarching community. As 
Ojibwe historian Thomas Peacock explains, “Although our ancestors identified who they were 
primarily by dodaim (clan membership) and then by community, there was a sense of tribal 
                                                 
129 Victor Barnouw, Wisconsin Chippewa Myths and Tales and Their Relation to Chippewa Life: Based on 
Folktales Collected by Victor Barnouw (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977); John A. Grim, The 
Shaman: Patterns of Religious Healing among the Ojibwe Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983); 
Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Sociology (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937). 
130 See, for example, John Tosh, Clan Leaders and Colonial Chiefs in Lango: The Political History of an East 
African Stateless Society, c. 1800-1939 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
131 Individual Ojibweg lived in clusters of families, highly mobile in their pursuit of seasonal resources. The 
seasonal village formed the most significant unit in an Ojibwe’s everyday life. Miller, Ogimaag; Stark, “Marked by 
Fire”: 119-150.  
132 Gerald Taiaiake Alfred, Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of 
Native Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Stark, “Marked by Fire”: 119-150.  
133 “A dense web of clans, kinship ties, and loyalties to non-Anishinaabe nations existed within nationhood, not as 
forces that opposed it,” argues Stark. She describes the band structure as nations within a nation. Stark, “Marked by 
Fire,” 124.   
134 Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book, 3. From an Ojibwe perspective, ethnogenesis occurred within aadizookanag.  
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unity, as one people, in those traditional times.”135 Anishinaabe intellectuals throughout time 
have defined Anishinaabe peoplehood in terms of inawemaagan (kinship) or doodem (clan), 
Anishinaabewaki (land), Anishinaabemowin (language), aadizookanag (sacred history), and 
manidookewin (ceremonial cycle).  
 Inawemaagan provides the ties that bind the People together. Anishinaabemowin encodes 
Ojibwe kinship, which derives its power from aadizookanag, is reaffirmed in manidookewin 
gatherings and seasonal movements, and connects individuals both in and across the aki. When 
Ojibweg differentiated between themselves and others, they focused on relationships. 
Community insiders were inawemaagan, or relatives. Outsiders, by contrast, they called 
meyaagizid.136 Mayag, the root of meyaagizid, translates as stranger. A meyaagizid, then, meant 
a stranger, which implies a lack of relationships.137 Patrilineal doodem (clan) or doodemag 
(clans) formed the base of Ojibwe relationships, which helped to organize the large and fluid 
Ojibwe community.138 Doodem networks fed an ethic of reciprocity.139 Aadizookaanag about 
                                                 
135 Thomas Peacock, Ojibwe Waasa Inaabidaa: We Look in All Directions (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society 
Press, 2009), 45. 
136 Additionally, the Anishinaabe referred to the phrase as na-towe-ssiwak, often transcribed as Nadouessioux, 
which, according to Witgen, meant “alien or foreign people.” Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 371, 59. 
137 Ojibwe People’s Dictionary, http://ojibwe.lib.umn.edu/, accessed November 15, 2013. This digital, talking 
dictionary was established by faculty and students in the Department of American Indian studies at the University of 
Minnesota. It supplements dictionary entries with the Minnesota Historical Society’s collections.  
138 Kinship formed such an integral aspect of Ojibwe community relationships that individuals identified themselves 
with pictographs representing their doodem, a practice that continued on treaties and petitions through the twentieth 
century. Heidi Bohaker, “Nindoodemag: The Significance of Algonquian Kinship Networks in the Eastern Great 
Lakes Region, 1600-1700,” William and Mary Quarterly 63:1 (2006): 23-52.  
139 Additionally, the relationship between doodemag provided the basis by which members of different doodemag 
interacted. Addizookanag suggest that Gitchi Manitou gifted the original clans to provide for the needs of the 
people.Each patrilineal clan, designated by an animal emblem, took on a specific set of duties to fulfill those needs. 
The Crane and Loon doodemag, for instance, served the function of political leadership. The Fish clan served as 
teachers, Bear clan members fulfilled the role of police and legal guardianship, people of the Martin clan provided 
hunters and warriors, and the Bird clan played a spiritual role. Thus, the doodem system required that different 
doodemag cooperate for the good of the people. Without one, the entire community suffered. Village groups tended 
to include only one or two clans, but marriage between members of different doodemag provided broader 
connections. Kinship might have been the most meaningful layer of identity for most Ojibweg on a daily basis, but 
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gift exchanges between human beings and manidoog informed the social lives of Anishinaabeg 
people. Kinship, both real and fictive, required certain behavior—both to give and to receive.140 
For Anishinaabeg, reciprocity helped to forge community ties that bound together a dispersed 
population without superseding local autonomy.  
 In addition to kinship, aki, or land, forms an integral aspect of Ojibwe peoplehood. 
Anishinaabewaki comprises thousands of miles of mitigoog (forest), mashkigoon (marshes), and 
mashkoden (prairie), connected by the ziibiwan (rivers) and zagaa’iganan (lakes) that provide the 
people with manoomin.141 My earliest memories of understanding that I am Ojibwe are linked 
directly to walking the forested hills and shallow riverbeds of the Lac Courte Oreilles reservation 
with my grandfather. My grandfather, who grew up away from the reservation and only returns 
for summer visits, still calls this aki his home. On one trip, he took me to the graveyard where 
our ancestors lay in the ground, and I remember him telling me, “This is where we come 
from.”142 For Anishinaabeg, the bones in the aki represent a living relationship with the land.143 
Aadizookaanag confirmed an ancestral right to the lands and waters of Anishinaabewaki, where 
the Ojibwe were relatively recent arrivals in the sixteenth century. 144 The Creator chose this land 
                                                                                                                                                             
these relationships nonetheless facilitated outward connections by establishing reciprocal duties. Edward Benton-
Banai, The Mishomis Book, 3; William Whipple Warren, History of the Ojibways, 45.  
140 As historian Cary Miller argues, “A society based on the need for establishing social networks of reciprocity 
likely places greater value on and defines itself in terms of its larger social units rather than its smaller parts.” Miller, 
Ogimaag, 34-35.  
141 Mitigoog literally means trees. Noopiming means in the forest. Ojibwe People’s Dictionary, ojibwe.lib.umn.edu.  
142 Conversations with the author.  
143 Peacock, Ojibwe Waasa Inaabidaa, 57.  
144 These aadizookaanag also defined place as an integral aspect of Anishinaabe identity, not an inanimate object to 
claim but as an entity with what Basil Johnston (Wasauksing First Nation) calls a “soul-spirit.” Basil Johnston, 
Ojibway Heritage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 29. The Earth forms part of a larger system that 
incorporates the land, men and women, plants, and animals into a system of reciprocity. Ojibwe land use was 
intensely personal and incorporated a wide range of economic activities—hunting, fishing, gathering wild rice, 
berries, and maple sugar—into the patterns of Ojibwe life. The seasonal pursuit of resources, etched into everyday 
language, reinforced families’ connections to particular places and brought larger groups of Anishinaabeg together 
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for them, and he led them home from their exile in the east using visions of the miigis or sacred 
shell—the same shell through which the Creator blew life into Anishinaabe the first man.145 
 Ojibweg link the preservation of Ansihinaabemowin with their very survival as a people. 
Archie Mosay, a St. Croix elder whose mother belonged to the Lac Courte Oreilles People, 
observes that with the decline of native speakers, the Ojibwe people are “losing this thing he was 
gifted with, to have a language for us to speak—Ojibwe.”146 The Creator gifted 
Anishinaabemowin, one of the foundational aspects of what makes them Ojibwe, to the People. 
Language shapes the way people see the world. It contains a people’s memories. 
Anishinaabemowin holds “the Anishinaabe connection to the past, to the earth, and to the 
future.”147 The structure of Ojibwemowin, with its abundance of animate nouns, emphasizes 
relationships. Animacy allows for the recognition that some things, like a drum or the moon, can 
house spirit and are alive.148 Thus, Ojibwemowin speakers mark their peoplehood both internally 
and externally in terms of relationships. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for ceremonies and mutual support. It also reinforced the importance of adaptability and change contained in 
migration stories and Ojibwe understandings of the living world. As communities formed and reformed with the 
seasons, Ojibweg integrated economic and political activities with the sacred history of their environment. 
145 The Ojibwe became a people through their journey to the Great Lakes. Stories told about the journey reminded 
Ojibweg of their origins as a common people even as continued migration spread them further apart. In these 
narratives, the Ojibwe began their travels with other Algonquian-speaking peoples who stayed behind at various 
stops or, like the Odawa and Potawatomi at Sault Ste. Marie, Michigan, peeled off to pursue their own interests. Out 
of the journey emerge the Ojibwe, who continued to the seventh stopping point prophesied when the migration 
began. The various partings not only differentiate them from other groups but also define relationships and alliances 
with them, in particular with the Odawa and Potawatomi who form the other two keepers of the Anishinaabe Three 
Fires alliance. Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book, 12-20; Warren, History of the Ojibways, 85; Copway, Traditional 
History, 43; Peacock, Ojibwe Waasaa Inaabidaa, 15.  
146 Archie Mosay interview with Anton Treuer, Living our Language: Ojibwe Tales and Oral Histories, edited by 
Anton Treuer (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 2001), 9.  
147 Mosay interview, Living Our Language, 5.  
148 Ojibwemowin speaker and scholar Margaret Noodin discusses how understanding the language enables one “to 
think in an Anishinaabe way, not just think about the Anishinaabeg.” Noodin, Bawaajimo: A Dialect of Dreams in 
Anishinaabe Language and Literature (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 20014), xx.  
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Anishinaabe sacred history provides meaning and instructions for the other aspects of 
Ojibwe peoplehood. For the Ojibwe, sacred history resides in aadizookaanag, or sacred stories. 
The fact that Ojibweg understand sacred history through storytelling emphasizes again the 
relational nature of their peoplehood. Anishinaabe stories are bagijiganan, or offerings. The 
intent of bagijige, the act of making an offering, is to initiate, confirm, and enrich ties to other 
people, animals, spirits, and beings. Moreover, Anishinaabemowin classifies aadizookaanag as 
animate, implying the living, creative nature of these narratives.149 Aadizookanag include more 
than ancient pasts; Anishianabe sacred history enfolds more recent events such as treaties in a 
sacred narrative that extends back to the chibimoodaywin narrative. Aadizookaanag affirm the 
relationships that define Anishianabe peoplehood. 
 Manidookewin or the ceremonial cycle, articulated in Midewiwin or Grand Medicine 
Lodge ceremonies and tied to seasonal economic activities, united the Ojibwe People. The best-
known of these ceremonies is athataion (the Feast of the Dead), two weeks of dancing, games, 
gift exchanges that ended in an eat-all feast where the living dined alongside the dead before 
their kin returned their bones to the earth.150 The primary site of athataion, 
Mooningwanekaaning-minis (Madeleine Island in Lake Superior), served as a unifying center 
not only for sacred gatherings but also for political and economic business. Even those Ojibweg 
who could not make it to Mooningwanekaaning-minis performed the same ceremonies in the 
same seasons.151 Manidookewin also occurred on a daily basis—zagaswe (burning tobacco) 
before a meal or travel, welcoming a visitor into one’s wigwam by offering them food, the 
                                                 
149 Doerfler, Sinclair, and Stark, Centering Anishinaabeg Studies, xvii-xviii.  
150 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 31-35.  
151 Peacock, Ojibwe Waasa Inaabidaa, 121.  
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exchange of gifts before diplomatic negotiations.152 Like the aadizookaanag from which they 
derived, Ojibwe ceremonies, performed in Anishinaabemowin, embodied living relationships—
with doodem, with specific places, and with the manidoo or power that comes from stories.  
 Inaawemaagan or doodem, aki, Anishinaabemowin, aadizookanag, and manidookewin 
form the living relationships that comprise the Anishinaabeg People. These relationships were 
never static, nor was Anishinaabeg peoplehood. As scholars such as John Moore and Brenda 
Child have demonstrated, change occurred before Europeans arrived on Turtle Island, and it 
continued after. The Anishinaabe chibimoodaywin narrative makes change an integral part of 
Anishinaabewi (being Anishinaabe). Like any language, Anishinaabemowin evolved to 
incorporate new experiences. Aadizookanag and manidookewin absorbed new sacred 
relationships into the relational network that comprised Anishinaabeg peoplehood, and these 
helped to form ties with western territories. Understanding sovereignty as lived relationships 
allows for flexibility and change that avoids essentializing and helps to explain how 
Anishinaabeg Peoples advanced their sovereignty between 1854 and 1954.  
Lac Courte Oreilles 
 Beginning in the 1850s, the Settler governments of Canada and the United States created 
reserves and reservations that isolated Anishinaabeg communities and sought to limit their 
movements. Reserves and reservations, however, remained a part of Anishinaabewaki. The 
evidence lies in Anishinaabemowin, which incorporated this new, fixed territorial arrangement. 
A reserve is ishkonigan, derived from iskhonan, which, as mentioned above, means to reserve or 
to save. Anishinaabe elder Harry Bone explains, “Elders told us that, gigii-mii-ishkonaamin – 
                                                 
152 Ojibwe People’s Dictionary, http://ojibwe.lib.umn.edu/word-part/zagaswe-initial, accessed Nov. 15, 2013.  
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meaning we left some part of that land for ourselves, that is what it means. Gigii-mii-
ishkonaamin—in other words, here is the land, it’s not left over and that is not what the intent 
was, set aside, we set aside for ourselves this land.”153 The Lac Courte Oreilles People in 
Wisconsin, the Turtle Mountain People in North Dakota, and the St. Peter’s People and later 
Peguis People in Manitoba experienced the Settler policies of confinement and erasure enacted 
on ishkoniganan in distinct ways, but together they illuminate Anishinaabeg peoplehood in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  
 At Lac Courte Oreilles, the People navigated repeated attempts by federal, state, and local 
officials to appropriate their lands and resources.154 After a deadly attempt at forced removal in 
the 1850s, the Ojibweg surrounding Lake Superior, including the Lac Courte Oreilles People, 
sought a treaty to protect their right to stay in their homeland. Along with inawemaagan from the 
region, the Lac Courte Oreilles People negotiated the Treaty of La Pointe in 1854 with U.S. 
officials and insisted on about a dozen reservations that protected Ojibwe villages and resources. 
When officials came to make the boundaries of the reservation, Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaa 
Akiwenzii walked around manoomin to map the border of the ishkonigan in a way that would 
allow the Ojibwe to maintain access to essential resources. In the 1880s, allotment policies 
divided ishkonigan land into individual parcels.  
 At the same time destructive, exploitative logging threatened the ishkonigan, Lac Courte 
Oreilles anokiiwin or labor in the woods on and beyond the ishkonigan inscribed the People’s 
                                                 
153 Doris Pratt, Harry Bone & the Treaty and Dakota Elders of Manitoba, with contributions by the Assembly of 
Manitoba Chiefs Council of Elders & Darren H. Courchene, Untuwe Pi Kin He—Who We Are: Treaty Elders’ 
Teachings, vol. 1 (Winnipeg: Treaty Relations Commission of Manitoba and Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, 2011).  
154 The Lac Courte Oreilles are part of a subdivision of Ojibweg known as the Lake Superior Ojibwe, which reflects 
both bureaucratic organizing and Ojibwe relational networks. The division emerged through negotiating the 1854 
Treaty of La Pointe, discussed in the first chapter. Other Lake Superior Ojibwe include Keweenaw Bay, Lac Vieux 
Desert, Red Cliff, Bad River, Lac du Flambeau, St. Croix, Mille Lacs, Sokaogon, Fond du Lac, Grand Portage, and 
Bois Forte. Kinship and ceremonial networks continue to connect the various Lake Superior Ojibwe Peoples.  
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sovereign right to access those resources. In the 1910s, the Lac Courte Oreilles experienced a 
devastating loss. The People met in zagaswe’idiwag or general councils to discuss how to protect 
their lands and resources. Despite their best efforts, they were unable to stop the state of 
Wisconsin from building a hydroelectric dam that flooded much of the ishkonigan in 1919, 
including mitigoog, wild rice, and the ancestors’ graves. Rather than destroying the People, 
however, the loss compelled Lac Courte Oreilles to continue to fight for their sovereignty. 
Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the People met in zagaswe’idiwag. Evolving leadership led to 
internal conflicts that centered on who had the right to lead, but the Lac Courte Oreilles People 
agreed that Ojibweg leadership was necessary to protect their lands and resources. In the 1930s, 
the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) again raised issues of land rights and resource access, as 
well as leadership, and the People voted to accept the IRA and its promises to reunite ishkonigan 
lands. They rejected, however, the IRA constitution, becoming one of very few Indigenous 
Peoples in the United States who accepted the IRA but not a constitution, for they preferred the 
somewhat tenuous balance leaders had worked out between zagaswe’idiwag and elected, 
Bureau-approved representatives.  
 In the 1940s and 1950s, the decentralized governance at Lac Courte Oreilles did not 
prevent the People from asserting treaty rights against an increasingly encroaching state, which 
led to conflict especially visible between state game wardens and Ojibweg exercising their treaty 
rights to hunt and fish both in the ishkonigan and on ceded lands. As termination legislation 
sought to replace Anishinaabeg sovereignty with state sovereignty, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People articulated a clear defense of treaties that affirmed the right to hunt, fish, and gather, even 
as individual Ojibweg went to jail. The Lac Courte Oreilles Peoples kept their treaties—and the 
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inherent sovereignty they represented—alive for the next generation, as the previous generations 
had done since 1854.  
Turtle Mountain 
 The Turtle Mountain People’s dibaajimowin parallels that of Lac Courte Oreilles. For 
one hundred years between the 1850s and 1950s, the Turtle Mountain People, once the vanguard 
of Anishinaabe westward expansion, fought against the near constant threat of erasure. Toward 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Turtle Mountain People, drawn onto the plains by the 
buffalo trade, controlled an expansive territory that ranged from the Red River in the east to the 
Rocky Mountains in the west. Although the 1863 Old Crossing Treaty recognized their 
expansive homeland, they avoided ceding land through the 1870s. In the 1880s, the Turtle 
Mountain People, led by hereditary ogimaag Little Shell III, sought an ishkonigan, recognizing 
that increasing Settler presence threatened their relationships with their homeland. Although the 
federal government claimed to have stopped negotiating treaties in 1871, the Turtle Mountain 
People sent delegations to Washington and succeeded in securing an ishkonigan via executive 
order. Land loss came quickly to Turtle Mountain. Unilateral moves in the the 1880s reduced the 
reservation to a mere two townships. At the same time, the Turtle Mountain People welcomed an 
influx of kin from the north, across the border that cut through their homeland. The U.S. 
government viewed these inawemaagan as foreigners and many as not truly Indian because they 
came from mixed-descent families.  
 Turtle Mountain land rights remained unsettled in the 1890s. The federal government 
sent what amounted to treaty negotiators in 1892. The treaty negotiators disparaged the mixed-
descent, transnational Turtle Mountain People as not truly Indian, and they used the overcrowded 
People’s hunger as enticement to sign the agreement. The resulting document confirmed the two 
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township ishkonigan, opened it to allotment, and also provided for allotment on the public 
domain to draw Ojibweg away from the ishkonigan. The agreement, known as the McCumber 
Agreement or the Ten Cent Treaty, raised two key, related issues, as allotment had done at Lac 
Courte Oreilles: belonging and resource access. The agreement called for a roll, and the Turtle 
Mountain People used the roll to ensure inawemaagan had access to land and resources and that 
those who lacked relationships did not jeopardize the future of the Turtle Mountain homeland.  
 When Settler officials ignored Turtle Mountain decisions, the People found ways to 
advance those relationships, making room for unenrolled kin on overcrowded allotments. The 
People also continued to access non-ishkonigan spaces and to use their labor on the mashkoden 
or prairie to support individuals and the People as a whole. In this context, a dispute about 
making hay had implications for Turtle Mountain sovereignty, as happened in the 1890s. 
Overcrowded, hungry, and struggling with the effects of land loss, the People continued to enact 
their sovereignty. Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century, they pursued a claim 
against the federal government for the coerced sale of their lands. They refused to surrender their 
sovereignty or the daily governance of the reserve to overbearing agents, and, in 1932, the Turtle 
Mountain People adopted a new Constitution, two years before the Indian Reorganization Act. 
The People rejected the IRA in its entirety, suspicious of federal legislation, but their pre-existing 
systems of governance continued to advance the People’s sovereignty. In the 1950s, the People 
faced perhaps the most serious challenge to their existence in the form of federal termination 
policy, but decades of fighting against erasure through dispersal and poverty prepared the People 
to fight. The Turtle Mountain People fought termination both on the ishkonigan and in 
Washington, and they won. 
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St. Peter’s and Peguis  
 Like the Turtle Mountain and Lac Courte Oreilles Peoples’ histories, the St. Peter’s 
People dibaajimowin tells of unbroken sovereignty. The St. Peter’s People moved northwest 
from Sault Ste. Marie, which is why they call themselves Saulteaux.155 Led by an ogimaa named 
Peguis, the St. Peter’s, later Peguis, People established themselves in an important colonial 
center along the Red River south of Lake Winnipeg. Peguis cultivated an extensive network of 
relationships that placed his People at the center of a thriving fur and buffalo trade network, 
taking advantage of their position straddling prairie and woods and connected to essential 
waterways. Peguis negotiated land access agreements with a group of Maškēkowak (Swampy 
Cree) who moved east into Anishinaabewaki and newly-arrived British Settlers under Lord 
Selkirk in 1817. The St. Peter’s People built on this history of negotiated alliances when they 
entered into Treaty One in 1871, ceding much of their homeland to Settler agricultural use while 
retaining a substantial ishkonigan on the Red River to sustain future generations of their People.  
 Although the Saulteaux knew what they had negotiated, Settler officials manipulated or 
forgot aspects of the agreement. In addition to treating the Maškēkowak as equally entitled to the 
Saulteaux ishkonigan, Dominion of Canada officials sanctioned Settlers who claimed ishkonigan 
land and resources. By the 1880s, the People relied on an elected council, frequently led by 
Peguis’s descendants and created independently of the Department of Indian Affairs. They 
protected timber, hay, and other ishkonigan resources against unauthorized use by both Settler 
and Maškēkowak. Amidst economic change in the 1880s through the 1920s, Saulteaux men and 
women remained an integral part of the Red River region, working the waters around their 
ishkonigan.  
                                                 
155 Pronounced “soh-toh.”  
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 In 1907, Settler officials colluded to force a fraudulent agreement that surrendered the 
ishkonigan in exchange for a new ishkonigan more than one hundred miles north along Lake 
Winnipeg. The Saulteaux fought the so-called surrender and won a legal victory in 1912 when a 
Royal Commission ruled the surrender invalid. The Settler legislature, however, reaffirmed the 
fraudulent agreement in 1916. The St. Peter’s People’s forced relocation, although never 
complete, exacerbated existing tensions between Saulteaux and Settlers and Saulteaux and 
Maškēkowak. In the 1930s, tensions swelled to a climax. After Saulteaux ogimaag lost a 
zagaswe’idiwag election to Maškēkowak leaders, the Saulteaux, led by an ogimaa named 
Naynahkawkanape and a gifted writer and speaker named Angus Prince, refused to transfer 
power to the newly-elected Maškēkowak. Naynahkawkanape and Prince led several dozen 
Saulteaux families back to their former ishkonigan, where they camped in the haylands they had 
long protected. The courtroom drama that followed, and the everyday anokiiwin of Saulteaux 
families within the erased boundaries of their ishkonigan, affirmed the existence of the St. 
Peter’s People despite a quarter-century of ethnic cleansing.  
 To bring together the dibaajimowinan of these three Anishinaabeg Peoples, the chapters 
in this dissertation are organized thematically. Every chapter opens with a version of the 
chibimoodaywin story, where every Anishinaabe dibaajimowin begins, retold to reflect the 
themes within the chapter.156 Each chapter explores various social, political, and economic 
relationships through which Anishinaabeg Peoples enacted their sovereignty. Internally, the 
                                                 
156 Bad River scholar Patty Loew validated my approach. As I was working on the third chapter of my dissertation, 
Loew gave the keynote address at a conference on Wisconsin history held at the University of Wisconsin-Platteville. 
Loew recounted her experiences talking with elders about their successful efforts to prevent construction of a mine 
that would have destroyed a sacred site. At first, she felt frustrated that, instead of talking about the mine, the elders 
started with the migration story and then the history of the treaties. After listening to this pattern several times, Loew 
recognized that it was all the same story. In order to talk about the mine, one had to talk about the treaties, and in 
order to talk about the treaties, one had to start long, long ago on the eastern shores of Turtle Island. 
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chapters proceed geographically, with sections that address the Lac Courte Oreilles, Turtle 
Mountain, and St. Peter’s People to organize the local dibaajimowinan. The order in which each 
People appears varies from chapter to chapter to preserve internal chronology. Although there is 
some overlap between chapters, because timelines at the three ishkoniganan do not always run 
directly parallel, each new chapter moves the narrative forward in time. Together, the chapters 
tell a dibaajimowin of dynamic, unbroken sovereignty. 
Chapter Outline  
 Chapter Two begins with Anishinaabeg understandings of treaties. During the nineteenth 
century, Anishianabeg in the United States and Canada negotiated a series of treaties that both 
ceded and reserved aki, resources, and sovereignty. The Anishinaabeg understood these treaties 
as part of a longer history of alliance-making where written documents comprised only one part 
of living relationships that protected peoplehood while also making room for new alliances to 
access resources according Anishinaabeg understandings of usufruct rights. After exploring early 
alliances and treaties, the chapter focuses on three main events: the aftermath of the Sandy Lake 
Tragedy in 1850 and the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s efforts to retain their rights to their 
homeland, culminating in the 1854 Treaty of LaPointe; the St. Peter’s People’s negotiations for 
Treaty One in 1871; and the Turtle Mountain People’s involvement in the 1863 Old Crossing 
Treaty, which ceded no land, and subsequent efforts to secure an ishkonigan, created by 
executive order in 1882. After 1854, when Anishinaabeg ceded land, they also created 
ishkoniganan. Reserves and reservations emerged not only from Settler policies forced on the 
Anishinaabeg but also out of the context of Anishinaabeg alliance making that engaged 
Anishinaabeg peoplehood.  
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 Chapter Three considers the theme of belonging between 1870 and 1900. Determining 
belonging involved more than legal definitions; it implicated kinship and other living 
relationships that granted or denied access to land and resources, increasingly contested in the 
context of Settler colonial allotment policies in the United States and Canada. At Lac Courte 
Oreilles, allotment opened the newly-created ishkonigan to exploitative logging, and the men and 
women of Lac Courte Oreilles called for an Office of Indian Affairs investigation into the theft 
of their resources. As part of the investigation, the Lac Courte Oreilles People adjusted federal 
rolls to more closely align with Ojibweg expectations of kinship, which determined access to the 
land and its resources. The Turtle Mountain People faced impending allotment when a team of 
federal negotiators, the McCumber Commission, arrived in the Turtle Mountains in 1892. The 
negotiations required that the People compile a tribal roll, which raised questions of belonging 
for mixed-descent families and those whose histories intersected the U.S.-Canadian border. The 
chapter concludes with the St. Peter’s People, focusing on chief and councillor elections in 1875 
and 1891 that threatened their right to determine resource access against the Maškēkowak People 
included in their ishkonigan’s borders.  
 Chapter Four explores Anishinaabeg anokiiwin or labor both on and beyond 
ishkoniganan. The period between 1880 and 1920 involved economic change, but Anishinaabeg 
men and women continued to pursue a variety of seasonal anokiiwin in a variety of economic 
contexts. To make sense of the many forms of anokiiwin, I focus on harvesting maple sugar and 
logging in the woods at Lac Courte Oreilles, fishing and trapping on lakes and rivers at St. 
Peter’s, and buffalo hunts and agriculture at Turtle Mountain. In all three cases, anokiiwin, 
protected by treaty relationships, served as conduit to advance Anishinaabeg sovereignty.  
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 The fifth chapter acknowledges the traumatic land loss that Anishinaabeg experienced 
between 1900 and 1920. The McCumber Agreement, derisively known as the Ten Cent Treaty 
for the one million dollars paid for ten million acres of Turtle Mountain aki, not only reduced the 
Turtle Mountain homeland to two townships but also opened the ishkonigan to allotment and 
scattered the People across the prairies in public domain allotments after 1904. The St. Peter’s 
People could not stop the theft of their ishkonigan by the Canadian government through a 
coerced land surrender agreement in 1907 that exchanged the St. Peter’s ishkonigan for a new 
reserve more than one hundred miles north near the Fisher River. The final episode in the chapter 
recounts the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s fight in the 1910s against a dam that ultimately 
flooded acres of manoomin and ancestors’ graves. Each section documents not only loss but also 
Anishinaabeg efforts to prevent that loss or repair relationships in the aftermath. The theme of 
loss does not mean defeat; the story of the Anishinaabeg People remained ongoing.  
 Chapter Six centers on the theme of leadership. In the broader context of debates about 
Indigenous leadership in the United States and Canada in the 1920s and 1930s, Anishinaabeg 
Peoples adapted leadership and governance systems along lines that sustained sovereignty. In 
response to the Ten Cent Treaty and subsequent loss of land, the Turtle Mountain Ojibweg 
organized a constitution with federal approval in 1932, two years before the IRA. The People 
voted to reject the IRA, not because the 1932 constitution settled questions of who should lead 
and how but precisely because these issues remained unsettled. The Lac Courte Oreilles People 
voted to accept the IRA in 1935 but refused to adopt a written constitution. A group of hereditary 
ogimaag challenged the elected leadership on the ishkonigan in the 1920s and 1930s. In Canada, 
where officials sought to dismember Indigenous leadership during this period, the St. Peter’s 
People’s ogimaag challenged their ethnic cleansing. In 1932, the Saulteaux lost an election to the 
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Maškēkowak. Ogimaa Naynahkawkanape refused to concede the election, which led to his arrest 
for stealing government property. Like the theme of belonging, the debates surrounding 
leadership revolved around questions of land usage and resource rights and sought answers 
through the relationships of Anishinaabeg peoplehood.  
 The dissertation ends where it began, with treaty rights and relationships. Chapter Seven 
picks up the story of Naynahkawkanape, who led a group of Saulteaux to occupy their former 
ishkonigan following the election in 1932. The Saulteaux argued their treaty rights in a series of 
court cases between 1933 and 1935 and subsequently asserted them with their anokiiwin. The 
Turtle Mountain People defended their sovereignty against termination between 1947 and 1954, 
holding the federal government to the relationships it established in nineteenth century treaties. 
The Lac Courte Oreilles People likewise faced termination policies in the 1940s and 1950s, but 
in the form of the state of Wisconsin’s efforts to wrest control. The chapter concludes by looking 
at two episodes, a confrontation between Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag and state game wardens in 
1941 and the arrest of Frank Denasha for hunting out of season. In both events, the Lac Courte 
Oreilles People articulated a dynamic sovereignty rooted in the living relationships of nineteenth 
century treaties. Anishinaabeg understandings of their treaties remained consistent from 1854 to 
1954, and the People of Lac Courte Oreilles, St. Peter’s, and Turtle Mountain relied on these 
relationships to refashion Anishinaabewaki as they advanced a dynamic vision of Anishinaabe 
sovereignty.  
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Chapter 2 
Gidaakiim Ezhi-Dibendaman Noongom:1 Negotiating Alliances and Treaties, 1854-1882 
 The Ojibwe People arrived at Mooningwanekaaning-minis (Madeline Island) nearly six 
hundred years ago after a long migration.2 When they lived far way “somewhere on the shores of 
the Great Salt Water in the East,” seven prophets visited the Ojibwe men and women to share 
their vision of the future. They told of a coming chibimoodaywin (migration). “If you do not 
move, you will be destroyed,” the First Prophet warned the People. Salvation lay to the west. The 
Ojibwe People would have to travel to a turtle-shaped island in the land where the food grows on 
water. They would draw strength from the journey. The Miigis, the sacred shell of the 
Midewiwin (Medicine Lodge), led them along their journey. The Ojibwe People travelled west, 
stopping at each of the places that the prophets foretold: the first turtle-shaped island in what is 
now the St. Lawrence River, Gichi-gakaabikaang (Niagara Falls), Wawiiantanong (Detroit), 
Manitoulin Island, Baawitigong (Sault Sainte Marie), and Wiikwedong (Fond du Lac or Spirit 
Island/Duluth). At last, the Miigis led them to Mooningwanekaaning-minis, the turtle-shaped 
island from the First Prophet’s story.3 The Creator chose this land for the Anishinaabe People. 
Manoomin, or the food that grows on water (wild rice), grew there in abundance. The island 
became the sacred gathering site for Midewiwin ceremonies. The People kept moving west, 
                                                 
1 Eric Redix translates this phrase, found in the 1864 petition by Lake Superior area ogimaag, as “your land how you 
own it now.” The ogimaag were paraphrasing what U.S. negotiators said to the Anishinaabeg regarding their land 
and rights.  
2 Ojibwe and Anishinaabe both refer to the same people, as does Chippewa. The term Anishinaabe also refers to 
three allied groups of Native Americans whose homelands are in the Great Lakes region: the Ojibwe (the Faith 
Keepers), the Ottawa (Keepers of Trade), and the Potawatomie (Keepers of the Fire). I use them interchangeably, in 
part for stylistic variation but also because the multiple names are simply another manifestation of layered 
Anishinaabe identity. In Anishinaabemowin, the Anishinaabe language, the plural of Ojibwe is Ojibweg and the 
plural of Anishinaabe is Anishinaabeg. 
3 Edward Benton-Banai, The Mishomis Book: The Voice of the Ojibway (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1988), 92-102 [quote p. 94]; Basil Johnston, Ojibway Heritage (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 1990).  
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while many more remained at various stopping points in between, and the aadizookanag centered 
in Mooningwanekaaning-minis bound the People together.  
 In 1854, Ojibwe ogimaag gathered on Mooningwanekaaning-minis to negotiate a treaty 
with the United States that would protect their sovereignty. The Anishinaabe People called on 
the United States government to honor the obligation of their alliance, laid out in more than three 
decades of treaty-making. Ogimaag came from Keeweenaw Bay on the shores of Lake Superior, 
Fond du Lac and other villages near the headwaters of the Mississippi River, and Lac du 
Flambeau and Lac Courte Oreilles from the southern woods. Ogimaag asserted that they had 
upheld their role in the alliance with the United States. “We have never shed the blood of the 
whites, killed their cattle, nor done them any injury and we are not in their way,” they declared, 
“And why is it that now we hear this order to remove? We do not understand it.”4 Several 
decades past, the Ojibwe People had formed an alliance with the United States that incorporated 
American people into their relational networks and allowed their American neighbors to share 
their land, hunt game in their woods, fish in their lakes and streams, and use the soil for their 
farms. The American settlers, however, behaved like meyaagizid (strangers), not inawemaagan 
(relatives or allies). They crowded Ojibweg from their homes, appropriated game and timber 
without reimbursing the losses, and ignored Ojibwe authority.5 In 1850, federal officials halted 
annuity payments guaranteed in earlier treaties in an attempt to force Ojibweg in Michigan, 
Wisconsin, and Minnesota to relocate to Sandy Lake, west of the Mississippi. Several hundred 
                                                 
4 Buffalo, Chiefs, and Head Men of the Chippeway Tribe of Indians of Lake Superior, “Petition to Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs Luke Lea,” Nov. 6 1852, No. 70, Archives Division, State Historical Society of Wisconsin.  
5 For a history of Ojibwe-Settler relations, see the following: Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, 
and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Rebecca 
Kugel, To Be the Main Leaders of Our People: A History of Minnesota Ojibwe Politics (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 1998); Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early 
North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012).  
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men, women, and children died as a result of this ethnic cleansing, and the Ojibwe People 
responded by calling the United States to Mooningwanekaaning-minis to restore their failing 
alliance. The 1854 treaty negotiated at the town of La Pointe on Mooningwanekaaning-minis, 
initiated by Anishinaabeg, created the first Ojibwe reservations in Anishinaabewaki and voiced 
Ojibwe sovereignty in the context of Settler policies intended to confine and erase Indigenous 
Peoples. 
 Treaties, like that at La Pointe in 1854, must be understood as more than written 
documents imposed on desperate Native peoples. That people perceive treaties as one-sided, 
foreign documents derives from the events that followed their signing. As Canadian legal scholar 
J. Edward Chamberlain argues, “We deeply discredit Aboriginal participation in the process if 
we see it as powerless, victimized, defrauded.”6 Undeniably, these treaty documents put in place 
the legal mechanisms that Settler governments ultimately used to override Indigenous 
sovereignty and control their lands and resources.7 Nevertheless, as historian Alexandra Harmon 
explains in relation to treaties in the Pacific Northwest, scholars must look beyond an “outcome-
oriented perspective on power relations.”8 She stresses the need to understand treaties in their 
local and transnational historical contexts and to tell more complicated stories. Attention to the 
                                                 
6 J. Edward Chamberlain, “Culture and Anarchy in Indian Country,” Aboriginal Treaty Rights in Canada: Essays on 
Law, Equity, and Respect for Difference, edited by Michael Asch (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 
1997), 16. 
7 Historian Michael Witgen argues, “Treaty making with the United States, however, began a process has tied 
Native political power to a land base legally situated within the sovereign territory of the American nation-state.” 
Witgen, Infinity of Nations, 355-357 [quote p. 357]. The Ojibwe, however, could not have anticipated this distortion 
of treaty negotiations. They entered into treaties as equal partners, both sides with something to give. The problem 
developed later, when Settler lawyers and politicians imposed a utilitarian view of treaties. See also Colin Calloway, 
Pen and Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty-Making in American Indian History (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2013).  
8 Alexandra Harmon, The Power of Promises: Rethinking Indian Treaties in the Pacific Northwest (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2008), 17.  
  
59 
 
Ojibwe perspective reveals that Anishinaabeg saw treaty-making as an egalitarian endeavor—
one rooted in Anishinaabe peoplehood and sovereignty.9 
 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Anishinaabe People made alliances with 
many meyaagizid. Before the arrival of Settler traders, missionaries, and military representatives, 
Anishinaabeg created and maintained alliances to initiate and stabilize a range of relationships: 
trade contracts, alliances in peace and war, and land occupancy and usage. During the fur trade, a 
renewed moment of Ojibwe westward expansion, made inawemaagan of French, British, and 
American traders. After the American Revolution, a new form of alliance making developed in 
Anishinaabewaki: treaties. Between 1785 and 1923, Ojibweg ogimaag signed more than sixty 
treaties with Settler governments, forty-two in the United States and thirty-six with Great Britain 
and, later, Canada.10 Early treaties focused on economic and military relationships. Following the 
War of 1812, both the United States and Great Britain, fueled by imperial expansion and 
confident in their power, used treaties to acquire Ojibwe land. Certainly, the Ojibwe ceded land 
to the United States in exchange for annuity payments, yet they maintained clear ideas about 
what exactly they exchanged. After 1854, Ojibwe treaties with the United States and Canada 
shared one common detail: they were not merely land cessions; they included reservations of 
land and resource rights. The Lac Courte Oreilles, Turtle Mountain, and St. Peter’s Peoples made 
treaties to protect their peoplehood, incorporating treaty-making and reserves and reservations 
into their strategies for sovereignty. Anishinaabeg Peoples shaped reserve and reservation policy 
as they negotiated agreements that protected relationships with land, kin, language, sacred 
history, and ceremonial cycles.  
                                                 
9 Chamberlain, “Culture and Anarchy,” 16-18.  
10 Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights, 168; B. Chamberlin, editor, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, from 1680-1890, vol. 
1-3 (Toronto: Coles Publication Company, 1971).  
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 “The Perpetuity of Our Nation”: Alliances and Treaties in Western Anishinaabewaki 
 In the early eighteenth century, pushed by their prophetic chibimoodaywin and pulled by 
the Atlantic World’s fur trade, the Anishinaabeg People incorporated new places as they 
expanded west from Mooningwanekaaning-minis. Risking conflict with the Dakota who also 
lived in the region, several Ojibwe families belonging to the Makwa (Bear) Doodem hunted near 
a large lake at the head of Anishinaabe-ziibi (Chippewa River) in the hilly, wooded region to the 
south of Mooningwanekaaning-minis. Earlier hunters had named the lake Odawasagaegun after 
finding and burying the dead body of an Odawa man on its eastern shore.11 In 1741, when the 
French governor in Montreal lifted a fur trade moratorium, the Makwa Doodem hunters hoped to 
fill their canoes with fur.12 An Anishinaabe child died while the families wintered by the lake, 
and they buried the child in woods near the water. Their young kin’s bones in the ground bound 
the families to the place, which they made their home. In the summer of 1750, Odawasagaegun 
hosted its first Midewiwin ceremony. Each spring, the families traveled to 
Mooningwanekaaning-minis to trade fur, interacting with other Anishianabeg around Lake 
Superior, and the muskets that they received in return helped to make the isolated outpost secure 
against Fox and Dakota who hunted within the contested edges of Anishinaabewaki.13  
 As Anishinaabeg such as the families who settled at Odawasagaegun pushed west, they 
created alliances with the people whom they met. Along the Ojibwe’s initial chibimoodaywin 
detailed in their creation story, for instance, the Ojibwe encountered an unnamed people. After a 
long and protracted war, the Ojibwe People adopted the group’s surviving members rather than 
                                                 
11 Rick St. Germaine, “Odawasagaegun: A Brief History of Lac Courte Oreilles”; Spirit of the Ojibwe: Images of 
Lac Courte Oreilles Elders, edited by Sara Balbin, James R. Bailey, and Thelma Nayquonabe (Duluth: Holy Cow! 
Press, 2012), 190.  
12 St. Germaine, “Odawasagaegun,” 190.  
13 Warren, History of the Ojibwe People, 131; St. Germaine, “Odawasagaegun,” 190-191.  
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exterminate them.14 The Ojibwe continued to use similar strategies as they encountered 
meyaagizid in the west. Anishinaabeg used marriage to solidify peace between themselves and 
the Dakota, one time so frequent that “to some extent they learned to speak each other’s 
language.”15 Such connections ultimately led to the Ojibwe integrating Dakota drums into their 
ceremonies and dances.16 William Warren, a nineteenth-century Ojibwe scholar and politician 
born at Mooningwanekaning-minis, recounted an incident involving a Dakota warrior, whom the 
Ojibwe captured and then adopted “as a relative.” The Dakota captive fit so naturally within the 
kinship network that “blood was nearly shed on his account” when members of another band 
murdered him. After protracted negotiations with the murderer’s kin, the family accepted gifts to 
cover their loss.17 The kinship system incorporated other peoples. Ojibwe set the terms for 
membership within the People, remaining fluid and adaptable but also forming boundaries 
between themselves and others. These relationships formed the foundation of Ojibwe alliances 
and treaty making. 
 At the most fundamental level, Anishinaabeg alliances like those described above were 
human relationships, a way of turning meyaagizid (strangers) into inawemaagan (relatives). 
These alliances, embedded in Anishinaabeg peoplehood, were egalitarian and based on 
expectations of proper behavior such as reciprocity. These relationships enabled the shared 
access of land and resources, one of the primary reasons to form alliances. Kinship ties 
facilitated international alliances. The Ojibwe cast interactions with the Odawa and Potawatomi, 
for example, in relational terms. The Ojibwe People were the older brothers, the Odawa People 
                                                 
14 Warren, History of the Ojibway People, 44.  
15 Copway, Traditional History, 165. 
16 Treuer, Living Our Language, 27. 
17 Warren, History of the Ojibwe People, 179.  
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the middle, and the Potawatomi People the younger brothers.18 The relationship between brothers 
was equitable, although younger brothers were expected to show some deference to older 
brothers according to Anishinaabeg understandings of age.19 Resource access depended on the 
obligations of inawemaagan, which extended across borders.20 
 As with reciprocity and kinship, trade relationships defined Anishinaabe alliances. 
Seasonal economic activities provided the basis of Ojibwe trading patterns. While Native 
villages such as La Pointe already functioned as trading centers among Indians, Ojibwe families 
incorporated visits to Settler trading posts into their rounds, stopping in late fall to trade for 
goods and in spring to bring the furs and meat from their winter hunts.21 Posts established on the 
Mississippi and at interior lakes, including Lac Courte Oreilles, served as smaller centers.22 The 
strength of Anishinaabe peoplehood, as well as the flexibility and mobility that allowed them to 
maintain it over thousands of miles of territory, meant that, in the nineteenth century, the Ojibwe 
encountered the settler colonialism of the British and American empires on equal footing. 
By 1800, the village of Odawasagaegun became an important fur trade post. The name, 
which may have referred to a dead Odawa, also meant trader’s lake. The French called it Lac 
Courte Oreilles. It was a good place, one that would share with the People if they took care of the 
aki. The woods contained abundant wiigwaasaatigoog (birch trees) to build their wigwams, 
ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog (maple trees) for sugar, and waawaashkeshiwag (deer) and other 
animals for hunting. Along the Anishinaabe-ziibi and the many marshes and lakes—Odaawaa-
                                                 
18 Phil Bellfy, Three Fires Unity: The Anishinaabeg of the Lake Huron Borderlands (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2011).   
19 Kugel, To Be the Main Leaders of Our People; Cary Miller, Ogimaag.  
20 Stark, “Marked by Fire,” 134.  
21 Peers, Ojibwa of Western Canada: 174; Warren, History of the Ojibway People; Copway, Traditional History; 
Carver.  
22 Warren, History of the Ojibwe People, 192.  
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zaaga’igan, Gaa-zhiigwanaabiko-zaaga’igan (Grindstone Lake), Ashigani-zaaga’igan (Bass 
Lake), Waawiyegamaag (Round Lake)—the Lac Courte Oreilles People had manoomin beds, 
giigoonyag (fish), and a convenient travel route through Anishinaabewaki, especially useful for 
trading.  
The North American fur trade required a host of new relationships.23 The fur trade, part 
of an expanding trans-Atlantic economic network, connected Indigenous and Settler geographies, 
politics, and economies in the Great Lakes region as early as the sixteenth century.24 Contests for 
power within the trade fueled both Anishinaabe expansion and Settler colonial empire-building, 
and the lucrative exchange depended on a complex network of relationships rooted in 
Anishinaabe peoplehood. Anishinaabeg naturalized European newcomers by incorporating them 
into kinship networks. Ojibwe women who married French traders formed similar alliances, 
incorporating the French into a nexus of kin relationships that encouraged reciprocity and 
facilitated trade.25 Additionally, the fur trade facilitated marriages between Ojibwe women and 
French traders, which in turn gave these women and their families’ greater mobility and 
connected them to a broader Anishinaabe alliance network. Individuals in these blended families 
could then use Anisinaabeg networks to promote the interests of the Ojibwe People. For instance, 
                                                 
23 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ojibweg played a central role in the development of the fur 
trade, in particular with the French but also later with British and American traders. The Ojibwe initially 
incorporated French traders into Ojibwe peoplehood. French traders married Ojibwe women according to Ojibwe 
customs, spoke Ojibwemowin, participated in ceremonies to create ties, and abided by Anishinaabeg land and 
resource protocols. Some of these marriages provided the foundation of Metis and Michif mixed-descent Peoples. 
Additionally, the fur trade fueled Ojibwe expansion and brought westward-moving Ojibwe into conflict with Dakota 
neighbors. The Red River functioned as a main pathway for the trade, and westward-moving Ojibweg incorporated 
buffalo into trading patterns. For a history of the Great Lakes area trade, see Child, Holding Our World Together, 
31-80. For the western trade, see Peers, Ojibwa of Western Canada, 11-14, 32-40. For a history of Ojibwe-
descended Metis, see Chris Andersen, Metis: Race, Recognition, and the Struggle for Indigenous Peoplehood 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2014).  
24 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations, 11-12, 127.  
25 Susan Sleeper-Smith, editor, Rethinking the Fur Trade: Cultures of Exchange in an Atlantic World (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2009).  
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throughout the nineteenth century, William Warren, the product of a fur trade marriage, used his 
connections to the network of social relationships to travel throughout Anishinaabewaki to 
strengthen and secure Ojibwe alliances with Settler governments.26 
 After the American Revolution, the Ojibweg created a new set of relationships and 
alliances. Amidst their expansion, the Ojibweg encountered a young United States, economically 
weak and desperate to protect itself against Great Britain. Forming alliances offered economic 
opportunities and stability to both growing nations. The United States, however, desired access 
to land, which it hoped to obtain via treaties.27 Treaties satisfied several Settler colonial goals. 
First, these documents located authority to deal with Indian peoples in the federal government, 
which contributed to nation building by diminishing the role of individual states.28 Treaties also 
asserted the power of one Settler nation in relation to other nations, claiming territory and 
authority through an internationally recognized process. Additionally, treaties satisfied 
ideological impulses. In the United States, General Henry Knox, Secretary of War under 
                                                 
26 Settler governments intended traders to perform some of the earliest work of reservation policy. In 1795, the 
United States created the factory system, in which Congress established trading houses throughout the western lands 
it hoped to hold. Government-appointed traders offered “what were supposed to be quality foods at fair prices.” 
More importantly, officials believed that trade would reduce Native dependence on hunting, thereby reducing their 
need for land. If that failed, argued Thomas Jefferson, trading posts would at least encourage a cycle of debt and 
dependency that would force Indians to sell their lands. The Hudson Bay Company played a similar role in the 
Canadian Northwest at the behest of the British and affected Native peoples more directly than the distant imperial 
government. Apart from trade, the Hudson Bay Company’s responsibilities included selling land to Settler 
newcomers and developing the infrastructure necessary to exploit local resources. HBC officials, although 
dependent on Native labor, sought to confine Indigenous populations through land cessions and cycles of debt. 
Government-sponsored traders facilitated peaceful, economical expansion. See Nichols, Indians in the United States 
and Canada, 75; Cole Harris, “How did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire,” Annals of 
the Association of American Geographers 94:1 (March 2004): 165-182; Rockwell, Indian Affairs,  and the 
Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 94-102. 
27 After unsuccessfully attempting to use military force to evict Indigenous Peoples between 1783 and 1786, the 
United States returned to the previous British policy of treaty making, coupled with a push for assimilation. 
Reginald Horsman, Expansion and American Indian Policy, 1783-1812 (Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
1968).  
28 The federal or Crown governments in the United States and Canada assumed responsibility for Indian affairs, 
rather than states or provinces, in part because the treaty process recognized Indigenous Peoples as sovereign 
nations. Chief Justice Marshall explains this reasoning in Worcester v. Georgia.  
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President George Washington, promoted the concept of “expansion with honor.” He and other 
American leaders saw expansion as inevitable and necessary, and treaties offered a diplomatic 
means to fulfill the young republic’s goals that appeared most in line with the new nation’s self-
identification as a bastion of justice and liberty.29 
 After 1812, new forces impinged on Ojibwe alliance making. The peace between the 
United States and Great Britain following the War of 1812 diminished opportunities for the 
strategic alliances while emphasizing the Settler border that cut through Anishinaabewaki.30 
Furthermore, the rapid arrival of Settlers in the Great Lakes region after the War of 1812 
accelerated Settler encroachment on Ojibwe lands, resources, and authority.31 Between 1815 and 
1865, the United States population increased from 7.5 million to 30 million.32 The western 
frontier, which included the Ojibwe homeland, attracted many of these settlers. Between 1837 
and 1848, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota all achieved statehood. Rather than to secure 
economic ties with Indian nations or stanch military alliances with Great Britain, the United 
States now saw treaties as a way in which to acquire Indigenous land and economic resources.  
 The Anishinaabe People incorporated treaty making into existing ceremonies and 
procedures for forming alliances. According to Ojibwe scholar Heidi Kiiwetinepinesiik Stark, 
Anishinaabe diplomacy “was carried out through the stories told, the customs practiced, and the 
                                                 
29 Hoxie, “Why Treaties?” 90-92; Rosier, Serving Their Country, 4.  
30 Richard White marks the shift in power in the Great Lakes region following the War of 1812. Middle Ground, 
517. Similarly, historian Mark Zuehlke argues that, while the War of 1812 minimally impacted the United States 
and Great Britain, it reduced opportunities for alliances between Native Americans and Settlers. Mark Zuehlke, For 
Honour’s Sake: The War of 1812 and the Brokering of an Uneasy Peace (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2006). 
Historian Alan Taylor argues that the War of 1812 solidified the United States’ northern border, as well as 
generating what Taylor calls a “new ‘Canadian’ identity.” Both legacies fueled Settler nation-building and hunger 
for Native lands. Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, and Indian 
Allies (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 171, 439.  
31 C. Joseph Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths to Allotment: The Fight over Federal Indian Policy after the Civil War 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014); Rockwell, Indian Affairs.  
32 Nichols, Indians in the United States and Canada, 175.  
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commitments filled.”33 For Ojibweg, written treaty documents represented merely one aspect of 
an agreement. Anishinaabeg emphasized the ceremonies and gift-giving that preceded 
negotiations, which replicated the reciprocity that Ojibweg expected, as well as the oral 
arbitrations that led up to the written documents. In the nineteenth century, Ojibweg saw, and 
still see, treaties as government-to-government agreements derived from Anishinaabe 
sovereignty. Settler governments often chose to ignore Ojibwe understandings of these 
relationships, but records of oral discussions and even the written documents themselves 
preserved the Anishinaabeg perspectives that shaped negotiations.34 Ojibweg understood treaty 
making as an active process that formed part of broader systems of relationships entangled with 
their peoplehood, including daily encounters, reciprocal duties, resource access, and 
negotiations.  
 Anishinaabeg entered into post-War of 1812 treaties to address their territorial, economic, 
and military concerns of alliances. Westward-moving Ojibweg expanded into a contested 
borderland that also served as a stage for United States and British imperial ambitions. In 1825, 
when ogimaag from various Ojibweg Peoples met with United States and neighboring 
Indigenous Peoples at Prairie du Chien, a trading post on the Mississippi River in modern-day 
Wisconsin, to clarify their western boundaries, Ojibweg and U.S. representatives had diverging 
purposes.35 The United States hoped to increase the legibility of Indigenous Peoples in what it 
                                                 
33 Stark, “Marked by Fire,” 122.  
34 Red Lake scholar Brenda Child, for example, noted, “Even as the United States grew in power, diplomacy with 
indigenous social formations was maintained through the treaty process, which recognized the self-government and 
inherent sovereignty of the Ojibwe.” Child, Holding Our World Together, 50. 
35 For an understanding of United States Settler perspectives, see Frederick Hoxie, “Why Treaties?”, Buried Roots 
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saw as the United States’ western frontier, while the Ojibweg hoped to secure their own western 
borders. In the 1825 Prairie du Chien treaty, Anishinaabeg ogimaag addressed relationships with 
their neighbors while resisting United States’ attempts to bind their peoplehood. The Indigenous 
Peoples thwarted United States hopes reducing the complex network of kin, alliances, and 
resources to legible map lines.36 Ogimaag reported the boundaries of their territorial rights. St. 
Croix ogimaa Pee-a-guck presented a map drawn on wiigwas (birch bark) to illustrate the lands 
to which he possessed access rights. The 1825 treaty ceded no lands to the United States. Instead, 
Ojibweg laid out their relationships with both inawemaagan and meyaagizid. Negotiations 
confirmed that kinship ties with the Menominee allowed each people to hunt in the other’s 
territory. Grizzly Bear, a Menominee leader, said that his People’s land was “so small that we 
can’t turn round without touching our neighbors.” He acknowledged that the Ojibwe could stop 
the Menominee from hunting in Anishinaabewaki, but they “do not restrain us from doing so.”37 
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In contrast, the lack of relationships with the Dakota People frequently led to conflict.38 An 
Ojibwe ogimaa identified in the treaty documents simply as The Wind warned that “giving it [the 
land] to our enemies may make new disturbances and breed new wars.”39 From an Ojibwe 
perspective, treaties could not simply redraw boundary lines. Access to territory depended on 
relationships, and determining who possessed those rights remained an important function of 
peoplehood. Ogimaag used the 1825 treaty to demarcate the relationships that gave people access 
to resources in Anishinaabewaki, relationships that had nothing to do with Settler colonial goals. 
Between 1808 and 1867, the Anishinaabe ceded all but a few thousand acres to the 
United States while protecting and preserving essential resources. Anishinaabeg understood “to 
cede” differently than Settlers. Ojibweg in Wisconsin and Minnesota agreed to allow Settlers to 
access Anishinaabewaki’s resources but did not sell the land. In 1837, ogimaag signed the White 
Pine or Pine Tree Treaty, which granted the United States timber rights in central Wisconsin and 
Minnesota. The 1842 Copper Treaty, concerning lands north of the 1837 boundaries, opened the 
rich copper deposits along Lake Superior to Settler mining. Ogimaag understood these treaties as 
agreeing to grant access to certain resources—white pine trees and copper—while protecting 
Anishinaabe homelands and sovereignty. Leading up to the 1837 treaty, ogimaag told federal 
officials that they would lease timberlands to white “friends,” as they had done on a smaller scale 
to allow the husbands of Ojibwe women to log and operate sawmills.40 Throughout the 
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negotiations, the Ojibweg remained adamant that they intended to stay on their lands. Leech 
Lake ogimaa Magegawbaw (La Trappe) laid a mitigomizh (oak) leaf over the map that outlined 
the proposed cessions, distinguishing it from the zhingwaak (pine) that the Settlers wanted. With 
this gesture, he signaled that the treaty concerned only the zhingwaak. He explained 
Anishinaabeg intent, “We wish to hold on to a tree where we get our living, and to reserve the 
streams where we drink the waters that give us life.”41 Settler officials interpreted this expression 
of rights as retaining the “privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice,” which 
Magegawbaw and other ogimaag undoubtedly intended to reserve. By insisting on hunting and 
harvesting rights, Ojiweg , perceived treaty making via the matrix of their peoplehood. The 
Ojibwe informed United States officials of the inviolable relationships that Anishinaabeg 
possessed with the land the United States tried to claim. These relationships comprised their 
peoplehood, and the ogimaag reminded the United States of that fact. “You know we can not 
[sic] live, deprived of our Lakes and Rivers….The Great Spirit above, made the Earth, and 
causes it to produce, which enables us to live,” explained Eshkibagikoozhe, or Flat Mouth, 
another Leech Lake ogimaa.42  
 Before Congress ratified the 1842 treaty, an ogimaa from Lac Courte Oreilles named 
Martin wrote to Washington to correct claims that he had agreed to cede his People’s land. While 
negotiating the treaty, he insisted, Settler officials had promised that the Ojibwe would be 
“permitted to live on the land as long as we behaved well and are peaceable with our grand father 
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[sic] and his white children.”43 Martin positioned the agreement as relational, dependent upon the 
active and reciprocal ties between kin, and compatible with flexible Anishinaabeg land tenure 
practices. Akiwenziii, a young ogimaa from Lac Courte Oreilles, saw these treaties as leasing 
timber and mineral rights, not ceding land. The Ojibwe People did not “sell” the land; they 
offered it (ninganibagidinamawaa), as they reminded the United States in an Ojibwe-language 
petition several decades later.44 The Ojibwe People “reserve the root of the tree,” asserting that 
Ojibweg retained the rights to the land in which these roots grew.45 Adhering to Ojibwe 
understandings of relational resource rights, ogimaag negotiated treaties to protect their 
peoplehood.  
 In the 1830s and 1840s, Ojibweg emphasized the promises made by American officials at 
treaty conferences. One female elder admonished the United States for failing to honor its 
obligations. “My Father,” she began, “truly I am poor, your Children the Chippewas are poor. At 
the time when the English People were supporting me I had plenty to wear; but when you made 
your appearance you who are called ‘Big Knives’ and come among us, you told me that you 
would support me, that I would not be poor, that I would be better off than I had been with the 
English. I am now a good deal poorer than I was then. You have made me a great many promises 
which you have not fulfilled.”46 The unnamed woman chastised the United States government’s 
seeming inability to behave as proper allies—their failure to honor reciprocal obligations—
which she strategically compared to the behavior of British allies. Moreover, in an 1864 petition 
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that expressed Ojibwe understandings of what they had agreed to in 1837 and 1842, ogimaag 
insisted that the agreement they negotiated allowed access to territory but did not sunder Ojibwe 
access to the land and its resources. They admonished, “[Y]ou may not destroy the Rice in 
working the timber. Also the Rapids and Falls in the Streams I will lend you to saw your timber, 
also a small tract of land to make a garden to live on while you are working the timber. I do not 
make you a present of this, I merely lend it to you.”47 Annuities fit into these relational 
agreements. Ogimaag saw the grant of timber rights as “an exchange of civility” to which the 
conceded “out of respect” for their relationships with the United States. In return for the lease, 
the United States owed annuities and other gifts to the Anishinaabeg People.48 Ojibweg might 
sell land, but they understood treaties as preserving a mutual land use policy, not an absolute 
surrender. Throughout the petition, the ogimaag rarely referenced the written documents. They 
emphasized the relationships that constituted the treaties—the preceding negotiations and 
subsequent behavior in carrying out the agreed-upon terms of alliance. For the Ojibwe People, 
treaties represented relationships between sovereign Peoples. 
 At the same time Ojibweg reminded Americans of their reciprocal obligations, the United 
States pursued a federal policy of assimilating and relocating Indigenous Peoples, approaches 
that threatened the bonds of kinship, language, sacred history, ceremonial cycles, and land.49 
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Most Settlers saw these policies as the “humanitarian” alternative to outright physical 
extermination.50 The end goal, however, remained to destroy Indian peoples as distinct—and 
inherently sovereign—groups in order to facilitate Settler expansion. Reservation policies, a 
form of Settler colonialism directed at both external and internal sovereignty, began long before 
the first neatly-bounded reserve appeared on a map.51 The process started small and 
inconspicuously, driven by the desire for Native land and resources. Settler colonialism sought to 
remove Native peoples and replace them with a Settler population. This form of expansion left 
no room for Native peoples’ continued existence.52 
 The Ojibwe Peoples who moved into western Anishinaabewaki imposed what they 
expected about reciprocity onto potential alliances with Settler representatives. For instance, in 
the 1830s, the men and women living at Ozaawaagamig or Yellow Lake, north of the Mississippi 
in what is now Wisconsin, negotiated alliances with missionaries. Two dozen or so Pembina 
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families lived at Ozaawaagamig. The Pembina or Aniibiminani-ziibiwininiwag had moved south 
from a trading center on the Red River. They built their wigwams in the borderlands between 
Anishinaabe and Dakota territory, risking conflict to access seasonal resources such as game and 
berries that abounded in the dense woods south of Lake Superior. In 1832, these Ojibwe families 
allowed Presbyterian missionary Frederick Ayer to settle at Ozaawaagaming. Ayer, the son of a 
Presbyterian minister from Pennsylvania, worked as a teacher at the mission school on Mackinac 
Island, where he met his wife Elizabeth, before joining the American Board of Commissioners 
for Foreign Missions.53 Funded by the War Department, Ayer served as an agent of the federal 
government’s civilizing mission, which facilitated the overarching goal of expansion. Through 
secular education, religious instruction, and sedentary farming, both the United States and 
Canada hoped to convert Indians into the mass of Settlers. In 1817, the federal government 
collaborated with the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, a Presbyterian 
organization, to establish missions among the tribes in the western Great Lakes. As Indian Agent 
Henry R. Schoolcraft wrote, “I am quite satisfied that their political, may result from their moral 
melioration.”54 The Presbyterian ministers worked closely with the federal government, 
receiving funds and reporting on their Native targets’ progress, throughout the nineteenth 
century.55 However, Ojibwe power defined and constrained their alliance.  
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In the early nineteenth century, Anishinaabeg often allowed missionaries to settle in their 
communities as representatives of Settler society.56 The Anishinaabe treated missionaries as 
potential allies, allowing them to plant gardens in Ojibwe soil, hunt in their forests, and interact 
peaceably with Ojibwe communities. As a gesture of goodwill, some Ojibweg allowed their 
children to attend the missionaries’ schools. In return, they expected missionaries and other 
Settlers to behave like inawemaagan, which meant meeting their mutual obligations. Ojibwe men 
and women expected the exchange of gifts that accompanied peaceful relationships, and they 
anticipated that their new allies would respect their continued autonomy. When Settlers intruded 
on Ojibwe autonomy or withheld resources that inawemaagan ought to have shared, Ojibwe men 
and women tried to shame their fumbling allies into proper behavior. If that failed, they 
sometimes resorted to theft to enforce reciprocity.57 
Despite missionaries’ hopes to transform Ojibweg people into sedentary farmers, Ojibwe 
men and women defied assimilation efforts. Ayer wrote that the Ojibweg from Ozaawaagamig 
were “almost constantly moving from place to place and are much scattered over considerable 
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territory.”58 Ojibwe families moved away from their settlement at Ozaawaagamig in the spring 
for maple sugaring, back to the village to “cultivate small gardens in the summer,” away again to 
gather manoomin in the fall and in the winter to hunt. Likewise, Pokegama and Red Lake, also 
Pembina communities, displayed similar patterns of movement. In 1848, after two land cession 
treaties and several decades of missionary presence, Ojibweg from Red Lake continued to “go 
and visit [their family at Pokegama and Red River] and are absent two or three months in the 
summer and frequently all winter. Another portion of the Band (the men) go three or four times a 
year to a Trading Post on the Mississippi 6 days [sic] they encountered Major Woods’ expedition 
while on the plains hunting buffalo and fighting the Dakota with their kin.”59 Ojibweg also 
incorporated travel to claim the annuity payments that they negotiated at early treaties into their 
seasonal economic movements, naturalizing the processes of confinement pressed by Settler 
reservation policies.60 
 Continued mobility allowed the Pembina and Pillager People to approach the potential 
alliance with Ayer and other Presbyterian missionaries from a position of strength. Shortly after 
Ayer’s arrival, the families gathered for “a Medicine Dance and Feast at which there were about 
35 men.” The ceremony served not only a religious purpose but a political one as well. Ayer 
complained that, after the dance, the attitude of the Yellow Lake Ojibwe changed significantly. 
The men used the time for “consultation and delivering speeches on the subject of our coming 
among them.” Afterwards, the man he considered his strongest supporter, whom he identified as 
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Maiians, joined in a show of solidarity with his people.61 In 1834, Maiians told him, “You must 
go—you shall go.”62 The band remained opposed to Ayer’s presence, ultimately convincing him 
to relocate. These gatherings reinforced broad connections in a landscape increasingly marked by 
Settlers’ borders. The U.S. asserted state and national boundaries alongside treaty cessions. The 
mobility that emerged from Ayer’s letters suggests that the Anishinaabe continued to define the 
bounds of their own People.  
  Anishinaabeg interacted with missionaries according to Anishinaabe understandings of 
alliances. When Ayer built his mission, he had to obtain permission from the local Ojibweg. In 
the 1830s Maiians, a Yellow Lake band leader, told Ayer, “If this room were filled with goods 
and you were to offer them all in exchange for our land, we wouldn’t sell it. It is ours and our 
childrens [sic]! This is all we have. We love it; nor will we ever give it up or sell it, for where 
would our children play?”63 Rather, the local Ojibwe would only grant Ayer temporary rights 
that covered his house and field but little else. The pattern repeated itself at Pokegama and Red 
Lake, where Ayer moved to avoid the “hostility and indifference” of the previous band of 
Ojibweg—likely a sign that he failed to display the reciprocity that Ojibweg expected to 
maintain good relationships.64 Like the Red River bands to the north, the Pillagers and Pembina 
expected frequent gifts for the use of their land. Even after Ayer provided flour, seeds, and tools, 
“still they [the Ojibwe] often advised him of his great obligations to them for his privileges.”65 If 
he did not comply, the Ojibwe promised to remove him. Ayer and his colleagues saw themselves 
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as extending American institutions into the wilderness, but through the 1850s they remained in 
Anishinaabewaki, and the Ojibwe selectively entered into alliances by controlling access to aki 
and resources.  
 Ayer, however, refused to honor the reciprocal obligations of inawemaagan. Underlying 
his religious efforts, he filled the role of expanding American interests. He asked for more and 
more land, and rather than offer additional supplies in exchange, he most ungenerously chose to 
withhold them until the Ojibwe complied with his demands. When several men and women 
showed up at his house in Yellow Lake in 1834, frightening his wife and confiscating supplies, 
the Ojibweg acted not as belligerents but as allies demanding that Ayer recognize their 
relationships.66 Indeed, they resisted Ayer’s presence at Yellow Lake so strongly that, in 1836, 
Ayer believed he had no choice but to relocate to Pokegama.67 At Pokegama in 1840, he 
promised to provide local Pembina with a farmer and a blacksmith in exchange for his use of 
their land. When he sent both workers to a different mission, the Pembina informed him that he 
had violated their alliance. To demonstrate their displeasure with their ally, they withdrew their 
children from school.68 
 The Pembina and Pillager at Pokegama and Yellow Lake people fulfilled their 
obligations toward Ayer. The Ozaawaagamig community consented to send their students to 
school as a sign of their willingness to form a mutually beneficial relationship with their new 
American neighbors. However, they incorporated school into their seasonal rounds, 
demonstrating that entering an alliance did not surrender their autonomy. In the ziigwan (spring), 
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maple sugar camps drained so many people that Ayer closed his school entirely. During the 
summer, however, Ojibweg eagerly accepted seeds and hoes from the mission to plant their 
gardens—gardens that Ojibwe women had planted for generations. The Ojibwe understood 
agricultural supplies as gifts that demonstrated that the missionary fulfilled his reciprocal 
responsibilities. At Ozaawaagamig, Ojibwe women continued to plant potatoes, beans, squash, 
and other vegetables in the early summer, often leaving for weeks at a time to pick berries and 
attend ceremonies.69 Men, meanwhile, reluctantly converted to agricultural labor, reaffirming 
Ojibwe gender roles and subsistence practices that derived from creation stories. Their refusal to 
conform to Ayer’s image of proper farmers frustrated the missionary, but the mutual obligations 
that came with accepting his gifts of seeds and tools did not include total obedience. In entering 
alliances with missionaries like Ayer, the Ojibwe People maintained their autonomy.   
 Beginning in the late 1840s, treaty-making facilitated a shift in Settler policy from 
external to internal attacks on Indigenous sovereignty. Historian John Wunder defines the 
differences in Settler policy as “Old Colonialism” and “New Colonialism.” While “Old 
Colonialsm” focused on “the physical acquisition of valuable western and southern lands and the 
physical subjugation of its people,” “New Colonialism” launched a broad assault on “every 
aspect of Native American life” from religion to economy to political structures.70 From a United 
States perspective, the reservation system furthered the goals of undermining Native Peoples’ 
autonomy and facilitating Settler expansion. The reservation provided a space to isolate and 
ultimately erase Indigenous Peoples. In order to accomplish this goal, both governments had first 
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to dissolve community ties and deny the inherent sovereignty that facilitated Native Peoples’ 
defiance. Particularly in the Great Lakes region, where the United States and Great Britain 
struggled to assert their own visions of themselves as nation-states, Indian autonomy threatened 
colonial interests. As a result, Settler policies often targeted the foundations of Anishinaabe 
peoplehood.71 Removal, containment, and assimilation policies sought to undermine Anishinaabe 
sovereignty. Treaty making, with an emphasis on land cessions, seemed like a convenient tool to 
expedite this process.  
 Nineteenth-century treaties almost always orchestrated cessions that confined Native 
Peoples to ever-smaller land bases. The United States employed annuities to secure land 
cessions. From the perspective of Settler treaty-writers, annuities provided an entry into internal 
tribal workings and a tool to socially, politically, and economically confine Indigenous Peoples, 
which characterized reservation policies. While Anishianabeg saw annuities as part of active, 
reciprocal relationships, Settlers interpreted them as transactions to secure absolute rights to the 
land. Annuities reduced the upfront costs of land sales. Settler officials hoped annuities would 
replace off-reservation resource gathering and confine Anishinaabe within treaty-limited 
boundaries. Yet, Anishinaabe people continued to move through their homeland and assert 
peoplehood.  
Along with annuities came civilization initiatives. After twenty years of payments, the 
Office of Indian Affairs believed that the Ojibwe and other Peoples would be “above the 
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necessities which the annuity system is desired to submit.”72 In other words, they would achieve 
self-sufficiency. The federal government sent more missionaries and teachers to reserves and 
reservations, as well as farmers, blacksmiths, and carpenters. These services intended to 
transform First Nations people into sedentary, English-speaking farmers with no claim on the 
land stronger than a fee simple patent. These goals targeted Ojibwe peoplehood. That the United 
States expected Native people to fade away is evident from phrases like that included in the 1837 
treaty with the Ojibwe, which reserved “[t]he privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the 
wild rice” on ceded territory “during the pleasure of the President.”73 The Ojibwe possessed a 
different understanding of these agreements based on a more fluid concept of resource rights 
rooted in relationships, but from the federal government’s perspective, dealing with Native 
peoples as independent nations was a temporary inconvenience.  
In the 1850s, as the alliance between the United States and the Anishinaabe People 
frayed, Anishinaabe men and women, including those at Odawasagaegun, continued to move 
throughout their homeland and assert their peoplehood. As they expanded, the Ojibwe People 
maintained close connections with Mooningwanekaaning-minis. This island, the place to which 
Gitchi Manitou led them at the end of their chibimoodaywin, was the primary site for Midewiwin 
ceremonies. The Ojibwe from Odawasagaegun (Lac Courte Oreilles) traveled there several times 
a year for ceremonies and trade. George Copway remembered a visit in 1836 where he saw the 
Lac Courte Oreilles and others from Sandy Lake and Lac du Flambeau engaged in a ball game. 
While the bands of Ojibwe playing against one another might seem to drive each other apart, 
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after the day’s game, the players “parted company, in good humor, and mingled with the 
crowd.”74 These games served as opening ceremonies for religious, economic, and political 
gatherings.75 When Ojibweg like those from Lac Courte Oreilles came to La Pointe, they came to 
participate in a stronghold of sovereignty built on relationships with place, kin, sacred history, 
and ceremonies. In 1850, the federal government tried to sunder those ties by moving annuity 
payments from La Pointe to Sandy Lake.  
  In the mid-nineteenth century, federal and local officials decided that the gatherings at La 
Pointe interfered with the goals of Settler colonialism. Minnesota Territory governor Alexander 
Ramsey, intent on enforcing the boundaries of a Territory in which he invested political and 
financial capital, convinced the federal government to approve his plan for the removal of all 
Ojibweg east of the Mississippi to Sandy Lake in Minnesota. On February 6, 1850, President 
Zachary Taylor issued an executive order mandating the removal of “all said Indians remaining 
on the lands ceded” by the 1837 and 1842 treaties and revoking the hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights reserved in those treaties. The Ojibwe, including those at Lac Courte Oreilles, 
understood these earlier treaties as guaranteeing those rights and their residency for at least 150 
years, if not perpetually.76 The Ojibwe from Lac Courte Oreilles held councils where they agreed 
that the removal order violated their treaties. They sent messengers to Lac du Flambeau and La 
Pointe and the other communities, all of which remained united in their opposition.77 When they 
refused to abandon their understanding of treaties as more than written documents, federal and 
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territorial Settler governments colluded to force removal. They consolidated annuity payments at 
Sandy Lake, intending to trap them there for the winter—long enough for federal troops to arrive 
and contain them on the reservation.78 
 Both along the journey and after their return, the Ojibwe of Lac Courte Oreilles acted in 
ways that reflected the continued strength of their peoplehood. As they traveled, family groups 
met relatives at Lac du Flambeau, later stopping at the St. Croix River to wait for bands from 
Pokegama and St. Croix to join them. Continuing as a group, eventually totaling nearly seven 
hundred, protected the travelers from Dakota, with whom the Anishinaabe still fought over 
territory and resources. For three weeks, they fed themselves by hunting and gathering, as they 
had done on trips to collect annuities at La Pointe for twenty years.79  
When they and more than three thousand additional Ojibweg arrived at Sandy Lake, 
however, there were no supplies and no payments, and winter had frozen the waterways home.80 
One hundred seventy men, women, and children, died of hunger and disease in this attempt to 
wrest them from their homelands. The Ojibwe People rejected removal, returning to their homes. 
Two-hundred-thirty more died on the return journey.81  
This episode of ethnic cleansing convinced many Ojibweg that they needed to find a way 
to protect their villages. For the next four years, they struggled to force officials in Washington, 
D.C., to negotiate a treaty and recognize the rights inherent to their peoplehood. The Ojibwe 
People, including those living at Lac Courte Oreilles, refused to surrender their homeland. A 
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delegation at Madeline Island firmly stated, “when we die we will lay our bones at La Pointe,” a 
sacred place where their ancestors’ bones also lay beneath the earth.82 Over time, they grew 
“convinced that the perpetuity of our nation can only be secured by permanent settlements.”83 In 
order to protect their existence as a distinct and sovereign people, they asked the United States to 
recognize their community through a treaty.  
Ogimaag from Anishinaabe communities south of Lake Superior worked to bring 
officials from Washington, D.C., to Anishinaabewaki to negotiate such a treaty. Treaty-protected 
reservations became a central focus of their efforts. Bizhiki or Chief Buffalo, the most prominent 
ogimaa in the region, led these campaigns.84 More than 70 years old, Bizhiki had witnessed 
several decades of deteriorating relationships with Settlers from his home at La Pointe. He and 
five additional ogimaag, including the young rhetorically-skilled Oshoge of the St. Croix People, 
traveled to Washington in April 1852 with the goal of rescinding the removal order. Their 
undertaking began in Anishinaabewaki, setting out in a wiigwaasi-jiimaan (birchbark canoe) 
newly made for the occasion. Bizhiki and his fellow ogimaag traveled through the homeland 
they wanted to protect, collecting signatures on a petition against removal. Although they 
targeted Settlers whose names on the paper would attract attention in Washington, the ogimaag 
visited the oodenawan or villages of their kin and undoubtedly discussed the business of their 
trip. They traveled first along the southern shore of Gichigami and stopped at the many copper 
mines opened by the Treaty of 1842. They also stopped in oodenawan such as Dasoonaaganing 
or Ontonagan, where the Dasoonaagani-ziibi (Ontonagon River) flows into Gichigami, and 
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Baawatigong or Sault Ste. Marie. Their route then took them through the Great Lakes to Buffalo, 
New York, from which they traveled by rail to New York City and then on to Washington, D.C., 
where they arrived in June.85  
 In Washington, Bizhiki and Oshoge reminded federal officials of their obligations to the 
Anishinaabeg. Benjamin Armstrong, a trader with kinship ties by marriage to Bizhiki and 
interpreter for the delegation, recounted the diplomatic skill of both the elder and the younger 
ogimaag. According to Armstrong, Oshoge opened a meeting with President Filmore with an 
hour-long reminder about the 1837 and 1842 treaties. Oshoge “did not understand that in either 
treaty they had ceded away the land,” and they certainly had never consented to remove.86 He 
spoke of the Anishinaabeg relationship with “the great father,” calling attention to how the 
removal order violated the ties of their alliance.87  
 The ogimaag returned to Anishinaabewaki successful. President Fillmore agreed to 
revoke the removal order and continue to distribute treaty payments at La Pointe.88 However, 
Bizhiki’s actions on the return journey reveal that canceling the removal order was only one step 
in the process of protecting Anishinaabeg peoplehood. As he spread the news of the favorable 
outcome in Washington, Bizhiki told his fellow Ojibweg “that there was yet one more treaty to 
be made with the great father,” and, as he called for a meeting in La Pointe that fall, he suggested 
that this treaty should “reserve a part of their land for themselves and their children.”89 As they 
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prepared to negotiate another treaty with their fickle allies, ogimaag saw reservations as a way to 
protect their sovereignty in their homelands. 
 In 1854, at least four thousand Anishinaabeg traveled to La Pointe to discuss a new 
treaty.90 As a respected ogimaa, Bizhiki continued to play a significant leadership role in the 
proceedings, but each individual community participated. The official representatives for the Lac 
Courte Oreilles People included Akiwenziii from the village at Lac Courte Oreilles, Gichi-binesi 
from Paquahwong, Omadaagami from Lake Chetac, Nenaa’angabi from Rice Lake, and three 
ogimaag from villages on the Chippewa River: Ginoozens, Waabizheshi, and Ozhaawashko-
giizig.91 Throughout the councils and discussions that led to the treaty, ogimaag connected 
reservations with peoplehood. While the United States saw the new treaty as primarily a land 
cession, Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag and others understood it as an agreement to protect their 
land and sovereignty. Before official negotiations began, the gathered Anishinaabeg agreed “that 
no one would sign a treaty that did not give them reservations at different points of the country 
that would suit their convenience, that should afterwards be their bonafide home.”92 Armstrong 
noted reservations’ significant place in Anishinaabeg intentions, “The Lake Superior Indians did 
not seem, through all these councils, to care so much for future annuities either in money or in 
goods as they did for securing a home for themselves and their posterity that should be a 
permanent one.”93 Insisting on separate reservations that confirmed their current locations 
reflected Ojibwe goals of protecting the diffuse, autonomous structure of their Peoples. 
Moreover, it preserved important kinship relationships. Armstrong noted that his Anishinaabeg 
                                                 
90 Gilbert to Mannypenny, October 17, 1854.  
91 Redix, “Murder of Joe White,” 127.  
92 Armstrong, Early Life Among the Indians, 35.  
93 Armstrong, Early Life Among the Indians, 36-37.  
  
86 
 
kin demonstrated an “unwillingness to give up and forsake their old burying grounds.”94 They 
also protected resources intimately connected with ceremonial cycles and aadizhookanag. For 
instance, the treaty reserved land on Madeline Island to protect fishing rights and access to the 
final stopping point on their migration from the east. The agreement created reservations at 
L’Anse, View De Sert, Bad River, Fond du Lac, Bois Fort, Lac du Flambeau, and Lac Courte 
Oreilles. 95 Additionally, Article XI of the treaty reaffirmed the right of the Ojibweg to hunt and 
fish in ceded territory, as well as guaranteeing that La Pointe, their traditional gathering place, 
remained the site of annuity payments.96 In treaty negotiations, Ojibweg requested a shift in the 
contents of these payments from “dry goods” to “guns, camp kettles, traps, cooking stoves and 
cooking utensils”—all items that indicated the continued vitality of seasonal economic 
activities.97 Apparently, the Ojibwe did not intend for treaties and reservations to alter their way 
of life or their understanding of themselves as a people. They had negotiated a treaty that, as they 
understood it, not only reserved key pieces of their homeland but also preserved non-ishkonigan 
rights to hunt, fish, gather, and work in ceded territory. The 1854 Treaty and the negotiations 
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surrounding it contained an Anishinaabe understanding of mutual land use and resource rights, 
and they intended to force the United States to honor that agreement.  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles People used the treaty to retain their villages as permanent 
homelands. They reserved three townships, whose specific locations the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People would designate at a later date, supplemented by treaty-protected access to ceded lands 
for hunting, fishing, and gathering purposes. The boundaries, however, remained unconfirmed 
for nearly two decades, and the Lac Courte Oreilles People had to fight to enforce the Treaty of 
La Pointe and secure their reservation. In June 1859, Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag proposed an 
irregularly-shaped ishkonigan that strategically included manoomin gathering places.98 In 1863, 
federal officials surveyed the proposed lands for the first time. In part because of the lack of 
Settlers in the area surrounding Lac Courte Oreilles, Akiwenziii and other ogimaag succeeded in 
directing the survey. Still hoping to consolidate the Ojibwe in Wisconsin, federal officials 
delayed formal confirmation. Ojibwe ogimaag pressed officials to recognize the boundaries, 
especially as removal remained a Settler goal. Akiwenziii and other ogimaag likely knew of 
federal officials’ intention throughout the 1860s and 1870s to contain Wisconsin’s Ojibwe 
population at Bad River. Akiwenziii joined a delegation of ogimaag that traveled to Washington 
in 1865, meeting with President Lincoln to remind him of the 1854 treaty and to quell the talk of 
consolidating their Peoples. The delegation stalled removal and presented a petition, written in 
Anishinaabemowin and translated into English, that again called the United States’ attention to 
their obligations under various treaties. The reprieve proved temporary, but Lac Courte Oreilles 
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ogimaag remained determined.99 In May 1872, Congress approved an Appropriation Bill that 
called for the removal of the Lac Courte Oreilles, along with the Lac du Flambeau and Fond du 
Lac Peoples, to Bad River, although Secretary of Interior Columbus Delano insisted on obtaining 
the Indians’ consent.100 The Lac Courte Oreilles denied the request and finally succeeded in 
convincing the federal government to declare the ishkonigan’s boundaries in March 1873.101  
 The men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles remember ogimaag for their roles in creating 
their ishkonigan. For instance, they praised the efforts of Rice Lake ogimaa Nenaa’angabi. In the 
1940s, people from Lac Courte Oreilles told anthropologist Joseph B. Casagrande, “There was 
one head chief who got the Indians seven reservations. His name was Nina’angebi [sic].”102 
Before he could visit Washington “to get a reservation for his people” at Mashkode-
manoominikaaniing (Prairie Rice Lake)—to set the boundaries of the reservation provided for in 
the 1854 Treaty—Nenaa’angabi died in a campaign against the Dakota in 1855.103 In 1858, the 
ishkonigan’s boundaries failed to include Prairie Rice Lake, despite its prominence as a town on 
the expanding western edge of Anishinaabewaki.104 The people of Lac Courte Oreilles 
remembered that “his people were accepted here,” and the off-ishkonigan community of Rice 
Lake, which continued to thrive in spite of disappearing monoomin beds and encroaching 
Settlers, maintained close ties with their kin now within the boundaries of the Lac Courte 
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Oreilles Reservation.105 These borders, although they protected Lac Courte Oreilles homes, did 
not separate them from the broader network of Anishinaabeg relationships that sustained their 
peoplehood.  
 While Nenaa’angabi died before securing a place for Mashkode-manoominaakiing within 
the ishkonigan, Akiwenziii, whose prominence increased following Nenaa’angabi’s death, 
protected his People’s manoomin. He walked the surveyor along his People’s territory to set the 
ishkonigan boundaries, leading him around manoomin-rich lakes to create the irregular outline of 
the Lac Courte Oreilles ishkonigan.106 The zigging and zagging boundaries protected essential 
land, doodem, ceremonial, and sacred relationships that comprised Lac Courte Oreilles 
peoplehood and also thwarted Settler policies designed to disrupt those relationships and erase 
Indigenous sovereignty.  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibwe faced perhaps the most direct, intensive incidents of 
reservation policy: coerced removal to Sandy Lake. Their experience with ethnic cleansing, 
however, reveals that even in the most tragic moments where it seemed like the forces of 
colonialism had totally subjugated the Ojibwe People, Ojibweg found ways to express and 
protect their peoplehood. As the aftermath of the Sandy Lake Tragedy demonstrates, the Ojibwe 
used treaty making to maintain essential economic, political, and social relationships. The Lac 
Courte Oreilles Ojibwe interpreted their treaties in a way that emphasized land use and 
maintained the movement that facilitated connections between Anishinaabe communities. In 
1864, as they had many times in the past, leaders from throughout Anishinaabewaki came 
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together to protect Ojibwe interests and conduct international diplomacy. They wrote a statement 
to send to Washington, detailing their understandings of the treaties they signed since 1825 and 
the numerous ways in which the United States failed to respect these international agreements. 
Significantly, the ogimaag wrote the statement first in Anishinaabemowin and then translated 
their words into English.107 Grounded in this Ojibwe foundation, they stated, “Again this I hold 
in my hand the Maple Timber, also the Oak Timber, also this straw which I hold in my hand. 
Wild Rice is what we call this. These I do not sell.”108 Maple trees and manoomin were gifts 
from the Creator, sacred in themselves and intertwined with ceremonial and economic activities. 
By using treaties to secure ishkoniganan, the Ojibwe leaders protected their relationships with 
places and resources outside the new boundaries—and, by extension, their peoplehood. 
“Property of Them Still”: Reserving the Red River Valley 
 From the banks of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers, the Ojibweg identified with ogimaa 
Peguis established relationships with a kaleidoscope of landscapes and peoples. Peguis, born in 
1774 near Baawitigong (Sault Ste. Marie), became a prominent ogimaa of the Ojibwe or 
Salteaux living in the northern Red River valley by the time he turned just eighteen. Around 
1771, Peguis’ family left Baawitigong to escape a smallpox epidemic. After hunting and fishing 
for a while with the Red Lake or Pembina People, he and his kin moved north along the Red 
River. Peguis settled on the marshes near Netley Creek, which fed into the Red River south of 
Lake Winnipeg and provided centralized access to wazhashkoog (muskrats) and wild fowl, fish 
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from the Red River, and buffalo and elk on the prairies. In 1810, Peguis also forged ties with the 
Hudson’s Bay Company, connecting his People to essential fur trade networks.109  
 Perhaps no other part of Anishinaabewaki seems so peripheral as the prairie where Peguis 
and his kin made their homes. Anthropologists and ethnohistorians often describe the 
northwestern plains as a transitional zone where Anishinaabeg transformed into Cree or Métis.110 
In other words, scholars assume that the Plains are a region where Anishinaabe people disappear. 
In reality, however, the prairies and the rivers that ran through them held as much significance 
for Anishinaabe peoplehood as the lakes and forests of the Great Lakes. From an Anishinaabe 
perspective, the Red River was not a place where inawemaagan became meyaagizid but rather 
the reverse. Peguis and his kin called themselves the Saulteaux, a French name meaning people 
of the falls in reference to their original home at Sault Ste. Marie. Thus, their name affirmed ties 
to Anishinaabewaki’s interior. The Peguis People relied on their position within a larger 
Anishinaabe relational network. Their seasonal movements in pursuit of buffalo and other 
resources extended as far west as the Turtle Mountains, and kin from Red Lake, Lake of the 
Woods, and Rainy Lake visited their settlements at the Red River.111 As William Warren pointed 
out in 1852, an alliance with the Assiniboine enabled the westward-moving bands to “joi[n] their 
[Ojibwe] brethren of the Southern division in their wars against the fierce Dakotas.”112 This 
alliance illustrates two points. First, the bands near the Red River expanded Ojibwe relational 
networks—in many ways, the decentralized center of their community—by allying with the 
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Assiniboine. Second, Warren suggests that these supposedly peripheral Anishinaabeg maintained 
alliances and continued to pursue the interests of their people as a whole. Peguis had positioned 
his People at a focal point of Anishinaabe political, economic, and social relationships. 
 Movement in the pursuit of resources reinforced the Peguis People’s connections to the 
broader Anishinaabe People. At the end of sugaring in the spring, several hundred to more than a 
thousand Ojibweg assembled along the Rainy River, which runs east from Lake of the Woods 
across most of what is now northern Minnesota to Lake Superior, for the three- to four-week 
name (sturgeon) run. Trade, seasonal thanksgiving feasts, and other Midewiwin ceremonies 
followed the gatherings.113 One important resource missing from west of the Red River was 
manoomin. Nevertheless, in the early 1800s, members of the Peguis People traded rice with 
settlers. In all likelihood, the Peguis People traveled east to rice beds they used before their 
westward shift.114  
 The Peguis People supported their peoplehood by maintaining flexible relationships with 
sacred history and language. While their relatives south of Gichigami hunted in the woods, the 
Red River bands explored the plains, where they encountered new animals like the maskode-
bizhiki, or buffalo.115 Ojibwe integrated stories about mashkode-bizhikiwag into aadizookanag. 
In one example, “Nänabushu Hunts Buffalo with his Younger Brother,” cultural hero Nanabozho 
learned the proper way to butcher and distribute mashkode-bizhikiwag from his nephews and 
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little brother.116 Such stories incorporated the buffalo as part of the reciprocal network of kinship 
relations and naturalized the mashkoden or plains as part of the Ojibwe landscape, expanding 
their peoplehood.117 
 As the Nanabozho episode suggests, the buffalo hunts connected kin and reinforced 
sovereignty. Setting out from the Red River Settlement, Ojibweg bands joined their Métis 
relations. Most Métis—or, at least, those mixed-descent relatives who identified as Métis rather 
than Ojibwe—lived separate from Peguis’ band. On the road to the prairies, the Ojibweg and 
their Métis descendants drew on kinship ties to unite, much like Nanaboozho hunted buffalo with 
his little brother.118 For the Peguis People in particular, bison hunts supported peoplehood not 
only because of their cyclically unifying movements but in diplomatic relationships as well. 
They used the hunts as cover for surprise offenses against the Dakota.119 The northern bands also 
met their relatives living in the south, including the Pembina and Pillagers.120 The Red River 
band, Pembina, Pillagers, Métis, and the occasional Cree and Assiniboine used bison hunts to 
celebrate and reconfirm their affinitive relationships, enacting reciprocity ties through the hunt, 
participating in ceremonies related to war, and marking their territory by engaging the Dakota. 
The alliance between Ojibweg and their inawemaagan, both within and without the Ojibwe 
People, allowed them to share land and access resources in an expansive territory. This 
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understanding of mutual land use policy shaped Anishinaabe expectations when they met to 
make treaties and alliances with Great Britain and, later, Canada.  
 At their village on the Red River, the Peguis First Nation engaged representatives of 
Great Britain’s Settler society. In 1811, the Earl of Selkirk purchased land from the Hudson Bay 
Company—land that the HBC never received from its Indigenous possessors. By the following 
year, the first Settlers arrived at the fork of the Red and Assiniboine Rivers. As with HBC 
traders, the Ojibwe set out to incorporate the newcomers. Already the Peguis People had used the 
fur trade to forge favorable relations with the French, and they attempted to do the same with the 
Selkirk settlers. In the settlement’s first years, they succeeded. After constructing the first 
buildings, British settlers invited the Peguis band to celebrate with a horse race. The Ojibwe 
eagerly participated, seeing an opportunity to establish the reciprocal relationships necessary for 
a peaceable alliance. Red River settler Miles Macdonnel counted “18 fellows—freemen, 
servants, Indians, ever one that could muster a horse running races with each other.”121 The races 
resembled Anishinaabe games that preceded ceremonies at La Pointe and often opened trade 
gatherings and other alliance negotiations. The two communities established ties, and trade 
between settlers and the Red River Ojibwe grew so quickly that traders depended on Ojibwe 
supplies. This commerce enabled the Ojibwe to profit from their seasonal economic activities 
and retain their autonomy from HBC traders, who limited the credit available to Indian traders.122 
In turn, trade in buffalo meat, fish, and other staples like manoomin moved people and resources 
throughout Anishinaabewaki. 
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 An alliance agreement, the so-called Selkirk Treaty, signed in 1817 formalized the 
relationship between settlers and Anishinaabeg. Unlike treaties in the post-War of 1812 United 
States, the 1817 Selkirk Treaty ceded no lands. Instead, it reflected an Ojibwe form of land 
tenure based on shared access to resources among kin. The physical production of the document 
itself expressed Ojibwe peoplehood. Rather than a lengthy text, it consisted primarily of a hand-
drawn map. The settlers marked rivers by their European names, but the Ojibwe inscribed the 
landscape with doodem pictographs. The Marten, Bear, and Sturgeon doodemag stray from the 
neat list of settler signatures to overly the map itself, emphatically marking the land and water as 
Anishianabewaki. Ogimaa Peguis later described the 1817 agreement “as a preliminary to a final 
bargain,” a relationship in process, not one fixed on paper. In the years that followed, he and 
other members of his band demanded that the settlers pay “the same small quantity of 
ammunition and tobacco” as the first year to reaffirm the alliance that gave the Red River 
settlement access to their tract of land.123  
 The Red River Ojibwe led by Peguis also pursued an alliance with missionaries from a 
center of Ojibwe peoplehood. Missionaries—not only representatives of their God but also 
agents of colonialism who facilitated Settler goals of confinement and erasure through 
assimilation—expected converts; Peguis wanted a mutually beneficial relationship. Ojibwe 
alliances did not move in one direction. Peguis certainly believed the settlers and their religious 
leaders had accrued the larger debt by settling on Ojibwe land and accessing Ojibwe resources, 
but he remained willing to maintain his end of the bargain. In the case of the missionaries, that 
meant attending services and, in 1840, allowing the St. Peter’s Catholic church to baptize him 
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William King.124 Peguis forged these connections to enact the relationship required for a 
productive alliance.125  
As at Pokegama and Yellow Lake to the south, Settler demands for more land strained 
the alliance. Canada’s rapid growth mirrored that of the Settler population in the United States. 
In 1815, Canada’s population hovered around half a million. By 1867, it increased five times to 
2.5 million. Additionally, the 1867 confederation of the Dominion of Canada transferred power 
from Britain to Canada, where representatives answered the calls of Settler constituents for 
land.126  
Peguis and his relatives articulated their rights to autonomy by calling attention to British 
and Canadian obligations. In an 1857 protest to the Aboriginal Protection Society against 
unlicensed settler encroachments, Peguis first acknowledged “we have already derived great 
benefit” by trading with and learning from farmers.127 Even more explicitly, he wrote, “We wish 
to practice these good rules of the whites, and hope the Great Mother will do the same to us.”128 
In this speech, he revealed the logic of aligning with missionaries in the context of reserve 
policies, which had already begun, albeit at a lower intensity than in the United States. The HBC 
shifted their credit policy in the 1830s and insisted on cash-and-carry for goods, which conflicted 
with Anishinaabe seasonal hunting practices. They needed supplies in the fall but had the goods 
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to exchange in the spring.129 Peguis suggested that debt to traders, “who pay us little for our 
furs,” prevented Ojibweg from leaving forts to live near the missionaries.130 Peguis’ goal in 
giving this speech, however, was not to promote the Christianization and permanent settlement 
of his band. He intended to prevent “our lands to be taken from us in this way.”131 For, as the 
Saulteaux leader knew, “in securing our own advantages, we wish also to secure those of our 
children and our children’s children,” not as future citizens but “on behalf of my tribe”—an 
example of peoplehood in action.132 He demanded that the missionaries return the good will 
shown by his people if they hoped to continue the relationship.  
 Ownership of the Red River settlement changed hands twice in the mid-nineteenth 
century. In 1836, the HBC repurchased the land from Selkirk’s estate to use as a base for their 
expansive trading network. In 1869, Métis under charismatic leader Louis Riel occupied the 
nearby Ft. Garry to demand that Settler officials recognize Métis land claims. The Manitoba Act 
of 1870 provisionally acknowledged Métis rights. The Act also transferred Settler claims to the 
land from the HBC to the newly-created province of Manitoba. These transfers of territory 
ignored the Peguis People’s claims, falling back on Settler notions of discovery and the denial of 
absolute aboriginal claims to the land.  
To fuel expansion, British and later Canadian officials perpetuated a myth of generosity, 
in which many earnestly believed. Treaty commissioners presented themselves as arbiters of 
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“peace and goodwill” resulting from “Her Majesty’s bounty and benevolence.”133 Most 
importantly, treaties provided access to land for an expanding nation. Canadian motivations 
matched those of the United States. Canadian officials, pressed by the British imperial 
government seeking to cut costs for its expansive empire, sought to deemphasize the status of 
treaties as government-to-government agreements. Instead, they increasingly portrayed treaties 
as simple land sales.134 With the switch from alliances to land cessions, treaties became even 
more intertwined in nation-building. Agreements negotiating the exchange of land, from the 
Settler governments’ perspective, sought to redefine nation “along territorial lines.”135 Within 
those lines, they included Native Peoples, defined out of territorial existence and, thereby, out of 
sovereignty. 
 In conjunction with confining Native Peoples geographically, Canada, like the United 
States, increasingly attached legal and political boundaries to peoplehood. In 1871, the same year 
the United States ended treaty making, Canada signed its first numbered treaty. Treaty-making 
proceeded unabated in Dominion of Canada, but in the 1870s Canada, too, moved to unilaterally 
deny First Nations sovereignty. The Indian Act of 1876 defined reserves negotiated in treaties as 
“Crown land set aside for the use of a Band of Indians,” placing rights to the land with the Settler 
state rather than Indigenous peoplehood.136 Both the United States and Canada continued to 
negotiate for territory with Indigenous Peoples whose sovereignty they could deny on paper but 
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not always in practice, but Anishinaabeg faced increasing encroachment into the internal 
relationships of their peoplehood. 
Since an 1823 court decision acknowledged the Crown’s right to confiscate Mohawk land 
for charges of treason, Canada considered First Nations to be subjects, no different from the 
French in Quebec. Between 1857 and 1890, a series of Canadian laws relegated Indians to the 
legal status of minors, inserting federal control into tribal affairs. The federal government 
interfered in everything from membership to the election of tribal leaders. For example, the 1869 
Compulsory Enfranchisement Act denied status to Aboriginal women who married non-
Aboriginal men. Thus, the Canadian government created categories of Indianness—status 
Indians, non-status Indians (who might be Native by kinship but not by legal definitions), Métis, 
and Inuit—that had nothing to do with Ojibwe understandings of peoplehood. 
 United States and Canadian policies differed in the details. From the perspective of the 
Anishinaabeg People, however, these divergences remained superficial. By the 1850s, both 
Canada and the United States developed reserve and reservation policies designed to isolate 
Ojibweg from their language, kin, sacred history, ceremonial cycle and, perhaps most obviously, 
their land. Settlers did not create reserves and reservations on their own, however, nor did they 
succeed in inscribing these spaces with Settler meanings. Anishinaabeg and other Peoples helped 
to create and define reserves and reservations through the treaty-making process. Drawing on a 
long history of alliances based in reciprocity, relational land usage rights, and kinship, the Peguis 
People made treaties to protect their homeland and the relationships that comprised their 
peoplehood. Reserves, like reservations, emerged from the negotiations and alliances—albeit 
sometimes from their failures—as Anishinaabe places. 
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The newly-confederated Canadian government failed to acknowledge the Peguis People’s 
inherent rights. Like their Lac Courte Oreilles relations, the Red River People “applied” for a 
treaty to assert their rights to the land.137 At least one thousand Natives, many Anishinaabeg, met 
in July of 1871 at Stone Fort in southern Manitoba. The negotiations intended to bolster 
threatened aspects of Ojibwe peoplehood. From the beginning of the meeting, Ojibweg 
expressed their sovereignty. They came to the negotiations not as desperate victims but as 
political equals. Canadian officials delayed proceedings because the Ojibweg “of the lake 
districts meet, as you know, on Rainy River yearly, about the 20th June to fish for sturgeon, and 
they could not be called together sooner.”138 By forcing the Canadians to wait, ogimaag ensured 
negotiations respected Anishinaabe terms.  
Ojibweg guided negotiations with a relational concept of land use based on resource 
access that extended across boundaries. As the council proceeded, Lt. Governor Adam Archibald 
fumed, “the Indians seem to have false ideas of the meaning of a reserve. They have been led to 
suppose that large tracts of ground were to be set aside for them as hunting grounds, including 
timber lands, of which they might sell the wood as if they were property of them still.”139 
Archibald “told them it was of no use for them to exert any such ideas,” but Ojibweg left the 
negotiations with the understanding that their land sale did not include a surrender of their 
resources and access rights.140 The gathered First Nations and Settler officials agreed to annual 
payments, among other provisions. The text of the treated stated that the queen “makes them a 
present of three dollars for each Indian man, woman, and child belonging to the bands here 
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represented.” After the British Empire transferred responsibility for funding acquired territory to 
the Dominion of Canada, officials in Upper Canada devised a system where rather than a large 
lump sum that required high taxes to cover, they used annual interest on Settlers’ plots purchased 
in ceded territories. Annuity payments made sense to Ojibweg and other First Nations, fitting 
protocols of gift-giving and demonstrating that treaties were not a fixed sale but an ongoing 
relationship.141 
Nine days after the treaty negotiations began, the Peguis People signed Treaty 1 and 2. 
The written document limited the Ojibweg to 160 acres per family of five, reflecting the 
Canadian government’s failure to take seriously Ojibwe perspectives. The land continued to be 
held in common, but the allotment-style apportionment facilitated the reduction of the Peguis 
First Nation’s, now officially the St. Peter’s First Nation, land. Despite the disparity between 
Anishinaabe negotiations and the final document, Anishinaabeg entered the treaty relationship to 
assert sovereignty based in peoplehood. 
“The Master of Life Gave It to Us for an Inheritance”: Claiming Turtle Mountain 
The region along the western reaches of Anishinaabewaki was a zone of interaction. 
Coming into contact with diverse peoples, including Dakotas, Crees, Métis, Americans, 
Canadians, Ho-Chunks and other Ojibweg, the Red Lake or Pembina, and Pillager Peoples 
continued to display their peoplehood through transnational relationships and conflicts. The 
Ojibweg living west of the Mississippi River had much in common with their northern relations, 
including their joint buffalo hunts. They ranged from the St. Croix River Valley in northern 
Wisconsin to the Red River Valley in southern Manitoba, trading at the Red River settlement, 
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and west into the Turtle Mountain region. William Warren described these western bands as 
“standing one foot on the deep eastern forests, and the other on the broad western plains.”142 
Both feet, however, remained firmly within Anishinaabewaki.  
The Turtle Mountain People emerged from this Anishinaabe-dominated milieu.143 
Originally a subsidiary band within the Pembina or Red Lake People, by the 1860s, the Turtle 
Mountain People became a distinct group with their own territory, identity, and authority. 
Although the move onto the mashkoden (prairies) occurred relatively recently in Anishinaabe 
history, spurred by the growth of the fur trade, aadizookanag claimed Turtle Mountain as part of 
the Anihsinaabe homeland. Anishinaabe modified their sacred histories to include their western 
territories. When water covered the world, perhaps after “the great melting of ice,” Sky Woman 
rode upon Mekinok (the turtle) (other versions place Nanabozho on the turtle’s back). Wazhashk 
(muskrat), a strong and capable swimmer, dove down into the water and returned with his paws 
full of mud. Sky Woman used her breath to spread the dirt in all four directions, building up the 
earth around Mekinok’s shell. The land continued to pile up, eventually covering Mekinok’s 
back. Anishinaabeg called the place Mekinok Wajiw (“the mount of earth that is the turtle”), or 
Turtle Mountain.144 When Ojibweg expanding their fur-trade empire rediscovered Turtle 
Mountain, they found not only mashkode-bizhiki (buffalo) but also a landscape dotted with small 
lakes and rivers and the densely-wooded mountains rising out of the prairies in modern-day 
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North Dakota and southern Manitoba.145 Perhaps the best-known ogimaa of the Turtle Mountain 
People was Little Shell II, son of the first Little Shell killed by Dakota warriors onto whose lands 
Ojibweg encroached.146 Moving through a homeland bisected by the United States-Canada 
border in 1818, Little Shell II and his fellow Turtle Mountain People defined their peoplehood 
within a network of shifting alliances that helped them to maintain their autonomy against 
competing Settler expansion.  
 Many Pembina families from settlements along the Mississippi moved west to the 
wooded hills and open prairies of the Turtle Mountains after 1850 as game near the Mississippi 
became scarce. For these Ojibwe, the uncertainty of their landbase threatened their peoplehood 
most directly throughout the mid-nineteenth century. Although the Sandy Lake removal tragedy 
did not include the Pembina bands, federal policy in the 1860s remained concentration.147 
Confinement on northern reservations may have happened on a smaller scale, but it comprised 
removal nonetheless. Between 1868 and 1870, American officials moved Ojibweg from Gull 
Lake and Crow Wing in central Minnesota northwest to White Earth, which the federal 
government then targeted for allotment.148 White Earth was also the intended destination of the 
Pembina Ojibwe residing west in the Turtle Mountains, but the Pembina and Turtle Mountain 
Peoples used treaties to defend their right as a People to remain in their homeland.149  
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 The Turtle Mountain People and their Pembina kin incorporated treaty-making into their 
alliance relationships with other Indigenous Peoples, most notably the Dakota. The Sweet Corn 
Treaty, negotiated in 1825 and named after a Dakota leader who helped define its terms, later 
became useful in proving the Turtle Mountain People’s rights to the United States. Following the 
Prairie du Chien treaty meeting in 1825, Ojibweg and Dakota parties defined the boundaries 
between Dakota and Ojibweg territory west of the Red River. They agreed upon a line from the 
Red River west to where the Knife River meets the Missouri River, marking the northern half of 
North Dakota as Anishinaabeg. The Sweet Corn Treaty did not recognize Settler authority in the 
entirely Indigenous-centered region, although Dakota leaders presented the written document to 
the United States at treaty negotiations in 1867 to support their rights to lands in southern North 
Dakota.150 The Turtle Mountain and Pembina People used treaties to define the extent of their 
sovereignty in a region of shifting borders.  
 The Ojibwe remained determined to direct interactions with the Dakota. The array of 
relationships ranged from waging war in the 1840s after the attack on Pokegama to 
accommodating refugees from the Dakota-Minnesota War in 1862. Turtle Mountain lawyer John 
Bottineau observed that, in 1862, the Ojibwe allowed the Dakota “to cross over into the country 
north of the Sheyenne River, and to hunt at and about Devil’s Lake” in territory that formed part 
of Anishinaabewaki.151 When the United States established a permanent reservation in 
Anishinaabwaki at Devil’s Lake (now Spirit Lake), however, the Turtle Mountain Pembina 
bands insisted that they “do not recognize the right of the Government to establish such a 
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reservation for Indians of another tribe in the very heart of their present unceded country.”152 The 
Dakota reservation remained, and so it might seem like an empty statement, but the people at 
Turtle Mountain remained as well, refusing to be crowded out of their land. 
 The emerging Turtle Mountain People did not participate in the land cession treaties 
signed by their eastern kin between 1836 and 1871. Instead, they continued expanding westward 
onto the plains of modern-day northern North Dakota. They spent much of the years from 1850 
to 1892 articulating their rights to the land based on their status as an independent People. In 
1863, the Pembina and Turtle Mountain Peoples entered into a treaty with the United States. In 
what became known as the Old Crossing Treaty, the Pembina ceded their lands in the Red River 
Valley, but only the portion within Minnesota. The Settler government tried to minimize 
Ojibweg relationships with the region, undoubtedly hoping to secure more land for less money. 
Former Governor Alexander Ramsey, architect of the disastrous Sandy Lake removal attempt, 
suggested that the road and river had little value for the Red Lake and Pembina bands. Red Lake 
leader Little Rock contradicted him, “The Master of Life gave us the river and the water thereof 
to drink, and the woods and the roads we depend on for subsistence, and you are mistaken if you 
think we derive no benefit from them. The Master of Life gave it to us for an inheritance, and 
gave us the animals for food and clothing.”153 Little Rock stated his peoples’ claims to the land 
in terms of sacred history. He articulated the intimacy of this relationship when he said, “My 
heart is made of silver, and the earth that I tread on is silver also.”154 Ramsey noted this speech 
through an interpreter. In Anishinaabemowin, Little Rock’s speech captures the continued 
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strength of Ojibwe peoplehood even more clearly. Silver, if he referred to the mineral substance 
that comes from the ground, is zhooniyaawaabik, a combination of zhooniyaa (silver) and the 
stem –aabikw (metal or stone).155 Thus, his words imply in a uniquely Anishinaabe way that the 
same substance composed both himself and the earth. Ojibwe aadizookaanag contain many 
stories about rocks, emphasizing their capacity to hold a spirit.156 A treaty and two decades of 
annuity payments were not enough to separate Little Rock and the land.  
 Nor could the pressures of Settler colonialism turn inawemaagan into meyaagizid. When 
the Pembina and Turtle Mountain People arrived to negotiate a treaty ceding the southern Red 
River Valley in 1863, known as the Old Crossing Treaty, they brought “nearly all the half-breed 
population of Pembina and St. Joseph, whose attendance was not expected or desired at all” by 
U.S. officials.157 The Lac Courte Oreilles People likewise insisted on including all their relations 
in treaty negotiations. In the build-up to the 1854 treaty, Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag including 
Akiwenziii told Washington that they could not agree to live without “our half-breed 
children.”158 The 1854 treaty included a six thousand dollar payment for “the mixed-bloods of 
said nation” and eighty acres of land for each “mixed-blood” head of family. In both cases of 
mixed-blood scrip for Ojibwe relations in the United States, graft and mismanagement by 
officials more interested in timber and expanding American business and settlement interests 
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defrauded nearly all who identified as mixed-bloods of their rights.159 Likewise, in 1871, 
Ojibweg from the Red River region insisted that the treaty must cover their mixed-descent 
children. Canadian officials noted that many of these descendants “have lived all their lives on 
the Indian reserves” and have been “calling themselves Indian.”160 Ojibweg, including those in 
the Turtle Mountains borderland region, refused to allow Settler borders to divide inawemaagan. 
The movements of Red River and the Pembina men and women rebuffed the U.S.-Canada 
boundary as they pursued bizhiki on the plains. At the negotiations for Treaty Three, the Ojibwe 
insisted that Canadian officials include “some of their children [who] had married in the states” 
in annuities and allotment. British concern that the treaty include only “bona fide British 
Indians” suggests that movement throughout the region without any regard for the border 
remained common.161 As with the Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s Peoples, mobility had been 
an essential strategy for maintaining Anishinaabe peoplehood for centuries. In the nineteenth-
century, the Ojibweg denied the power of someone else’s border stop them from recognizing 
members of their People. 
 The Treaty of Old Crossing, revised and ratified by the Senate in 1864, created the White 
Earth ishkonigan and ceded millions of acres in northern Minnesota.162 The ten million acres of 
the Turtle Mountain region, however, remained unceded. The federal government expected the 
Pembina People to remove to White Earth, and two hundred men, women and children 
ultimately settled there, but the Turtle Mountain People refused to leave their homeland. Little 
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Shell II, who participated in the treaty-making process, refused to sign the version of the Old 
Crossing Treaty ratified in 1864.  
 The different responses to the treaty performed the final step in differentiating the Turtle 
Mountain People into a distinct Anishinaabe People.163 Negotiations reveal that the Pembina 
People used the treaty making process to assert cultural and political sovereignty through the 
relationships of peoplehood. The Turtle Mountain People, meanwhile, sought to protect their 
autonomy by refusing cessions. Both strategies reveal that Anishinaabe people used treaties to 
promote and protect their peoplehood in the context of reservation policies designed to confine 
and erase.  
 For the remainder of the nineteenth century, the federal government pressed for the 
removal of the Turtle Mountain People to White Earth. Meanwhile, the Turtle Mountain People 
continued to avoid the pressures of reservation policies by maintaining their seasonal 
movements. In 1873, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs observed, “The wandering bands of 
Chippewa in Minnesota require the attention of the Government.”164 The Turtle Mountain People 
resided on lands the Pembina obtained “in pursuance of a solemn agreement or treaty of peace 
concluded between the Chippewas and the Sioux Nation,” the Sweet Corn Treaty.165 These lines 
“were well known to all the Indians connected with said nations and were zealously guarded and 
defended by them.”166 The Turtle Mountain Chippewa understood that moving to White Earth 
“would be construed as abandonment of their remaining territory and that they would thus be 
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unable ever after to maintain their rights to their remaining lands.”167 Their peoplehood was at 
stake. 
Turtle Mountain Ojibweg continued to act as if negotiating a treaty, despite the official 
end to United States treaty making in 1871.168 Tacked on to an Indian Appropriations bill in 
March 1871, Congress declared “that hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of 
the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power 
with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”169 Settler governments used legislation to 
further interfere with Ojibwe autonomy. In 1885, the Major Crimes Act, authorizing federal 
jurisdiction over seven major crimes even in the case of Native-on-Native offense, replaced 
Native systems of justice with American punitive jurisprudence. As part of the legal framework 
surrounding these laws, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the federal government could 
limit the authority of Native Peoples on reservations without Indian consent.170  
As the Lac Courte Oreilles had taken action before the 1854 treaty at La Pointe, the 
Turtle Mountain People sent several delegations to Washington, D.C., and engaged the help of a 
                                                 
167 White Weasel, Pembina and Turtle Mountain Ojibway (Chippewa) History, 6.  
168 Many scholars have acknowledged that treaty-making continued after its official end. See Clara Sue Kidwell, 
The Choctaws in Oklahoma: From Tribe to Nation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), 150-167; 
Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths to Allotment, 86-87; Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft.  
169 Calloway, Pen and Ink Witchcraft, 231; John Wunder, “No More Treaties: The Resolution of 1871 and the 
Alteration of Indian Rights to Their Homelands,” Working the Range: Essays on the History of Western Land 
Management and the Environment, edited by John Wunder (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1985): 39-56; Genetin-
Pilawa, Crooked Paths, 25-26, 85-87. Historian Richard White provides a humorous yet apt summation of this 
transition: “The House didn’t end negotiations; it merely demanded a say in them. The agreements enacted after 
1871 looked like treaties, walked like treaties, and even quacked like treaties, but they weren’t treaties. They were 
agreements, approved by Indians, the Senate, and the House.” Railroaded, 61. From a Native perspective that 
privileged negotiations, where exactly the United States government approved the results of those negotiations likely 
mattered little. 
170 See, for example, United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375 (1886) and Sidney Harring, “The Distorted History that 
Gave Rise to the ‘So Called’ Plenary Power Doctrine: The Story of United States v. Kagama,” Indian Law Stories, 
edited by Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn, and Philip P. Frickey (New York: Foundation Press, 2011).  
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lawyer, mixed-descent Turtle Mountain resident John B. Bottineau, to make their case.171 The 
Ojibwe convinced federal officials not to issue land in 160-acre individual tracts, preferring 
instead to hold the land in common and use Anishinaabe methods of resource allocation through 
kinship obligations to determine land rights internally. In 1882, the Turtle Mountain People 
succeeded, when President Chester A. Arthur created an executive order reservation of twenty-
four by thirty-two miles. Although the United States government declared its refusal to negotiate 
with Native peoples on a nation-to-nation basis, the Turtle Mountain Ojibweg continued to 
negotiate as sovereign people. For the Anishinaabe People, treaties had always been more than 
written documents authorized by Congress. They represented reproductions of the relationships 
of peoplehood. 
 
 Treaties provided an opportunity for Anishinaabeg to articulate their peoplehood to 
meyaagaazid and, hopefully, transform them into inawemaagan. These relationships seemed 
increasingly important in the context of reserve and reservation policies and Settler threats to 
Ansihinaabewaki. Pembina leader Little Rock drew directly on sacred history to articulate his 
peoples’ claims to the land. “Now, my friend,” he said, “I am going to show you how we came to 
occupy this land. The Master of Life placed us here. You can see far towards the east where our 
grandfather comes from. Our grandfather’s tracks are perfectly plain and visible, not only here 
but far and away to the east.”172 Little Rock and other ogimaag used treaties to voice that the 
sacred territorial and environmental inheritance entitled the Ojibweg to a fully autonomous 
                                                 
171 Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 71-72. 
172 Old Crossing Treaty, 18.  
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peoplehood. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ojibwe People continued to engage in 
diplomatic relationships on their own terms. 
 Settler reservation policies threatened Anishinaabe peoplehood. In the Turtle Mountains, 
the United States executive branch created a twenty-four by thirty-two mile reservation out of a 
territory that extended for at least fifteen thousand square miles—and then in 1884 they reduced 
that area even further to a mere twelve by six miles, and all without compensating the Turtle 
Mountain People for the additional acreage.173 Pursuing a policy of containment to facilitate 
expansion, Settler governments sought to confine Anishinaabeg to reserves and reservations. In 
these bounded spaces, law and policy would restrict internal Anishinaabeg sovereignty—or so 
Settler officials assumed. 
 Through alliances and treaty making, Ojibweg shaped reserve and reservation policies. 
They claimed ishkoniganan, which comprised part of Anishinaabewaki before the treaties and 
executive orders, as spaces to maintain their peoplehood. As Mawedopenais, from the Rainy 
River region, proclaimed at the negotiations for Treaty 3 in 1873, “[T]he Great Spirit has planted 
us on this ground.”174 The disparity comes from the impression of isolation and boundedness of 
official ishkonigan designations. But these limits remained clearer on Settler maps and in Settler 
minds than in Anishinaabeg experience. Seasonal movements continued for a range of reasons 
from ceremonial to economic pursuits. The Midewiwin retained its strength, and off-reservation 
hunting and gathering persisted.175 Ojibweg experienced rapid change during the nineteenth 
century, and their peoplehood did not survive the experience untouched. However, at the Red 
                                                 
173 Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 74.  
174 Proceedings of Connection with the Treaty, Oct 1873, The Canadian North-west, 59.  
175 Larry Nesper, The Walleye War: The Struggle for Ojibwe Spearfishing and Treaty Rights (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002).  
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River, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles, treaty-making conversations about the meaning 
and expression of that peoplehood contributed to its persistence rather than its dissipation.  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles, St. Peter’s, and Turtle Mountain People each requested and 
fought for their ishkoniganan. Treaty negotiations reveal that the Anishinaabe People recognized 
the dangers reservation policy posed to the various aspects of their peoplehood; as a result, they 
actively pursued treaties to guarantee their political, territorial, economic, and cultural 
sovereignty. We know the aftermath of these treaties. Allotment policies broke up reserved 
lands. State, provincial, and federal Settler governments denied the hunting, fishing, and 
gathering rights the Ojibwe People had preserved by making treaties. The treaties negotiated in 
the nineteenth century, however, remained testaments to the sovereignty of the Ojibwe People. 
They became enfolded into a sacred history that extended back through the chibimoodaywin. 
Again and again in the decades that followed, Ojibwe men and women throughout 
Anishinaabewaki returned to the relationships symbolized by the written documents to contest 
Settler encroachments. These relationships continued to provide a source of power for the 
Anishinaabe People. In the following decades, Anishinaabe men and women relied on treaties to 
thwart Settler goals to confine them on reserves and reservations and preserving the economic, 
social, and political relationships that comprised their sovereignty.  
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Chapter 3 
Anishinaabewi: One of the People, 1875-1904 
 The aadizookananag of Anishinaabe expansion from the Great Salt Water in the East to 
the manoomin beds of Gichigami and the plains beyond tell a story of becoming Ojibwe.1 Along 
the journey, the men and women following the Miigis fought their enemies, including the 
Haudenosaunee, to expand and protect their People. They also expanded their People by 
incorporating former enemies. For example, several days after defeating a village of meyaagizid, 
whose name Ojibweg no longer remember, the travelers came across a group of survivors who 
asked for protection. The Ojibweg absorbed these former strangers so completely that, according 
to some stories, these new relatives founded the Waabizheshi or Marten doodem, which provides 
warriors to protect the People.2 Other inawemaagan—most notably, the Odawa and 
Potawatomi—remained at various stopping points. Still bound by kinship in a web of mutual 
obligation, the Odawa and Potawatomi emerged as distinct Peoples when they remained on the 
eastern shores of Lake Superior. The men and women who continued the journey and found the 
manoomin to fulfill the dream of the Seven Prophets were the Ojibwe People.3 The five hundred 
year chibimoodaywin marked the ethnogenesis of the Ojibwe People.  
 In a world of expansive movement and layered identities, Ojibwe men and women knew 
who was one of the People and who was not. They knew who was inawemaagan and who was 
                                                 
1 Benton-Banai, Mishomis Book, 94.  
2 Later, the Waabizheshi doodem incorporated the doodem-less, primarily the children of Ojibwe women and non-
Indian men, into the network of Anishinaabe kinship. Anton Treuer explains that the practice of adopting children 
with non-Native fathers into the patrilineal clan system—a birthright for these children, not a ceremonial or legal 
adoption—differed depending on where in Anishianabewaki one lived. The Waabizheshi doodem seems to have 
fulfilled this role in the eastern territories, while the Migizi doodem (eagle clan) functioned as the adopting clan in 
many western communities, including Lac Courte Oreilles. Treuer, Assassination of Hole in the Day (St. Paul, MN: 
Borealis Books, 2011), 16-18.  
3 Benton-Banai, Mishomis Book; Warren, Ojibwe People.  
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meyaagizid, who had access to Anishinabewaki’s resources, who participated in community 
relationships, and whose voices had a right to speak about the future of the Ojibwe People. This 
knowledge involved the very heart of Ojibwe peoplehood. In the mid-nineteenth century, 
Ojibweg negotiated treaties with Settler governments to protect their People, claim expansive 
relationships with the land and resources of Anishinaabewaki, and enact their peoplehood. 
Ogimaag knew what they had surrendered in treaties, and they knew they had not relinquished 
their sovereign right to determine who belonged as one of the People. 
 As the United States and Canada expanded into Anishinaabewaki, Ojibweg communities 
faced questions of who belonged in the People. Anishinaabewi—being Anishinaabe—derived 
from the relationships that comprised peoplehood—not only kinship but also how an individual 
related to aki, Anishinaabemowin, aadizookaanag, and ceremonial cycles. Settler allotment 
policies targeted peoplehood by attacking the aki and also pressing to assimilate Anishinaabeg 
relationships. Land and the use of its resources cannot be separated from questions of belonging 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While Settler governments imposed reductive 
but easily legible categories of Indianness, Ojibweg utilized fluid identities and extensive kinship 
networks. At Lac Courte Oreilles, allotment rolls challenged kinship relationships as well as ties 
to land and resources. The Ojibwe People on St. Peter’s Reserve encountered meyaagizid in their 
midst — Swampy Crees or Maškēkowak — recognized by the Settler government as equal 
members of the Reserve but outside Ojibwe social relationships and therefore lacking the 
inherent right to access land and resources. On the Turtle Mountain reservation, diminished 
territory and resources strained kinship networks that traversed Settler borders of nation-state and 
blood quantum. In all three cases, Ojibwe Peoples relied on distinctly Ojibwe relationships to 
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define the human contours of their peoplehood and defend their sovereignty against both external 
and internal encroachment, shaping in turn the Settler policies meant to confine them.  
 Anishinaabeg discussed who was one of the People in the context of a broader 
conversation about the citizenship of Indigenous people in Settler societies. At times, the 
Canadian and U.S. governments linked citizenship and behavior, extending citizenship to those 
deemed “civilized.” At the same time, they imposed blood quantum on Native Peoples when 
determining tribal membership.4 However, the Ojibwe considered identity relational, not 
biological. Relationships to kin (not always blood relatives), the aki, Ojibwemowin, sacred 
history and ceremonies differentiate Ojibweg People from others.5 In her novel The Round 
House, Turtle Mountain novelist Louise Erdrich reflects on what it means to be Ojibwe amidst 
competing Settler and Indigenous definitions of belonging. She writes, “Indians know other 
Indians without the need for a federal pedigree, and this knowledge—like love, sex, or having or 
                                                 
4 Scholars have shown the need for Indigenous understandings for Native People. Mark Rifkin applies Foucauldian 
biopolitics to explore how the Settler colonial state racialized Indian and Indian blood, where anthropological 
notions of kinship supersede Indigenous definitions of belonging and reduce peoplehood to “reproductively 
transmitted Indianness.” Rifkin, “Making Peoples into Populations: The Racial Limits of Tribal Sovereignty,” in 
Theorizing Native Studies, edited by Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 
149-187. Kathleen Pickering explains that culture, not biology, defines Lakota identity, although Lakota often 
phrase cultural behavior in terms of biology—calling those whose behavior deviates from Lakota norms “mixed-
blood” and those who maintain closer connections to Lakota values and communities “full-blood” regardless of 
actual blood quantum. Behavior and relationships—both to kin and to land—define who belongs as one of the 
Lakota People. Pickering, Lakota Culture, World Economy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). Circe 
Sturm describes a similar behavioral definition of bloodedness in Blood Politics. Anishinaabeg studies scholar Jill 
Doerfler (White Earth) demonstrates how the White Earth People have rejected pseudo-scientific definitions of race 
and blood quantum in favor of multifaceted identities. Doerfler, Those Who Belong: Identity, Family, Blood, and 
Citizenship among the White Earth Anishinaabeg (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015).  
5 For example, drawing on Lakota scholar Ella Deloria, White Earth Ojibwe writer Gerald Vizenor equates being a 
good citizen with being a good relative. Vizenor and Doerfler, White Earth Constitution, 4. Likewise, according to 
Jill Doerfler, also from White Earth, “There was no single system for determining who was part of the community 
and who was not....Identity was flexible and depended on the choices of individuals. Ultimately, little was agreed 
upon except that rigid racial designations of ‘mixed blood’ and ‘full-blood’ pushed by the U.S. government 
investigators were unacceptable and in direct conflict with all Anishinaabeg understandings of identities.” Vizenor 
and Doerfler, White Earth Constitution, 44. 
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not having a baby—has nothing to do with government.”6 Like the intimate matters about which 
Erdrich writes, such as love, sex, and reproductive choice, being Ojibwe derives from living 
relationships rather than blood quantum and federal recognition. The Settler government’s 
membership rolls, drawn up to facilitate policies such as allotment that sought to confine Native 
Peoples in place and time, imposed rigid definitions of membership on fluid identities.7 Ojibweg, 
however, insisted on maintaining fluidity and emphasizing relationships more than biology.  
 Determining membership comprises one of the fundamental prerogatives of a sovereign 
People.8 For the Ojibwe, allotment and other policies designed to narrow Indigenous sovereignty 
were as much about this aspect of their peoplehood as land and resource rights. In fact, the 
Anishinaabe People could not separate land and resource rights and community membership. 
Resource access depended on the obligations between inawemaagan, which extended across 
borders.9 Kinship, both real and fictive, came with certain obligations—both to give and to 
receive. For instance, sharing food among families in times of abundance guaranteed generosity 
in times of scarcity, and these networks of exchange facilitated community connections as well 
as defined who could access what land and resources and under what circumstances.10 Ojibweg 
determined who belonged to the People through these lived relationships. Being one of the 
Anishinaabe People meant access to territory and material resources. It also meant access to 
                                                 
6 Louise Erdrich, The Round House (New York: Harper Perennial, 2012), 30.  
7 For a discussion of how creating a legible populace facilitated the project of nation building, see James Scott, 
Seeing Like a State.  
8 The U.S. Supreme Court agrees. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court ruled that American Indian nations 
retained the right to determine membership criteria.  
9 Stark, “Marked by Fire”: 134.  
10 For example, as Heidi Stark explains, Ojibweg and Menomonee established kinship ties that allowed each people 
to hunt in the other’s territory. In contrast, the lack of relationships with the Dakota People frequently led to conflict 
between Anishinaabeg and Dakota concerning land and resources. Stark, “Marked by Fire”: 127, 133. Stark notes 
that “the kinship and sociopolitical obligations that motivated some Native nations to allow access into their 
territories also served to prevent access into their lands and often led to warfare, most prevalently seen between the 
Anishinaabe and the Dakota.” Stark, “Marked by Fire,” 133.  
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place, to doodem, to the Creator-given language and ceremonies, and to shared aadizookananag 
that facilitated these relationships—and it meant the responsibility to maintain those resources 
for one’s kin in the past, present, and future.11 
Logging and Allotment on the Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation 
 During the period generally associated with allotment and land loss, the Lac Courte 
Oreilles Ojibweg continued to act as a sovereign People. They challenged Settler policies—
allotment rolls, hunting and gathering restrictions, cultural suppression—that sought to 
undermine aspects of their autonomy. At Lac Courte Oreilles, Ojibweg men and women forced 
the Settler government to recognize their criteria for determining who was and was not Ojibwe, 
relying on kinship networks and behavior rather than blood quantum. Additionally, they resisted 
Settler efforts to divide and reduce their land base by asserting relational concepts of land usage 
and resource access rights. 
 The Lac Courte Oreilles People’s experiences with outsiders and logging before 
allotment shaped their concerns about belonging. During the fur trade, Ojibweg men and women 
frequently formed business relationships with non-Ansihinaabeg, taking advantage of resources 
for material and political purposes. Ojibweg men and women generally set the terms of these 
partnerships. Likewise, they negotiated with Settlers to allow logging on their land, leasing land 
to traders and other entrepreneurs incorporated into their alliance networks through marriage. 
The 1837 Pine Tree treaty was, from an Ojibwe perspective, a contract that allowed Settlers 
                                                 
11 Johnson, Ojibwe Stories; Peacock, Ojibwe Waasaa Inaabidaa; Child, Holding Our World Together; Miller, 
Ogimaag.  
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access to “Shingwakwang” (pine timber) and protected Ojibweg rights to the waters, game, and 
ininaatig (maple trees).12  
Following the creation of the reservation, logging remained an appealing means of 
diversifying their subsistence and strengthening their network of relationships. Ojibweg relied on 
their own understandings of land use to direct how they interacted with loggers. As an 1864 
petition reminded the United States, Ojibwe timber contracts had long included strict and 
articulate limits: access to timber but not rice, restraints on what types of trees loggers could cut, 
and a finite time period in which the Ojibwe loaned the rivers and the land to Settler loggers.13 In 
1872, Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag negotiated a contract with William A. Rust “to cut and 
remove pine timber from said reservation for a period of five years.” This contract drew on a 
long history with non-Anishinaabeg. The Lac Courte Oreilles saw themselves as equal partners 
in the alliance with Rust. The 1872 contract allowed Rust to cut as much pine as he wanted each 
year for $10,000 per year. After three years of logging, however, Rust paid a mere $675, or 75 
cents to each of the 900 reservation residents. Under the terms of the agreement, however, Rust 
owed the Ojibwe $30,000. Rust failed to honor the reciprocal obligations that had opened access 
to the land, and the Lac Courte Oreilles cut off his access to resources in the future.14 Although 
many Ojibwe continued to view timber as a resource “to live upon,” as gifted by the Creator, the 
agreement with Rust taught Lac Courte Oreilles men and women the dangers of allowing non-
relations access to resources.  
                                                 
12 Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights, 13-19; Ojibwe Treaty Statement, 4.  
13 Ojibwe Treaty Statement, 1-16.  
14 Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Year 1887, 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1887), 229; Anthony Godfrey, A Forest History of Ten Wisconsin Indian 
Reservations Under The Great Lakes Agency: Precontact to the Present (Salt Lake City: U.S. West Research, 
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 In the context of United States and Canadian reservation policies, defining “belonging” in 
the Ojibwe People became a crucial site of the defense of sovereignty.15 Throughout the 
nineteenth century, both the Settler colonial governments of Canada and the United States 
pursued policies meant to dissolve Ojibwe peoplehood. Reservation policy in both the United 
States and Canada sought to reconfigure Native peoplehood into a legible, and therefore 
manageable, taxonomy.16 Treaties comprised one aspect of this process; containment and control 
on reservations represented another phase.17 Lumping neighboring Native Peoples together on a 
single reservation made sense to Settler bureaucrats seeking to reduce the number of entities with 
which they had deal, while at the same time they divided expansive nations such as the Ojibwe 
People into multiple reserves to dismantle the broad social relationships that sustained 
Aboriginal sovereignty. 
 Allotment was the ultimate fulfillment of reservation policy in the United States. In 1887, 
the United States Congress passed the Dawes Act, which carved reservations into individual 
plots of land. The legislation attacked communal landholding as another form of assimilation 
policy, and the promise of fee simple ownership and U.S. citizenship after twenty-five years 
once again demonstrated the government’s intent to dismantle Native peoples like the Ojibwe as 
both cultural and political entities. The Dawes Act also promised to reduce Native landholdings 
by opening up so-called surplus land to settlers and enterprises, such as logging. In terms of a 
                                                 
15 Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 12.  
16 In Seeing Like a State James Scott demonstrates how modern states reorganized the peoples and societiees they 
governed, imposing order to render them legible and thereby facilitating centralized state control. James C. Scott, 
Seeing Like a State, 2.  
17 Historian Andrew Fisher notes that U.S. reservation boundaries “purported to divide kinship networks, reassign 
political loyalties, and restructure group rights”—in other words, to externally re-define the meaning of belonging to 
a People. Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 38. Similarly, historian Gray Whaley discusses how Westerners replaced 
Indigenous conceptions of place and human networks (Illahee) with Settler ones. Whaley, Oregon and the Collapse 
of Illahee.   
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land base, United States allotment came frighteningly close to achieving its goal of erasing 
Indians as a distinct people. Sales of surplus land turned reservations into checkerboards of 
Indian and white ownership, which in the late nineteenth century hindered the ability of Natives 
to exert sovereignty over their own territory and people.18 
 Allotment renewed the threat to the relationships that undergirded Ojibwe peoplehood. 
The 1854 treaty had initially laid the groundwork for allotment. Article III gave the Settler 
government the right to “assign to each head of a family or single person over twenty-one years 
of age, eighty acres of land for his or their separate use.” The parceled land would result in fee 
patents and U.S. citizenship “as fast as the occupants become capable of transacting their own 
affairs.”19 Ogimaag and federal officials finally fixed the ishkonigan’s borders in 1873, and in 
1885, when lingering Settler hopes of clearing the Ojibwe from Wisconsin had faded, the U.S. 
government prepared Lac Courte Oreilles for the division of land. A group of Lac Courte 
Oreilles petitioned the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to reserve a tract of land near the village 
of Pahquahwong (Old Post) for a Catholic church and a school.20 Commissioner John Atkins 
consented, “the NE/4 of the NE/4 of the said section (being the smallest legal subdivisions) will 
be withheld from allotment. This fact should be noted in your tract book.”21 Already officials had 
surveyed the reservation and prepared to distribute the land as individual plots. At the same time, 
                                                 
18 Emily Greenwald, Reconfiguring the Reservation: The Nez Perce, Jicarilla Apaches, and the Dawes Act 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002); C. Joseph Genetin-Pillawa, Crooked Paths to Allotment: 
The Fight over Federal Indian Policy after the Civil War; Stremlau, Sustaining the Cherokee Family; Hoxie, A Final 
Promise; Wilkinson, Blood Struggle.  
19 Treaty of La Pointe, Article III.  
20 O-gah-pay-pe-nase, et al, to the Secretary of the Interior, Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation, 14 March 1885, 
Reports of the Inspection of the Field Jurisdictions, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Roll 24.  
21 Jonathan Atkins to W. R. Durfee, Washington, D.C., 31 March 1885, Reports of the Inspection of the Field 
Jurisdictions, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Roll 25.  
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the Ojibwe of Lac Courte Oreilles demonstrated their determination to manage their territory by 
setting aside land for a church.  
 Allotment opened Ojibwe lands to increased timber extraction. By 1888, the Department 
of Interior investigated logging companies on four reservations: Fond du Lac, Bad River, Lac du 
Flambeau, and Lac Courte Oreilles. Loggers at Lac Courte Oreilles paid $1.00 to $1.50 per foot 
below market price, threatening allottees that if they did not enter into a contract quickly, they 
would lose their land. Within a year after allotment, logging companies removed 28.5 million 
feet of timber from the reservation. Nearly one third of the logs came from the allotments of 
those whom Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibweg considered meyaagizid.22 
 Reservation policies revealed the complexities of defining what it meant to be one of the 
People. In order to distribute land and annuities, both the Canadian and U.S. governments 
created membership lists. These lists, often called rolls, imposed a legalistic, racialized, and 
static definition of membership.23 In the United States, Settler officials relied on blood quantum, 
which had very little to do with Indigenous understandings of identity. Moreover, when Settlers 
registered membership, they targeted the flexibility of Native identities. Individuals could belong 
to only a single tribal entity and receive one allotment or annuity claim, although kinship 
networks often meant that an Indian person maintained connections to multiple Peoples and 
places.24 
 Throughout this process, however, Indian people maintained an active role in defining 
belonging. Partially in response to Native people’s fears that, according to sociologist Eva Marie 
                                                 
22 Testimony of William Rusler, LCO, April 10 1888, Reports of the Inspection of the Field Jurisdictions, National 
Archives Microfilm Publications, Roll 24: 12-13.  
23 Tiya Miles, Ties that Bind: The Story of an AfroCherokee Family in Slavery and Freedom (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2005), 179-189; Fisher, Shadow Tribe; Carter, Aboriginal People and Colonizers; 111.  
24 Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 103-106.  
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Garroute (Cherokee), the government would “pack their rolls with unqualified applicants” as a 
way to dismantle Indigenous sovereignty, the United States Department of the Interior created 
enrollment councils of tribal people to review applications for enrollment.25 Constrained by 
racialized federal definitions based on blood quantum, these councils negotiated internal 
understandings of ties to the People.26 Thus, Ojibweg linked closely defining and defending 
membership or citizenship in the People with nationalism as a strategy for defending 
peoplehood.27 The struggle to define tribal membership was a fight to “preserve their lands as 
distinctly Indian spaces.” It was a matter of sovereignty.28 
 Ojibwe peoplehood excluded meyaagizid from the reciprocal systems that governed 
access to resources. Each April between 1885 and 1888, the people of Lac Courte Oreilles 
gathered in council to protect their reservation by asserting Anishinaabeg principles of identity 
and belonging. Relying on kinship and behavior as standards, the community voted to remove 
from allotment rolls those individuals who had disconnected themselves from Ojibweg relational 
networks. In the winter of 1885, in the middle of logging season, the Lac Courte Oreilles People 
sent a petition to Washington, stating their intent to begin “throwing out the half-breeds not 
living here.”29 Anishinaabeg used the term “half-breed” not to refer to blood but to actions and 
                                                 
25 Garroutte, Real Indians, 21.  
26 Harmon, “Tribal Enrollment Councils,” 183-193; Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 105; Miles, Ties That Bind, 199-203. 
Miles shows how, in the Cherokee case, official definitions of identity conflicted with Cherokee understandings. In 
the case of Shoe Boots’ grandchildren of African and Cherokee descent, for example, the Dawes Commission 
insisted that “black” and “Cherokee” could not overlap and saw no room for Shoe Boots’ mixed but free 
descendants. From a Cherokee perspective, however, kinship networks meant that his grandchildren were 
“deserving of Cherokee citizenship.” She concludes that the Cherokee enrollment council refused to make an 
official judgment under Settler rules that would have denied Shoe Boot’s grandson his citizenship rights as “an act 
of resistance” (199).  
27 Miles, Ties That Bind, 104-111.  
28 Fisher, Shadow Tribe, 105. See also Alexandra Harmon, “Tribal Enrollment Councils.”  
29 N.E. Pero to W.R. Durfee, 26 Mar 1885.  
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relatonships.30 A “half-breed,” a term that implies alienation, lived outside of Ojibwe 
communities and relationships. In Minnesota during the 1860s, for instance, Ojibweg and the 
mixed-descent people considered a person Ojibwe if they lived in an oodena, identified Bagone-
giizhig (Hole in the Day) as their ogimaa, and referred to themselves as Ojibweg. In contrast, 
men and women whose behavior defined them as outsiders—living exclusively with non-
Ojibwe, not associating themselves with Bagone-giizhig or the Ojibwe People—earned the “half-
breed” or “mixed-blood” label.31 Political, social, and economic relationships, rather than blood, 
determined what made one mixed-descent person a “half-breed,” with its implication of being 
meyaagizid, rather than Ojibwe.  
 In response to the 1884 petition, United States officials appointed a Committee of Four 
from the Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaag, which later provided the basis for an elected council.32 
Akiwenziii, an ogimaa who had represented the Lac Courte Oreilles People in the treaty 
negotiations of the previous fifty years, served on the committee. The Committee of Four 
reviewed individual cases and presented them to the general council for a final decision. At the 
first council in April 1885, the Committee of Four created a list of all men, women, and children 
entitled to allotments and matched individuals with selections of land.33 
 In 1886 and 1887, the Lac Courte Oreilles People again met in council and reevaluated 
their lists. The original roll, they claimed, contained “outsiders and men of other tribes,” notably 
                                                 
30 “Half-breed” has a long and complicated history in both treaties and colloquial use. Treuer writes, “Treaty 
terminology and government and tribal discourse has often made clarity about these assumptions in speech and 
writing impossible, rending all labels problematic.” Treuer, The Assassination of Hole in the Day, 174.  
31 Treuer, The Assassination of Hole in the Day, 174.  
32 Danziger, Chippewa of Lake Superior, 125.  
33 Rusler to Gregory, 2 July 1887.  
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the nearby reservation-less St. Croix Ojibwe People.34 They disenrolled at least thirty-five 
individuals in 1886, replacing the names on allotment selections with their Lac Courte Oreilles 
kin. Akiwenziii described these inserted names as “his relatives,” which may have meant 
immediate family but, given the nearly two dozen individuals with a variety of surnames, he may 
also have meant relatives in the more expansive sense of inawemaagan, which implied access to 
rights as one of the People.35 When Agency workers refused to acknowledge the new lists, the 
Lac Courte Oreilles People visited the Farmer in Charge at Reserve and the Indian Agent at 
LaPointe. They sent petitions to the Commissioner and held additional councils.36 Every spring 
for four years, they made decisions about the same people, observing their relationships over 
time. One woman, Mary Arbuckle, made it on the original 1885 list, but subsequent councils in 
1886 and 1887 identified her as an outsider because she did not renew her ties to the ishkonigan 
or the people who lived there. Meanwhile, John LaFave, a mixed-descent Ojibwe who lived at 
least part of the year in Superior, Wisconsin, had his claim to belonging recognized three 
consecutive years.37 In 1887, Misigan (George Buck), a Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaa who 
disagreed with many of the disenrollments, told La Pointe Indian Agent J. T. Gregory, “the 
Indians have had these half-breeds scratched out for to save land for there [sic] children that are 
not of age yet and that are not born yet.”38 Akiwenziii would likely have agreed, but he 
considered preserving the aki for future generations his duty to his People. The ogimaa believed 
the councils made necessary decisions “for the benefit of his people” and remained “opposed to 
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the outsiders coming upon this reserve and cutting the pine off of their lands and then leaving 
their allotments without improving them.”39  
 Council records show the criteria for excluding men and women from the list. The 
ogimaag denied land rights not only to non-resident “half-breeds” but also to “women married to 
white men,” seen as meyaagizid.40 Because of patrilineal doodemag, the children of these 
relationships entered the world without a clan and therefore outside of Anishinaabe definitions of 
belonging. Those who lived within the community could create missing doodem ties through 
active relationships and incorporate themselves into the People. Children whose mothers lived 
separate from the reservation community had no way to integrate themselves. Lac Courte 
Oreilles residents feared that the lack of relationships would lead to the sale of land and 
resources, emphasizing that land usage and resource rights remained tied to relationships among 
the Ojibweg people. Their position as meyaagizid not only suggested that they lacked the 
relationships with land and resources that would prevent their sale to non-Anishinaabeg; it also 
meant that they did not have a right to that land or those resources in the first place.41  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles People defined meyaagizid through a lack of relationships. 
Ogimaag explained that their targets “consider themselves other than Indians when at their 
homes among white people, who have abandoned their tribal relations, and have adopted the 
                                                 
39 Rusler to Gregory, 3 Jan 1887.  
40 LCO Chiefs to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, June 20 1888, Reports of the Inspection of the Field 
Jurisdictions, National Archives Microfilm Publications, Roll 25.  
41 LCO Chiefs to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 2. In Ties That Bind, historian Tiya Miles suggests that the 
Cherokee, who like the Ojibwe convened a committee to decide membership in the Cherokee nation, defined 
belonging along racial lines, at least in regards to black people. She discusses the example of William Shoeboots, 
descendant of a formerly-enslaved black woman and a Cherokee father, whom the Dawes Commission and the 
Cherokee Commission on Citizenship denied belonging. According to Miles, William Shoeboots was “evaluated in 
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rights of suffrage and privileges of citizenship.”42 The ogimaag considered the disenrolled 
meyaagizid not because they had white husbands or fathers but rather because they no longer 
maintained relationships with Anishinaabe kin. These “outsiders” were people “who would never 
thought [sic] of coming on the reservation were it not for the pine timber.”43 The emphasis on 
kinship emerges in even sharper relief when the ogimaag argued for the individuals whom the 
Ojibwe wanted to remain on the allotment lists. They distinguished between kinless “strangers” 
and “those who are away on good reasons.”44 The leaders also wanted to require logging 
companies to hire Ojibwe workers. Here, they specifically mentioned “a number of mixed bloods 
who are efficient and competent scalers,” emphasizing again that kinship and not blood 
determined membership in the Ojibwe people, as well as their access to resources.45 
 Privileging Settler notions of blood quantum and descent, the local Agent ignored the 
Ojibwe People’s sovereign right to determine their own membership. The names of the 
“strangers” remained on the rolls. The Lac Courte Oreilles council, however, secured a 
compromise. They stipulated that the identified meyaagazid must sign a contract promising to 
“build suitable dwellings on their allotments…and make such improvements as would show that 
they had come to the reservation in good faith to make it their future home.”46 In other words, 
with kinship defined as an active relationship and not merely a passive similarity of blood, 
individuals with questionable connections to Anishinaabe land and community had to promise to 
develop these relationships in order to retain rights to the land. Joseph Gurnoe, the mixed-
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descent nephew and adopted son of Lac du Flambeau ogimaa Shingob, wrote the petition to 
fulfill his reciprocal obligations to Lac Courte Oreilles kin, relationships created by his marriage 
to one of the People. “To secure the good will of the Indians I must render service,” he 
explained.47 This good will became particularly important in the context of the conversations 
about belonging and land rights that grew out of allotment. Without these ties, he knew that 
someone would tell him “that I do not belong to this reservation and have no business here, and 
that the land I hold for my children should be held vacant because they are not of age.” Failing to 
cultivate reciprocal bonds would make him an outsider and abrogate his rights to access lands 
and resources such as timber for himself and his children. On the other hand, writing to 
Washington to protest encroachment on Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty demonstrated his 
commitment to the People.48 The Ojibwe at Lac Courte Oreilles could not stop allotment, but 
they influenced it in a way that supported Ojibwe relationships and, by extension, Ojibwe 
sovereignty.  
 Although commercial loggers exploited the Lac Courte Oreilles before allotment, the new 
land policy made it easier for Settlers to acquire Anishinaabe resources. Allotment severed the 
aki from the People’s control and placed it in individual—increasingly non-Indian—hands. In 
particular, allotment disrupted Ojibwe inaakonigewin (law) regarding rights to aki. The ability to 
access resources derived from a person’s position within the network of relationships that 
defined Lac Courte Oreilles peoplehood, and paper lists in Settler archives could neither enact 
nor sustain those living relationships. Throughout the 1880s, Lac Courte Oreilles People 
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expressed their concern about meyaagizid gaining access to lands and resources that belonged to 
inawemaagan, and Akiwenziii and other ogimaag struggled against Settler enrollment practices 
that erased essential relationships. By defining Anishinaabewi in zagaswe’idiwag and pushing 
back against Settler-generated rolls, the Lac Courte Oreilles People prevented allotment from 
radically redefining land use and resource access, maintaining the continuity of their sovereignty. 
Kin and non-Kin at St. Peter’s Ishkonigan 
 As at Lac Courte Oreilles, the St. Peter's People asserted their definitions of belonging 
within the context of contested power. Reservation policies extended into the internal workings 
of the People, threatening the ability to control access to land and resources. The St. Peter’s 
People defined their peoplehood against that of the Maškēkowak, with whom they shared the 
ishkonigan. Settler intrusions such as mandated reserve-wide elections and administration of 
timber and annuities conflicted with Saulteaux understandings of who had rights to resources and 
power as one of the People.    
As in the United States, Canadian officials wrote down rolls that racialized and 
immobilized membership in Indigenous Peoples. Similar to blood quantum, Canada’s Indian Act 
of 1876 relied on rigidly-defined categories to constrain First Nation individuals’ identities. The 
act narrowly defined “Indian” as individuals listed in the Indian Register. These men and women 
were “Status” Indians whose rights as members of a sovereign People the Canadian government 
protected. The act also differentiated between Métis and Status Indians and revoked status from 
women who married non-Indian men, the children of Settler or Métis men and Native mothers, 
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and men who renounced their membership in their People to gain enfranchisement as Canadian 
citizens.49 
 During the 1820s, a group of Maškēkowak (northern, or Swampy, Cree) traveled from 
York Factory on Hudson Bay to the Red River settlement. They approached Peguis and asked to 
buy land so they could settle in the agriculturally rich trading center. The ogimaa agreed to allow 
these families to purchase settlement rights in his People’s territory. Miskoopenais, one of 
Peguis’s fellow ogimaag, remembered, “They bought land from Peguis, some three chains, some 
six chains, and lived there.”50 Their purchase of land, however, did not mean that the Saulteaux 
and Maškēkowak merged. The Saulteaux viewed their Cree neighbors in the same way as the 
French and other Settlers who increasingly moved to the area: potential allies within a broad 
network of relationships, but distinct.  
 Many Maškēkowak joined the Saulteaux in marriage, linking them through mutual 
obligations, but the Ojibwe People at St. Peter’s Reserve did not absorb their new neighbors. At 
times, relationships grew contentious, indicating that the Swampies remained meyaagizid. The 
Ojibwe often saw the Cree as dangerous conjurers who used their power to threaten 
Anishinaabeg. The Swampies likewise distrusted Ojibwe manidoo.51 The two communities also 
pursued separate methods of sustaining their communities. The Maškēkowak quickly engaged in 
sedentary agriculture on their newly acquired land and cultivated close relationships with 
missionaries by converting to Christianity.52 In 1830, Peguis responded to Settler officials’ 
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51 Peers, Plains Ojibwe, 139. See Cary Miller’s Ogimaag for a discussion of the role of manidoo (power) and 
spiritual leaders in Ojibwe leadership. 
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requests that they follow the Maškēkowak’s example by distinguishing himself and his people 
from the “half breeds and Swampies.” He continued, “It would be contrary with us were we to 
adapt [sic] the same customs. This new mode of life is different from that of my ancestors. I have 
followed them I wish to follow them and I shall follow them as long as I can.”53 The 
Maškēkowak and Saulteaux remained so different, according to Peguis, that the same actions 
would yield opposite results. He preferred to rely on aadizookananag, ceremonies, and resource 
use that he could link to his ancestors, unshared by the Maškēkowak.  
 Most important, the Maškēkowak did not join the Ojibwe at St. Peter’s in Treaty One. 
The Maškēkowak were recent arrivals to the area, and they lived on Ojibwe land—land that was 
therefore not theirs to cede. Only Ojibweg ogimaag, led by Mis-Koo-Kinew (or Henry Prince, 
Peguis’s son), represented the community.54 During the negotiations, Mis-Koo-Kinew and other 
Ojibweg representatives did not consider themselves beholden to the concerns of the Swampy 
Crees. They remained separate, and the ogimaag from St. Peter’s derived their authority 
exclusively from the Ojibweg men and women.55  
 After the treaty, the Settler government began to treat the Maškēkowak and Saulteaux as 
one cohesive entity. Since both groups lived within the same reserve boundaries, it made 
bureaucratic sense for the Canadian government, a new nation trying to extend its authority 
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within its own expanding borders, to consider them a single unit.56 The Ojibwe People at St. 
Peter’s, however, objected to this assault on their sovereignty. At a time of increased pressure 
from local Settlers and the Canadian government, determining the human borders of their People 
took on increased importance, for such boundaries determined access to land and resources as 
well as to economic, political, and cultural power.  
 The conversation about who comprised the People took place in the context of external 
threats to Saulteaux sovereignty. The Saulteaux at St. Peter’s soon realized that the Canadian 
government either misunderstood or misrepresented the terms of the treaty negotiated by both 
parties in 1871. Two years later, Ojibweg refused to accept their annuity payments because “the 
other promises that were made to them had not been fulfilled.”57 They remembered that the 
exchange for ceding their land included “two sets of clothing (summer and winter) every year” 
and an annuity of six dollars per person rather than three dollars.58 Their protests, as well as the 
reminders of other Ojibweg and Cree signatories, forced the Canadian legislature to amend the 
treaty to reflect the “outside promises” that the Native Peoples saw as an essential part of the 
treaty process.59 
 The unsanctioned sale of land threatened Saulteaux peoplehood. The alienation of land 
was possible in part because of Canadian allotment policies that allowed individual Indians and 
mixed-bloods to apply for fee patented allotments, exchanging citizenship in their Native nation 
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for Canadian citizenship.60 Canada incorporated allotment into its treaties. While individual 
landownership was rarely enforced in the 1880s, Canadian allotment determined reserve size 
based on 160-acre plots per person, and the practice of granting fee simple to Métis men and 
women and others deemed “competent” accelerated the process of privatizing First Nations 
landholdings.61 The policy reduced the size of Native landholdings and opened reserves to non-
Indian settlement, often contradicting what First Nations understood as the terms of their 
treaties.62 Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the Peguis People challenged the sale of reserve 
lands. As a result, the Department of Indian Affairs informed dozens of frustrated settlers that the 
reserve lands they believed they had purchased “could not be sold to any white man or half-breed 
without the approval of the Government and consent of the band, and that the price paid by 
parties who had bought land from individual Indians would be lost to them.”63  
 Meanwhile, on St. Peter’s Reserve, the fluid identities of Ojibweg men and women 
thwarted Canadian attempts to reduce Indian identity to bureaucratic categories. The Indian Act 
of 1876 offered mixed-descent families the option of withdrawing from treaty to obtain “half-
breed scrip,” patent to a 160-acre plot of land and a rejection of Indian status. However, Ojibweg 
men and women continued to identify themselves in ways that crossed these categories. While 
the Settler legislature debated the act, Ojibweg at St. Peter’s expressed concern over their 
relationships that defied the act’s constraints.64 For instance, the act sought to impose a single 
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category of belonging on families by tying women’s status to that of their husbands. One of the 
fears underlying the act was that unscrupulous non-Indian men would marry Indian women to 
access annuity payments and reserved resources. Yet, an Ojibwe woman from St. Peter’s married 
to a Métis or Settler man did not automatically lose her ties with the Ojibwe community.  
 As at Lac Courte Oreilles, the Ojibweg of St. Peters believed they could assess one’s 
belonging for themselves. Questions from the St. Peter’s community about the status of their 
individual relationships overwhelmed Commissioner Provencher. “Many applications have been 
made for information on each of these points, and the many difficulties that might arise with 
regards to them make me desire that I should soon be able to give to the interested parties a 
decisive and final answer,” he wrote.65 Often, a mixed-descent “husband alone has asked to have 
his name struck off, so as to have the right to vote at election and to dispose of his property, 
when his wife and children would continue to draw the annuity.”66 While the motives behind 
such mixed-status arrangements may have been exploitative, from an Anishinaabe perspective 
they allowed for intersecting layers of identity. Mixed-status marriages continued strategic ties to 
multiple communities, building on the networks of the fur trade.67 Many mixed-blood families 
never withdrew from the treaty or took scrip. After the Stone Fort Treaty of 1871, Canadian 
officials noted, “A very few only decided upon taking their grants as half-breeds,” instead 
following kinship ties to affirm their membership in the Ojibwe people.68 In 1893, the St. Peter’s 
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People welcomed home Reverend Baptiste Spence and his family, including his sons and 
widowed daughter-in-law. The Spence family sought an official transfer in their annuity 
registration from Islington Reserve where Reverend Spence was working to St. Peter’s, “to 
which reserve they formerly belonged,” and where they still had family. The transfer entitled 
them not only to the annuity payments of the St. Peter’s band but also “all the rights enjoyed by 
said band.”69 Several years previously, son John Spence had withdrawn from the treaty in 
exchange for a Métis land grant, but he applied along with his relatives for membership at St. 
Peter’s. Apparently, revoking his treaty status and obtaining the patent to his land failed to 
separate him from the Ojibwe People. The Saulteaux People at St. Peter’s, less concerned with 
bureaucratic categories, consented to the transfer. Presumably, they understood John Spence in 
the context of his kin relationships rather than the delineations of the Indian Act, and these 
relationships made him one of the People. Ultimately, the Indian Department barred Spence’s 
enrollment, demonstrating the gap between Saulteaux and Settler definitions of membership.70 
For the Saulteaux, honoring flexible kinship networks advanced their peoplehood against 
bureaucratic categories that sought to legislate the Saulteaux and their sovereignty out of 
existence.  
 Within this context of Settler encroachment and contested land and resources, the 
Saulteaux continued to differentiate themselves from the Maškēkowak. The Maškēkowak 
occupied an uncertain position between inawemaagan and meyaagizid. Before the treaty of 1871, 
the alliance between the Maškēkowak and Saulteaux served both Peoples. Now that the 
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ishkonigan placed limits on Saulteaux lands and resources, however, the contours of the alliance 
shifted. Peguis descendent and ogimaa Henry Prince chose a familiar Anishinaabe strategy; he 
formed an alliance with the Maškēkowak, in part through his and his sons’ marriage to 
Maškēkowak women. Like other alliances that came before it, including his father Peguis’ 
relationship with the Selkirk Settlers, this union had the potential to protect Saulteaux 
peoplehood by integrating Maškēkowak families into the People.71 
 The first request for the Canadian government to recognize the separation between the 
Saulteaux and Maškēkowak Peoples came in August of 1874. A group of Ojibweg living near 
Netley Creek in the northern half of reserve approached the Minister of the Interior when he 
visited St. Peter’s to investigate contested land claims. Four Saulteaux men—Miskoopenais, 
Muskogoose, George Reysas, and Indegow—led the Netley Creek families. They insisted “that 
their Reserve was too small” and “the Band did not live harmoniously.” The only possible 
solution was “a Division of the Reserve.”72 Despite the connections of intermarriage and the 
shared threat of Settler intrusions, the land remained, from the perspective of many Ojibweg, part 
of Anshinaabewaki. Their relationships with the land—the land of their ancestors—intertwined 
with their understanding of sovereignty. They possessed the power and the right to decide how to 
allocate the land and its attendant resources. Since that was a primary function of authority, 
Ojibweg men and women should lead the government.  
 The Department of Indian Affairs failed to recognize the conflict as an international or 
inter-People dispute. Instead, local Agent Alexander Muckle, Commissioner Provencher, and 
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Inspector of Indian Agencies E. McColl relied on well worn explanations about “progressives” 
versus “traditionals.”73 Indeed, as in the 1830s, an observable difference existed between 
Saulteaux and Maškēkowak relationships with the market economy. Inspector McColl described 
Ojibweg as “hunters and warriors” who “find it hard to settle down to farming (none of them 
grow wheat or oats),” while the Swampy Crees “all farm” and “[m]ost of them live at home.” 
The mixed, seasonally based economy of gardening, gathering, and gaming that McColl 
described fit with Ojibweg sacred understandings of resource use and ceremonial cycles.74 In 
reality, the divide had little to do with religion or traditionalism. More than half of the Indians on 
St. Peter’s Reserve attended either Presbyterian or Catholic services. As Anishinaabeg scholars 
have repeatedly demonstrated, Christianity and Ojibweg sacred history and ceremonial cycles 
were compatible.75 Ojibweg communities dealt with religious differences, not without conflict, 
but without threatening Ojibwe peoplehood.76 Not every Ojibwe person at St. Peter’s supported 
dividing the ishkonigan. For example, Peguis’ son Henry Prince, who signed the Stone Fort 
Treaty and under Settler-imposed reserve policies was later elected chief, strongly objected to 
any partition.77 Nevertheless, the disagreement was not about religion or farming. At its core, the 
dispute about dividing the reserve concerned who belonged to the Ojibwe People.  
 Ojibweg at St. Peter’s asked the Canadian government to recognize a separation that 
already existed: the two distinct Peoples of the Ojibweg and the Maškēkowak. Agent Muckle, 
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who himself owned a lot adjacent to the reserve and had lived there for several years before 
applying to become agent, recognized that the divide extended beyond denominational 
squabbling. “The division of the Band between Christians and Heathen, cannot, I believe, be 
applied as a rule for the separation of the St. Peters Reserve,” he cautioned. He noted that both 
communities contained a mixture of converted and unconverted men and women. Muckle 
apparently remained unable to articulate the root of the difference, but he suggested that the 
people of the reserve were best qualified to decide their allegiance. Thus, “[t]he question of 
residence, as selected by the heads of family would afford the only practical way” of dividing the 
band.78  
 In a letter to the Minister of the Interior, Henry Prince identified the underlying issue. 
The Saulteaux seeking the split objected when Prince “took two kinds, different tribes of Indians 
for my Councillors, that is Crees Swampies—and pure Indians [Anishinaabeg].”79 From the 
perspective of the pro-separation Saulteaux, the inclusion of Maškēkowak leaders on the council 
usurped Saulteaux authority. Prince himself considered the Saulteaux and the Maškēkowak 
“different tribes,” and his use of “pure Indians” reveals his Anishinaabe perspective and defied 
colonial ideas regarding mixed-bloods and full-bloods.80 While Prince found a sufficient network 
of reciprocal relationships to unite himself and his People with the Maškēkowak as members of 
the St. Peter’s Reserve, other Saulteaux, including Miskoopenais and Indegow, saw the 
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Maškēkowak as meyaagizid, unconnected to the Saulteaux People and therefore without right to 
serve as councilors.  
 One of the main contentions of the Saulteauxx seeking formal separation concerned the 
distribution of resources. One petitioner objected “that they had not received their share of the 
agricultural implements and nets” from Chief Prince.81 Prince admitted to withholding these 
goods but argued that “he had been told [by Agent Muckle] that the implements for farming were 
only to be given to those who had made improvements, he did not consider those who were 
unsettled, had any claim on them.”82 From the Netley Creek Saulteaux’s perspective, which 
conceived of a People without the Maškēkowak, a council that contained Crees had no business 
allocating resources that by right belonged to Ojibweg men and women. Additionally, 
Miskoopenais, Indegow, and their followers protested “that the Indians on the south part of the 
Reserve were selling land and coming on his part.”83 These Maškēkowak, concentrated on the 
southern portion of the reserve, violated relational conceptions of resource access and use. The 
petitioners’ goal was to preserve Ojibwe sovereignty by protecting land and resources and the 
boundaries of their People. 
 Likewise, ogimaa Henry Prince believed he acted in the best interests of the Ojibweg 
people.84 At a meeting with the Minister of the Interior on August 19, 1874, Prince “said that if 
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the Band should be divided those who were dissatisfied must receive their land outside of the 
reserve.”85 He objected to the redistribution of reserve lands under any terms. Prince had signed 
Treaty One, which created the reserve, only three years earlier. Dividing the reserve must have 
seemed like a dangerous precedent, a threat to the territorial protection he secured on behalf of 
his People. From his perspective, Settlers exploiting reserve resources proved the most pressing 
threat. Prince “complained that white men were cutting hay and wood on the Reserve, that he 
had sent two men to represent them to the Commissioner, and that nothing had been done.”86 
Prince, who had integrated Maškēkowak into Saulteaux kinship networks via marriage with 
himself and his sons, hoped to absorb the Maškēkowak into Saulteaux relationships and thereby 
avoid displacing Saulteaux sovereignty. He maintained a distinction between the Maškēkowak 
and “pure Indians,” but a unified ishkonigan served as a political strategy in the face of Settler 
encroachment.87  
 Miskoopenais, Indegow, and the other pro-division Ojibweg seemed to convince the 
Canadian officials. In April of 1875, the Minster of Interior approved Muckle’s proposal to allow 
the reserve’s residents to choose their own membership by their residence in either the north or 
south sections of the reserve, which would then be apportioned according to the number of those 
who moved. The next month, he placed a surveyor “at [Provencher’s] disposal.”88 The division, 
however, fell through and the question of who belonged to the Ojibwe People remained 
unresolved. 
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 The Maškēkowak raised the issue of separation next. In 1888, a group of Swampy Cree 
filed a petition listing their grievances against the Ojibweg People and demanding autonomy. 
Their leaders included William Asham, the son of a Swampy Cree mother and British father who 
identified as Maškēkowak. “Our neighbors the Saulteause [sic] tell us that the government did 
not treat with us but with them and therefore that we have no right to claim here,” the 
Maškēkowak wrote.89 For the same reason, Saulteaux leaders argued “that we are not entitled to 
elect a Swampy Cree as chief or councillor.” Asham and the other Maškēkowak objected to 
being treated as meyaagizid on their own reserve, although they, too, recognized a difference 
between themselves and the Saulteaux People. Appealing to the Minister of the Interior, they 
framed their request in terms of their desire to escape “the tyranny and dictation of the almost 
untutored and unreasoning savage”—the Saulteaux—and emphasized a Settler-friendly religious 
division between the Catholic Saulteaux and Protestant Cree. Their demands, however, were the 
same as the Ojibweg living near Netley Creek: a division of land, a separate chief and council 
“of our own people,” and the ability to determine their own access to resources in “the hay 
grounds and wood lands.”90 In other words, the Maškēkowak wanted the Canadian government 
to recognize their autonomous peoplehood. Canadian officials dismissed the petition, and the 
Maškēkowak chose not to renew their request—most likely because the next election went in 
their favor.91  
 The 1891 election for chief and council shifted the balance of power on the reserve. 
William Asham, son of a Settler father and Maškēkowak mother fully integrated into the 
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Maškēkowak community, won the election for chief. For the first time, a Maškēkowak controlled 
the political leadership on St. Peter’s Reserve. The council, too, contained two Maškēkowak and 
only one Ojibwe.92  
 Threatened by meyaagizid dominance of Settler-sanctioned reserve leadership, Ojibweg 
renewed efforts to separate the two Peoples. Miskoopenais again led the fight for control of their 
peoplehood. When Asham and the other Swampies complained that the Saulteaux “have now 
gone as far as to say that we are a parcel of thieves,” they did not exaggerate Saulteaux 
understandings of their relationship with the Maškēkowak. An 1891 petition from several dozen 
Ojibweg asserted that the Maškēkowak, as meyaagizid, had no claim to reserve lands and 
resources or to the annuities that derived from the cession thereof, “but only to the land they 
bought from Peguis. They had no land to sell here, and when treaties were made at York Factory, 
then, only then, had the Swampies a right to get up and talk to the Government about land.”93 
Any appropriation of those resources without Ojibweg permission was, from an Anishinaabe 
perspective, a form of theft because the Maškēkowak did not belong to the Ojibwe People at St. 
Peter’s. The reserve belonged to the Saulteaux, and they did not intend to allow meyaagizid to 
govern it.  
 Again, resource access and membership were closely related. In the petitions that 
followed during the next four years, the Ojibwe People linked the abuse of timber lands with 
their refusal to accept the Maškēkowak as part of their People. One petition signed by eighty-one 
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Ojibweg men claimed that “if there is no Division they [the Maškēkowak] will come down 
amongst us to cut and hall [sic] off the wood as they have done in the upper part we are looking 
for our Children’s interest and our selfs [sic] for time to come if our reserve is cleaned off [sic] 
the wood what is gone [sic] to become of our children[?]”94 This concern matched the 
conversation among the Lac Courte Oreilles People. Outside the relational nexus of reciprocal 
obligations, the lack of ties between the Maškēkowak and the land—between the Maškēkowak 
and the Ojibwe People who shared this land with them—put Anishinaabewaki and its resources 
at risk.  
 The Indian Department dismissed the Saulteux’s request as they had the 
Maškēkowaks’.95 Settler officials saw squabbling factions of Indians, not two distinct Peoples 
with legitimate claims.  
Meanwhile, to consolidate their power, the Maškēkowak leadership tried a new tactic: 
moving the treaty grounds. The Indian residents of St. Peter’s Reserve received their annuity 
payments on the northern side of Netley Creek where a majority of Saulteaux families lived, 
while Swampy Cree families concentrated further south. Maškēkowak leaders phrased their 
proposed move to the East Protestant School in terms the Settler government would appreciate. 
“Our reason for this request is,” Chief Asham argued, “some of our Indians who have gardens 
poultry pigs and other things which require daily attendance cannot conveniently leave places of 
abode for to lay a time and to such a distance without loss to some of us.”96 Nonetheless, it was a 
political move. Treaty days were significant annual events. In a community where people 
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remained mobile for much of the year, the camps on the treaty grounds every July were one of 
the few opportunities for the community to congregate. Treaty days fit into a pattern of seasonal 
gatherings and became a time for reaffirming kinship ties, for participating in ceremonies, for 
honoring their land through the recognition of their treaty, and for conducting politics. The 
democratic chieftainship and council continued to allow for dispersed authority, and any leaders 
including Asham needed widespread consent. Even a slightly greater distance to travel may have 
prevented some Ojibweg families from attending the gathering. More importantly, moving the 
treaty grounds into what had become essentially Maškēkowak territory served as a display of 
power and a claim to the land and resources of the reserve.  
 The Saulteaux seeking separation recognized the threat to their sovereignty. They offered 
a counterproposal: multiple camps.97 For a People seeking independent recognition, securing 
their own treaty grounds may have seemed like acknowledgement of their independent authority. 
Additionally, because of the importance of treaty camps as gatherings that reaffirmed social 
relationships, a separate site would have allowed them to cultivate an authority outside the 
official chief and council. Not to mention, a second location in an Ojibwe-dominated region of 
the reserve would provide the opportunity to come together as a People, without the 
Maškēkowak—and, presumably, to gather support for the split.  
 Despite the Maškēkowak-aligned council’s protests, the Department of Indian Affairs 
agreed to three annuity sites, one more than requested. Inspector McColl argued that large 
encampments “contribute to numerous disorders and scandals among those assembled.”98 
Similarly, the Deputy Superintendent of Indian Affairs approved the decision, commenting that 
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“the nearer to their homes the payment is made, the less interruption there will be to their work, 
and the tendency will certainly be to avoid objectionable features connected with a large 
assemblage.”99 Their reasons were paternalistic and ultimately intended to undermine both 
Saulteaux and Maškēkowak sovereignty, contributing to the progress of civilization programs 
that ultimately remove the need for treaty days and reserves. Nevertheless, the St. Peter’s People 
used the creative space generated by Settler policies to protect their sovereignty.  
 Because the Canadian government ignored Ojibweg claims to an independent 
sovereignty, many of the St. Peter’s People’s concerns remained unresolved. The Maškēkowak 
retained access to resources such as wood and land—access that Ojibweg could not control and 
could not rely on the ties of inawemaagan to protect. The reserve chief and council actively 
managed these resources, so as control of the leadership shifted between the two Peoples, so did 
the calls for separation. Rejecting the constraints of Settler administrative categories, Ojibwe 
ogimaag continued to speak “on behalf of the Saulteaux Indians of St Peters Band.”100 If they 
could not achieve official separation, they could still differentiate themselves as a People distinct 
from the Maškēkowak. The conflict about belonging to the People never made its way to the St. 
Peter’s rolls. Instead, ogimag protected Saulteaux relationships through the elections that became 
a part of Settler reserve policy and by claiming autonomous spaces on their ancestral land.  
Turtle Mountain People in Transition 
 In the first decades following the creation of their reservation, the Turtle Mountain 
Ojibwe were a People in transition. These changes arose not from Settler colonialism, although 
the pressures of encroachment intensified their significance, but rather from the centuries-long 
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expansion of Anishinaabewaki and its People. The emerging community on the western edges of 
Ojibwe territory incorporated diverse demographics: Ojibweg families who had pursued buffalo 
and other economic opportunities onto the prairies, Métis or Michif relatives, and Cree, 
Assiniboine, Ottawa, and even Settler kin. They came together in the Turtle Mountains without 
regard for the colonial border between the United States and Canada, and increasingly they 
identified as a distinct Anishinaabe People with rights to a ten-million-acre swath of wooded 
hills, clear blue lakes, and fertile meadows. Divisions, however, existed within broader networks 
of kin, in part between those who identified as Michif and those who identified primarily as 
Ojibwe; it was not always clear who counted as inawemaagan and who as meyaagizid. When the 
United States treaty commissioners arrived in 1892 to negotiate reservation boundaries and 
compensation for millions of acres of unceded lands that had already been occupied by an 
expanding Settler population, the people of Turtle Mountain had to determine those distinctions. 
Amidst the heightened stakes of the illegal diminishment of their homeland, the Turtle Mountain 
People worked out who was one of the People.  
 As with the People of Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain Ojibwe 
expanded by relying on and forging alliances with neighbors. Integrating allies and relatives had 
enabled Ojibwe expansion since they left the Atlantic coast, and the move onto the prairies was 
no different. Cross-border buffalo hunts built relationships between Ojibwe and Métis or Michif 
kin.101 Cooperation facilitated access to increasingly scarce beaver and buffalo in a larger 
territory, and the mutual pursuit in turn reconfirmed kinship relationships. They relied on each 
other not only for hunting but also to fight the Dakota, into whose territory they expanded. The 
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combination of declining buffalo populations, U.S. refusal to recognize mixed-descent land 
rights, and two failed campaigns against the Canadian government by Métis led by Louis Riel 
encouraged many of the people living near the Red River to move to join their kin near the Turtle 
Mountain reservation or further west in Montana.102 Differences persisted. For instance, while 
some adopted the Michif language on the reservation as a common language that gave voice to 
their new identity, other Ojibweg interpreted speaking Michif as an attack on their autonomy.103 
Many Michif and Métis also had more experience with large-scale farming, leading to differing 
perspectives on land use. Despite disagreements, the shared experiences of buffalo and battles 
became embedded in Michif and Ojibwe oral history, binding relatives and allies through stories 
and lived relationships into the Turtle Mountain People.104 
  Settler intrusions exacerbated the tensions between the coalescing groups. Intent on their 
own nation-building, the United States and Canada imposed their borders across Indigenous 
Peoples and insisted that men and women in this mobile borderland belonged either to Canada or 
the United States.105 Moreover, the United States used reservation boundaries to further divide 
and reduce the number of Indigenous Peoples. In 1880, the federal government opened a land 
office in unceded Turtle Mountain territory in 1880. Two years later, when they secured their 
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executive order reservation, the Turtle Mountain People lived throughout an approximately 15.5 
thousand square mile region south of the U.S.-Canada border, as well as on an unspecified extent 
of land in what had become Manitoba. The various communities remained connected by seasonal 
movements, with extended families gathering on the prairies to gather roots and pick buffalo 
bones during the summer and people traveling to visit relatives throughout the year.106 In 
October 1882, the land office began accepting claims on homesteads for the thousands of settlers 
seeking land in the Dakotas.107 The federal government supported these Settlers by further 
constricting Turtle Mountain land. In 1884, a second executive order unilaterally and without 
compensation reduced the reservation to two townships or twelve by six miles, a mere ten 
percent of the original reservation and utterly insufficient for the approximately two thousand 
men, women, and children who claimed affiliation with the Turtle Mountain People.108 Between 
the executive order and the opening of the land to Settlers, Turtle Mountain families living at 
Walhalla (previously St. Joseph), Devil’s Lake, Dunseith, and St. Johns suddenly became 
outsiders in their own homeland, at least from the perspective of the United States government. 
Farmer in Charge E. W. Brenner, once an officer in the U.S. army, repeatedly referred to those 
whose homes fell beyond the now-reduced reservation’s boundaries as “outsiders.”109 “Outside,” 
however, was a fiction created by Settler imaginations, furthering the goals of dispossession via 
confinement. United States officials instructed the men and women living beyond the 
reservation’s townships to file claims to their unceded territory with the Devils Lake land office. 
Many Ojibweg refused to do so. They saw no reason to file claims on land that “belonged to 
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them anyhow.”110 Unable to physically contain the Turtle Mountain population, Settler policies 
sought to draw bureaucratic lines around who counted as Indian. 
 The Turtle Mountain People refused to allow federal officials to exclude mixed-descent 
and Canadian-born Ojibweg from their rights in the People. Led by a council under Little Shell, 
the People sought redress for unilaterally appropriated lands. When Special Indian Agent Cyrus 
Beede visited the reservation in 1883, he pressed the People to exchange their reservation for 
individual public domain allotments. When Beede told them that the U.S. government would 
never recognize “Canadian Indians” as part of the Turtle Mountain People, they insisted on the 
inclusion of “those members on the Canadian side of the line” in rights to the reservation and any 
payments or allotments from land ceded in the future.111 This visit also revealed disagreements, 
in particular about land use. Many people who identified as Métis expressed a willingness for 
individual wheat farming, perhaps influenced by their success with wheat near Pembina, whereas 
other Ojibweg preferred to retain the land in common.112  
 While these differences persisted, as they had at both Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s, 
the Turtle Mountain People continued to define belonging for themselves. In the winter of 1890, 
Brenner limited the ration list to those he deemed “full-bloods.” The community responded 
immediately, insisting on the right of all the people to rations. At a general council meeting, the 
men and women of Turtle Mountain “decided that they wanted rations for everybody or they 
                                                 
110 Brenner to Cramsie, Aug. 23, 1889, Letters Received, Turtle Mountain Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA 
Kansas City, MO.  
111 Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 78-79.  
112 Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 77.  
  
149 
 
would not let [Brenner] issue rations to anybody.”113 The decision reflected an understanding of 
belonging linked to reciprocal kinship obligations and asserted Anishinaabe peoplehood. 
 The issues of land and belonging remained linked. The Turtle Mountain People sent an 
almost constant stream of petitions and letters to officials in Washington reiterating that they had 
made no formal cessions.114 U.S. negotiators visited the reservation in 1890, suggesting removal 
to White Earth as solution. The Turtle Mountain People refused. The reality of Settler occupation 
of unceded territory and the uncertainty of the U.S. government’s response caused disagreement 
among the coalescing groups within the Turtle Mountain People. By 1884, a Grand Council led 
by Little Shell represented the People’s interests to the United States government. Little Shell, 
who himself lived between Manitoba, North Dakota, and Montana, continued to insist on 
incorporating all his kin, regardless of their previous residence. In keeping with his position, the 
council included a significant number of Michifs with ties to Canada, which some Turtle 
Mountain People worried would jeopardize their efforts to convince the United States to 
negotiate a treaty.115 U.S. officials unwaveringly stated that so-called Canadian Indians had no 
rights on the south side of the line, and they sent troubling signals about the position of mixed-
descent men and women. Scrip promises for mixed-descent relatives after the Old Crossing 
Treaty in 1863 had fallen apart. Voicing the federal perspective, Brenner complained that the 
“half-breeds,” whom he did not consider real Indians, were “endeavoring to force on the 
government a claim for support, to which they are in no way entitled.”116 The question for the 
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People of Turtle Mountain, then, became who could present a case that the United States would 
hear.  
 Many of the mixed-descent populations throughout the Turtle Mountain region worried 
about protecting their rights against Settler violations. The United States had no official or 
consistent corollary to Métis status, which in Canada offered at least a form of sovereignty and 
acknowledgement of rights to the land. Southern mixed-descent Ojibwe therefore lacked legal 
protection of their rights, an increasingly precarious situation as Settler expansion transformed 
them into squatters in their own homelands. Many of the mixed-descent men and women, who 
may have crossed borders in their own lives but nonetheless met Settler definitions of American, 
wanted to reach an agreement with the United States that recognized and protected their 
Indigenous status. From their perspective, the best way to ensure they protected their 
relationships with their People and their land was by excluding their more newly-arrived 
neighbors from the North.117  
 Out of these questions of belonging emerged the Council of Thirty-Two. On September 
17, 1890, shortly after the disagreements about “outsiders” receiving rations and cutting hay, a 
new entity called the Council of Thirty-Two approached Brenner in his Belcourt office. They 
asked Brenner to write to Washington about sending a commission so they could “know what 
their future might be.”118 With their concerns clearly focused on negotiating a treaty, this council 
formed without Little Shell or a single representative of the Canadian community. By the arrival 
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of the McCumber Commission, the Council consisted of sixteen mixed-bloods and sixteen full-
bloods.  
 Little Shell, meanwhile, maintained his separate council. Along with other ogimaa 
included Red Bear, recognized as a leader in the Old Crossing Treaty of 1863, Little Shell 
asserted that mixed-descent Ojibweg possessed full rights in the People. He brought his brother-
in-law, recently arrived from Canada, to the agency at Belcourt and told Brenner to put his 
relative on the ration rolls.119 At a Grand Council in 1892, they appointed John Bottineau, who 
came from a mixed-descent family, as their official attorney, viewing him as someone capable of 
representing their interests. . He had received mixed-blood scrip as part of the Old Crossing 
Treaty and had continued to reside with the Turtle Mountain People. The Grand Council also 
voiced their intent to continue to recognize the rights of all mixed-descent relations with no 
reference to international boundary lines.120 While the Council of Thirty-Two took action to 
exclude Canadian Ojibweg, John Bottineau, Little Shell, and others continued to articulate a 
vision of Turtle Mountain peoplehood that included “all Indians or mixed bloods,” regardless of 
which side of the Settler boundary line they came from and their blood quantum.121 From their 
perspective, the idea of a “foreign” Ojibweg made no sense. All of the Turtle Mountains were 
their homeland, and Settler borders had no impact on the relationships among kin.  
 In 1892, the Council of Thirty-Two, not Little Shell, succeeded in bringing the United 
States to negotiations for a new treaty. Their articulation of Indianness seemed more compatible 
with Untied States definitions, and Brenner had done his best to discredit “this idiot of a ‘Little 
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Shell.’”122 The ogimaa found himself essentially shut out of the McCumber Commission 
negotiations. In protest of the United States’ recognition of the Council of Thirty-Two, he and 
his followers pursued an old Ojibwe political strategy and abstained from McCumber 
Commission activities.123 The Turtle Mountain People sought a new treaty for a variety of 
reasons, many of which contradicted American expansionist goals. The Michif population 
wanted to protect their relationships to the so-called “full-blood” kin, and with that relationship 
the right to the land.124 All parties knew the reservation was too small to support even a reduced 
People, and they hoped to protect against removal or further encroachment. Specific objectives 
varied within the community, represented most dramatically by the split between Little Shell’s 
council and the Council of Thirty-Two, but all served the larger goal of protecting Anshinaabe 
sovereignty and its essential relationships.  
 In September 1892, the McCumber Commission arrived in Belcourt. North Dakota 
Senator Porter J. McCumber led the United States officials. While the Turtle Mountain People 
pursued their own goals, Congress directed the McCumber Commission to clear the reservation 
and the surrounding area for non-Indian settlement. In addition to the pressures of increasing 
Settler demands for land and conflicts stemming from the Turtle Mountain People’s refusal to 
file claims on their unceded territory, the United States officials expressed concern about the 
challenge to confinement posed by easy mobility across the international border. To facilitate 
these goals, Congress instructed the McCumber Commission to negotiate not only a land cession 
but also a removal agreement, the Fort Berthold reservation to the southwest as the proposed 
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destination.125 They hoped to obtain as low a price as possible for the ten-million-acre Turtle 
Mountain territory that the commissioners themselves described as “far superior” to all other 
land in North Dakota, and they wanted to reduce their obligations in terms of allotments and 
rations by shrinking the Turtle Mountain rolls.126  
 The Turtle Mountain People remained unanimously opposed to removal. This was “the 
country the Great Spirit had given them,” referring to aadizookananag about the earth being built 
on the turtle’s back after the flood. The commissioners made it clear that, in their own words, 
“Congress could not be induced under any circumstances to increase the size of that 
reservation…or extend a single foot.” In response, the People declared, “They would rather 
accept a very small farm for the head of the family and remain where they are than take liberal 
allotments for themselves and their children elsewhere.”127 The Turtle Mountain People likewise 
opposed allotment, the effects of which many had undoubtedly observed on visits to relations at 
White Earth and other reservations. Allotment was “so offensive to the leading Indians that to 
have inserted or retained such a clause in this agreement would have defeated it.”128 They 
preferred to retain common rights, which they would continue to administrate among the People 
as they always had.  
 On October 22, 1892, the Turtle Mountain People signed the McCumber Agreement. The 
treaty, which then went to Congress for ratification, confirmed the two-township reservation and 
provided for $1 million in compensation for ceded land—or, roughly ten cents an acre. Little 
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Shell never signed the document, nor did dozens of other adult men whose names no longer 
appeared on the rolls in the months leading up to the negotiations.129  
 In January of 1892, the Council of Thirty-Two began the work of reducing the rolls, 
before the Commission arrived. Initially, they focused on “Indians or mixed-bloods of doubtful 
nationality,” using the Settler border as a criteria for belonging in the People. By May 2, the 
Council of Thirty-Two had created a list of all those individuals with “Chippewa blood, born in 
the United States or persons married to women of that kind, and have excluded all the rest.”130 
They identified 175 families comprised of 525 individuals as not possessing rights as one of the 
People. This number included a mixture of people living within the two townships of the 
recognized reservation and others living throughout the prairies and the Great Lakes region.131 
The McCumber Commission reviewed this list and began its own census on September 20, 
reinforced by the presence of a deployment of U.S. troops. In the next phase, all those who did 
not make the Commission’s list found their names on a register of the disenrolled, posted “in 
conspicuous places throughout the reservation” and read in church. Disenrolled people had the 
opportunity to appeal and argue their entitlement to rights in the Turtle Mountain People before 
the McCumber Commission and Council of Thirty-Two with proof of their birthplace, history of 
residence, and any other information that might prove their affiliation—which, from the U.S. 
                                                 
129 I choose to use ‘treaty' to refer to the McCumber Agreement. The difference between ‘treaty’ and ‘agreement’ 
remains one of semantics, semantics that privilege Settler desires for power relationships between Indigenous 
Peoples and the United States. After 1871, so-called agreements such as the McCumber Agreement still required 
negotiation, and they implicitly acknowledged that Indigenous Peoples retained inherent rights that the U.S. had to 
negotiate in order to obtain land and resources. Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 91.  
130 Brenner to Waugh, May 31, 1892, Decimal Correspondence, Turtle Mountain Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA 
Kansas City, MO. 
131 Brenner to Waugh, May 2, 1892, Decimal Correspondence, Turtle Mountain Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA 
Kansas City, MO. 
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officials’ perspective, meant Americanness and, often, blood quantum.132 The Commission and 
Council of Thirty-Two rejected nearly all of the 525 petitions.133 The McCumber Commission’s 
census was only the start of a process that reveals how the Turtle Mountain People shaped 
federal policy and their own definitions of belonging. They recognized the connection between 
membership and land claims. Appeals continued into the twentieth century, and the men and 
women of Turtle Mountain continuously pushed back against U.S. attempts to impose Western, 
bureaucratic definitions of membership on their People.  
 Several criteria emerged as the baseline for understanding Turtle Mountain definitions of 
belonging. The primary measure was affiliation with the People, which had to be strong enough 
that the community recognized an individual as a member. Related to his baseline of affiliation, 
an individual had to prove residence in the Turtle Mountain homeland, defined by the 
Department of Interior as a nine-million-acre tract that ended three miles short of Walhalla, at the 
time of the McCumber Commission in 1892. Finally, men and women defending their 
enrollment had to demonstrate that they had established no “other statuses than that of members 
of the Band,” meaning that they did not belong to another reservation’s rolls, had not tried to 
claim the status of an enfranchised American, and were not Canadian.134 In the deliberations over 
individual enrollments, both by the Council of Thirty-Two and a later twelve-person council that 
included seven of the original members, Turtle Mountain ogimaag frequently disagreed with 
U.S. officials about what these requirements actually meant. For instance, the Council of Thirty-
Two considered marriage to one of the People sufficient relationship to entitle a man or woman 
                                                 
132 “Report,” 10.  
133 Brenner to Waugh, Sept. 1, 1892, Decimal Correspondence, Turtle Mountain Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA 
Kansas City, MO. 
134 Secretary of the Interior to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Oct. 25, 1905; Decimal Correspondence, Turtle 
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to rights, giving kinship precedence over blood.135 Throughout the process, the Turtle Mountain 
People continued to rely on a matrix for belonging rooted in the relational aspects of peoplehood.  
 The more contested cases highlight Turtle Mountain understandings of the above criteria. 
The application of Manitoba-born Alexander Charette raised a range of debated definitions. The 
Department of Indian Affairs recommended that the Council reject his and his daughter’s 
petition, “[n]otwithstanding the fact that the Council is willing to recognize these persons.”136 
The McCumber Commission had enrolled his brothers, father, and other relatives but not 
Charette, who lived near Walhalla. United States officials considered Walhalla and its 
surrounding towns to lie beyond the nine-million-acre tract they used to determine residence in 
the Turtle Mountain homeland, while the Council argued, “he lives and did live at the time of the 
meeting of the McCumber Commission on the nine-million-acre tract at Olga, N.D.” Moreover, 
he maintained a clear affiliation with the People, evidenced by his frequent “visits [to] the 
reservation” and his relationships “among the mixed-bloods around Olga.” Of his daughter Lisa 
Ducharme’s recognition, the Council explained, “We have known her from childhood.” U.S. 
officials, however, saw the mixed-descent communities near Walhalla as illegitimate, whatever 
their relationship with the rest of the Turtle Mountain People.137 From the United States’ point of 
view Charette and Ducharme’s relationships with members of the Turtle Mountain People could 
not overcome their location on a clearly-delineated map. Affiliation, Canadian, Turtle Mountain 
homelands—these terms remained up for debate. As in the case of Charette, the Council insisted 
                                                 
135 Brenner to Waugh, May 2, 1892, Decimal Correspondence, Turtle Mountain Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA 
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136 Special Indian Agent E.A. Allen, “Report on Enrollment Applications,” 20 Aug 1906, 34.  
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on Anishinaabe definitions and significance of the relationships of belonging that contradicted 
Settler categories.  
 Like the People of Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s, the Turtle Mountain People 
defined affiliation in terms of living relationships with people, places, and stories rather than 
blood quantum. As at Lac Courte Oreilles, the council maintained their right to reject those 
women whose marriage to Settler men moved them out of the relational nexus of the People and 
thereby jeopardized their ties of obligation and belonging.138 Similarly, as in the case of brothers 
Moise and Joseph Gardepay, the relationships of one brother did not guarantee those of the other. 
The council rejected Moise Gardepay because he was “dead, and would not be recognized if he 
were living.” His brother Joseph and family, meanwhile, “are recognized by the Council because 
he has lived and now lives inside the nine million-acre tract at Olga, N.D., and his father 
belonged to the Turtle Mountain band and affiliated with it.”139 The only difference between 
these two brothers was in their individual relationships with the People. The Council recognized 
Andrew LaRoque, whose family history spanned the U.S.-Canadian border, because he 
“affiliated with this band at Olga and on the prairie,” where he joined buffalo hunts and later root 
gathering expeditions. This labor reaffirmed is connections with kin, place, ceremonies, and the 
stories that had forged the Turtle Mountain People.140 Special Indian Agent Allen, who reviewed 
enrollment applications for the U.S. government, denied LaRoque’s application on the basis of 
what he saw as weak and intermittent affiliation, but the Ojibwe men on the council knew the 
strength of relationships cultivated by seasonal movements throughout their homeland.  
                                                 
138 Allen, “Report on Enrollment Applications,” 18-21.  
139 Allen, “Report on Enrollment Applications,” 77-78. 
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 Residence became an important factor in determining affiliation, but affiliation also 
helped to define residence. United States officials sought to confine belonging in the Turtle 
Mountain People to a rigidly defined nine-million-acre tract, although the Turtle Mountain’s 
newly ceded territory comprised up to ten million acres. The nine million number, however, 
conveniently cut off immediately west of Walhalla and its surrounding towns, where lived 
several long-established Michif communities. The United States government automatically 
disqualified any individual living near Walhalla and complained that Ojibweg “used the tract of 
country covered by what is known as the Turtle Mountains synonymous with the Turtle 
Mountain Reservation.” Indeed, the men and women of Turtle Mountain frequently relied upon 
that definition, for that was how they understood their homeland. When discussing Charles 
Cloutier and his daughter Rosalie, the council and federal officials asserted opposing views of 
Turtle Mountain territory. Rosalie was born in Elkwood, just west of Walhalla, where her father 
lived. Special Agent Allen concluded that “in view of this mixed-blood’s continued residence at 
Elkwood among the Canadian and other mixed-bloods who were uniformly refused enrollment 
by the McCumber Commission,” the Cloutiers’ applications were invalid. The council, however, 
insisted on recognizing both father and daughter, not only because of their regular visits to the 
reservation but also because they “lived on the nine million-acre tract, about three miles 
northwest of Walhalla, N.D.”141 The council used their relationships with towns like Elkwood, 
Olga, and Walhalla to determine inclusion in the Turtle Mountain homeland rather than a fixed 
location on a map.  
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 The council similarly employed fluid, relational definitions of Canadianness, which 
would have excluded a person from rights as one of the Turtle Mountain People. The council 
rejected the application of Ka-ki-ka-yash, a “hunter and trapper” who worked on both sides of 
the border, due to his enrollment with the Swan Lake Reserve. Pe-wa-pi-koo-kwa-na (Iron 
Feather) likewise lived between Swan Lake and Turtle Mountain. Married to the daughter of 
Little Shell, he received recognition from the council “on account of being the son of a 
recognized member of the Band” and, undoubtedly, because of his relationship by marriage with 
prominent Turtle Mountain families. Special Agent Allen dismissed their acceptance of Pe-wa-
pi-koo-kwa-na as “merely out of compliment to Little Shell,” but he and other U.S. officials 
often could not understand how relationships bound together Anishinaabeg Peoples via ties that 
did not recognize Settler borders.142 Angelic Villenewe, the widow of a French-Canadian Settler, 
visited her children on the Turtle Mountain reservation but lost her bid for recognition because 
she received a pension from the Canadian government for her husband’s military service. Her 
daughter, however, lived on the reservation, was known to the People, and retained her official 
enrollment.143 Differentiating between mother and daughter, the council presented a definition of 
Canadianness based on relationships—or, rather, a lack thereof.  
 Through the McCumber Commission enrollment process, Canadian became synonymous 
with meyaagizid. Men and women such as Renville and Pe-wa-pi-koo-kwa-na who maintained 
the necessary connections with place, people, and other relationships remained Turtle Mountain, 
not Canadian. Those whom the council designated as Canadian, and therefore meyaagizid, 
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lacked those relationships. As with non-resided mixed-descent relatives at Lac Courte Oreilles 
and the Maškēkowak at St. Peter’s, for the Turtle Mountain People Canadianness involved 
resource access and reciprocal obligations. The council used selling scrip as a measure of 
Canadianness, despite Bureau of Indian Affairs rulings stating that scrip did not automatically 
disbar enrollment.144 Although the council “knew” Dunseith resident Rosalie Belgarde Allery, 
for instance, they declared her ineligible due to her choice to receive Canadian scrip near Moose 
Jaw, Saskatchewan, several years after the signing of the McCumber Agreement.145 Norbert St. 
Pierre, meanwhile, had sold Canadian scrip following the Red River Resistance, but the council 
decided that he maintained his rights as one of the People. St. Pierre and Allery differed in their 
relationships with the land and its resources. St. Pierre, who lived on the reservation during the 
winter and left during the warmer months to find work, maintained the necessary relationships 
that not only granted him access to Turtle Mountain resources but also, in return, required 
obligations to protect those resources.146 In the context of Settler encroachment on Turtle 
Mountain territory and impending allotment, the council may have interpreted Allery’s decision 
to sell her rights to the land in Canada as a sign of weak or nonexistent relationships. The 
Council may have known her, but they did not know her well enough.  
 The Turtle Mountain People continued to define belonging flexibly, helping them to 
defend their sovereignty against both geographic and bureaucratic encroachment. They protected 
their lands, woods, and other resources and their decision-making power from meyaagizid, as the 
People of Lac Courte Oreilles protected their timber and St. Peter’s their autonomy, while also 
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honoring the bonds of inawemaagan. The office of Indian Affairs tried officially to overrule the 
Turtle Mountain council’s decisions. They declared Renville, Pe-wa-pi-koo-kwa-na, Cloutier, 
Gardepay, LaRoque, and others to be outsiders. For those who possessed the relationships of 
inawemaagan, even without recognition by the United States, exile occurred less in reality than 
on paper. On October 15, 1892, the Farmer in Charge at Turtle Mountain posted a notice 
throughout the reservation ordering, “[A]ll parties who are not enrolled as members of the Turtle 
Mountain Band and accepted by the Commission now present as entitled to participate in any 
proceedings with the said Commissioners are directed to withdraw from within the limits of the 
Turtle Mountain reservation at once or be arrested.”147 Belonging, and with it the rights as one of 
the Turtle Mountain People, proved to be more complicated than bureaucratic categories, and 
despite U.S. interference, the Turtle Mountain People remained determined to define these 
relationships for themselves. As of August 1896, at least 185 non-recognized individuals 
comprising between twenty and thirty families continued to reside on the reservation, and Turtle 
Mountain ogimaag ignored the Agents’ directives about denying access to lands and 
resources.148  
 Many of the People became dissatisfied with the Council of Thirty-Two in the aftermath 
of the derisively-nicknamed Ten-Cent Treaty. In January of 1894, several Turtle Mountain men 
rejected their nominations to the “Executive Committee,” a new name for the reduced Council of 
Thirty-Two, now about twelve seats. In addition to non-enrolled individuals receiving 
nominations, several people refused to associate with the Executive Committee. For instance, 
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Wa-ge-m-wish-king, Ayak-bi-kh-tring, and Be-me-metung all reported that they did “not wish to 
appear in this connection” and refused their nominations.149 Although their reasons went 
unrecorded, their desire to distance themselves from the Committee suggests that they 
disapproved of its decision regarding the treaty and accompanying census. Meanwhile, ogimaa 
Little Shell and the general council continued to meet and advocate for the Turtle Mountain 
People.150 A group known as the “Chief’s Council” presented itself as the People’s ogimaag. 
Despite the complaints of Brenner and other Settler officials, this council went about the 
business of “administer[ing] the affairs on the reservation.” They granted or withheld permission 
for non-enrolled to cut hay or timber and build on the reservation, and they prevented non-Indian 
Settlers from crossing reserved lands to cut wood on land claimed by the United States 
government.151  
 
 Settler colonialism shaped but did not determine Ojibweg discussions about who was one 
of the People. In both Canada and the United States, the reserve and reservation, respectively, 
provided a space to isolate and ultimately erase Indigenous peoples. In order to accomplish this 
goal, both governments first had to dissolve community ties and deny the inherent sovereignty 
that facilitated Native peoples’ defiance. Particularly in the Great Lakes region, where the United 
States, Great Britain, and Canada struggled to assert their own visions of themselves as nation-
states, Indian autonomy threatened colonial interests. As a result, Settler policies often targeted 
the foundations of Anishinaabe peoplehood. Through containment, allotment, and assimilation 
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policies, Settler governments sought to undermine Anishinaabe sovereignty. The Ojibwe People 
did not simply react, however; they consistently asserted their peoplehood, shaping the formation 
of policies such as allotment. 
 The Ojibweg at Lac Courte Oreilles faced allotment—another in a series of challenges to 
Ojibwe sovereignty—as an autonomous People, unified by relationships with kin, land, 
language, ceremonial cycle, and sacred history. These relationships shaped their engagement 
with Settler policies, including allotment. Ojibweg efforts in the 1880s raised important 
questions about membership and citizenship—questions that persisted in the twentieth century 
and continue to arise today. If relationships with kin and land were intertwined, how could 
estranged blood descendants be one of the People? What obligations would they feel to fellow 
Ojibwe and to resources that they could sell? Ojibweg at Lac Courte Oreilles and other 
reservations throughout the Great Lakes region sought to answer these questions as a sovereign 
people. The men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles maintained an active role in the allotment 
process, articulating their peoplehood by reaffirming their relationship with their homeland. 
 At St. Peter’s, the Peguis People demonstrated both the fluidity and the boundaries of 
access to belonging in the People as they fought to protect their newly-established reserve. The 
lack of reciprocal relationships and the Maškēkowaks’ position outside of Ojibwe social 
relationships meant that, from the perspective of Ojibweg at St. Peter’s, their Maškēkowak 
neighbors did not share the same rights to their reserve. They were not part of the Ojibwe People, 
the forced inclusion of Maškēkowaks with competing interests challenged Ojibwe sovereignty. 
Within this context, however, the Peguis People continued to assert their own definitions of 
being Anishinaabe, unofficially when Maškēkowaks held the council and chieftainship and from 
a position of authority when Ojibwe men won elections.  
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 The Ojibwe People of Turtle Mountain likewise negotiated the boundaries of 
inawemaagan and meyaagizid. The issues remained unresolved by 1896—and, indeed, well into 
the twentieth century—but they nevertheless highlight the contested, dynamic nature of Ojibwe 
peoplehood, which never formed a static category. The Ten-Cent Treaty met with immediate 
criticism from various sections of the Turtle Mountain People. In fact, the agreement never 
represented a consensus about the community’s composition. Bureaucratic lines drawn before 
the McCumber Commission’s negotiations began excluded significant Ojibwe voices from the 
treaty-making process. Arbitrary distinctions between reservation and non-reservation, American 
and Canadian, mixed-blood and full-blood—divisions that belied the continued relationships that 
bound people and territory in the western reaches of Anishinaabewaki—meant that dissenters 
became “outsiders” with no right to an opinion on their People’s future. Attacks on “that idiot of 
a ‘Little Shell’” and the previous council delegitimized their role as representatives of the 
People, at least from the perspective of the United States, and by extension their belonging as 
one of the People. These divisions served Settler goals of expansion, confinement, and erasure. 
Beyond bureaucratic maneuvering, however, the silences refused to last. Many of the disenrolled 
remained on the reservation with their kin and continued to access shared land and resources. 
The Turtle Mountain People, along with the People of Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s, 
continued to define belonging based on Anishinaabe relationships.  
 Facing the threat of Settler policies designed to confine Anishinaabe sovereignty, 
Anishinaabe Peoples turned to the relationships that governed access to land and resources—
relationships with kin, land, language, sacred history, and ceremonial cycle that defined who was 
one of the People. At St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles, they reaffirmed ties 
with those whose status as one of the People obligated them to protect the land and resources and 
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excluded the meyaagizid who did not share in those rights or reciprocal responsibilities. These 
relationships continued to sustain Anishinaabe peoplehood as Settler goals of expansion led to 
even more encroachment on Anishinaabewaki during the twentieth century.  
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Chapter 4 
Anokii Giiwitaashkaa:1 Adapting Labor, 1880-1920 
 When they left their homes on the eastern edge of Turtle Island, the Anishinaabe People 
knew their destination: the land where the food grows on water. They stopped at many places 
along the way to camp, perform ceremonies, mark sacred places, and work to provide for their 
people. At each site, women constructed wiigiwaman and planted gitigaanan (gardens) while 
they waited for the next phase of the chibimoodaywin. Fishermen caught adikamegad (whitefish) 
with nets from the back of their canoes. Men also hunted, while women tended gitigaanan and 
gathered the first manoomin. At last, after many years, they reached Mooningwanekaaning-minis 
(Madeline Island) and the end of their journey. In this place, they found not only manoomin in 
abundance but also waters that teemed with fish and forests filled with maple trees for sugar and 
deer, bears, and elk for meat. Gitchi Manitou had put this land for the People and, with Ojibwe 
men and women’s labor, the aki would support the People.  
 Anishinaabeg anokiiwin or labor sustained the People along their migration and forged 
their connection to their homeland once they arrived. Facing Settler encroachment on their lands 
and resources, Anishinaabeg Peoples negotiated treaties throughout the nineteenth century, 
protecting their rights to the place the Creator had made for them and the resources within that 
place. On ishkoniganan, Anishinaabeg mobilized flexible kinship networks that challenged 
Settler policies meant to confine and erase, again protecting rights to aki and resources. Between 
the 1880s and 1920s, labor provided a physical means for Anishinaabe men and women to 
maintain the relationships of peoplehood, unbroken by the crush of Settler reservation policies 
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designed to spatially and politically confine Indigenous Peoples.2 The treaties that Anishinaabeg 
negotiated during the nineteenth century reflected the relationship between labor and sovereignty 
and empowered Anishinaabeg peoplehood through the next century. The Anishinaabeg at St. 
Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles followed seasonal patterns of labor that 
connected them to their homeland and each other, enacting a form of belonging. Anomie, to 
work, was Anishinaabewi. Ojibwe men and women moved in pursuit of resources, such as wild 
rice and game, to renew relationships with places beyond ishkonigan borders, for the People had 
also reserved these rights. Further, when Ojibwe people accessed resources within ishkonigan 
boundaries, they claimed ishkoniganan as part of Anishinaabewaki against Settler attempts to 
redefine those spaces. In addition to gender and seasonal patterns, Ojibwe men and women 
organized anokiiwin by environment. They worked noopiming (in the woods), agamiing (at the 
water), and mashkodeng (on the prairie). Anishinaabe scholar and storyteller Basil Johnston 
(Nawash First Nation) describes the “meadows, forests, and shorelines” that sustained the 
Anishinaabe People. The relationship with aki and its resources went beyond physical 
sustenance. Aki, which Johnston personifies as Mother Earth, “whispers and chants to the 
downhearted and dispirited through the treetops, over the meadows, in cascades and rapids.”3 
                                                 
2 I do not mean to suggest that Ojibwe men and women did not also engage in seasonal labor for so-called rational 
or financially motivated purposes. See Bruce Trigger, “Early Native North American Responses to European 
Contact: Romantic versus Rationalistic Interpretations,” Journal of American History 77 (March 1991): 1195-1215. 
Of course they did. However, these decisions took place within the context of Settler colonial policies that targeted 
Ojibwe peoplehood, a struggle in which Indigenous labor became a central battleground for Indigenous sovereignty 
and Settler nation-building. Additionally, from an Ojibwe perspective, the social relationships of peoplehood cannot 
be separated from economic and political relationships. See Norrgard, Seasons of Change.  
3 Basil Johnston, Honour Mother Earth (Cape Crocker, ON: Kegedoke Press, 2003), viii.  
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Anishianabeg used seasonal labor to connect with these places and receive “Mashi-aki” or “the 
strength of the earth.”4  
This chapter uses woods, waters, and prairies to organize the discussion of anokiiwin, 
demonstrating how Anishinaabeg continued to define Anishinaabewaki through their actions.5 
Ojibweg engaged in seasonal anokiiwin, including working for wages, in woods, waters, and 
prairies to maintain reciprocal relationships to kin, lived out the relationships established by 
aadizookaanag, and provided the context for ceremonies. In a period most frequently associated 
with decline and dependency, the St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles Peoples 
engaged in seasonal anokiiwin to reinforce their sovereignty. 
 Yet, late nineteenth and early twentieth century Setter policies attempted to reconfigure 
Anishinaabeg anokiiwin. Reservation and reserve policies including allotment confined 
Indigenous Peoples to limited land bases and attempted to teach them agriculture. At the turn of 
the twentieth century, federal Indian policy shifted from promoting self-sufficiency through 
agriculture to transforming Indigenous people into a docile and compliant workforce.6 
Simultaneously, Gilded Age economic change directed Settler interest toward extracting the 
natural resources in Anishinaabewaki’s woods, waters and prairies.7 In the twentieth century, 
                                                 
4 Johnston, Honour Mother Earth, viii.  
5 Andrews uses the term workscape in his discussion of labor in the Colorado coal mine to capture the mutually 
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workers. Andrews, Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).  
6 Hoxie argues that Progressive Era reformers in the United States shifted to racialized views of Native Americans, 
which contributed to a shift in Indian land policy from the goal of self-sufficiency to marginalized laborers. In 
Canada, federal and provincial officials consistently prioritized Settler economic expansion and undermined their 
supposed goals of First Nations agricultural self-sufficiency. The policy to locate reserves away from the planned 
path of the Canadian Pacific Railway, for instance, meant that reserves lost access to both farmland and markets. 
Hoxie, A Final Promise, 173; Carter, Lost Harvests, 59-60.  
7 Hoxie, A Final Promise, 43-44. Historian Joshua L. Reid provides an example of how national conservation laws, 
solidifying nation-states, and expanding commercial industries at the end of the nineteenth century marginalized 
Makah whalers and sealers. The Sea Is My Country, 17, 164-209. During the Gilded Age, U.S. and Canadian Settler 
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Progressive Era boosters in Wisconsin, Manitoba, and North Dakota promoted tourism to bolster 
state and provincial economies. While Anishinaabeg viewed treaties as protecting the woods, 
waters, and prairies that comprised their homelands, the United States, Britain, and Canada saw 
them as tools of confinement.8 Reserves, reservations, and the policies that built them placed 
limits on Indigenous Peoples, rendering them legible to—and therefore controllable by—the 
Settler state and clearing room for spatial, social, political, and economic expansion.9 Once 
treaties laid the spatial groundwork for confinement, reservation policies erected additional 
barriers. Both Canada and the United States imposed limits on Indians’ freedom to leave their 
newly-bounded homes.10 In the aftermath of the Métis resistance in 1885, the Dominion 
government required Indians to obtain passes from their local agent before leaving, despite 
possessing no legal authority to impose those restrictions that remained in place through 1935. In 
                                                                                                                                                             
colonial systems increasingly sought to facilitate the efficient development of tribal lands, often under a logic of 
conservation. Both Louis S. Warren and Karl Jacoby trace how territories used in common by Indigenous people 
and sometimes rural Settlers transformed into public resources and criminalized subsistence hunting, fishing, and 
gathering. Warren accounts for the "reification of wild animals as public goods" and the shift of local commons to a 
national commons under pressure from recreational sportsmen and the tourist industry. Warren, The Hunter's Game: 
Poachers and Conservationists in Twentieth-Century America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 12-19. 
Jacoby gives the example of the Havasupai in the Grand Canyon. Anglo grazing and logging threatened game and 
firewood, and Settler conservation efforts enclosed the Havasupai in a multi-layered bureaucracy that threatened 
their ability to access essential resources.; Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and 
the Hidden History of American Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 149-170. Scholars 
around the world have traced similar patterns during this era. For instance, Indian historian Ramachandra Guha links 
the grassroots struggle against commercial forestry in the Himalaya mountains to the process of colonial state 
formation. Ramachandra Guha, The Unquiet Woods: Ecological Change and Peasant Resistance in the Himalaya 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). See also David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha, eds., Nature, 
Culture, Imperialism: Essays on the Environmental History of South Asia (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Zoe Laidlaw and Alan Lester, eds., Indigenous Communities and Settler Colonialism: Land Holding, Loss and 
Survival in an Interconnected World (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). These studies link settler colonial state 
formation, economic expansion, and conservationism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Restricting 
access to resources for conservation or commercial purposes reinforced racial and class inequality and bolstered 
settler colonial systems of power.  
8 Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths, 21; Unrau, Rise and Fall of Indian Country, xii; Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 7.  
9 Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked Paths, 21-28; Scott, Seeing Like a State.  
10 Paige Raibmon discusses mobility as a form of resistance in “Meanings of Mobility on the Northwest Coast,” in 
New Histories for Old: Changing Perspectives on Canada’s Native Pasts, ed. Ted Binnema and Susan Neylan 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2007), 175-195.  
  
170 
 
1890, the Canadian Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) granted agents the authority to act as 
justices of the peace and arrest Indians for violating vagrancy laws, targeting those who moved 
away from the reserve in pursuit of seasonally-available resources.11  
 In addition to policies aimed at mobility, Settler states passed measures that interfered 
with the internal relationships of Native peoplehood. Laws and administrative procedures 
prohibited the sale of alcohol, allowed departments of Indian Affairs to intervene in tribal 
governance by requiring and sometimes deciding elections of chiefs and councils, and 
criminalized religious and ceremonial activities.12 Beginning with potlatches in 1880, Canada 
placed increasingly restrictive prohibitions on “Indian dances.” By 1904, both Settler nations 
banned the Sun Dance, a central part of the ceremonial cycle for Anishinaabe Peoples who had 
incorporated the dance as they moved west.13 Anishinaabeg Peoples pressed against additional 
layers of confinement. States and provinces asserting their own borders imposed themselves 
upon Indigenous sovereignty, enforcing gathering and game regulations and denying Native 
                                                 
11 Dickason, Canada’s First Nations, 314-315, 326; S. Bennet, Passes for Indians to Leave Reserve (Ottawa: 
Treaties and Historical Research Center, 1980); F. Laurie Barron, “The Indian Pass System in the Canadian West, 
1882-1935,” Prairie Forum 13:1 (1988): 25-42.; Sarah Carter, “Controlling Indian Movement: The Pass System,” 
NeWest Review (May 1985): 8-9; West, Last Indian War. The massacre at Wounded Knee, close enough to Turtle 
Mountain that federal agents accused Turtle Mountain people of aiding the Lakota “hostiles,” was in part a terrible 
culmination of policies intended to confine, targeting Lakota men and women who refused to acknowledge 
reservation boundaries or prohibitions against the Ghost Dance. The threat of violence accompanied the push for 
expansion at any cost.  
12 Chief Joe Mathias and Gary R. Yalsky, “Conspiracy of Legislation: The Suppression of Indian Rights in Canada,” 
British Columbia Studies (Spring 1991): 34-47; Diane Newell, Tangled Webs of History: Indians and the Law in 
Canada’s Pacific Coast Fisheries (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 96; Genetin-Pilawa, Crooked 
Paths; Hoxie, Final Promise; Wilkinson, Blood Struggle. For a transnational perspective of confinement by law, see 
Amanda Nettleback and Russel Smandych, “Policing Indigenous Peoples on Two Colonial Frontiers: Australia’s 
Mounted Policy and Canada’s North-West Mounted Police,” Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology 
43:2 (Aug 2010): 356-375. 
13 Dickason, Canada’s First Nations, 315, 327; Katherine Pettipas, Severing the Ties that Bind: Government 
Repression of Indigenous Religious Ceremonies on the Prairies (Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 1994); 
Raibmon, Authentic Indians,  
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American jurisdiction in the courts.14 Although federal Indian policy and regional economic 
changes undermined Ojibwe work and labor, Ojibwe people engaged in “purposeful 
modernization” to take advantage of the changing economic landscape of the United States-
Canadian borderlands.15  
Anishinaabeg Views of Anokiiwin 
  While Settler reservation policies aimed to confine and erase, Anishinaabeg intended 
ishkoniganan to last. The treaties that the People of St. Peter’s, Lac Courte Oreilles, and Turtle 
Mountain negotiated protected Anishinaabewaki for future generations. These agreements 
reserved the right to hunt, fish, and gather, ensuring access to the woods, waters, and prairies that 
provided essential resources and making labor central to Anishinaabe efforts to protect and 
express sovereignty in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.16 Ojibweg Peoples knew 
that their treaties had transferred land but not resources. For instance, in the negotiations leading 
up to the Stone Fort Treaty or Treaty 1, Dominion representatives assured the representatives 
from the Peguis or St. Peter’s People that they could continue to hunt and fish as before, and 
reserve boundaries would not apply to those access rights.17 In their 1864 petition, ogimaag from 
the Lake Superior area likewise knew that the treaties and ishkoniganan had not affected the 
                                                 
14 Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights.  
15 Building off of Latin American scholars, Eric Meeks refers to this process as “resistant adaptation.” Richard 
White and Brian Hosmer used the term “purposeful modernization,” and Steven High employed “selective 
adaptation.” All three emphasize that Indigenous Peoples actively and purposefully integrated transforming 
economic forces for their own economic, as well as social and political, ends, and they did so without abandoning 
their Indianness. Meeks, “The Tohono O’odham, Wage Labor, and Resistant Adaptation, 1900-1930,” Western 
Historical Quarterly 34:4 (Winter 2003): 469-489; Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace; White, Roots of 
Dependency; High, “Native Wage Labor and Independent Production during the ‘Era of Irrelevance’” 
Labor/LeTrevail 37 (Spring 1996): 243-64.  
16 Chantal Norrgard explores the relationship between labor, treaties, and Anishinaabe resistance to Settler 
colonialism in Seasons of Change.  
17 Friesen, “Grant Me Wherewith to Make My Living,” 143. Chantal Norrgard discusses Ojibwe understandings of 
reserved rights in Minnesota, Michigan, and Wisconsin throughout Seasons of Change.  
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People’s rights to Anishinaabeawki’s resources. In addition to listing their United States allies’ 
unfulfilled obligations, the ogimaag drew the federal government’s attention to what the 
Anishinaabeg had exchanged in the treaties: “From the usual height of cutting a tree down and 
upwards to lop is what I sell you, I reserve the root of the tree. Again this I hold in my hand the 
Maple Timber, also the Oak Timber, also this Straw which I hold in my hand. Wild Rice is what 
we call this. These I do not sell.”18 Ojibwe ogimaag recognized that resources and rights to 
anokiiwin within their homeland grounded their sovereignty. Anokiiwin intertwined with 
sovereignty and the relationships of peoplehood that supported it.19 Anokiiwin became a central 
axis of Anishinaabeg resistance to Settler encroachment and confinement, not only because it 
enabled survival but also because labor connected the Anishinaabe People to the essential 
relationships of their peoplehood. 
 The connection between sovereignty and anokiiwin has deep roots in Ojibwe peoplehood. 
The Anishinaabe People accessed the Creator’s gifts through anokiiwin. A sacred relationship 
existed between anokii, the Anishinaabe People, and aki. Spiritual power permeated the physical 
world. Through work, labor, and resource use, human beings reaffirmed relationships with their 
                                                 
18 "Statement made by the Indians, a bilingual petition of the Chippewas of Lake Superior, 1864,” 4.  
19 Deconstructing perceived barriers between modernity and traditionality, scholars of Indigenous labor history have 
demonstrated the agency of Indian communities to participate in market capitalism without degenerating or 
sacrificing their autonomy. Richard White’s Roots of Dependency is perhaps the best known work that argues for the 
collapse of subsistence economies into dependency. More recently, scholars have challenged this perspective. In 
their collection of essays entitled Native Pathways, Brian Hosmer, Colleen O’Neill, and various contributors 
challenge the notion of binary constructions of modernity and traditionality and discuss the ways in which Native 
Peoples in the twentieth century forged “alternative pathways of development” within the market economy (2). See 
also Hosmer, Indians in the Marketplace; O’Neill, Working the Navajo Way; Raibmon, Authentic Indians; Bauer, 
“We Were All Like Migrant Workers Here”; Cattelino, High Stakes. Indians in Unexpected Places by Philip Deloria 
also helps to deconstruct the modern/traditional binary, as does Frederick Hoxie’s “From Prison to Homeland.” 
Wage labor and other expanding economic strategies often served as tools of survival and sovereignty. For instance, 
William Bauer argued that work and labor—tied to creation narratives, social networks, and the land—supported the 
survival of California Indian communities. Bauer, “We Were All Like Migrant Workers Here.” Native Peoples 
persevered in part because of, not in spite of, labor. Anishinaabe scholars such as Brenda Child and Chantal 
Norrgard link labor and reservation practices to Anishinaabe survival in the reservation era. Child, Holding Our 
World Together; Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 2.  
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human and non-human relatives in a reciprocal cycle, part of a labor ethic that valued reciprocity 
and honored life-giving powers.20 Melvin Eagle, an elder from Misizaaga’igan (Mille Lacs), 
explains this relationship. Gitchi Manitou lowered the Anishinaabe to this place  
to look after this here, to take care of this earth and look after these creatures, so 
that we can take good care of these animals, and these birds, and the fish, and the 
lake, the trees, all of these things.’ He said that we’ve been told to be caretakers. 
(Gizhi-manidoo gigii-izhi-igoonaan ji-ganawendamang o’ow, ji-ganawendamang 
o’ow aki ji-ganawenimangwaa ongow, weweni ji-ganawaabamangwaa ongow 
awesiinyag, miinawaa ingiw binesiwag, miinawaa giigoonyag, miinawaa 
zaaga’igan, mitigoog, akina sa ingiw.’ Mii gaa-izhid a’aw ani-igooyang ji-
ganawendamang.) 
 
To be a caretaker implied an active relationship, enacted through both thought or intention and 
the physical actions. Throughout the treaty process, according to Eagle, “[g]aawish wiin i’iw gii-
miigiwesiiwag i’iw, mitigoon, giigoonyan, waawaashkeshiwan, miinawaa i’iw manoomin. (But 
they never ceded this here, or the trees, fish, deer, and that rice. The Indians took care of those 
things.)”21 Taking care of the resources—the manoomin, waawaashkeshi (deer), 
ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog (sugar maples)—formed part of a web of reciprocity that bound 
together and defined the Ojibwe People.  
 Anokiiwin conformed to a seasonal, cyclical pattern that emerged from aadizookaanag. 
According to Lac Courte Oreilles elder and scholar Edward Benton-Banai,  
  While Original Man was carrying out the instructions given to him by the 
Creator, he noticed that the Earth had four seasons. All life was part of a never-
ending cycle. The plants were given new life in the spring. With the coming of 
summer, they blossomed and bore seeds for the next generation. Some of the 
plants produced fruits. In the fall season, the leaves of many of the plants turned 
from green to many spectacular cools. The leaves gradually fell to the round as the 
gee-zhi-gad-doon’ (days) got shorter and the dee-bee-kad-doon’ (nights) got 
colder.  
                                                 
20 Child, Holding Our World Together, 64.  
21 Eagle interview, Living Our Language, 116-117. 
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  In winter, the cold winds of the Gee-way’-din (North) brought the 
purifying snows that cleansed Mother Earth.Some of the plants died and returned 
their bodies to their mother. Other plants fell into a deep sleep and awoke only 
when Grandfather Sun and the warm winds of the Zha-wa-noong’ (South) 
announced the coming of spring.22  
 
Seasonal patterns directed Anishinaabe labor, which had an intimate connection with aki, and 
ensured access to a diverse array of natural resources. The seasonal round also moved 
Anishinaabeg through their homelands and tied families to certain places as they camped 
noopiming (in the woods) to hunt or collect sugar maple, agamiing (at the lake) for fishing or 
harvesting wild rice, on the mashkoden (prairies) to cut hay or follow buffalo, and to oodenawan 
(towns) to trade.  
 Anokiiwin both depended upon and reinforced kinship networks. Gendered divisions 
defined anokiiwin, which in turn reinforced men’s and women’s roles within larger 
Anishinaabeg reciprocal networks. Men’s primary anokiiwin consisted of hunting and fishing, 
while women gathered maple sugar, wild rice, berries and other resources; cared for and moved 
camps; and processed meat and fish. These gendered divisions functioned as complementary or 
balanced duties in a web of relationships built on reciprocity, and they remained relatively 
flexible to maintain that balance. Activities such as sugaring, ricing, farming, and fishing were 
often family affairs. Families camped and worked together, and movements for labor connected 
kin over long distances and Settler boundaries. Additionally, within the reciprocal context of 
kinship, extended families often relied on various members for support.23 
                                                 
22 Benton-Banai, Mishomis Book, 16-17. John Borrows describes seasonal movements similarly. He goes on to 
connect seasonal anokiiwin, aadizookanag, and inawemaagan, as new generations of Ojibweg replicate the patterns 
of their ancestors. Drawing out the Law, 149.  
23 Child, Holding Our World Together, 24-28; Redix, The Murder of Joe White: Ojibwe Leadership and 
Colonialism in Wisconsin (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2014).  
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 For the Ojibweg, various forms of anokiiwin possessed meaning beyond simple 
economic value. Ojibweg conceived of labor as part of maintaining good relations, meaning that 
Ojibweg ideas about work included activities generally left out of Settler understandings. For 
instance, Baadwewidaang of Leech Lake worked as “a messenger in the medicine dance.” His 
son, Porky White, explained: 
Gii-oshkaabewisiwi dibishkoo mii go gaye niin noongom ezhi-anokiiyaan. 
Indooshkaabewisiw….Aanishinaa, o’ow niibing, nixing azhigwa indizhichige 
o’ow isa izhichigeyaan, wiidookawag saw niijanishinaabe gagwejimid gegoo 
akeyaa waa-gikendan o’ow isa akeyaa midewiwin. (He was a messenger just like 
I am today in my work. I’m a messenger….Well now, this summer, in the 
summer I do this, doing things, helping my fellow Indian in what he asks me of 
what he wants to know about the mide way of doing things.) 
 
White refers to being an oshkaabewis or messenger in the Midewiwin as anokiiwin.24 Drumming 
and singing qualified as work or labor because they contributed to keeping the balance, and that 
gave anokiiwin its meaning.  
In the late nineteenth century, Settler industries, fueled by Indigenous People’s resources, 
penetrated Anishianabewaki as they accelerated westward in the late nineteenth century and 
transformed the labor landscape of the North American West.25 Mining, logging, and 
commercial fishing and agriculture companies colluded with federal, state, and provincial 
authorities to enact policies that favored their development while placing limits on Indian 
Peoples.  
Turtle Mountain, St. Peter’s, and Lac Courte Oreilles Peoples all experienced land loss 
within their ishkoniganan because of intersecting state and commercial interests. In 1884, an 
                                                 
24 White interview, Living Our Language, 234-235.  
25 White, Railroaded; Andrew C. Isenberg, Mining California: An Ecological History (New York: Hill and Wang, 
2005); Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991); West, Last 
Indian War.  
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executive order reduced the Turtle Mountain Reservation to a mere tenth of its original size to 
open surrounding lands to agriculture and mining, and the Ten Cent Treaty targeted the 
ishkonigan for allotment. Federal officials and the state of Wisconsin chipped away at Lac 
Courte Oreilles land in small pieces. In 1909, Billy Boy, a respected ogimaa, told Congressional 
representatives that the Indians understood that this land inside the boundary lines of the Lac 
Courte Oreilles reservation belonged to them and they possessed inalienable rights to everything 
within that ishkonigan. However, Billy Boy discovered that the state of Wisconsin had 
appropriated ishkonigan land for schools and drainage programs, and  
We find that there are up at the head of the lake here twelve forties that are inside of 
the boundary line of the reservation that we do not own, belonging to the someone 
else. Here across the way, where our government farmer is living on a piece of land; 
and we hear that piece of land belongs to the Government, but as we understood it 
years ago, that land was tribal land belonging to the tribe.26  
 
The Crown similarly constricted the size of the St. Peter’s ishkonigan. Although the Treaty One 
reserved the ishkonigan for Saulteaux use, the federal government frequently sided with Settlers 
who lived within the ishkonigan’s boundaries.27 As a result, Settlers claimed 17,331 of 55,246 
acres within the reserve.28 Policies through the 1920s often had an economic edge: residential 
boarding schools’ manual labor practices, agency workers seeking to control women by 
reconfiguring gendered divisions of labor and household economies, allotment and other land-
use and agricultural policies that promoted farming. Labor comprised a critical axis of state- and 
                                                 
26 Condition of Indian Affairs in Wisconsin: Hearings before the Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate, 
on Senate Resolution no. 263 (Washington : The Committee, 1910), 191-193.  
27 Treaty One, 1871, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke, &Co., 1880), 313.  
28 H.M. Howell to His Excellency the Governor General of Canada, 1906, Clandeboye Agency - Two Copies of a 
Forty-Three Page report by H.M. Howell on Land Claims on the St. Peter’s Reserve, RG 10, Volume 3618, File 
4645 part 2, Library and Archives Canada.  
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empire-building.29 Incorporating Indigenous individuals via assimilation furthered the goal of 
eliminating Indigenous Peoples. Neither the United States nor Canada intended ishkoniganan to 
last. Settler officials conceived of reserves and reservations as temporary, transitional spaces that 
dismantled Indigenous peoplehood at its core and transposed Settler relationships and power in 
its place.30 Reservation policies of confinement were, at their root, policies of erasure.31  
 Rather than disappearing or falling into a cycle of dependency, the Ojibwe People dealt 
with economic transformations on their own terms. Like other Indigenous peoples throughout 
North America, Ojibweg have a long history of creative adaptation.32 As the Ojibwe People 
adapted their multisource sustenance economy to changing circumstances, the seasonal round 
diversified and grew more complex rather than disintegrating. Ojibwe men and women perhaps 
first engaged with global markets through the fur trade, which they incorporated into their 
seasonal round. The fur trade provided an early market not only for animal pelts but also for 
products such as manoomin, berries, and garden produce, which Ojibwe women sold to traders 
                                                 
29 Pamela Margaret White, “Restructuring the Domestic Sphere: Prairie Indian Women on Reserves: Image, 
Ideology and State Policy, 1880-1930,” (PhD Thesis, McGill University, 1987), 1; Jane E. Simonson, Making the 
Home Work: Domesticity and Native American Assimilation in the American West, 1860-1919 (Alexandria, VA: 
Alexander Street Press, 2009). On the link between labor and empire, see Usner, Indian Work; Mae Ngai, 
Impossible Subjects; Glenn, Unequal Freedom; Meeks, Border Citizens; De Genova, Working the Boundaries; 
Colby, The Business of Empire; Evan Lampe, Work, Class, and Power in the Borderlands of the Early American 
Pacific: The Labors of Empire (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2014). 
30 Between 1880 and 1920, policies that constrained Indian Peoples on reservations existed simultaneously with the 
drive to dismantle reservations and replace them with Settler people, places, and economies. By 1920, the push 
toward assimilation meant not incorporation but marginalization or confinement to their “place” within a rigid social 
hierarchy. Hoxie, Final Promise, 242-244.  
31 Patrick Wolfe discusses the “logic of elimination” that accompanied Settler colonialism in “Settler Colonialism 
and the Elimination of the Native”: 387-409.  
32 The Cherokee People in northeastern Oklahoma shared similar experiences with the Ojibwe. Allotment policy 
aimed to assimilate—to rupture Cherokee relationships—but Cherokee families managed the disruptions of Settler 
land policies by continuing to draw upon a wide range of resources including gardening, gathering, hunting, and 
wage labor, which they used to sustain kinship ties. Stremlau, Sustaining Cherokee Families, 223-224.  
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and early lumbermen.33 The fur trade declined, in part because of Settler encroachment and 
environmental factors, but the Ojibwe People did not. Anthropologist Laura Peers demonstrates 
this resiliency among the Saulteaux in Canada. The decrease in moose, deer, elk, and other large 
game in northwestern Anishianabewaki did not, as scholars once asserted, drive the Saulteaux 
People into dependency. They developed sophisticated, successful strategies to maintain the 
seasonal food-harvesting round, including sustainable pursuit of smaller game and accepting 
handouts of pemmican at the trading posts where they had long done their business.34 As 
industry and tourism expanded in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ojibwe 
people again adapted their sustenance activities. Ojibweg directed these transformations to 
sustain their identity, preserving cultural and political meanings.35 Anokiiwin formed a conduit 
within the matrix of Anishinaabe peoplehood, not only connecting Anishinaabe men and women 
to resources but also embedding Anishinaabeg in relationships with aki, Anishinaabemowin, 
aadizookanag, manidookewin, and doodemag. 
Noopiming: Lac Courte Oreilles Anokiiwin in the Woods 
 Mitigoog (trees) covered much of Anishinaabewaki. Dense forests blanketed the rolling 
hills south of Gichigami, particularly rich in wiigwaasaatig (birch), okikaandag (jack pine), 
zhingwaak (pine or white pine), giizhik (cedar), and ziinzibaakwadwaatig (maple).36 Mitig 
                                                 
33 Child, Holding Our World Together, 21-23. Hosmer argues that wage labor was often not Native men and 
women’s first encounter with wages or the market economy. Rather, a long history of economic adaptations, like the 
fur trade, supported the Ojibweg as they engaged the marketplace. Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace.  
34 Laura Peers, “Changing Resource-Use Patterns of Saulteaux Trading at Fort Pelly, 1821-1870,” Aboriginal 
Resource Use in Canada: Historical Aspects, edited by Kerry Abel and Jean Friesan (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press, 1991), 107-118.  
35 Chantal Norrgard establishes this perspective in “From Berries to Orchards.” See also Child, Holding Our World 
Together and Rohde, “Labor and Leisure in the ‘Enchanted Summer Land’: Anishinaabe Women’s Work and the 
Growth of Wisconsin Tourism, 1900-1940,” Indigenous Women and Work.  
36 Although ziinzibaakwadwaatig were scarce in the mashkode, or prairie region on Anishinaabewaki’s westernmost 
edges, the Turtle Mountains rose out of the prairie with a thick growth of azaadi (poplar and aspen), aniib (elm), 
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means “stick” or “piece of wood” when inanimate, but when paired with animate noun endings 
or verbs it indicates a tree, signifying the living relationship between the Ojibwe People and their 
forests. Anishinaabeg men and women enacted this relationship in part through the reciprocal 
ethics of anokiiwin. Mitigoog provided shelter from wind, rain, and cold. Deer, partridges, and 
other animals lived and gave birth to their young amongst the trees, and berries, roots, and other 
food and medicine that grew in the rich soil between the trunks.37 The mitigoog and the other 
plants and animals in the woods sustained the Ojibwe men and women who accessed these gifts 
through their anokiiwin, and the reciprocal relationships of anokiiwin fused the Anishinaabeg 
People with the woods of Anishinaabewaki even as Settlers redefined these spaces in their 
attempts to erase Indigenous sovereignty.  
 Around the time that the ice on the rivers and lakes starts to melt in the early ziigwan 
(spring), the sap of the ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog (sugar maple trees) loosens and begins to flow 
within the trunks. This usually happens in iskigamizige-giizis (April), which means maple sap 
moon. Often while snow still covered the ground, Lac Courte Oreilles men, women, and children 
moved into the woods to their families’ sugar maple groves. Women, who directed labor in the 
iskigamizigan (sugar bush or camp), held usufruct rights to groves where they returned each 
year, setting aside a store of dried berries and wild rice to feed the families when they arrived to 
tap the trees after a long winter.38  
 Sap from the ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog provided more than physical sustenance for the 
People. In Ojibwemowin, maple sugar translates into either ziinzibaakwad or anishinaabe-
                                                                                                                                                             
baapaagimaak (black ash), and some wiigwaasaatig and zhingwaak, and sturdy but scattered stands of azaadi and 
gaawaandag (spruce) grew in the St. Peter’s People’s homelands between Lake Winnipeg and the Red River.  
37 Johnston, Honour Earth Mother, viii.  
38 Child, Holding Our World Together, 76.  
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ziinzibaakwad. The latter emphasizes that the Creator gave the ziinzibaakwadwaatig to the 
Anishinaabe People as a gift, along with the sap they harvested. Ziinzibaakwadwaatig is an 
animate noun, and one aadizookaanan recounts how a tree gave its sap to save an Ojibwe man’s 
life. Many years ago, during early ziigwan, the man collapsed from hunger in the woods. He 
offered tobacco and asked the Creator to save his life, and then a misaabe—a large, hairy 
being—appeared, a large knife in his hand. The giant used his knife to open a gash in his leg, 
transforming into a ziinzibaakwadwaatig as his blood poured out. The starving man ate the 
blood, which transformed into ziinzibakwadaaboo (unprocessed maple sap), and he felt the 
strength return to his body. The ziinzibaakwadwaatig saved the Ojibwe man’s life, as 
anishinaabe-ziinzibaakwad sustained the Ojibwe People for generations to come.39 
 Collecting the gift of ziinzibakwadaaboo and transforming it into sugar or syrup required 
intensive effort. Every day, the buckets had to be checked and their contents hauled back to 
camp, where Ojibweg boiled liquid down into one of two forms: a thick syrup or a granulated 
sugar. In order to produce one gallon of syrup, a family had to collect thirty to forty gallons of 
ziinzibakwadaaboo. A single tap yielded between five to fifteen gallons of sap, depending on the 
season and the size of the tree. An average maple grove included approximately forty trees with 
as many as one hundred taps in all, although before logging reduced the number of 
ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog in the region the largest groves could host up to one thousand taps.40 
The unprocessed liquid sugar also provided a syrup in which to boil medicine. After the 
processing, sugar had to be preserved, generally by placing it in birch bark containers. By the 
twentieth century, men and women shared in the work of sugaring, although it had once been 
                                                 
39 Anton Treuer, “Ojibwe Lifeways,” Minnesota Conservation Volunteer (Sept. 2012): 40. 
40 GLIFWC, “Mazina’igan Supplement,” 1996; Child, Holding Our World Together, 20-22; Densmore, Chippewa 
Customs.  
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primarily a woman’s activity.41 Despite the process of Settler colonialism, with access to 
resources like ziinzibaakwadwaatigoog threatened because of logging and the criminalization of 
Ojibwe seasonal labor, Ojibweg adapted patterns of anokiiwin and continued to access the 
anishinaabe-ziinzibaakwad that they protected in their treaties.  
 Women returned to the woods in niibin, when the low bushes and creepers grew heavy 
with ode’iminan (strawberries) and miinan (blueberries). Ojibweg traveled throughout 
Anishinaabewaki to pick these berries. The several ways of saying in Ojibwemowin that she 
picked berries emphasize place and movement. Mawinzino means simply she picks berries, but 
nanaandawinzo means she goes to look for berries to pick, and danawinzo means she picks 
berries in a certain place. She might also want to conceal the source of berries being picked, or 
aawinzo.42 The act of picking berries helped to connect Ojibwe women to these places, many of 
which lay beyond reservation borders.43  
 In the deep snows and bitter cold of biboon (winter), the forests filled with the sounds of 
falling mitigoog. Although logging occurred in all seasons, biboon saw the most activity. 
Ojibweg cut mitigoog near their homes for personal use and for sale to U.S. agencies and local 
Settlers. Many lived in the camps for the entire season, while others logged for a few weeks and 
moved on to other biboon anokiiwin such as hunting and trapping.44  
 Although Ojibweg worked in the woods in similar ways as they had in the past, the 
woods changed between 1880 and 1930. Federal Indian policies and Gilded Age-era 
industrialization threatened the relationship between the Ojibwe and their forests. After the 1837 
                                                 
41 Child, Holding Our World Together 20-22.  
42 Ojibwe People’s Dictionary. 
43 Norrgard, “From Berries to Orchards,” 33-61; Child, Holding Our World Together, 83-86.  
44 Condition of Indian Affairs in Wisconsin (1909-1910), 79.  
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Treaty, the Settler logging industry deforested vast swaths of Anishinaabewaki. Wisconsin’s 
lumber industry grew rapidly, propelled by Ojibwe land cessions throughout the nineteenth 
century. The 1837 treaty, for instance, received the nickname “the White Pine Treaty” because 
Settlers pursued the agreement to obtain access to Anishinaabewaki’s white pine forests. 
Allotment, initiated on Lac Courte Oreilles in the 1870s, removed considerable timber from 
Ojibwe control. In 1875, the Lac Courte Oreilles People received their final annuity payment 
from the 1854 treaty, which combined with the onset of allotment policies pressuring Ojibwe 
men to clear individually-owned land for farming to strain Ojibwe mitigoog resources. 
Government officials encouraged Ojibweg to cut and sell timber to supplement their decreased 
income in both cash and goods. By 1888, about a decade after federal officials implemented 
allotment at Lac Courte Oreilles and other Ojibwe reserves near Lake Superior, the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Indian Traders found that logging companies had extracted one half of all 
commercial timber in the La Pointe district, which included Lac Courte Oreilles.45 Between 1890 
and 1910, commercial logging peaked. By the 1920s, most of the valuable timber near Lac 
Courte Oreilles had floated down rivers or had ridden the railroads to Settler towns, fueling 
further expansion.46 Unlike their Menominee neighbors, Anishinaabe Peoples in the United 
States and Canada lacked a buffer against exploitative commercial interests.47 Nevertheless, as 
                                                 
45 Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 87.  
46 Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 87, 105; Satz, Chippewa Treaty Rights, 13-14.  
47 Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 88. Anishinaabeg control of their timber resources was made even more precarious 
in the United States by United States v. Cook (1873). In United States v. Cook, the United States Supreme Court 
held that because Indian Peoples supposedly maintained only a right of occupancy on their lands, they lacked the 
authority to cut and sell timber on their own lands for profit—unless they could prove the logging was “for the 
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the woods changed around them, Anishinaabeg continued to access these places through their 
labor, reaffirming the relationships of their peoplehood.  
 Exploitative logging nearly disrupted the relationship with the ziinzibaakwadwaatig. 
Indian Department agents and farmers pushed Lac Courte Oreilles people toward farming on 
their allotments, but woods covered the reservation so thickly that farming could not proceed 
before clearing the timber.48 The federal government’s allotment process, tied to individual 
property rights, ignored traditional Ojibwe land usage and resource rights. In the 1910s, William 
Wolf, son of hereditary ogimaa Peter Wolf, discovered a man “making sugar on my eighty.” 
Presumably recognizing that his allotment overlapped with this man’s preexisting claim, Wolf 
directed his complaint not against the unnamed man but rather at the Signor, Crisler, and 
Company logging operation, which he accused of cutting ziinzibaakwadwaatig without his 
authorization. Wolf relied on customary usufruct rights, criticizing encroaching Settlers while 
protecting his fellow Indians’ access to resources and, by extension, his People’s sovereign right 
to control the aki.49  
 Lac Courte Oreilles men and women continued to sugar on reduced lands. In essential 
ways—in terms of the relationships cultivated by tapping trees and boiling sap each spring—
everything about how they collected sugar remained the same, except that they now had larger 
kettles.50 Wamazleigafogwiakogijig, a middle-aged man who had lived all of his life in the 
woods near Lac Courte Oreilles, protected the maple groves on his allotment, certainly not 
conforming to the assimilative vision of a farmer. He cleared some of his land for planting 
                                                 
48 Danziger, Lake Superior Chippewa, 64.  
49 Conditions of Indian Affairs in Wisconsin, 1909-1910, 136.  
50 “Maple Sugar Industry” by Peter Halfday, WPA interviews. 
  
184 
 
during the first decade of the twentieth century but “reserved some big trees, nice trees, standing 
there which are maple,” ensuring the continuance of a sacred and life-sustaining resource.51 The 
Coons family of Lac Courte Oreilles resisted the arbitrary divisions imposed by allotment, 
continuing to access maple groves according to kinship-based, shared usage rights. Ruth Carley, 
who belonged to the makwa doodem, traced her birth in the ziigwan of 1921 to a sugar camp on 
a hill above the town of Reserve, “where Uncle Henry Coons had a maple sugar camp.”52 The 
Coons family used an eighty-acre allotment to make sugar.53 From a practical standpoint, the 
numerous tasks that went into extracting sap and processing it into sugar necessitated family 
labor, and parents pulled their children from school for several weeks to join them in the bush.54 
By uniting families, including children in government-run schools, sugaring reinforced the bonds 
of kinship that the individual landownership implemented by allotment threatened to divide. 
Ojibweg men and women made choices that maintained kin-based economies, preserved their 
role in aadizookanag as the aki’s caretakers, and also provided for their sustenance.55  
 As the woods changed, Anishinaabe men and women adjusted anokiiwin without losing 
Anishinaabe perspectives and practices. The Settler tourist industry expanded into cutover 
                                                 
51 Conditions of Indian Affairs in Wisconsin, 1909-1910, 149. It is unlikely that this name is spelled correctly in the 
recorded testimony, but I have been unable to connect it to anyone else.  
52 Quoted in Sara Balbin, James R. Bailey, and Thelma Nayquonabe, “Ruth Carley,” Spirit of the Ojibwe: Images of 
Lac Courte Oreilles Elders (Duluth: Holy Cow! Press, 2012), 64. Many Lac Courte Oreilles elders today trace their 
births by season to sugar camps or rice beds rather than specific dates. Nearly all of the people included in Spirit of 
the Ojibwe, born between 1880 and 1930, remember seasonal labor as an essential part of their lives since 
childhood, emphasizing in particular sugar making along with gathering wild rice, hunting, and fishing. In the 1920s 
when rising waters from the construction of a dam flooded Lac Courte Oreilles member Frances Denasha’s family 
out of their homes when she was a young girl, they reestablished sugar camps “in the hills south of New Post” (72).  
53 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, “Ruth Carley,” Spirit of the Ojibwe: Images of Lac Courte Oreilles Elders 
(Duluth: Holy Cow! Press, 2012), 64. 
54 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the Ojibwe, 50, 64.  
55 In 1916, Superintendent H. J. McQuigg noted that the Lac Courte Oreilles produced several tons of sugar each 
spring. Although he estimated its value at several thousand dollars, he noted that Ojibweg consumed most of it for 
themselves. McQuigg to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 6 Jun. 1916, Letters Sent, NARA at Chicago.  
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woods, aided by new rail lines in the north woods and on the plains. Wealthy locals and 
vacationers from nearby cities built homes and resorts on lands opened by allotment and 
subsequent land loss.56 The promise of economic development encouraged state and provincial 
officials to seize increased control of local resources while relegating Indigenous Peoples to 
quaint, “authentic” scenery.57 In this context, working like an Indigenous person constituted a 
political act.58 Ojibweg reshaped anokiiwin to accommodate changing political, economic, and 
environmental circumstances within their forests, including the tourism industry.59  
 Ojibwe women blended wage work in the tourism industry with seasonal labor patterns 
among the mitigoog. Historically, Ojibwe women constructed the bark lodges where Ojibwe 
families lived. According to St. Croix elder Archie Mosay, a spiritual leader whose mother came 
from Lac Courte Oreilles and who lived west of the ishkonigan in the St. Croix River valley, 
 
Gaye know wiigiwaaman, gabe-niibin ongow ikwewag gii-ozhitoowaad onow, 
onow isa gas-apishimowaajin anaakaning, gaa-izhi-wiindamawaajin. Minnawaa 
                                                 
56 Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 110. Manitoba experienced similar tourist growth during this time period. Berry 
Potyandi, Selkirk: The First Hundred Years (Winnipeg: Josten’s, 1981), 27-35. 
57 Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 112; Raibmon, Authentic Indians, 1-14; Patricia C. Albers, “From Legend to Land 
to Labor: Changing Perspectives on Native American Work,” Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical 
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the world. More generally, James C. Scott’s “weapons of the weak” includes accommodations and mundane acts of 
resistance within exploitative labor systems. The everyday acts of Indigenous labor, and anokiiwin more 
specifically, defied the corrosive, eliminating impulses of Settler colonialism by keeping Indigenous knowledge and 
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59 Scholars such as Chantal Norrgard, Larry Nesper, Clyde Ellis and John Troutman have demonstrated how Native 
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and preserve cultural autonomy. Norrgard, Seasons of Change, 110-1135; Nesper, “Simulating Culture”; Ellis, “Five 
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and craft production to Seminole sovereignty, and Paige Raibmon shows how Peoples from the Pacific Northwest 
found ways to use the tourist industry and events such as the Chicago World’s Fair to support their own goals. 
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onow megwaa abakwang iniw wiigwaasan, mii apii gaa-mamoowaad gii-
ozhitoowaad iniw, iniw isa wiigwaasi-abakwayan. Miinawaa ingiw aya’aa 
apakweshkweyag gii-iniibinaawaad ingoji ayi’ii wiigiwaaming. Mii imaa gii-
aabaji’aawaad iniw agidigamish iniw wiigwaasan wiigwaasi-abakwayan. Mii 
akeyaa gaa-ozhitoowaad iniw, iniw isa gii-abiwaad. (And these bark lodges, every 
spring these women made them, they laid the beds for them on the mats, the ones 
that have been talked about. And while the birch bark was being hung, at this time 
they took it and made them, those birch bark shingles. And they lined up those 
birch bark roofing rolls in a certain way on the lodges. That’s how they made the 
places they lived in.)60 
 
As wigwams became less common, many women redirected their labor. They worked at tourist 
resorts doing “spring cleaning” in preparation for the summer season.61 Lucy Mizhakwad 
Mustache Begay (name or sturgeon doodem), a Midewiwin member raised on the life-sustaining 
resources of fish, manoomin, and deer and rabbit meat, worked as a housekeeper at local resorts 
near Lac Courte Oreilles until 1927, when at nineteen she moved to Chicago to work as an 
industrial seamstress.62 This work for wages provided flexible schedules that could fit into the 
seasonal patterns of women’s responsibilities such as sugaring and processing pelts and food.63 
 Tourism provided a market for women’s manidoominensikaan (beadwork). In the 1910s, 
beadwork brought in $800 to $1,000 a year at Lac Courte Oreilles.64 Women could easily craft 
                                                 
60 Mosay interview, Living Our Language, 28-29.  
61 “Untitled Report,” A. Irving Hallowell Papers, APS. At the resorts near Lac du Flambeau, women earned around 
$3.50 per day in the 1940s cleaning hotels rooms and sprucing up common areas. 
62 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the Ojibwe, 52.  
63 Women also performed daily household tasks including laundry and cooking. Laundry was constant and 
unchanging, but cooking varied according to seasonal factors, as women preserved or prepared the results of their 
own and their male kin’s labor. Overlooking women’s work reflects a Settler mindset rooted in capitalism that 
devalues women’s work. Ojibwe gender relations included binary but balanced gender practices—views that 
capitalism encroached upon but never full eroded (see Child, Holding Our World Together). Taking a holistic view 
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64 At Lac du Flambeau, beadwork brought in $2,000 per year. Tourists regarded both Lac Courte Oreilles and Lac 
du Flambeau as the best sites to obtain Native women's work. 1916 Narrative Report, Annual Reports, 1906-1916, 
Lac du Flambeau Agency; 1911 Statistical Report, Annual Reports 1906-1916, Lac du Flambeau Agency. Men 
occasionally participated in the tourist craft trade. At Walpole Island in Anishinaabewaki’s eastern waters between 
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beadwork in between other tasks such as gardening, berrying, and changing diapers. For women 
such as Lucy Mizhakwad Mustache Begay and Mary Mandaamin Homesky who traveled 
throughout Anishinaabewaki during various seasons, the work was also relatively portable. 
Women generally chose to sell their work individually. They took advantage of the local 
souvenir shops and tourist traffic, but they also traveled to larger towns such as Minocqua, where 
they received better prices. In Minocqua, a billfold that represented about five days of labor, 
performed intermittently with other tasks, sold for approximately eight dollars. Additionally, 
women occasionally contracted directly with prospective buyers staying at resorts.65 Although 
many of the patterns were commercialized and even simplified for tourist tastes, 
manidoominensikaan helped some women maintain their relationship to the interconnectedness 
of all things. Susan Peterson used pre-fabricated moccasins rather than making them herself, but 
she also noted, “Patterns still come in dreams.”66 Manidoominensikaan remained rooted in 
ceremony, which connected Anishinaabe women to their peoplehood. 
 Several Ojibweg families at Lac Courte Oreilles sought more direct control of the land 
and its resources in the northwoods tourist industry. William Debrot, forty-five years old in 
1922, reported to federal officials that he leased another allottee’s land in Pahquahwong or Post, 
a prominent village within the ishkonigan, “on which he conducts a summer resort” with at least 
two log cabins for guests.67 The mixed-descent LaRonge family owned a hotel in Reserve. 
Charlie Coons or Esiban, an athletic man of the makwa doodem (bear clan) known as much for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ontario and Michigan, Ojibwe men and women made “fancy baskets, mats out of splints and sweetgrass; also canes, 
bows and arrows and small bark canoes, which they sell to the summer visitors and excursionists” from the United 
States. Sessional Papers, 1910 vol. 11, number 27, p. 42.  
65 “Josephine Poupart,” Hallowell Collection, APS.  
66 “Susan Peterson (Informal),” Hallowell Collection, APS.  
67 Lac Courte Oreilles Industrial Survey, Hayward File, Reports of Industrial Surveys, 1922-1929, RG 75, National 
Archives Washington, D.C., Box 17.  
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his strength of character as his physical strength, took advantage of the tourist industry and his 
neighbors’ increasing cash income and opened a general store next to the LaRonge hotel.68 
Esiban stocked the store with everything from groceries and tobacco to clothing, tools, and toys. 
As Indigenous owners and operators, Debrot and Esiban refused to allow Settler colonialism to 
dislodge them from the economy of their homeland.  
 Esiban attracted tourists to his store and earned additional income by meeting the 
growing Settler demand for Indian performances. Dances and pageants where Ojibwe men and 
women performed for tourists supplement the seasonal round for many Ojibwe and reaffirmed 
connections with their peoplehood. Lac Courte Oreilles men and women also traveled to the 
Apostle Islands (including Mooningwakauning-manis) in the mid-1920s to participate in the 
Apostle Islands Indian Pageant. In 1924, performers earned only eight dollars for three weeks 
work. Nevertheless, about 225 traveled from Lac Courte Oreilles to the pageant grounds the 
following summer. As scholar Melissa Rohde argues, monetary compensation was most likely 
not the primary motivation for the Ojibwe men and women who participated in the pageant. 
Rather, community—the opportunity to reaffirm social relationships by congregating with 
friends and relatives, dancing, and participating in games and celebrations—in the familiar 
context of labor would have been the greater inducement.69 Moreover, the three-week event, 
fitting comfortably within seasonal labor patterns, allowed Ojibwe men and women to travel and 
reconnect with Anishinaabe places beyond the reservation. The Lac Courte Oreilles People held 
smaller performances in Reserve on Sundays throughout the summer, charging fifty cents for 
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each tourist. In a creative appeal to Settler tourists, Esiban sponsored these “Indian dances” 
beginning in the 1920s as a way “to increase his business of selling groceries, etc.”70 Performers 
shared equally in the proceeds, and the casual, temporary nature of the work fit in between other 
seasonal activities such as berry picking, gardening, and logging.71 
 The performances involved more than just work or a commodification of Ojibwe culture. 
Ojibwe Wanda Brown Hunt explained that summer dances at Lac du Flambeau similar to the 
performances at Esiban’s store had a dual significance for her People. She recalled, “It was for 
both [the community and the tourists]….Those were big powwows, all kinds of activities out 
there, not just dancing. Races and things like that, games.”72 Susan Peterson, who belonged to 
the Midewiwin, reflected shortly after a dance in the summer of 1946 that it was “the real old 
thing.”73 Dancing, singing, and drumming for tourists demonstrates the creative ways in which 
Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibweg incorporated new forms of anokiiwin into their seasonal round. 
They used these dances to live out relationships with their peoplehood, visiting friends, relatives, 
and places, passing skills and stories on to their children, and relying on inawemaagan-based 
resource networks.74  
 Indian policy and economic changes produced other changes in the woods. The same 
sportsmen who found their way in the woods with the help of Ojibwe guides reshaped the labor 
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landscape by encouraging shifts from local to national control of resources.75 At Lac Courte 
Oreilles, hunting remained an essential activity, despite harassment both on and off the 
reservation from state officials. When the weather turned colder in dagwaagin (fall), sending 
both humans and animals in search of shelter from chilling winds and the first snow, 
Anishinaabe men hunted (giiyose) and trapped (wanii’ige) amongst the mitigoog. In 1921, 
Esiban, who owned the store where Anishianabeg danced for toursits, returned to Lac Courte 
Oreilles to hunt, fish, harvest maple sugar, and work in logging camps as part of a seasonal round 
after several years working in Detroit, Michigan, and Hartland, Wisconsin, in automobile 
factories.76 During dagwaagin, his hunting trips lasted several days, and he stayed in the woods 
“building a lean-to for shelter and sleeping on a bed of pine boughs” while he hunted 
waawaashkeshi.77 
 Some of the most contentious, violent attempts to impede Ojibwe treaty rights took place 
in the the woods around Lac Courte Oreilles. In 1894, a Wisconsin game warden murdered Joe 
White or Gishkitawag (Lac Courte Oreilles), shooting him in the back while attempting to arrest 
him for hunting out of season and off the reservation.78 Despite the evidence against him, an all-
white jury cleared the Settler game warden of all charges, and the state of Wisconsin continued 
to violate Ojibwe treaty rights.79 Lac Courte Oreilles historian Eric Redix uses Gishkitawag’s 
                                                 
75 Warren, Hunter’s Game. See footnote 6. Although states often chafed at federal control, in states such as 
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violent death to mark the decline of Ojibwe autonomy among the mitigoog.80 However, 
Gishkitawag also signifies the continuation of anokiiwin in the woods of Anishinaabewaki and 
the beginning of a century-long struggle to claim the sovereign rights to the land and its 
resources as protected in nineteenth-century treaties. Like Joe White, Lac Courte Oreilles hunters 
continued to act on their rights. The frequency with which state game wardens arrested Lac 
Courte Oreilles men throughout the next several decades suggests that hunting remained a 
common activity. In 1929, state game wardens entered Moses Cloud’s home and “confiscated 
several hides and furs.”81 They arrested Cloud, who spent several months in jail. Although 
Cloud’s arrest seems to have happened on an allotment, Settler officials crossed reservation 
boundaries to arrest him. The same year that the police arrested Cloud, for example, “Chicken” 
Martell was “arrested with furs on ‘reservation’ lands.” State game wardens also seized furs from 
the government warehouse on the Hayward Indian School grounds.82 In 1929, when a 
Congressional committee stopped in Hayward while investigating conditions on reservations 
following the Merriam Report, the Lac Courte Oreilles People included these treaty violations in 
their formal list of complaints.83 Charles Smith, a representative of the federal government, 
visited the ishkonigan the following year, and the Ojibweg asserted their right to hunt in the 
woods surrounding the ishkonigan. Anakwad or Pete Cloud, an ogimaa from the influential 
Akwawewining community, stood up at the meeting with Smith and declared, “That wild game 
is mine, it doesn’t belong to you. Ever since I have been able to remember and been able to hunt, 
we have always killed deer and wild game after the reservation was established and no one had 
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any objections. That was the source of our living. There are agreements with the Indians that the 
Indian reserves the right to hunt fish and game.”84 Seventy-five years after the ink on the 1854 
treaty had dried, Anakwad repeated its words, the same words that his kin had penned both in 
Ojibwemowin and English and sent to Washington, D.C., with Akiwenziii in 1864. Repeatedly, 
the Lac Courte Ojibwe emphasized not only sovereign control of their own reservation but also 
treaty rights that granted them access to off-reservation sites.85 
 Protected by treaties, Anishinaabeg Peoples continued to rely on the relationships of 
peoplehood when Settlers attempted to redefine the woods. They adjusted to commercialized, 
constrained contexts and defined confining Settler policies. Hunting maintained essential 
relationships with the aki and its resources. The Anishinaabeg People’s claim to the land came in 
part because Gitchi Manitou had created these woods for them. To honor his gift and maintain 
that claim, Anishinaabeg acted as stewards. Hunting comprised an integral part of that 
relationship, and therefore intimately connected to sovereignty. Many Ojibwe linked consuming 
the forests’ products to their identity. Lucy Mizhakwad Mustache Begay, a member of the name 
doodem born in 1907 in the Round Lake village of Lac Courte Oreilles, linked “[b]eing a 
traditional Ojibwe woman” to her preferred diet of “traditional foods such as wild rice, berries, 
fish, and venison.”86 A 1916 report noted that Ojibwe consumed the majority of the 
ziinzibaakwad they produced—several tons per year.87 Ojibwe hunters not only fed their families 
through their anokiiwin but also lived out the relationships that made them the Anishinaabe 
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People, a sovereign community in this particular place. In Anishinaabemowin, hunting is often 
referred to as “nandawenjigewin gechitwaawendaagwak,” or the sacred art of hunting.88 Like 
manoomin, aadizookanaag and an associated set of ceremonies established this sacred 
relationship. Hunting started with tobacco offerings. According to Archie Mosay, 
Miinawaa o’ow isa menwinzha go anishinaabeg vii kiiyosewaad gaye, wa’aw 
oshki-inini oshki-nisaad awesiinyan, awegwen igo awesiinyan weshki-nisaajin, 
mii iniw ogii-sagaswe’aan manidoon. Asemaan ogii-pagidinaawaan o’ow isa gii-
oshki-nisaad onow awesiinyan .Miinawa asemaan ogii-pagidinamawaan 
manidoon wii-izhi-miijid i’iw isa, o’ow isa gaa-nisaajin. Akawe maniddon ogii-
wiindamawaan.” (“And when the Indian went hunting long ago as well, when a 
young man first killed an animal, whatever kind of animal was first killed, he 
smoked to the spirit. He offered tobacco for killing this animal first. Again 
tobacco was offered to the spirit when he ate that which he killed. He talked to the 
spirit first.”)89 
 
Hunting took place in the context of ceremonies that established proper relationships between an 
Ojibwe person and the natural world. Hunting invoked additional ceremonies, such as a 
celebration in honor of a young man’s first kill.90 By continuing to hunt, Ojibwe men ensured 
that these ceremonies and the relationships they invoked would continue.  
 Hunting and processing the animals relied on familial networks of labor, including the 
work of women as well as men. Ruth Carley processed waawaashkeshi (deer) meat and hides 
alongside her aunt. “It is hard work, and you have to have a lot of muscle,” she remembered, but 
she also drew strength from the work.91 Anishinaabe ethics of reciprocity and kinship grounded 
hunting. When the men went deer hunting in the fall, “[a]aningodinong go bezhig eta onisaawan 
waawashkeshiwan. Mii sa askina da-daashkonomidiwaad i’iw ([s]ometimes they would only kill 
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one a day. So they all shared in that).”92 Maintaining good relationships with the world mandated 
reciprocity, and Ojibwe used seasonal hunting to strengthen the bonds of reciprocity among 
kin—and, by extension, Lac Courte Oreilles peoplehood. 
 Although federal Indian policy and industrialization attempted to enclose the commons, 
these changes also created opportunities for Indigenous People to modernize their economies. 
Anokiiwin in the woods enabled Ojibweg to engage with the market while maintaining control of 
their labor. Income from mitigoog resources such as berries and furs physically supported 
families in a changing economic landscape. Between 1880 and 1930, miinan (blueberries) were 
perhaps the most common quarry. In the early twentieth century, forest fires stimulated rapid 
miinan growth south of Lake Superior.93 Ojibwe people throughout Anishinaabewaki “have 
always looked forward to the blueberry season as a considerable source of income,” according to 
Florina Denomie of Bad River. At Lac Courte Oreilles, Ojibwe families picked blueberries, 
blackberries, and raspberries for personal consumption and for sale in local towns.94 Ruth Carley 
and her aunts followed sugaring with berry picking. Through the month of Abitaa-niibini-giizis 
(mid-summer moon or July), they “would take a lunch out in the woods and pick berries all 
day.”95 Settler towns near the reservation and more distant berry patches sustained demand for a 
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variety of berries. In 1916, for instance, blackberries, raspberries, and blueberries sold for 
between ten and twelve cents per quart.96  
 Berrying provided a significant source of income, but the anokiiwan also enacted 
peoplehood.97 Although picking berries fell within women’s realm of anokiiwin, in the early 
twentieth century entire families traveled and worked together. Often, the men checked the 
blueberries first, and then they sent word that the fruit was ready and their families should 
follow. When the men confirmed that the berries had ripened, entire villages moved to the 
woods, packing up several wagons or a couple of cars with camping gear and other essentials.98 
Ojibweg gathered berries in one place and then moved on to new sites and other work.99 Families 
traveled and worked together. Joseph Larson, born during sugaring season in 1892, moved with 
his mother Mary Mandaamin Homesky and sister Olivia to Madeline Island each niibin to 
harvest miinan, traveling from their homes at Lac Courte Oreilles.100 Picking berries integrated 
Ojibwe men and women into the relational networks that supported their peoplehood. 
 Anishinaabeg naturalized wage labor in terms of Ojibwe relationships as they 
incorporated it into the seasonal round that brought them to the woods. Sawmills, for instance, 
attracted many Anishinabeg men, especially during dagwaagin. In 1916, the Indian agent at Lac 
Courte Oreilles reported, “All the Indians, however, that are able to work leave for the woods or 
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mills in the fall.”101 The primary employer near the reservation was Signor, Crisler and 
Company, and the camps offered more than only timber-related jobs. Elder and respected 
interpreter Ira Isham’s son “was cooking and his wife was helping him in one of the skidding 
camps, and Billy Boy, who lived on the allotment where the mill had built their dam, 
occasionally worked for Signor as an interpreter.”102 My grandfather's uncle Art “Sonny” 
Cornelia and other men in my grandfather's family also logged during the winter. That work 
initially motivated them to move from Lac Courte Oreilles to Bad River, and then from Bad 
River to a small town in northern Michigan. “They were always in the woods, it didn’t matter 
how deep the snow was,” my grandfather remembered.103 This anokiiwin in logging camps 
connected new generations of Ojibweg, who continued to range beyond ishkonigan borders, to 
the aki.  
 As with sugaring, hunting, and berrying, wage labor in sawmills remained embedded in 
Ojibwe peoplehood. Melvin Eagle, an elder from Misizaaga’igan (Mille Lacs) in Minnesota who 
worked at one of the Great Lakes area mills with other Ojibweg, reminded a young Ojibwe man, 
“O’ow dash gegoo ezhi-maniddowaadiziwaad gidewe’iganag imaa ko gii-anokiiyeg 
daashkiboojiganing imaa awas akeyaa agaaming gemaa gaye ankiiyaan, miish i’iw.” (“And your 
Drums are sacred things even there in the sawmill where you used to work or where I worked 
myself on the other side of the lake.”) Eagle worked at a sawmill when he hurt his back lifting a 
wooden beam. His injury prevented him from working and affected his overall health. “Barely, 
I’m able to walk, as there are all kinds of things messed up in my back,” he recalled. He attended 
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a Big Drum Ceremony. Eagle doubted that he would be able to dance. “Now at this time I had 
circled [the Drum] twice, and again there things changed for me, as I was able to dance again. I 
had now circled around three times here as I was dancing.”104 Ceremony helped to mitigate the 
negative effects of wage work in places like saw mills and logging camps, thereby preserving 
and even strengthening Ojibwe peoplehood. 
 Anokiiwin connected Anishinaabe Peoples with the woods and with relationships of their 
peoplehood, thereby entrenching the link between anokiiwin and sovereignty. The example of 
commercial logging at Lac Courte Oreilles demonstrates the connection. The Lac Courte Oreilles 
People struggled for control of their woods with the Signor logging company. As part of their 
contract to log on Lac Courte Oreilles allotments, which from an Ojibwe perspective seems to 
parallel earlier alliances founded on reciprocity, Signor agreed to hire Indian labor.105 In practice, 
however, Ojibwe workers believed that Signor showed preference to Settler workers. He hired 
Indian workers last and fired them first when business slowed. Moreover, Signor paid Ojibwe 
workers in time checks or vouchers for the company store. The time checks proved nearly 
impossible to cash. Henry La Rush and both of his parents received time checks for “working in 
the woods,” and La Rush discovered, “I could not cash them up here any place. I tried it at Court 
d’Oreilles [sic], and at Reserve, and I could not get the money, and I had only $1 in my own 
pocket of my own money. I earned that in the reservation. I went down to Rice Lake and tried to 
cash the checks. I went in every saloon and every bank and store and could not get the checks 
cashed.”106 When he finally found a person who could cash it—a local businessman associated 
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with Signor—the man charged a ten percent fee. La Rush “quit working for them after I found 
out the way they were using us. I would not work for them by the day.”107  
 The company vouchers, only redeemable at Signor’s store, likewise frustrated Ojibwe 
workers. The Ojibwe who had no choice but to buy from Signor knew that he charged unfair 
prices compared to the two merchants on the reservation. Signor’s store charged $.40 or $.45 for 
tea. On the reservation, tea cost $.25. Tobacco—Adam’s Standard brand—cost $.30 on the 
reservation, but Signor charged $.35. Ojibwe workers also objected when Signor reduced their 
pay if they did not stay in the camps from the fall through the spring. The long-term 
expectations, enforced through contracts that white workers did not have to sign, sometimes 
conflicted with Ojibwe seasonal labor patterns, especially if spring came early and warmed the 
sap before the lumber camps’ contract period ended. Lewis Dennis, an experienced lumberjack, 
pointed out that there were other options, saying, “We go up to Winters and Wolf Lake 
operations here. Why do we do it? If we work a day and quit to-morrow, we get cash. That is the 
only reason.”108 They preferred the camps that fit more flexibly within the seasonal round.  
 Ultimately, the conflict over labor with Signor was a matter of sovereignty. The problems 
with coupons and contracts demonstrated that Signor’s company suffered from corruption and 
intended to take advantage of the people of Lac Courte Oreilles. The core complaint concerned 
the unfair treatment of Ojibwe workers compared to Settler employees. Signor operated in woods 
that belonged to the Lac Courte Oreilles People, a relationship they maintained despite 
allotment’s parceling of the land. Signor logged in Lac Courte Oreilles territory. Those were Lac 
Courte Oreilles mitigoog he cut and sent down the river. Because of the relationship of these 
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resources to the Lac Courte Oreilles People, they retained a claim on the right to labor in those 
woods.  
 As Settlers attempted to redefine the woods, the Lac Courte Oreilles People continued to 
enact the relationships of their peoplehood through anokiiwin. Anishinaabeg had always 
performed anokiiwin amongst the mitigoog, and they continued to harvest maple sugar, gather 
berries, and hunt game in ways that connected them to aki, Anishinaabemowin, manidookewin, 
aadizookanag, and reciprocal doodem networks. Moreover, anokiiwin in the tourism and logging 
industry likewise engaged peoplehood while asserting Ojibweg control in spaces increasingly 
dominated by Setler interests. Determining access to resources remained, as the conflict with 
Signor demonstrates, the purview of the People. Anokiiwin in the woods performed the work of 
sovereignty. By carrying forward the relationships with aki, Anishinaabemowin, manidookewin, 
aadizookanag, and kin, Anishinaabeg peoplehood continued to thrive.  
Zaaga’iganan and Ziibiwan: St. Peter’s Anokiiwin on the Water 
 Zaaga’iganan (lakes) and ziibiwan (rivers) bind together Anishinaabewaki. Bibi (water) 
gives and sustains life, and zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan bring that nibs to Ojibweg. Gitchi 
Manitou created nibs, along with ishkwaday (fire), ashen (rock), and noodinan (winds) out of 
nothing, and into all four he blew the breath of life.109 During the chibimoodaywin, Anishinaabe 
ancestors traveled along waterways to reach their home in the western Great Lakes region. 
Countless zaaga’iganan dot the forests and prairies, from Gichigami and the other Great Lakes to 
smaller but equally important bodies of water such as Lake Winnipeg, Odawasagaegun (Lac 
Courte Oreilles Lake), and Rainy Lake. Shallow zaaga’iganan, ponds, and sloughs comprised 
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much of the landscape around the St. Peter’s ishkonigan. Anishinaabeg compared the ziibiwan 
that threaded Anishinaabewaki to veins or arteries, bearing nibs that nurtured and cleansed the 
aki.110 The water provided medicine, nourished manoomin, and teemed with a variety of fish that 
kept Anishinaabeg well-fed.  
 Amidst land loss and pressure from state and commercial interests, Ojibweg continued to 
enact essential relationships with zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan by accessing resources such as 
manoomin. Dagwaagin (fall) began with the manoomin harvest, which took place during 
Manoominike-Giizis (Rice moon, approximately August or September). The food that grows on 
water, put there for the Anishinaabeg, signaled to the ancestors that they had reached their home 
after their long migration. According to Saulteaux elder Gilbert Abraham, “Anishinaabe-
manoomin would be what they call the wild rice today, and it has always been wild rice since 
white men came. But there is no such thing as wild rice in Indian vocabulary.”111 Although 
usually shortened to manoomin, the word in Anishinaabemowin is anishinaabe-manoomin—
Anishinaabe or Indian rice, indicating their inherent relationship with the plant. The Creator 
bestowed manoomin as a sacred gift for the benefit of the entire community. Manoomin was the 
Ojibweg’s heritage; it connected the People to the land and to each other. Their labor every 
dagwaagin in the wild rice beds, however dwindling, kept those relationships alive.112 
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 Due to westward expansion, the St. Peter’s People did not live near manoomin. Although 
manoomin remained an essential part of their identity as Ansihinaabeg, and although at least 
some people from St. Peter’s traveled to harvest rice, the expanding Saulteaux reconfigured 
anokiiwin on the water to adapt to their new, manoomin-less environment.113 Between 1880 and 
1920, a period when many Ojibwe children spent their formative years in boarding schools 
intended to purge their Indianness, and federal officials in the United States and Canada 
pressured Ojibwe parents to abandon the mobile seasonal round for a stagnant agrarian existence 
while coveting the People’s land and resources for Settler benefit, the Saulteaux of St. Peter’s 
continued to adapt and find new ways for anokiiwin to sustain the relationships of their 
peoplehood. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Saulteaux continued to labor 
on the waters of their homeland as generations of ancestors had done before them. 
 Zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan offered an abundance of resources. In addition to manoomin, 
the St. Peter’s People trapped on frozen lakes. Trapping provided income and also mobilized 
relationships with the aki and its resources, including the Saulteaux People’s sovereign right to 
determine who could access those resources. In 1901, St. Peter’s hunters and trappers sold 
                                                                                                                                                             
wiigiwam in 1902, harvested manoomin on Fish Trap Lake. Barber’s family traveled approximately one hundred 
miles to Fish Trap Lake, located northeast of Lac du Flambeau. Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the 
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$1,082.46 worth of furs at the Hudson’s Bay Company trading post at Fort Alexander, which 
remained open until 1940. A single black fox skin brought $140, and that same year a bear pelt 
in excellent condition earned its hunter $40.114 Between the 1880s and 1920s, Adam Big Mouth, 
Saulteaux from Little Grand Rapids near the St. Peter’s People’s homeland, trapped across the 
frozen lakes east of Lake Winnipeg. He and his father brought in rabbits at the beginning of 
biboon (winter), and they “used to freeze them and smoke them” to last through the spring.115 
They sold some of the rabbits to the trading post at Grand Rapids, and most winters the post sent 
a team of dogs to collect the rabbits from the winter camps. Occasionally, he encountered other 
Anishinaabeg’s fox traps. Each time, he assured that the prey found its way back to whoever had 
set the trap. He and his fellow Anishinaabeg respected each other’s claims to hunting territory 
that underwrote the Settler landscape between reserves. Additionally, they treated Settlers 
differently from how they interacted with other Anishinaabeg. While checking his traps, he 
“found again in a trap a fox in a trap on a lake. I took back the fox but set the trap. It was a red 
one. Tried to find out who it belonged to. It seems to me the fox belonged to Co. man. He gave 
me half of the value. I found a mink once that belonged to an Indian—[ktcibgawa] from here. 
That one I did not expect pay.”116 He acknowledged his fellow Indian’s claims, delivering the 
mink without compensation. The Settler, however, did not have the same claim to the land or its 
resources. Within a Settler colonial landscape that privileged Settler definitions of space and 
resource rights, Saulteaux continued to rely on Anishinaabe understandings of resource use and 
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access rights in their everyday anokiiwin, demonstrating the unbroken arc of the People’s 
sovereignty. 
 The St. Peter’s People maintained relationships with the water through the anokiiwin of 
fishing, an economic activity that occurred year-round. Fishing provided a significant food 
source and marketable commodity. Spring fishing was primarily net or spearfishing, while 
during summer the main activity was open-water fishing and in the winter Ojibweg spearfished 
on frozen waters. Each of these types of fishing have their own verb in Anishinaabemowin. To 
fish with a net is bagida’waa. Akwa’waa is to fish though the ice with a spear, and wewabanaabii 
is to fish with a hook and line.117 The language distinguishes between the various types of fishing 
that fall within different seasons.  
 Fish comprised an important part of Ojibweg diets. They cleaned the fish and laid them 
on racks to smoke and preserve them, consuming most and selling surplus fish for cash. Melvin 
Eagle (Mille Lacs) said of fish, “Miieta gaa-izhi-wiisiniyaang miinawaa niibing. (That’s all we 
ate in the summer).”118 Up north, in the many lakes scattered around Lake Winnipeg and the Red 
River, Ojibweg caught adikamegwag and name (sturgeon) during the spring spawning season. 
They extracted oil for pemmican and smoked the fish to last through the summer. In 1891, 
Inspector Ebenezer McColl lamented that despite “advancement in agriculture,” Saulteaux men 
preferred to leave St. Peter’s Reserve to fish on Lake Winnipeg.119 
 Fishing, much like many of the Lac Courte Oreilles anokiiwin in the woods, required 
cooperative effort. Joe Stoddard, a fisherman from Bad River who netted fish on Anishinaabe-
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gichigami (Lake Superior), described the process that many St. Peter’s men followed on Lake 
Winnipeg:  
The Indian would go along slowly in his canoe until he selected a school of fish of 
the size desired, and those along the shore would assemble the net or nets, which 
were often spliced together. Then they would get into a canoe with the net, which 
they would lay out as the boat encircled the school. After the net was set the fish 
were in an enclosure of nets, bound on one side by the each. The fishermen then 
hauled in the net from the beach, drawing the fish within reach of others who 
threw them upon the sands.120 
 
The depth of cooperative labor stretched back even further, for although fishing was a man’s 
activity, women made the nets.121 Such cooperative labor allowed the Ojibwe to fulfill kinship 
obligations and other reciprocal relationships that bound inawemaagan.  
 Fishing continued into the twentieth century in off-reservation waters. The St. Peter’s 
People and other Anishinaabeg in Manitoba and Ontario began to trade fish with Settlers during 
the fur trade. Fish, especially adikameg or whitefish, fed hungry traders. Adikameg also provided 
oil that the Saulteaux used in making pemmican and as a lubricant.122 Fish also supported the 
dog teams that Saulteaux trappers used to carry furs to trading centers.123 The declining buffalo 
population in the late nineteenth century increased the importance of fish in supplying Settler 
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121 Women occasionally fished as well. Maggie Christiensen (Lac du Flambeau) jokingly described herself as a 
“great sportsman” and boasted of the time she caught a fifty-five pound muskie—a feat that surpassed even the 
celebrated forty-six pound muskie that fought against Ben Poupart, Sr., for three hours in July of 1946 before he 
finally brought it in. Christiensen’s brothers taught her to hunt and fish, and she used her skills to supplement the 
family income. Hallowell, “Notes on the Material Culture of the Island Lake Saulteaux,” Hallowell Collection, APS, 
Folder: Saulteaux Indians - Island Lake; “Christensen, Maggie,” Hallowell Collection, APS. 
122 Karen Nicholson, “A History of Manitoba’s Commercial Fishery” (Historic Resources Branch, 2007), 19-21; 
available from https://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/hrb/internal_reports/pdfs/Fishery_MB_Commercial.pdf; accessed Oct. 
10, 2015; Tough, ‘As Their Natural Resources Fail’: Native Peoples and the Economic History of Manitoba, 1870-
1930 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996), 177, 236.  
123 Thomas Andrew Judson, “The Freshwater Commercial Fishing Industry of Western Canada,” Thesis, University 
of Toronto, 1961, 12.  
  
205 
 
traders and Saulteaux families.124 Additionally, the European market valued namewag or 
sturgeon, particularly abundant in the waters of Lake Winnipeg and its tributaries near the St. 
Peter’s People’s home, for their air bladders, used to produce isinglass.125 As reserve policy 
closed in around them, fishing allowed the St. Peter’s People to actively participate in Atlantic 
economic systems and also to maintain relationships with the zaaga’iganan of their homeland.  
 In the 1880s, the nearby town of Selkirk became a central, convenient trading center. 
Selkirk, bordered by the Red River to the east and miles of marsh on the other sides, lacked 
farmland.126 The river town redirected its resources into becoming a fishing port.127 In the 1880s, 
Settler commercial fishing enterprises increasingly entered Lake Winnipeg. In 1886, C.W. 
Gauthier launched C.W. Gauthier and Company and built a fish refrigerator in Selkirk, one of the 
largest in the region.128 William Robinson, a former steamboat captain, owned several fish 
companies that operated from Selkirk.129 Saulteaux fishermen competed for increasingly scarce 
resources with Settler corporations with bigger boats and greater capital.  
 The new Dominion government passed laws that supported commercial interests over 
their treaty-enshrined obligations to Indigenous Peoples.130 In 1874, the Dominion government 
extended the Dominion Fisheries Act, which brought all fishing under the federal government’s 
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control and required licenses for commercial and subsistence fishing, to Manitoba.131 In 1887, 
the Department of Justice ruled that their distinct status did not exempt First Nations people from 
fishing regulations. Native people had to by fishing regulations, but they could apply for special 
licenses for subsistence fishing—and only subsistence fishing. Local agents controlled access to 
fishing licenses and, in practice, granted few.132 American capital financed many of the 
commercial fisheries on and around Lake Winnipeg, and, for the Dominion government, 
American capital trumped treaty promises.133 Ignoring treaties and promoting Settler colonial 
interests, the Dominion of Canada effectively criminalized the seasonal round.134 If St. Peter’s 
People and other Anishinaabe communities wanted to keep their treaties and their peoplehood 
alive, they had to work for them.  
 The People of St. Peter’s continued to fish, asserting their right to resources and, by 
extension, their sovereignty. Frank Tough argues that Native fisheries near Lake Winnipeg 
“reached crisis proportions in the late 1880s” because of the effects of overfishing.135 While 
subsistence undeniably became increasingly difficult in the 1880s and may have contributed to 
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starvation in several communities, the Saulteaux adapted to the changing economic landscape of 
their waters. The government record does not preserve any statements from the St. Peter’s 
People, but neighboring Saulteaux spoke out against Settlers who encroached on their sovereign 
right to their resources. In 1885, for instance, the Berens River People, who lived on Lake 
Winnipeg’s eastern shores, told their agent “that their fisheries are encroached upon by parties 
from Winnipeg, who, if allowed to continue the destruction of the whitefish and sturgeon at the 
present rate, will eventually exhaust the supply and deprive them of their principal source of 
sustenance.”136 Saulteaux such as those at Berens River recognized the connection between their 
ability to fish and the sovereignty that they had protected by consenting to treaties and 
ishkonigan.  
 Fishing remained an essential component of the St. Peter’s People’s economy. In 1889, 
Inspector Ebenezer McColl lamented the supposedly negative effects of Anishinaabeg engaging 
in commercial fishing. He wrote that fisheries deteriorated conditions on reserves rather than 
improving them, for “[s]ince the commencement of those fisheries their reserves are not properly 
cultivated, their gardens are frequently neglected, and their houses often deserted.”137 McColl 
complained of Indians who “wander about” instead of settling down to become government-
approved farmers. Blinded by Settler assimilative goals and reserve policies, McColl failed to 
recognize the continued vitality of the seasonal round. Hungry Saulteaux chose to expend their 
labor in fisheries, a choice they made for the next several decades. Gauthier’s workforce 
consisted primarily of Indigenous people and their Métis kin. Out of one hundred seventy 
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workers, one hundred were Indians and an additional thirty were Métis.138 Companies often paid 
Ojibwe fishermen in goods rather than cash. In 1889, Missionary J. Butler from Berens River 
noted that men bringing in name or sturgeon for the C.W. Gauthier company earned $1.25, but 
the value of the goods they received instead only totaled about fifty cents.139 World War I 
improved wages. During the war, fishers earned one dollar cash or two dollars in goods per one 
hundred whitefish. The American-financed fishing companies resold the fish in the United States 
for up to fifty times as much.140 In 1921, officials described commercial fishing for the Berens 
River People as “a more and more important factor during the past four or five years, and 
considerable income has been derived from it.”141 Saulteaux determination to continue fishing 
and the physical act of fishing demonstrates the commitment to maintain their peoplehood. 
Despite everything, they continued to fish. 
 While Settler colonial policies and commercial development changed the physical and 
economic landscape of the zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan, Saulteaux adapted. Anishinaabemowin 
expanded to incorporate changing legal contexts of Settler colonialism. The word for “fishing 
license” is “noojigiigoonyiwe-mazina’igaans,” which combines “s/he goes fishing” with 
“mazina’igaans,” which means a small book or document, a ticket, or a license. Although it is 
unclear when this word developed, the way that Anishinaabemowin integrated concepts such as 
licenses indicates the continued importance of fishing as an economic and cultural activity and 
reflects the way adaptations occurred without displacing peoplehood. Between 1914 and 1915 at 
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Fort Alexander near St. Peter’s, Saulteaux fished all year with one-hundred-yard nets. Out of a 
population of seven hundred, only nine had licenses in September of 1915. That month, however, 
the Fort Alexander People brought in 24,671 pounds of pickerel, 1,127 pounds of jackfish, and 
318 pounds of catfish.142 The same pattern occurred in November 1915. The DIA issued twelve 
licenses, and the Fort Alexander People caught 11,000 pounds of pickerel and 10,125 tullibee.143 
The absence of whitefish reflects the selective decline of overfishing. More importantly, 
however, the numbers suggest that the Fort Alexander People integrated noojigiigoonyiwe-
mazina’igaans into their kinship networks. The men who held the noojigiigoonyiwe-
mazina’igaans most likely relied on kinship networks to carry out the anokiiwin that yielded so 
many pounds of fish.144  
 Anokiiwin in the commercial fishing industry intertwined with ceremony and kinship 
networks. Fishing occurred during two main fishing seasons, the dagwaagin and ziigwan 
spawning seasons. Many Saulteaux men worked out of fishing stations, and their families joined 
them to camp on the shore for the season. Setting out from the temporary camps, many Saulteaux 
men took their jiimaanan (canoes), often wiigwaasi-jiimaanan (birchbark canoes), and dropped 
their generally homemade nets in the water. After eight to twelve hours of fishing, they returned 
to camp with their catch. Women’s anokiiwin remained essential to their success, not only in the 
work of maintaining camp but also in processing the fish. At one of Robinson’ fishing stations 
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on Horse (Selkirk) Island, Saulteaux women boiled whitefish guts to extract the oil.145 Tug boats 
periodically traveled to the various fishing stations, where they picked up partially-processed 
fish.146 At larger operations, steamers or sailboats came in from the deep waters that Saulteaux 
canoes could not access. The workers on the boat, mainly non-Indian, slid the fish to waiting 
Native workers via long sluices. The Native workers then cleaned the fish and boxed them up 
with ice before storing them in a freezing chamber, which kept the fish from spoiling on the trip 
to Selkirk.147 In the camps, the Saulteaux families socialized and danced. At Horse Island, which 
sprouted “quite a village” during the fishing season according to Lieutenant Governor J.C. 
Patterson, the Saulteaux from Grand Rapids and other reserves such as St. Peter’s held dances 
nearly every night. Federal officials complained that children missed school, and camp may have 
been away to avoid government surveillance, as well as to enact relationships with aki beyond 
limited reserves. Anokiiwin on the water fed not only bellies but also sustained ceremony and 
kinship ties.  
 Albert Edward Thompson, great-great-grandson of Peguis born at St. Peter’s in 1900, 
demonstrates how many Saulteaux integrated wage work in the commercial fishing industry 
without dislodging the relationships that underwrote St. Peter’s peoplehood. In 1919, after 
returning from the Armed Forces, Thompson signed on with the Northern Fish Company. He 
worked at Big Black River, along the northeastern side of Lake Winnipeg, in a variety of tasks. 
Thompson described little about the work in his autobiography, but he mentioned that his brother 
brother William, stationed in Siberia during WWI, joined him at Big Black River. “It was a 
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happy reunion,” Thompson noted.148 The Thompson brothers returned to their home at the new 
Peguis Reserve after the fishing season, where they “started to put up hay, for our own livestock 
and for sale.”149 During the next several decades, Thompson engaged seasonally in fishing in 
Anishinaabeg zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan.150 Strengthened by anokiiwin in the waters of their 
homeland, Anishinaabeg continued to work within their homelands. Their labor, and the fact that 
it remained motivated by Anishinaabeg perspectives, presented a continuous challenge to the 
economic and legal systems that comprised Settler colonialism. 
 Across the zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan of the St. Peter’s People’s homeland, the stories 
were the same. The Canadian and Manitoba governments imposed Settler regulations over 
inherent Saulteaux usufruct rights while industry boomed. As provincial and federal officials 
sought to extend jurisdiction over Indian land and resources, the Saulteaux continued to trap and 
to fish, altering the context of the anokiiwin to preserve its underlying relationships.  
Mashkodeng: Turtle Mountain Anokiiwin on the Prairie 
 The western edges of Anishinaabewaki spread out into mashkode (prairie). One day, 
before the Anishinaabeg migrated beyond the Great Lakes, Nanaboozhoo decided to travel west 
to see the flat prairie country, where he had heard he could see for miles and miles with no 
mitigoog blocking the view. Nanaboozhoo packed his few belongings, and to his Anishinaabe 
and animal friends he said, “I’ll be back in a few months. The northland is my home, and I will 
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always return to it while I live on the earth.”151 When he reached the flat plains, he looked out 
across the seemingly boundless mashkode and felt excited. But Nanaboozhoo soon learned of a 
problem. He responded to the cries of the birds who built their nests on the ground beneath the 
long prairie grasses. Every day, the mashkode-bizhikiwag (buffaloes)—which the birds 
described to Nanaboozhoo as the chiefs of the prairies because he only knew forest animals—
raced across the mashkode. The foxes helped the buffalo by running ahead to bark at the birds to 
clear the way. Fox and buffalo destroyed nests, trampled eggs, and flattened birds. Nanaboozhoo 
protected the birds. He confronted the lead mashkode-bizhiki, striking him on the back with a 
stick. The mashkode-bizhiki hunched his back and lowered his head in shame, which gives the 
mashkode-bizhikiwag their shape today, and the foxes burrowed into holes in the mashkode to 
avoid Nanaboozhoo’s wrath. Nanaboozhoo returned to the northern zaaga’igan and mitigoog, 
and centuries later, Anishinaabeg followed in the trickster’s footsteps, venturing onto the 
mashkode to hunt the now-humped mashkode-bizhiki.152  
 The aadizookan of Nanaboozhoo discovering the mashkode reflects the diversity of life 
and resources available to the Anishinaabeg mashkodeng. The aadizookan parallels seasonal 
movements onto the plains. The mashkode also contained new challenges, but like 
Nanaboozhoo, subsequent generations of Anishinaabeg found creative solutions to their new 
environment, even as Settler colonialism transformed the landscape in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. 
                                                 
151 Sam Snake, Chief Elijah Yellowhead, Alder York, David Simcoe, and Annie King, The Adventures of 
Nanabush: Ojibwe Indian Stories, edited by Emerson Chatsworth and David Chatsworth (New York: Atheneum, 
1980), 62. 
152 Snake, et al, The Adventures of Nanabush, 62-68.  
  
213 
 
 On the western mashkode of Anishinaabewaki, the Turtle Mountain People adapted labor 
practices to their new environment and, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to the 
changing economic, political, and social landscapes of Settler colonialism. The bizhiki drew 
Anishinaabeg onto the mashkoden from the waters and woods of the Great Lakes region that 
formed the center of Anishinaabewaki. Initially, the long-distance bizhiki hunts, in which entire 
families participated, were a seasonal pursuit. At the end of dagwaagin when the hunt concluded, 
Anishinaabeg families drove their carts laden with meat and hides home to the Red River, selling 
the surplus to local traders and Settlers.153 As Settlers encroached upon their homeland and other 
branches of the Anishinaabe People ceded lands near the Great Lakes, the families who became 
the Turtle Mountain People by 1870 increasingly remained on the prairies. The Turtle Mountains 
offered fertile land for gardening, as well as game, fish, and berries. The dwindling buffalo 
population meant that they, like other Plains Peoples, had to find alternate strategies for 
subsistence and economic support. The Turtle Mountain People, however, excelled at adapting 
their seasonal round.154 The buffalo hunts were a relatively recent addition to their seasonal 
activities, brought on by Anishinaabe westward expansion. As they intermingled with Plains 
nations such as the Cree and Dakota, Métis People, and Settlers, the Turtle Mountain People 
incorporated numerous strategies. Adapting to new landscapes, they erected teepees in place of 
the wiigiwaaman that required a larger supply of birchbark that the mashkodeng could sustain. 
Dakota drums helped them maintain relationships with the Creator and his gifts, and they spread 
this adaptation to other Anishinaabeg in the east.155  
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 Turtle Mountain men and women transformed bizhiki hunts into trips onto the prairie to 
collect bizhiki bones. Millions of pounds of buffalo bones lay scattered across the mashkodeng, 
drying in the sun as abandoned carcasses rotted away. Settlers valued the bones as a component 
in fertilizer, and depots such as Elkendale and Fort Totten shipped millions of tons east for 
processing each year.156 Turtle Mountain families set off with carts or wagons to camp on the 
mashkodeng away from their reservation in dagwaagin, just as they formerly embarked on 
weeks-long hunts. As they camped in the open, picking bones from the long prairie grasses, 
extended families reunited and worked together. After a few weeks, they brought their haul to 
Elkendale or Fort Totten and sold them to shipping companies for cash—up to fifteen dollars per 
ton.157 In 1886, Agent John Cramsie reported that “but for the little money earned by picking up 
dry buffalo bones many of these people would have died of actual starvation.”158 In 1889, 
Kashpaw Gourneau, a broad, bearded man respected by many Turtle Mountain People as a 
leader, convinced the agent, Ernest Brenner, to loan him a team of government cattle to pick 
bones.159 Bone-picking only remained profitable until the mid-1890s, when Settler and Native 
pickers exhausted the supply of bones, but the brief enterprise demonstrates the Turtle Mountain 
People’s willingness and ability to adapt to changing circumstances and transition to reservation 
era realities in ways that protected and promoted their peoplehood. In its effort to consolidate 
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Turtle Mountain landholdings in the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States 
government asserted that the Turtle Mountain People no longer had claim to the mashkoden 
beyond their shrinking reservation boundaries. By engaging in the bizhiki bone trade, however, 
these Ojibweg traveled through familiar landscapes and reasserted their sovereign rights to the 
mashkoden through their labor. 
 Expanding onto the mashkoden opened new opportunities for gitige ( s/he 
gardens/plants/farms or agriculture). Gitige connected the land and the People through 
anokiiwin. Undoubtedly trying to appeal to government officials obsessed with farming, Florina 
Denomie of Bad River demonstrated the origins of this anokiiwin in aadizookanag, not unlike 
Ojibwe relationships with manoomin or ziinzibaakwad, saying that farming was “utilizing the 
gift of nature in the soil, the rain, and the sunshine.”160 Although Denomie came from Bad River, 
the Turtle Mountain People would have understood her appeal to the sacred relationship 
established through their migration. Ojibwe had cultivated gardens, planted in late ziigwan and 
early niibin (summer), since before the arrival of Settlers. Tended primarily by women, their 
produce supplemented game and gathering. The responsibility of agriculture shifted during the 
era of Settler reservation policy as was true in other gendered tasks, but Settler assimilationists 
never succeeded in displacing Ojibwe women’s relationships as caretakers of the aki. Instead, 
men incorporated farming and gardening into their labor, and women shared responsibility.161   
 The Turtle Mountain People reaffirmed their sovereignty through their anokiiwin and 
control of resources. Following the Ten Cent Treaty, Settler officials such as Brenner attempted 
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to use the newly transcribed definitions of belonging to override Turtle Mountain sovereignty, 
but the Turtle Mountain People remained committed to allocating rights and resources according 
to Ojibweg understandings of relationships. At the end of the summer of 1890, shortly before the 
McCumber Commission’s negotiations, Brenner banned “outsiders” from cutting hay on the 
reservation.162 The council, led by Little Shell, objected to the Farmer’s arbitrary exclusions, 
“claiming that I [Brenner] had no right to give such orders, that he owned the land, and has in 
fact given permission to outsiders to cut hay.”163 The only outsider in this situation was Brenner, 
who had no right to dictate access to the lands and its resources, and he misapplied to term to 
reservation boundaries that most Turtle Mountain People did not recognize because they had not 
consented to their creation. By permitting access to reservation resources such as hay, Little 
Shell demonstrated that Brenner’s outsiders remained on the inside of tribal relationships. 
Reservation boundaries did not make inawemaagan into meyaagizid, and their anokiiwin such as 
making hay both created and reinforced this belonging. 
 The case of Leonard McKay demonstrates the connection between anokiiwin, kinship, 
and sovereignty. In 1892 following the Ten Cent Treaty, McKay lived just cross the southern 
border of the reduced ishkonigan. In previous years, he had cut hay from a meadow that he 
drained with his own anokiiwin, and in August of 1892, he again drained a meadow and 
proceeded to cut the hay. That year, Brenner sent a police officer to arrest McKay for 
trespassing. Only a few weeks earlier, the Council of Thirty-Two had stricken McKay’s name 
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from the McCumber rolls.164 McKay, however, maintained relationships with the Turtle 
Mountain People, and he used those ties to continue to obtain the resources that he had once 
accessed openly. He tried to call a council of the Turtle Mountain People to hear his case.165 
Although Brenner prevented the meeting, McKay received support from local ogimaag including 
Little Shell. In March of the next year, when police arrested him for accessing reservation 
resources, McKay responded by “saying he had something from Little Shell” authorizing his 
anokiiwin.166 At a general council meeting in February 1893, Little Shell had argued that “the 
mixed-bloods residing on the reservation but who were stricken from the rolls” should continue 
to cut and sell hay and wood.167 The Council of Thirty-Two agreed. Although Brenner warned 
McKay that “nobody but the U.S. Government can give you permission to cut hay on this Indian 
reservation,” the Turtle Mountain People continued to control resources according to their own 
understandings of who maintained access rights and without acknowledging Settler oversight.168 
Kinship networks permitted McKay to access ishkonigan resources, and allowing him to carry on 
with his anokiiwin despite Settler attempts to break those networks reinforced Anishinaabe 
peoplehood and used anokiiwin as a conduit for sovereignty.  
 Although men and women throughout Anishinaabewaki farmed following the onset of 
reservation policies, farming never became the exclusive or primary pursuit of the majority of 
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Ojibwe people. Settler officials both in the United States and Canada consistently identified the 
main occupations of Ojibwe people from Michigan to Manitoba and Montana as hunting and 
fishing, perhaps including logging and picking berries.169 Ojibwe people described their 
agricultural activities in a way that suggests that they saw gitige in terms of their place in the 
seasonal round of their ancestors. “Gardening” remained a popular choice. On 1917 draft cards, 
young Ojibwe men at Turtle Mountain listed their occupation as laborers or farmers or 
unemployed. Every so often, however, one of them answered, “gardening.”170 Children 
participated by hoeing and picking insects from potato plants.171 Logging camps on or abutting 
reservations provided one of the few markets for farm and garden produce, although that market 
varied with the changing fortunes of the timber industry.172 As they had for centuries, women 
processed much of the produce.173  
 Ojibwe in the United States and Canada engaged in agriculture for their own purposes 
amidst shifting and often contradictory Settler policy. At Turtle Mountain, people planted wheat, 
oats, barley, corn, and potatoes. Adele and Stephen Lizotte of Turtle Mountain, a tall and striking 
couple, farmed 50 acres of Stephen’s 160 acre allotment, and because the remainder was timber 
and pasture, they purchased an additional 160 acres and cleared 65 acres. In addition to the five 
room house, the farm included a large frame barn, granary, milk house, garage, chicken house, 
hog house, and a cellar. In 1925, the family of seven raised 600 bushels of oats, 800 bushels of 
wheat, 200 bushels of barley, 150 bushels of potatoes, two bushels of beets, and one bushel each 
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of beans, carrots, and onions. Stephen Lizotte put up 25 tons of sweet clover hay for his stock, 
which included 9 horses, 16 milk cows, and 250 chickens. The family sold cream and eggs.174 
The Lizottes, however, remained anomalous at Turtle Mountain. According to the surveys the 
federal government conducted on the Turtle Mountain reservation between 1922 and 1925, 
nearly two-thirds of the families on the reservation cultivated fewer than ten acres. More 
representative of agriculture on the ishkonigan was Kamenokwamayas (Flying Nice), a 52-year-
old single father of two. He cleared five acres on his 160-acre allotment, and in 1924 he 
harvested 40 bushels of potatoes, 20 bushels of corn, and “some garden truck.”175 The following 
year, he only cultivated two of his five acres, loaning the other three “to Fred Day to put in a 
garden on.”176 Kamenokwamayas raised enough food to feed himself, with perhaps a little extra 
to sell for cash to help support his children, who lived with relatives in Dunseith.177 Also typical 
of the families surveyed in the 1920s, Ekweas (Girl) tended a small garden to feed herself and 
her five children. She owned a horse and six chickens, but she relied on the agency to plow her 
garden for her each ziigwan. In 1924, she raised 8 bushels of potatoes, 5 bushels of corn, and one 
bushel of onions.178 
 Agriculture offered wage labor opportunities in during niibin and dagwaagin. Nearly half 
of Turtle Mountain men between eighteen and forty-five reported their occupation as farm 
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laborer during the summer of 1917. In the fall around the time when the buffalo hunts had 
departed toward the plains, groups of men from Belcourt and Dunseith set out as threshing 
teams. Unlike the buffalo hunts, women remained behind. Joe Swan, who spent the warmer 
months on the reservation and his winters in Canada, worked as a thresher from the time he was 
a teenager. His uncle, Pat Swan, lived on the reservation, and he stayed with him or with his 
uncle’s wife, Agnes Gorneau.179 The threshing teams worked for local farms who owned the 
threshing equipment, and they earned a wage for several weeks’ work. The same teams often 
rented the threshers and pooled their labor to harvest each other’s crops on their allotments. The 
harvests often ended with people gathering to dance.180 
 Labor-related movements carried Ojibweg across the Settler national border that cut 
through Anishinaabewaki’s mashkodeng. Men and women enrolled at Turtle Mountain but born 
in Canada often returned north for the winter. The border crossings that initially created the 
Turtle Mountain people were linked to seasonal labor: bizhiki hunts. Following land cessions and 
allotment, many of the same families who had once been involved in the buffalo hunts came 
back to Turtle Mountain for “the gathering” in the spring, when payments from the McCumber 
agreement were dispersed, and they remained in the vicinity of Turtle Mountain until the fall. 
These transnational movements founded an economic strategy that took advantage of competing 
Settler jurisdictions and relied on Anishinaabeg relational networks. Pierre Cadotte lived 
between the Lake Manitoba region in Manitoba, and Dunseith, North Dakota. He was of mixed-
descent and therefore qualified for scrip from the Canadian government. While living at 
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Dunseith, he sold his and his children’s scrip and collected money as the heir of his deceased 
parents’ land grants. Working as a trader and farmer, he traveled within a network of kin that 
ignored Settler borders. Dunseith itself lay outside Turtle Mountain’s shrinking boundaries but 
remained an integral part of the Turtle Mountain community. Similarly, Joseph Poitras (also 
spelled Poitra), born near Selkirk but at Dunseith to sign the McCumber agreement in 1892, 
made seasonal trips between Lake Manitoba region and the Turtle Mountains.181  
 These seasonal movements demonstrate the continued ties that united Ojibwe people with 
their kin when enrollment and Settler immigration policies attempted to link Anishinaabe 
identity to a single reserve or reservation. Official Settler policy in both the United States and 
Canada held that one could either be an American Indian or a Canadian Indian, but never both. 
Turtle Mountain people defied these classifications with their movements and economic 
strategies. Cadotte and Poitras, like many others at Turtle Mountain, had allotment in the United 
States but had sold their “half-blood” scrip in Canada. Joseph Poitras farmed on the Turtle 
Mountain Reservation, and Cadotte had obtained an allotment in Montana, but they traveled to 
Canada for the winter. Both were at the Ojibwe reserve Sandy Bay, Manitoba, in April 1908 and 
preparing to return to Turtle Mountain in time for the treaty payments dispersed in mid-spring. 
There were also those who did not have allotments at Turtle Mountain but came down from the 
north to stay with family on the reservation. When Agency officials attempted to remove them 
from the reservation and send them back to Canada, “they move onto a Fee Patented Allotment,” 
presumably belonging to another relative, “which is no longer of Reservation status and defy us 
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to interfere with them.”182 Cadotte and Poitras farmed and took advantage of their access to land 
in North Dakota during the warmer months but left the overcrowded reservations to spend the 
winters in Canada. They diversified their resources as much as possible to sustain the seasonal 
round at a time when Settlers attempted to cut off their access to their homelands. Through their 
everyday movements, Ojibweg such as Pierre Cadotte and Joseph Poitras demonstrated the 
resiliency of their People in a world of intersecting borders. They remained Anishinaabe, an 
identity determined by their relationships with the land and its resources, not by Settler map 
lines.  
 
 The diverse, complex seasonal round, rooted in Anishinaabe peoplehood and enshrined in 
treaty agreements of the nineteenth century, allowed Anishinaabe men and women to find new 
ways of performing customary patterns that avoided the restrictions put in place by Settlers. The 
Ojibwe People were hunters, gatherers, gardeners, and fishers. They were also, at times, 
lumberjacks, performers, guides, and salespeople. They lived on reserves and on supposedly 
ceded lands, in cities and small reservation villages, on frozen lakes and in maple groves. Their 
work over them throughout Anishinaabewaki, creating a landscape of movement comprised of 
mitigoog, zaaga’iganan and ziibiwan, and mashkode that rendered Settler borders meaningless.  
 By working in the woods, waters, and prairies of their homeland, Anishinaabeg remained 
active within a network of relationships that transcended Settler-imposed boundaries and resisted 
Settler attempts at erasure. Anishinabeg claimed the woods by sugaring, hunting, and even by 
working in the lumber industry that reconfigured the landscape. They asserted sovereignty over 
                                                 
182 James Hyde to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Aug. 13, 1930, Claims, 1940-1941, Allotment, Decimal 
Correspondence, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City. 
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the waters of Anishinaabewaki by fishing, ricing, and guiding tourists on zaaga’igan, and they 
reaffirmed ties to the mashkode by hunting and farming in open spaces. Anokiiwin connected 
them to these places. By continuing to act as caretakers and to work with the aki and its 
resources, they lived out relationships established by aadizookaanan. The legs of venison, racks 
of dried fish, and baskets of berries resulted from interactions with aki, and ceremonies 
intertwined with various tasks. The allocation of resources likewise demonstrated the resiliency 
of Ojibwe social relationships. Individual Ojibwe sold berries, meat, and manoomin in local 
markets, but they also shared resources along kin and community lines. Moreover, territory and 
usufruct rights continued to reflect ancestral, kinship-based access protocols that insisted on 
Ojibwe definitions of space and place throughout Anishinaabewaki.  
 Between 1880 and 1929, Settler colonialism pressed in on the Ojibwe. From an Ojibwe 
perspective, however, the story that emerges from this period is not one of destruction but of the 
survival of the People. Every bead that Lucy Mustache strung, every fish that Alfred Edward 
Thompason netted, and every stalk of hay that the People of Turtle Mountain cut formed part of 
a network of sovereign relationships. Through individual acts of labor, Anishinaabe men and 
women throughout their homeland preserved their People’s sovereignty. The Anishinaabe 
continued anokiiwin in Anishinaabe ways and for Anishinaabe reasons. In the context of Settler 
colonialism, in their everyday lives, the St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles 
Peoples continued to live and work within the place that the Creator put there for the People. 
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Chapter 5 
Ishkonigaade:1 Defending Homelands, 1895-1920 
 Anishinaabeg know they are a fortunate People. Gitchi Manitou, the Creator, breathed 
life through a Sacred Shell into Anishinaabe, the first man from whom the People take their 
name, and then the Creator placed Anishinaabe in the world. Long ago, when the Anishinaabeg 
People’s ancestors lived far away on the eastern shores of Turtle Island, Kitchi Manitou sent the 
Miigis shell to lead them home again to Mooningwanekaaning-minis, where manoomin grew in 
abundance and the water teemed with fish. The maple trees provided the Anishinaabeg with 
sugar, and tobacco offered itself in order for the People to give thanks to the Spirits and maintain 
the balance of reciprocity. Throughout the land that the Creator made for them, Anishinaabeg 
knew that “[t]here will be a lot of Spirits who look after us here, the Spirits who take care of 
us.”2 This aki, extending from the Great Lakes to the prairies, was Anishinaabewaki, the 
homeland of the Anishinaabe People.3  
 United States and Canadian Settler colonialism threatened Anishinaabeg relationships 
with the aki. In the nineteenth century, Ojibwe Peoples made alliances with the United States and 
Canada to protect Anishinaabewaki and provide lasting bases of Ojibwe sovereignty. The 
reserves and reservations within Anishinaabewaki, including St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and 
Lac Courte Oreilles, remained their homeland. Throughout the nineteenth century, Anishinaabeg 
men and women maintained their expansive relationships with the land by defying Settler 
boundaries with their labor and definitions of belonging. Within the context of reservation 
                                                 
1 It is saved/reserved.  
2 Mosay Interview, Living Our Language, 9.  
3 Benton-Banai, Mishomis Book, 47-49.  
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policy, Ojibwe Peoples adapted flexible social relationships to a colonial landscape. The 
unbroken presence of Anishianabe sovereignty presented a challenge to expanding Settler 
colonial empires in North America. On reservations, bureaucracies replaced brute force as the 
manifestation of Settler domination.4 Federal attempts to restructure Native space continued 
beyond removal, confinement, and allotment.5 Efforts to overwrite Indigenous landscapes 
included the penetration of industries such as mining, timber, and cattle, Settler towns and farms, 
Western laws and institutions, and non-Indian animals and plants.6  
 St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles each dealt with different iterations 
of what historian Frederick Hoxie called a “colonial land policy.” In the early twentieth century, 
a racialized idea of citizenship predicated not on equality but on an ethnic hierarchy that 
positioned Native Americans as unable or unwilling to assimilate supported Settler policies that 
rapidly dispossessed Indigenous Peoples, accelerated allotment and dismantled reserves while 
socially and politically marginalizing Indian men and women.7 Settlers pressed in around St. 
                                                 
4 Hoxie, Final Promise; Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights; Lawson, Dammed Indians; Prucha, The Great 
Father.  
5 Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation, 67-76.  
6 Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation, 50-51.  
7 Hoxie, Final Promise, 147-187. Brownlie confirms that Canadian officials shared similar racist attitudes and 
enacted them in administering the daily work of Indian Affairs. Hoxie suggests that the belief in Indians’ 
insurmountable racial inferiority represented a subtle shift away from assimilation policies founded on the goals of 
equality and “the incorporation of independent Indian landowners into American society on an equal footing with 
their fellow citizens.” Hoxie, A Final Promise, 152. He argues that the first phase of assimilation policies including 
the Dawes Act, supported by popular interest and public intellectuals, reflected policy makers’ commitment to fully 
integrating Native Americans via private landownership, education, and citizenship, a commitment they later 
abandoned as scientists and others grew increasingly ambivalent about the significance of race in the so-called 
“Indian Problem.” Hoxie, A Final Promise, 81. At least from the perspective of Native nations such as the Ojibwe, 
however, the policy makers’ motivations fade in the light of the underlying intent of Indian policy in both the United 
States and Canada: undermining Indigenous peoplehood and thereby eliminating Indigenous control of their own 
land and resources. In The Rise and Fall of Indian Country, historian William Unrau argues that settlers invaded 
Indian country—appropriating land and resources for Settler benefit—as early as 1825, fueled less by humanitarian 
impulses and faith in the equalizing power of assimilation than their own interests. He suggests that the 
humanitarian impulses were illusions rather than meaningful goals. Similarly, American Indian Studies scholar Tom 
Holm agrees with Hoxie that the Progressive Era represented a period of transition in federal Indian policy in the 
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Peter’s, just north of the city of Winnipeg, coveting Anishinaabe homelands and frustrated by the 
patchwork of jurisdiction created by half-hearted allotment. Settlers and the Dominion wanted 
the entire ishkonigan and perpetrated ethnic cleansing in a so-called surrender agreement. The 
Turtle Mountain People maneuvered the effects of allotment on a too-small reservation that 
threatened to unbind them from their peoplehood. The Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibweg fought the 
construction of a dam that threatened manoomin beds and ancestral graves. Settler states used 
ideas of economic development and progress to thwart Indigenous land rights and, by extension, 
sovereignty. Anishinaabe Peoples, however, continued to articulate peoplehood and to defend 
themselves against Settler land policies aimed at Indigenous erasure.  
 In the face of multiple layers of colonial encroachment, Anishinaabewaki suffered 
dismembering losses. The story, however, is more than a narrative of defeat. For the people of 
Turtle Mountain, St. Peter’s, and Lac Courte Oreilles, the early twentieth century contains stories 
about the survival of their sovereignty, stories that echo their ancestors’ experiences of creation 
and recreation. Anishinaabe Peoples pursued various strategies to protect their sovereignty by 
defending their homelands, as well as the interconnected and equally important social 
relationships that united the People.  
  
                                                                                                                                                             
United States and that assimilation policy was “the most liberal and enlightened yet devised,” but he also 
acknowledges that assimilation policies directly and purposefully targeted Indigenous peoplehood. Janet McDonell 
earlier made a similar point in The Dispossession of the American Indian, 1887-1934. Brownlie, Fatherly Lie, 41; 
Holm, The Great Confusion, xii, 16-17; Unrau, The Rise and Fall of Indian Country, 148-149, McDonnell, The 
Dispossession of the American Indian. From the perspective of Indigenous peoplehood, how federal officials 
justified policies of dispossession and erasure—whether with the intent of fully integrating Native Americans as 
equal citizens or confining First Nations Peoples to their proper, marginal place in the social order—matters less 
than the fact that Settler land policies consistently attacked the relationships that sustained Indigenous Peoples’ 
sovereignty. 
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“For the Sole Exclusive Use of Our Indians”: Removing the St. Peter’s People  
On September 24, 1907, in an over-crowded storage building at the treaty grounds, the 
chief and councillors of the St. Peter’s Reserve signed a four-page agreement surrendering their 
reserve in exchange for individual patents of sixteen acres per person and a new reserve to the 
north on Fisher River near Lake Winnipeg. The 1907 St. Peter’s surrender was a twentieth-
century example of an ongoing policy of ethnic cleansing, which continued to support land 
policies that privileged Settler expansion over Indigenous rights. The battle concerning that 
surrender’s legality continued for the next century. Despite two Royal Commissions and 
Canada’s highest court finding against the surrender on separate occasions, the agreement 
remains in effect today.8 From the Saulteaux People’s perspective, however, the reserve’s 
erasure must be viewed as an episode in the long and complex history of their sovereignty. 
 From the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries, federal Indian policy in both the 
United States and Canada exploited reserves and reservations for corporate and public interest. 
At the turn of the century, Canada experienced economic and demographic growth, particularly 
in the prairie provinces. Between 1901 and 1911, the population of Manitoba doubled, while that 
of Alberta and Saskatchewan increased fivefold.9 Imperial and federal administrations 
encouraged this expansion as they tried to strengthen their colonial domains and national 
borders.10 An important part of these processes featured Settler societies and governments 
appropriating Native spaces for “the common good.”11 
                                                 
8 Martin-McGuire, First Nation Land Surrenders, 240-248.  
9 Spaulding, “Executive Summary,” xx. 
10 West, Last Indian War; Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights, 6-7; Bilosi, “Imagined Geographies.”  
11 Hoxie, A Final Promise, 152; Silvern, “Negotiating Ojibwe Treaty Rights”: 153-176; Matsui, Native Peoples and 
Water Rights, 18; Shepherd, We Are an Indian Nation, 111-113, 171-177.  
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 Settler officials promoted state expansion by making western lands available to their 
citizens. In western Canada, officials emphasized farming and settlement. When Col. J. 
Stoughton Dennis, the first surveyor general of the Dominion Lands Branch of the Department 
of the Secretary of State, attempted a survey of the Red River Valley region in 1871, Ojibwe, 
Cree, and Métis Peoples protested the incursion on their sovereignty and refused to cooperate.12 
The Dominion government responded with policies intended to unleash a flood of settlement, 
hoping to overwhelm First Nations’ autonomy in the deluge. In 1872, while negotiating treaties 
with the Anishinaabe Peoples and others, the Settler government passed the Dominion Lands 
Act. The law facilitated settlement on the prairies, part of which remained unceded 
Anishinaabewaki, by offering 160 acres of land for no more than a nominal registration fee to 
any man over 18 or female head of household, regardless of whether they were British subjects.13 
The Dominion Lands Act, of course, echoed the U.S. Homestead Act of 1862, which likewise 
offered 160 acres to westward-moving farmers.  
 The United States and Canada supplemented these pro-settlement measures with policies 
designed to transform Native people into Western-style farmers idealized by John Locke and 
Thomas Jefferson and to dismantle the Native land base.14 The most successful Native farmers, 
such as the Cheyenne in the United States and the First Nations in the Qu’Apelle region of 
Saskatchewan, prospered and maintained stability in part by cooperative practices including 
pooling funds for seeds and machinery and by cultivating land in common. Peasant farming 
policies, however, prevented Indigenous Peoples from farming cooperatively. Peasant farming 
                                                 
12 Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights, 24.  
13 Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights, 26.  
14 Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights, 10-28.  
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favored small scale, subsistence agriculture that did not engage with the market and thus did not 
threaten Settler profits.15 Policies in Canada strategically undermined peoplehood by allotting 
land in severalty and interfering with Indian autonomy in making economic decisions.16 Settler 
farmers complained of unfair competition from their Native neighbors, whom they accused the 
government of supporting, and the national governments in both Canada and the United States 
implemented policies to divide the land and dismantle cooperative strategies.17 The Department 
of Indian Affairs required permits, signed by a Department agent, for any transaction between 
Indians and merchants or buyers, which restricted Indian debt and credit and made pooling 
resources more difficult.18 In the United States, the federal government confined available cash 
in individual trust accounts and carefully oversaw Indian nations’ tribal funds, which likewise 
prevented Indians from cooperating.19 With First Nations relegated to a marginal role in regional 
agriculture, Canadian officials hoped to encourage non-Indian settlement, extending Canadian 
control across the plains. The underlying goal of a colonial land policy that dismantled 
Anishinaabe and other Indigenous Peoples’ relationship with that land sought to fully open 
Anishinaabewaki to Settlers. 
 Dominion leaders responded to Settler demands for land with Orders in Council and 
Indian Act amendments to increase administrative direction of reserves and, ultimately, to 
                                                 
15 Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1990), 193; Rebecca B. Bateman, “Talking with the Plow: Agricultural Policy and Indian Farming 
in the Canadian and U.S. Prairies,” The Canadian Journal of Native Studies (1996): 211-228.  
16 Bateman uses the phrase “band structure,” but she is talking about the underlying relationships with land, sacred 
history, kinship, and the other aspects that define a People. Bateman, 21. Sarah Carter points out that Canadian 
officials met with representatives from the United States Indian service in the 1880s to discuss implementing 
allotment in Canada. Carter, Lost Harvests, 194-197, 201.  
17 Bateman, “Talking with the Plow”: 220 
18 Bateman, “Talking with the Plow”: 217.  
19 Bateman, “Talking with the Plow”: 217.  
  
230 
 
procure land surrenders, or supposedly voluntary cessions of portions of and even entire 
reserves.20 Linking land sales and assimilation to further erode Native sovereignty, as in the 
United States, Canada’s policies placed control of the majority of revenues with the Indian 
Department rather than with the sovereign nations the sale supposedly benefitted. Between 1890 
and 1940—a half-century that the Canadian Indian Claims Commission recently called a “brief 
and shameful period in Canadian history”—the Crown obtained more than one hundred land 
surrenders from First Nations in Western Canada’s prairies.21 Between 1896 and 1911, alone, the 
federal government coerced the surrender of at least twenty-one percent of prairie Peoples’ total 
landholdings.22  
 The Dominion government relied on several questionable but expedient strategies to 
secure Indian land. It linked surrenders to various incentives: promising to lift prohibitions on 
ceremonial dances and other celebrations, pledging or withholding support from Indian leaders, 
outright cash bribery. In 1908 at Swan Lake, an Ojibwe First Nation in Manitoba and 
Saskatchewan to whom many Turtle Mountain People had ties, Ojibwe leaders reported that 
Canadian negotiators had suggested that after signing the surrender the Ojibwe could resume Sun 
Dances.23 When positive coercion failed, officials occasionally resorted to threats of force. For 
example, at Ocean Man/Pheasant’s Rump Reserve in 1901, Department representatives warned 
                                                 
20 Spaulding, “Executive Summary,” xx.  
21 Spaulding, “Executive Summary,” xiii.  
22 The Canadian government used the language of “surrender" for these coerced land cession agreements. 
“Surrender” is a benign term that, like “removal,” masks the true nature of these agreements; it suggests a voluntary 
if powerless cession. The implied power imbalance portrays Indigenous Peoples as defeated, which further justifies 
their replacement by Settlers. It remains the official language of the Canadian government, as seen on their 
“Treaties, Surrenders, and Agreements” database. Library and Archives Canada, http://www.bac-
lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/aboriginal-heritage/first-nations/treaties-surrenders-agreements/Pages/introduction.aspx 
(accessed March 20, 2016). The term also suggests a total relinquishment of reserved lands and rights, which, as this 
chapter will demonstrate, conflicts with Indigenous understandings of these agreements.  
23 Martin-McGure, First Nation Land Surrenders, 292.  
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that they would use police to evict the Assiniboine and Nakota if they refused the government’s 
terms.24 If initial band meetings rejected a proposal, Dominion officials held additional meetings 
until the votes turned in favor of the surrender. Additionally, officials relied on vague 
explanations, inadequate translations, and spoken promises to manipulate Indian opinions. As 
with earlier treaties, however, Native Peoples acted as more than passive victims in an 
exploitative, unidirectional process.  
 Competing territorial claims plagued the St. Peter’s reserve since Treaty One outlined its 
boundaries. The St. Peter’s People frequently complained of Settler trespass. Not only had “non-
treaty persons” built houses on reserved lands, but they also sold wood “by hundreds of cords 
without protests from” Agent Alexander Muckle, who likewise “claimed a lot within reservation 
boundaries.”25 The area along the Red River near Selkirk had long been Saulteaux land. Chief 
Peguis allowed various individuals to purchase or lease rights to settle, cut wood, fish, and hunt 
in the People’s territory. When Peguis and his People negotiated their treaties—Treaties One 
through Three—a mixture of Saulteaux, Cree, Métis, and whites lived relatively interspersed on 
the hay lands and prairies north of the town of Selkirk. The Saulteaux, however, knew that this 
territory belonged to them, and they reserved the right to protect it amongst their cessions in 
Treaty One. From the perspective of the Anishinaabe People, their sovereign claims to the land 
superseded the individual holdings of various Settlers.26  
 The governments of Manitoba and the Dominion of Canada disagreed. Treaty One, which 
set aside the reserve, stated “that if, at the date of the execution of this treaty, there are any 
                                                 
24 Martin-McGure, First Nation Land Surrenders, 275.  
25 Chief Henry Prince and Council to William Henderson, 19 Mar 1890. In 1890, in his capacity as acting chief, 
Henry Prince wrote to the Minister of the Interior to protest “trespassers living on our Reserve.” 
26 Peers, The Ojibwa of Western Canada, 163.  
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settlers within the bounds of any lands reserved by any band, Her Majesty reserves the right to 
deal with such settlers as she shall deem just, so as not to diminish the extent of land allotted to 
the Indians.”27 Unfortunately for the People of St. Peter’s, Crown representatives often 
interpreted justice in favor of the private claims of individual Settlers. Officials who questioned 
the validity of what they generally considered vanishing Indian nations had little doubt that 
private property matched and even exceeded the sovereign claims of the Saulteax People and 
other First Nations.28 The primary confusion at St. Peter’s centered on the lots on the west bank 
of the Red River, or 17,331 acres according to a 1873 survey. Occupied by an overlapping blend 
of Saulteaux, Métis, and non-Indians, the river lots’ status remained uncertain. Were they private 
property or part of the reserve?  
 An 1891 Exchequer Court case approached the dispute. Throughout the spring of that 
year, ogimaag pressed Agent Muckle to evict several non-member families from their holdings 
on lands included in the reserve. One of these potential evictees was William Thomas, a farmer 
and carpenter of mixed descent who apparently lacked the relational networks of the St. Peter’s 
People. In 1864, Thomas acquired the land in question from a Métis man, Robert Sandison, and 
lived there continuously since his purchase. From 1871 to 1874, Sandison collected treaty 
annuities for himself, his wife, and two daughters, which the council for the Saulteaux argued, 
meant he had been an “Indian” under the law and therefore not entitled to a patent to his land 
under the provisions of the Manitoba Act and the Indian Act. The latter legislation, for instance, 
stated that the only claims an Indian could make were to a location title, which reverted to tribal 
holding upon abandonment. The judge, however, found that the Indian Act provisions did not 
                                                 
27 Treaty One, 1871, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians of Manitoba and the North-West 
Territories (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke, &Co., 1880), 313.  
28 Matsui, Native Peoples and Water Rights.  
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apply until 1876, and because Thomas withdrew from treaty in 1874, his lack of status validated 
the land’s alienation.29 
 The Department hoped the case would settle the question of the river lots and disputed 
patents more generally within the reserve.30 In a series of cases between 1871 and 1876, the court 
ruled that individual Indians could pass land into private property and out of the reserve. The 
ruling, however, only said that it was possible for individuals to alienate land and it impacted 
claims variably. Ogimaag successfully evicted Thomas’s son, Thomas Thomas, from a different 
plot because he withdrew from the reserve in 1886 “with the full understudying that he 
relinquished all claim to the land within the St. Peter’s reserve” in exchange for scrip.31 Like the 
Lac Courte Oreilles and Turtle Mountain Peoples dealing with allotment and enrollment 
decisions in earlier decades, the St. Peter’s People defended their peoplehood against meyaagizid 
who had gained a foothold in their midst because of colonial land policies.  
 The St. Peter’s People continued to assert their peoplehood within the boundaries of their 
reserve, which frustrated Settler officials. The DIA sought alternative means of diminishing 
Native power: a land surrender and removal of the St. Peter’s People several hundred miles to 
the north. In 1901, rumors that the Dominion intended to seek a surrender reached the reserve. 
Local Parliament representative William McCreary had won his recent election campaign on that 
                                                 
29 The Queen vs. William Thomas, 1891; Clandeboye Agency, Road Construction on St. Peter’s Reserve, Indian 
Affairs (RG 10, Volume 3557, File 25, part 28).  
30 Reed to McClough, no date, Clandeboye Agency, Road Construction on St. Peter’s Reserve, Indian Affairs (RG 
10, Volume 3557, File 25, part 28).  
31 Aikins to Reed, 11 Nov 1891; Reed to McColl 18 Feb 1892, Clandeboye Agency, Road Construction on St. 
Peter’s Reserve, Indian Affairs (RG 10, Volume 3557, File 25, part 28). This ruling echoes allotment policy, as seen 
in the previous chapter. See Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the 
American Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984). Myles, Ties that Bind; Knack, “The Saga of Tim 
Hooper’s Homestead,” 125.  
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very promise.32 Railroad companies, municipalities, and individual Settlers criss-crossed the 
reserve, but the Saulteaux and Cree People of St. Peter’s did not intend to abandon their homes. 
They again gathered as a People to protect their homeland and their peoplehood, coming together 
across Cree and Ojibwe lines to defend their homeland. In a scathing rebuke of outside control, 
the St. Peter’s People wrote, “Your Department are well aware of the conditions of affairs in this 
reserve, of the numerous lands that have been patented to outside parties, of the encroachments 
of the municipal officers of St. Andrews into this reserve. Collecting taxes and doing Statute 
labor. We have laid this matter for the consideration of your department time and again these 
many years, and regret to say that nothing has been done as yet.”33 They stated that the People 
would meet any surrender request with blunt refusals, warning that they believed the situation 
hovered on the brink of “serious unpleasantness.” The People remained resolved: “We the St. 
Peter’s Band of indians [sic], with unanimity strongly oppose to such move and reviewing it 
would be contrary to the stipulations of the treaty made with the indians [sic] at the Stone Fort in 
1871 according to the memorandum of the treaty signed.” The ishkonigan was their homeland, 
which by treaty they had “laid aside for the sole exclusive use of our indians [sic] and our 
children for ever.”34 By drawing on the 1871 treaty, they reminded the Dominion of their nation-
to-nation relationship and long-standing alliance. The St. Peter’s People presented themselves as 
a nation with full and unbroken sovereignty within its own borders, on equal footing with the 
Dominion of Canada and certainly not subject to the interference of a local Settler government. 
                                                 
32 Martin-McGuire, First Nations Land Surrenders, 89.  
33 Chief and Council to Honorable Clifford Sifton, Jan 16 1901, Road Construction on St. Peter’s Reserve, Indian 
Affairs (RG 10, Volume 3557, File 25, part 28).  
34 Chief and Council to Honorable Clifford Sifton. Jan 16 1901, Road Construction on St. Peter’s Reserve, Indian 
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 The contested property rights within the reserve served as the primary impetus for the 
Dominion’s request for a surrender. In 1905, Selkirk experienced a real estate boom. Reserve 
lands, seemingly uncultivated because the Department’s long policy of peasant farming, 
appeared even more enticing to settlers and speculators. The mess of disputed patents, however, 
blocked Settlers from acquiring the land. For twenty-five years, the Department faced monthly 
letters and complaints about land claims in the St. Peter’s Reserve, and in 1906, pressure from 
frustrated, land-hungry Settler elites and the frustrated St. Peter’s People trying to preserve a 
dwindling land base forced officials in Ottawa to take decisive action.35  
 Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs Frank Oliver dispatched 
Chief Justice Hector Howell, prominent local Liberal, to St. Peter’s. Howell headed a 
Commission with a directive to find a final solution to the land disputes. He spent several weeks 
meeting with both Native and non-Native claimants, compiling and evaluating each individual 
case.36 In his report, Howell concluded that the Canadian government had failed to carry out the 
terms of Treaty One relating to the reserve. Although he maintained that the personal property 
rights of non-treaty status individuals superseded the claims of those with treaty status on the 
river lots, he discovered that “the Reserve was not originally large enough to satisfy the terms of 
the treaty,” and, moreover, the patenting of lots through the process of “half-breed” scrip and the 
protections of previously occupied territory under the Manitoba Act further diminished the 
reserve.37 “The Indians,” he wrote, “claim a very large sum as damages for the loss of these lands 
                                                 
35 Martin-McGuire, First Nation Land Surrenders, 210-213. 
36 1912 Commission, 524.  
37 Clandeboye Agency - Two Copies of a Forty-three Page Report by H. M. Howell on Land Claims on the St. 
Peter's Reserve, RG 10. Steeped in the rhetoric of paternalism, Howell claimed to “know these Indians because I 
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and for the difficulty of carrying on their Tribal affairs on account of strangers holding 
practically alternate blocks of land in the midst of the River settlement and interfering largely 
with their Communal rights.”38 Howell revealed the validity of their claims, and the dispute 
threatened to cost his employers a great deal of money. Howell proposed an alternative solution: 
a surrender of the entire reserve.  
 Howell believed that the reserve had failed. Within the reserve, he reported, “not more 
than 250 acres are cultivated. The buildings and fences are not as good as at the date of the 
transfer. They have not now as many horses or cattle as the Band then had and the people of the 
Band as a general rule are retrograding.”39 He suggested that the surrender provided a way for 
the Dominion to “readily and cheaply [get] out of a nasty tangle” and “will relieve the locality of 
an undesirable element, to say the least.”40 He later plainly revealed his motivation: while 
compiling the report in 1906, he wrote, “I made up my mind that for the good of the Indian tribe 
beyond any question they ought to get off that reserve and as for the neighborhood it would also 
be a vast advantage. I felt that the Indian reserve there was a black spot.”41 For the good of the 
community—and for the good of the “undesirable” People of St. Peter’s—Howell resolved to 
obtain a surrender.  
                                                 
38 Howell Report, Clandeboye Agency, Two Copies of a 43 Page Report by H.M. Howell on Land Claims on the St. 
Peter’s Reserve (RG 10, Volume 3618, file 4646 Pt 2), 8.  
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 Between December 1906 and April 1907, Howell held at least half a dozen meetings with 
the St. Peter’s People. When Chief William Prince first met with Howell on Christmas Eve, 
Prince refused to consider a surrender, explaining, “I was stingy of my reserve.”42 Councilors 
W.D. Harper, William Henry Prince, James Williams, and John Prince joined their elected chief 
in opposition, as did the rest of their People when they heard Howell’s proposal. Howell, 
however, maintained pressure for removal. One of the earliest offers for the reserve contained the 
following conditions: eighty-acre patented allotments for each family, annual interest payments 
once the Dominion sold the “surplus” land, and a new reserve selected by the band with an 
allowance of one hundred acres per family.43 These terms did not entice the ogimaag, who 
rejected the proposal and refused to raise the issue with their People.44 Throughout the spring and 
most of the summer, the ogimaag and the band unanimously dismissed any form of a surrender 
agreement. In front of a gathering of the band in April, Prince reaffirmed his opposition to the 
surrender. “If I were to consider the surrender myself, I was offered promises enough to make 
me well off all the days of my life,” he said. For the sake of his People, however, he could not 
consent to the agreement. “I must consider my children and my grandchildren and the future 
generations,” he concluded, speaking in terms that his fellow Ojibwe and Maškēkowak 
understood.45 The reserve belonged not only to the present generation, but also to the ancestors 
and to their descendants.  
                                                 
42 “1912 Commission testimony,” 21.  
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 Pedley arrived to represent the Department and press for surrender toward the end of 
July. When he called for a band meeting to discuss the surrender, opposition remained strong.46 
The general consensus condemned the surrender up until the vote, and even William Prince, won 
over by the promise of land and money, “knew the band was opposed to it.”47 The men and 
women of St. Peter’s did not want to leave their homeland. They repeatedly told Howell, “We 
want to live here; this is our old home.”48 Howell “couldn’t understand it.” He asked them, 
“What are you giving up?”49 Several people answered, “We don’t want to leave here, but stay 
here. We have our graves here.”50 For Anishinaabeg, the presence of ancestors’ remains in the 
ground embodied the People’s inalienable relationship with place, uniting past, present, and 
future generations not only with each other but also with aki, aadizookanag and ceremony.51 The 
St. Peter’s People met for a third time in July, when Howell and other Department officials 
commandeered the Treaty Days camp to discuss the terms of surrender. United in their 
opposition, the St. Peter’s People refused additional negotiations, and the band and their council 
would not discuss the surrender again until the DIA called for a vote on September 23, 1907.52  
 Despite the obvious opposition, Settler officials prepared a removal document. Between 
the July meetings on the treaty grounds and the September vote for surrender, the chief and 
councilors continued to meet with Howell and various other Department officials including 
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Deputy Superintendent Frank Pedley and Agent J.O. Lewis in Selkirk.53 They continued to add 
inducements to convince the ogimaag to support the agreement, including larger allotments and 
greater shares of potential revenues from land sales.54 On Sunday September 22, hasty notices 
went up in two or three places on the reserve that the chief and council had called a meeting for 
the next day.55 
 After breakfast on Monday morning, Saulteaux and Maškēkowak men and women 
filtered into the storage building. The room filled quickly, and several dozen people clustered 
outside. Three windows lined each side of the room, and each one was “filled with heads” as 
people tried to hear the discussions inside.56 They had gathered once again to express their 
opposition to any form of surrender. At no point during this meeting did Pedley read in full the 
already prepared surrender agreement. Pedley read fragmented passages throughout the morning, 
and questions and discussion followed each provision—although council member James 
Williams twice requested to hear the entire document.57 Pedley informed the meeting that he had 
$5,000 cash with him in the building and explained “if the surrender was made the money would 
be paid.” Many believed that the $5,000 came from the sale of a disputed tract known as the Mile 
Square in 1901, money that the tribe had yet to receive. They did not know that it was an 
advance on future sales of their yet unsurrendered reserve.58 Asham recalled that Pedley added 
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that if no surrender occurred, “I will take the satchel and go and you will not get anything.” He 
made it clear that without a surrender, the St. Peter's People would see no money.59 Toward the 
end of the afternoon, “voices were raised in the building because they knew it was a question 
about the surrender and they wanted to make short work of it.” Asham and others who remained 
opposed demanded a vote that evening, but instead Pedley adjourned the meeting until the 
following day.60 
 On Tuesday, the meeting resumed around ten or eleven in the morning. Pedley made it 
known that the people would receive half of the proceeds from the sale of reserve lands and the 
other half would remain in trust. He also promised that they would receive the interest on that 
trust along with their annuity payments every summer.61 Estimating the value of the land at ten 
dollars per acre, Pedley suggested that, the next year, the individual payments would be ninety 
dollars. The meeting broke for lunch with the promise of ninety dollars and a full stomach with 
the bacon, flour, and tea supplied by the Indian Department for the occasion.  
 The vote took place when they reassembled for the afternoon. Asham described the 
voting process as chaotic, although William Prince remembered it as calm and orderly.62 While 
those who had been sitting inside joined the overflow who had been trying to listen from outside 
the building, chief and councilors called out instructions to separate into two groups, one for the 
surrender and one against the surrender. Normally, the band voted by a show of hands or by 
written vote. Inspector Semmens shouted over the noise, in Cree, “Who wants $90, let him go 
over there!” and he pointed toward the council and others gathering to vote in favor of the 
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surrender.63 Even Prince, who had decided to support the surrender, believed that Semmens’ 
statement “caused the surrender to carry; the people were poor and they were promised ninety 
dollars each head and they jumped at it and voted for it.”64 After a single body count, the 
surrender passed by a margin of eight votes: 107 voted in favor of surrender, 98 against.  
 The surrender failed to represent the will of the People. The 205 total votes represented a 
majority of eligible voters present at the meeting, but not a majority of eligible voters on the 
ishkonigan as a whole. Alexander Cochrane, for example, estimated “that there are some 348 
families, but those who voted numbered only 203.”65 Pedley, however, called the voters back 
inside the storage house, where the surrender document and a satchel with five thousand dollars 
waited. Only at this point, after the vote had already occurred but before the signing, did Pedley 
finally read the document through in full.66 Although the voting had ended, the men in the room 
objected so strongly to a provision that granted the Department of Indian Affairs the power to 
decide the sale of allotments that Pedley took his pencil and scratched out that clause. He or 
someone else also inserted Asham’s name into the document to allow him to collect the same 
amount of patented land as councillors, under the pretext that he was an ex-chief.67 “I was quite 
excited,” Asham later recalled, “and I took it for granted that I was defeated and there was no 
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remedy for it.”68 He signed the document along with the Chief and Council, and Pedley opened 
his satchel and began disbursing payments at once.69 The St. Peter’s Reserve was surrendered.  
 The surrender consisted primarily of two parts: the agreement dissolved the present 
reserve and created a new one. Approximately one half of the land in the reserve, 21,000 acres, 
went to individual Indians for patented lots. Additionally, each person signed a waiver when they 
received their patent relinquishing all claims under the Manitoba Act or the Indian Act. The 
Department sold the remainder of the land, dispersing half of the proceeds directly to members 
within a year of the sale and retaining the balance in a Department-administered fund for the 
benefit of the People. Each year, the Department would disperse the interest on that account in 
per capita payments. For their support, the Chief received an additional ten dollars and the 
councillors and ex-chiefs an additional six dollars at each payment. The agreement also reserved 
3,000 acres of haylands for the collective use of those who remained on their patented lands. The 
plan, however, was for the majority of the men and women of St. Peter’s Reserve to move to a 
new reserve, provided for in the surrender. The St. Peter’s People themselves would select a 
75,000 acre location near Lake Winnipeg, although the terms limited them to 10 miles of shore 
frontage. The surrender provisions also included a reinstatement of ration disbursals at treaty 
payment, a practice the Department had discontinued several years earlier; a “reasonable supply” 
of agricultural implements for the new reserve, and “reasonable assistance” in moving to and 
building new homes and schools on the reserve.70  
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 The Department expressed its goals transparently, at least internally. Howell admitted to 
his desire to see the reserve broken up for settlement. In his official report on the Howell 
Commission, he congratulated himself that the surrender would solve the claims headache that 
had plagued the Department and the Dominion government. “It might not be improper for me to 
add,” he wrote, “that in my view of the matter the Government by granting a new reserve of 
75,000 acres have readily and cheaply got out of a nasty tangle and taken a step which in the near 
future will relieve the locality of an undesirable element, to say the least.” Inserted in between 
the lines, he edited, “…and have greatly benefitted the band, and have…”71 In the weeks 
following the surrender, Pedley likewise stated, “the issuing of patents to individual Indians will 
ultimately, I believe, result in a considerable portion if not all the land granted to them passing 
into the hands of whites.”72 The surrender aimed to clear the area for white settlement with 
minimal cost to Settlers. Federal and local officials made public statements about removing the 
poor, “wild” Indians from the degrading influence of non-Indians, but their own official 
correspondence reveals Settler colonial and imperial goals behind their appropriation of 
Anishinaabe lands.73 The 1907 St. Peter’s land cession agreement exemplified ethnic cleansing 
in Canada between 1890 and 1940.74  
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 At least two explanations exist for Chief William Prince and the councillors’ decisions to 
support the agreement after several months of adamant opposition. The first is personal gain or 
greed. While the average member of the St. Peter’s Reserve could claim 16 acres of land, the 
chief received 180 and councillors and ex-chiefs received 120 acres. Moreover, they directed the 
location and disbursal of the former reserve, giving them the opportunity to allocate land and 
resources according their own interests and those of their kin. The Department also apportioned 
them a larger share of revenues from the land sales and bolstered their power by, at the council’s 
request, suspending elections. The next election for chief should have occurred during the 
summer of 1908, but Prince and the councillors remained in their positions until the summer of 
1912, when the first vote since 1905 was held on the new Peguis Reserve.75 The surrender 
agreement enhanced the power and prestige of the ogimaag who signed it.  
 As leaders of their people, however, the ogimaag’s support of the surrender must be 
considered from the perspective of their ongoing attempts to protect the People’s sovereignty. 
Local municipalities had inserted themselves into tribal jurisdiction. The Department refused to 
honor the claims of their People to the land and the resources, diverting wood and territory to 
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non-Indians. The ogimaag sought to wrest control from the Indian Department in the aftermath 
of the surrender. Frustrated with nearly four decades of Department interference, the Chief and 
Council fought efforts to interfere with the administration of allotted lands. In fact, the men 
inside of the storage building on September 24, 1907, after the vote shouted down the provision 
that allowed for Department oversight of their patents.76 Pedley simply crossed this line from the 
document before the chief and council signed it. Of course, the fact that the first time they heard 
this provision—or the surrender agreement as a whole—came after the vote demonstrates the 
hasty, heavy-handed way in which the Dominion government secured the Saulteaux and 
Maškēkowak People of St. Peter’s approval. From the perspective of at least some of the people, 
however, the surrender presented an opportunity to rid themselves of the Settler interference that 
led to the flawed agreement in the first place.  
 For the chief and council, selecting the location of the new ishkonigan offered the chance 
to provide a home to protect and develop their peoplehood. Perhaps they saw themselves in the 
context of the westward migration begun nearly a millennium ago by their ancestors who left 
their comfortable lives on the Atlantic Coast to avoid imminent destruction—and the ancestors 
who continued into the west, expanding the boundaries of Anishinaabewaki onto the prairies 
beneath which now lay the bones of those same ancestors. Perhaps they, too, would recreate 
themselves at a new resting place. 
 On October 1, 1907, only a few days following the surrender, a delegation comprised of 
the chief and council as well as two additional representatives selected by the band members left 
to explore potential locations. They decided on a site along Fisher River, northeast of the Fisher 
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River Reserve. When they traveled to Lake Winnipeg to view potential locations, the party 
moved through a network of Anishinaabe places. They spent the first night at Berens River, 
another Ojibwe reserve. Their third stop was the Fisher River Reserve, also home to Anishinaabe 
kin, who made no objection to the proposed move.77 Their wives might have come from these 
places, and their sons or daughters might have raised their grandchildren in these woods. These 
rivers and streams they floated on were familiar places for seasonal movements to hunt and fish, 
gather berries, and collect maple syrup. Equally as important for ogimaag who spent their time as 
leaders defending their territory and sovereignty from outside encroachments, this new space 
offered the opportunity to recreate themselves in a purely Anishinaabe landscape. William 
Prince, W.D. Harper, William H. Prince, and James Williams sold their allotments and 
committed themselves and their families to the new ishkonigan.78 
 The Saulteaux viewed the surrender and its negotiations in the same way as previous 
treaties.79 As they managed the transfer to the new reserve, the ogimaag fought to ensure that the 
Dominion honored the terms of the agreement. In the context of treaty negotiations, the land and 
cash incentives may have been interpreted as part of the reciprocal exchanges that preceded 
alliances and land cessions. Howell noted that in order to convince the ogimaag to meet with him 
in Selkirk about any business, including the land claims commission, he had to pay for their 
meals and to stable their horses.80 They expected compensation for their services, and the five 
dollars they received for attending the surrender meeting may have seemed like assurances of a 
mutually beneficial alliance. 
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 The surrender failed to pacify the Saulteaux or Settlers. Chief William Prince and the 
councillors who signed the agreement continued to demand that the Dominion honor its terms—
all of them, as understood in negotiations. In its haste to settle all questions related to St. Peter’s, 
the Department bungled their part of the land sales. Rather than ten dollars promised by Pedley, 
the poorly-attended auction only brought in an average of five dollars per acre and much of the 
land remained unsold.81 From the perspective of Anishinaabe treaty-making and the ogimaag, 
however, they had agreed to surrender with the understanding that the Dominion valued their 
land at ten dollars per acre or ninety dollars per capita—and that it was the Department’s 
responsibility to make up the difference in case of a shortfall.82 In addition to the ninety dollar 
payment, they reminded the government about its promises to fund the rebuilding on the new 
Peguis Reserve. Other members of the Saulteaux and Maškēkowak People of St. Peter’s 
protested the surrender altogether. William Asham continued his vocal opposition, along with 
emerging thirty-five-year-old Saulteaux leader Naynahkawkanape. They protested with their 
bodies, refusing to remove to the Peguis Reserve.83 Settlers felt frustrated that disputes about 
claims lingered, and they objected to compensating previous residents for their improvements.84 
As on other reserves, the majority of the land did not go to local farmers. Corporate land 
speculators dominated the market, consuming more than half of the opened lands.85 In 1911, the 
St. Peter’s People succeeded in forcing a legal hearing on the surrender. The St. Peter’s People 
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brought their grievances to the Attorney General, who filed a brief alleging that not only were 
the actions of Settlers and speculators following surrender unscrupulous, but the agreement itself 
had been obtained illegally.86 In response, Manitoba convened a Royal Commission to 
investigate these claims, and officials spent several weeks that summer interviewing settlers, 
Saulteaux and Maškēkowak people, and government officials. The Commission agreed with the 
Anishianabe People of St. Peter’s and declared the surrender invalid.87 
 And yet the surrender remained. The people had lost their aki, but the St. Peter’s 
Saulteaux did not dissolve. They reforged themselves as the Peguis People on the new 
ishkonigan to the north. They also refused to abandon their homeland and the graves of their 
ancestors that they had fought to protect. Many, like William Asham, remained on their former 
reserve. Others, including Naynahkawkanape and his family, moved between the new ishkonigan 
and the old one, incorporating additional spaces into their seasonal travels and defying colonial 
geographies of control by refusing to be contained by reservations boundaries. In a way, 
Anishinaabewaki did not shrink with the surrender agreement in 1907. It expanded, 
incorporating the new reserve without accepting the loss of their home, and in this constantly 
adapting network of relationships, Saulteaux sovereignty survived.88 
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“Our Answer Was No, and It Is Still No to This Day”: The Flooding of Pahquahwong 
 
 In 2008, I worked at a living history museum in southern Wisconsin when one of my 
coworkers, a man about my grandfather’s age, started talking about Lac Courte Oreilles. He 
grew up in Winter, a town on the reservation’s eastern edge. He told me about how, as a boy, he 
and his friends would take their boats and go looking for what he called the flooded Indian town. 
“It was like a ghost town, right there under the water,” he said, smiling as he remembered the 
adventures of his youth. “So close you could almost touch the tops of the buildings.” I did not 
know what to say to him. I had heard about the flooded town, too, but for the Ojibwe people who 
told me the stories, the dead below the water were not the exciting ghosts of a childhood 
adventure. They were the bones of our ancestors, stolen by the dam named after the town of 
Winter. In 1923, the gates of the Winter Dam closed, flooding nearly half of the reservation. The 
town of Pahquahwong, acres of wild rice beds, and, perhaps most devastatingly, the graves of 
more than seven hundred Anishinaabe relatives submerged under the waters. The dam became a 
site where the state of Wisconsin and the Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibwe fought to assert their 
understandings of space, place, and sovereignty.  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles band of Ojibwe had lived near the wild rice beds, maple groves, 
and muskeye-rich streams of the Chippewa River and its many lakes for generations, and it was 
part of Anishinaabewaki, that they claimed in treaties since “time immemorial.” Ojibwe historian 
William Whipple Warren described the settlement’s beginnings when several families camped 
near Little Rice Lake after burying one of their children.89 They claimed the land through the 
bones of their ancestors from the beginning. The 1854 treaty that created the reservation simply 
                                                 
89 Warren, History of the Ojibwe, 131.  
  
250 
 
confirmed their existing claim and, more importantly, as Ojibwe ogimaag wrote in a petition in 
1864, ensured that “[a]s long as there is one Indian living that he be allowed to own the lands.” 
The village at Pahquahwon (“where the river is wide”) or Post gave Ojibweg easy access to 
abundant manoomin and cranberries; deer, muskrats, ducks, and other game along the shore; and 
muskellunge, walleye, and sturgeon in the river; and an easily navigable water system that 
connected them to other Anishinaabe settlements. They buried their dead along both banks of the 
river.90 
 In 1911, the state of Wisconsin proposed a dam on the West Fork of the Chippewa River. 
The growing Settler population in the region required additional sources of power, and the 
Chippewa River offered a convenient solution from a Settler perspective. On May 18, 1916, 
Wisconsin utility companies and progress-minded Congressional representatives passed an act of 
Congress that declared,  
With the consent of the Indians of the Lac Courte Oreilles tribe, to be obtained in 
such manner as the Secretary of the Interior may require, flowage rights on the 
unallotted tribal lands....in the Lac Courte Oreilles reservation, in the state of 
Wisconsin, may be leased or granted for storage-reservoir purposes.91 
 
The preceding language seems compatible with the alliance-making strategies of the previous 
century. However, neither state and federal officials nor the business interests viewed the Ojibwe 
as equal partners with whom to negotiate. Both the United States and Dominion governments 
employed powers such as eminent domain to appropriate Native homelands for Settler gains. 
Public works seizures included not only railroad rights-of-way but also public roads, airports, 
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national forests, military facilities, and, perhaps most commonly, dams.92 From the United 
States’ perspective, supported by the doctrine of plenary power recently established by the 
Supreme Court, Native resources needed to be incorporated into the Settler economy, even if 
Native Peoples such as the Ojibwe protested.93 In the 1903 case Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the 
Supreme Court held that Congress possessed the power to abrogate treaties while implementing 
policies such as allotment. Plenary power enabled Congress, and its deputies at a state and local 
level, to dispossess Indigenous Peoples without consent.94 
 Using the 1916 act, Charles McPherson of the Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power 
Company, a Wisconsin corporation with power under Wisconsin laws to condemn land for 
storage reservoirs, negotiated through the Superintendent of Hayward Indian School Henry 
McQuigg to “obtain flowage rights upon tribal land and allotted lands in the Lac Courte Oreilles 
Indian Reservation” in return for annual rental fees or an equal exchange of land. McPherson 
absolutely refused to pay more than $15 per person, for a maximum of $20,000 when the Lac 
Courte Oreilles in favor of settling expected $127,000.95 After realizing the more than $100,000 
gap in expectations, those Ojibweg who had voted to sell joined the opposition. At a meeting on 
October 16, 1920, Charles Oshogay insisted the reply of the tribe was “‘NO,’ to any proposition 
the Company had to offer.” When Oshogay, a prominent ogimaa, “called upon the Indians to 
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show their will saying ‘Get up and say 'no,'....[p]ractically all of the 252 Indians present led by 
Charles Oshogay and John Goslin and two or three others, jumped to their feet and cried loudly, 
“No, No, No, Gaween, Gaween, we don’t want the dam.’”96 Lac Courte Oreilles member 
Michael Wolf explained his People’s refusal: “This has been the home of the Ojibwa, from time 
immemorial. He has learned to love this country for its wooded slopes and lakes and streams. 
Here he has reared his children with loving care; here, by the camp fire, he has listened to the 
sacred traditions of his people.”97 Wolf’s words framed the debate in terms of peoplehood.  
 Those few scholars who have discussed the Winter Dam emphasize its connections to the 
federal government. As Charlie Otto Rasmussen, who works for the Great Lakes Indian Fish and 
Wildlife Commission, points out federal oversight was indeed the guiding factor in the dam’s 
development through the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 and the resultant Federal Power 
Commission.98 Despite the eventual overarching federal framework, however, the initial impetus 
came from the state. Leonard Smith, an engineer employed by the Wisconsin Geological and 
Natural History Survey and the U.S. Geological Survey, reported to the state that the Chippewa 
River system appeared well-suited for a dam and reservoir. In his 1908 report, he specifically 
recommended Pahquahwong as the ideal location. Hoping not only to generate power but also to 
encourage tourism and settlement, the state passed a law in 1911 that called for the development 
of reservoirs along the Chippewa River.99 The state passed this law to circumvent Ojibwe land 
rights and sovereignty. 
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 In 1917, the state legislature passed a bill abolishing the town of Reserve and reassigning 
the taxable territory to adjoining towns. Technically, Reserve fell within the reservation 
boundaries designated by the 1854 treaty, but allotment had removed large tracts of land from 
Indian ownership and made them eligible for taxation. Ojibwe took the opportunity to govern 
local affairs in the reservation towns, given their largely Native population. State and local 
leaders, however, accused “the Indians were none too careful about the legality of the orders they 
drew or whether their bank account was large enough to cover their checks.”100 The act’s intent 
becomes clear in the responses of the towns that acquired the reapportioned sections of Reserve. 
Couderay, Radisson, Hunter, and Hayward received land heavy in timber, while Sand Lake “got 
the Indian vote.”101 The reorganized townships that now adjoined the land and water affected by 
the proposed dam voted in favor of the project now that the majority of their voters were white 
citizens who embraced contemporary notions of progress and industrial development.  
 In pressing for and supporting the dam, the state asserted its authority to appropriate 
Ojibwe land for the sake of progress. The dam, built and operated by the private company 
Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power, would generate electricity for thousands of local settlers. 
Additionally, the company promised that the lake created behind the dam, known as the 
Chippewa Flowage, would attract tourists. These goals aligned with Settler understandings of the 
value of land. Wisconsin marketed its northern woods and rivers as a sportsman’s paradise, and 
the Flowage promised easy fishing for tourists.102  
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 The Ojibwe fought the dam. At half a dozen council meetings from 1916 to 1919, they 
voted nearly unanimously against damming the river. Ojibwe leadership had transitioned to the 
reservation and the federal intrusions that accompanied it. Some leaders, like the ogimaag of 
Rice Lake, lost influence, but even they continued to lead their People, lobbying Washington and 
influencing local affairs until the murder of ogimaa Giishkitawag or Joe White by state game 
wardens. On the reservation, ogimaag such as Akiwenziii, who became a primary ogimaa 
following the death of his father Moozojiid, interpreted imposed institutions such as the 
allotment committee and federally initiated elections into the political relationships of the 
Anishianabeg People at Lac Courte Oreilles.103 Leadership on the reservation continued to 
originate from decentralized communities, the council meetings held between 1916 and 1919 
included general participation. Anakwad or Peter Cloud, not an officially elected representative, 
spoke for the people living at Pahquahwong at one of the first meetings in 1916. He said, “You 
ask for the land I am living on at the Post. You came and asked for this and our answer was no, 
and it is still no till this day.”104 Anakwad and his fellow Ojibweg articulated their objections to 
the dam in terms of access to resources and the violation of their ancestors’ graves.  
 In an 1916 meeting, Power Company representative McPherson promised that the Power 
Company would “buy the wild land,” paying more than its estimated value because “[t]he Indian 
land is worth more to us than to them,” projecting settler ideas of progress and use as the 
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defining value of a place.105 Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibweg, however, insisted again and again that 
this is not “wild land.” It was their home, and its value came not from man’s manipulation of it 
but from their relationships with the aki itself, affirmed through manoomin and the graves of 
their ancestors. In testimony after testimony, men and women from Lac Courte Oreilles 
emphasized that the planned flowage threatened their access to manoomin. One Ojibwe at a 1920 
meeting described rice as “nourishing.” Another, Jim Crow, articulated the economic value of 
rice, both as a form of sustenance and as a commodity. The Ojibwe “use the rice as a food....We 
had some rice here today for dinner.” He added that they also traded rice for other supplies, and 
he emphasized that the gathering of rice was a family and, even more broadly, a community, 
activity.106  
 The Power Company and local and federal governments framed their questions at these 
meetings to calculate the value of rice to determine how much the Power Company owed for 
destroying it. The Ojibwe of Lac Courte Oreilles, however, rejected monetary compensation. In a 
1921 meeting, Dick Potack explained that the land and its resources were more than dollars and 
cents to Ojibwe people. He called the land “a good place” and he went on to say it was “a 
beautiful place to live, and not only myself, but all my people who come here say that we are 
occupying it and using it as our home.”107 These men and women insisted on an Ojibwe 
conception of and use based on the living relationships of peoplehood and not limited to flat 
assertions of sovereignty within bounded space. 
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 In addition to manoomin, dam protestors used their ancestors’ graves to construct their 
relationship with the land beneath the water. “Why do we need to put under water the sacred 
bones of our honorable forefathers? Is it right?” asked William Wolf at a meeting in 1920. Wolf, 
son of ogimaa Peter Wolf, continued, “The prayer and desire of this Band is to be in the same 
bosom that shields the remains of their fathers, when the time comes. This has been the home of 
the Chippewa from time immemorial, and at present there are many Indians in this village. Those 
that are absent are not out visiting, but lie beneath the sod, which we claim as our home.”108 The 
concerns of Wolf and the rest of the Lac Courte Oreilles community were subordinated to 
electricity and vacation homes.  
 Meeting records demonstrate that the Ojibwe made the connection between land and 
sovereignty. Lac Courte Oreilles member John King, placed the dam in a broader context of 
colonialism and Ojibwe efforts for survival as a distinct community. He saw the dam as an 
attempt to “flood us out.” Peter Cloud likewise related the Ojibweg’s relationship with the land 
to the context of survival. He urged, “Please take notice of the number of Indians here, men, 
women and children….I would choose to save it and keep it intact for the future, for the future 
generation, my children and my grandchildren. We get a great deal from these waters and lands 
that is about to be flooded.”109 He mentioned manoomin and hunting, but Ojibweg derived more 
than that from the flooded lands. This place defined their identity as a People. 
 After 1920, Anishinaabe resistance no longer could stop the dam. The Federal Power Act 
of 1920, rooted in the plenary power doctrine that supported colonial land policy, empowered the 
Federal Government to appropriate reservation lands for the purpose of power production and 
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transmission lines. The dam would be built whether the Ojibwe consented or not, and the federal 
government would determine compensation.110 In August of 1921, the Wisconsin-Minnesota 
Power and Lights Company received one of the Federal Power Commission’s first licenses for 
the construction of the Winter Dam. As part of this contract, the Power Company agreed to pay 
the Lac Courte Oreilles Band $1,200 every year, for as long as they held the license; compensate 
the Ojibwe for lost timber; remove and reinter all the graves from the flooded area; replant the 
wild rice beds that the dam would flood; operate a fish rearing pond to stock the Chippewa 
Flowage; create the community of New Post to replace Paquahwong, including a church, school, 
stores, and homes for all those displaced, building a church, school, and stores.111 
 The Power Company built the dam. The floodgates closed in March of 1923, and by 
August 1, the Chippewa Flowage was full, and within months the water had covered church, 
houses and–despite promises—hundreds of graves.112 My family lost aki to the flooding, an 
allotment outside the village of Pahquahwong inherited in part by my great-great-grandmother 
Julia Galien Cornelia.113 During the next several years, the Power Company failed to fulfill its 
obligations as outlined in its license. Fish, rice, and homes remained unrestored. The water 
claimed ancestors’ bones, and as the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources increased 
enforcement of the state’s game laws in violation of Ojibwe treaty rights, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
Ojibwe were increasingly cut off from manoomin and game. The Power Company, the state of 
Wisconsin, and the federal government did nothing while Ojibweg like George Flemming had to 
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scoop the remains of their relatives, which had turned to mud, up in buckets to rebury them. 
Again, the Ojibwe presented an understanding of land as a living relationship, one linked to their 
inherent sovereignty as a people. Their appeals connected past, present, and future in the land 
through the bones of their ancestors. This sense of place and community, an expression of their 
peoplehood, placed the Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibwe in direct conflict with state-level settler 
notions of flat, bounded sovereignty and land values tied to notions of linear progress and 
capitalist exploitation.  
 By depleting manoomin and bringing in Settler fishermen, the dam forced the 
Anishinaabe to look for alternate sources of rice and fish, often placing them in direct conflict 
with state gaming and gathering laws. The Winter Dam heightened the conflict between the state 
and the Ojibwe, particularly in the arena of hunting and fishing rights, and these tensions would 
have profound consequences in the 1980s when the so-called “Walleye War” broke out between 
Ojibwe spearfishers and white sportsmen.114  
 In the first decades of the twentieth century, many smaller dams, such as the one built in 
Winter, Wisconsin, caused similar injuries on a local scale. Dams and other public works 
projects supposedly provided numerous benefits to the general public—from flood control to 
irrigation and hydro-electric power to sporting and leisure opportunities. From the perspective of 
Indian Peoples who call now-flooded valleys and other appropriated lands home, however, the 
benefits seem hard to remember amidst the negative effects: ecological damage, economic 
disruption, physical dislocation, and emotional trauma.115 Not to mention, the public benefits 
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promoted as the driving purpose of such projects often masked the interests of Settler elites, the 
primary beneficiaries compared to the average citizen.116 
 Today, Wisconsin Settlers take pride in the dam as a symbol of their ability to carve 
progress out of a wild landscape. For them, the flooded town of Pahquahwong, submerged 
beneath the flowage, marks the passing of the Indians. The Chippewa Flowage became a 
“northwoods treasure,” and dozens of non-Indian-owned resorts appeared on former allotments 
along the new lake’s shores to support the flocks of recreationists from nearby cities, including 
Minneapolis, Milwaukee, and Chicago.117 For the state of Wisconsin, the Winter Dam marked a 
success and undoubtedly bolstered their efforts to further dismantle the unity of the reservations 
within its borders, one of the successes that would lead the state to push for inclusion in Public 
Law 280 and other termination legislation in the 1950s. In supporting the construction of the 
dam, the state asserted its authority to appropriate Ojibwe land for the sake of progress. Through 
their continued resistance of the destruction of their village at Pahquahwong, the Lac Courte 
Oreilles claimed an alternative definition of place based on a concept of Ojibwe peoplehood. For 
the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa Indians, reasserting their claims to the land and 
resources beneath the water marked the contest for sovereignty in Wisconsin as a struggle for 
place.  
“The Country Their Creator Had Given Them”: Turtle Mountain Displacement and 
Allotment  
 The People of Turtle Mountain remember the early twentieth century as a period of 
struggle and survival. Turtle Mountain author Louise Erdrich shares a version of these stories set 
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on a fictional reservation in her novel Tracks, which opens with a story told by the old man 
Nanabush about a tuberculosis epidemic in 1912. “We started dying before the snow,” he tells 
his granddaughter, “and like the snow, we continued to fall. It was surprising that there were so 
many of us left to die. For those who survived the spotted sickness from the south, our long fight 
west to Nadouissioux land where we signed the treaty, and then a wind from the east, bringing 
exile in a storm of government papers, what descended from the north in 1912 seemed 
impossible.”118 Erdrich goes on to tell a story not of destruction but of perseverance. On the 
Turtle Mountain reservation where Erdrich’s ancestors lived, starvation killed one hundred fifty-
one people in the winter of 1887-1888. Smallpox outbreaks in 1900 and the winter of 1907-1908, 
combined with crop failures and delayed annuity payments, led to more suffering.119 The 
reservation shrank to a mere tenth of its original size, and the People scattered across 
Anishinaabewaki’s western prairies. The Turtle Mountain People, however, remember the 
continued strength of their peoplehood, which saw them through the disease, dispossession, and 
marginalization of the early twentieth century.  
 In 1892, the “storm of government papers” broke over Turtle Mountain when the 
McCumber Commission arrived. In addition to intruding into internal matters of belonging, the 
McCumber Commission oversaw the cession of most of the Turtle Mountain homeland—ten 
million acres at the bargain rate of ten cents per acre—and opened the reservation to allotment. 
Historian John Morrison Shaw calls the agreement “an egregious example of federal officials 
using food as a weapon to coerce a starving people into releasing their birthright for a 
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pittance.”120 Congress delayed approving the treaty for nearly fifteen years, finally ratifying the 
document on April 21, 1904. An insufficient two hundred seventy-five quarter sections of 
reserved land remained for three hundred twenty-six families, a number that failed to include kin 
denied recognition by the federal government but not in their living relationships with the Turtle 
Mountain People. Aggressive allotment policies forced families into western North Dakota and 
Montana. Nonetheless, federal intrusion, backed by local and corporate interests, failed to 
separate the Turtle Mountain People from their aki or the other relationships of their peoplehood.  
 By the 1880s, the combination of railroads and commercial ranching and wheat farming 
stirred the frenzy for Turtle Mountain lands. The Great Northern and North Pacific Railroads, 
completed in 1879 and 1881 respectively, secured millions of acres of land in North Dakota. In 
1874, reports circulated about a Settler homesteader who brought in 1,600 bushels of wheat from 
forty acres, yielding $1,900 annually. The railroads dispensed vast tracts of between three and 
sixty-five thousand acres to insiders such as presidents and directors and to business partners 
such as bank presidents, iron ore barons, and land speculators. Industrial-scale commercial 
agriculture moved into the Turtle Mountain People’s homeland, with land ownership heavily 
concentrated in a small number of rich landlords.121 Railroads, flour mills, grain elevators, and 
banks dominated the Great Plains, and railroad companies advertised free homesteads to attract 
Settlers to live near their lines. The verdant farmland and timber resources of the Turtle 
Mountain beckoned enticingly.122  
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 Corporate, local, and national pressures combined to destabilize Turtle Mountain land 
rights. In the 1870s, long before the Turtle Mountain People ceded so much as an acre, the 
United States appropriated thousands of acres of Turtle Mountain timber, turning it into the Fort 
Totten Timber reserve. The Turtle Mountain People gave no consent, and they received no 
compensation. While the federal government redistributed expropriated resources to land 
speculators, timber companies, cattle companies, and local settlers, U. S. Marshals arrested 
Turtle Mountain Ojibweg who continued to access the resources of their unceded homeland.123 
The Turtle Mountain People believed that they had protected their lands by lobbying for an 
Executive Order reservation in 1882, but a second Executive Order two years later reduced the 
reservation to one-tenth of its original area. The 1884 reduction purposefully cut from the 
reservation the town of Dunseith, home to a large community of Turtle Mountain men and 
women and to suspected lignite coal and silver deposits.124 The Great Northern Railroad 
promoted Dunseith as the “Little Chicago of the North,” and Ojibwe families for themselves 
surrounded by “capitalists who have secured title to the rich silver and coal mines of Dunseith, 
where they have laid out a town,” according to the New York Times.125 Prospectors found no 
silver, and coal deposits turned out to be minimal, but local coal fueled a Settler-owned 
brickyard and lime kiln at Dunseith for the next several decades.126 Non-reservation towns and 
counties imposed taxes on Turtle Mountain people and subjected them to state jurisdiction for 
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crimes ranging from murder to theft.127 When the McCumber Commission arrived in 1892, the 
combined Settler interests had effectively and unilaterally reduced the Turtle Mountain 
homeland.  
 The Turtle Mountain People remained determined to protect their rights to the land, 
articulating their relationships in similar terms as the Anishinaabeg Peoples of St. Peter’s and 
Lac Courte Oreilles. They unequivocally and successfully refused removal. To the McCumber 
Commission officials, representatives of the Turtle Mountain People explained that this was “the 
country the Great Spirit had given them,” and the place “where sleep their fathers.”128 The Turtle 
Mountain People placed their relationship with their land in terms of kinship, aadizookanag, and 
ceremony. They likewise relied on relational terms to articulate their claim against the United 
Sates. Speeches emphasized the long history of amicable alliances with Americans, stating, “And 
yet we have noticed that every time the Sioux tribes have risen against the Government and 
killed white settlers, the Government has gone down into its pockets and increased their 
provisions, and paid them well for their lands, while it arbitrarily seeks to deprive us, who have 
at all times been its friend, of our homes.”129 The Anishinaabeg of Turtle Mountain understood 
their rights to the land and their claims against the United States in terms of living relationships 
that supported their peoplehood.  
 The McCumber Agreement gave the veneer of consent to the appropriation of Turtle 
Mountain lands. Gathered in a warehouse barely large enough to hold the Council of Thirty-Two 
let alone a full assembly, with ogimaa Little Shell and attorney John Bottineau removed from the 
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reservation under threat of arrest, the McCumber Commission’s interpreter told Kakenowash, 
head of the Council of Thirty-Two, that they could receive one million dollars by signing the 
agreement that day. The interpreter followed with a threat, promising, “If you don’t sign this 
document I brought you for a million dollars, you will never get anything. Uncle Sam will take 
everything away from you for nothing.”130 Despite the threat, Kakenowash and his fellow 
council members attempted to negotiate favorable terms, having already prevented removal.  
 The People of Turtle Mountain had every reason to believe that Uncle Sam would leave 
them with nothing. The United States already occupied their lands. With the memory of a decade 
spent trying to protect their new reservation and the promise of increased rations, those present 
agreed to the McCumber Commission’s terms. An estimated one quarter of eligible voters 
approved the agreement in 1892, or approximately 300 men, and again in 1904 when Congress 
finally acted on the agreement, 208 men out of a total population of more than 2,500 gave their 
consent. The agreement confirmed the reservation’s reduced borders in exchange for a ten 
million acre cession. The ten cents per acre came at a time when the federal government had paid 
$2.50 for lands ceded by other Indian nations in the region.131 The federal government 
acknowledged that the two townships in no way met the needs of the Turtle Mountain People, 
and Article VI of the treaty promised, “All members of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewas 
who may be unable to secure land upon the reservation above ceded may take homesteads upon 
any vacant land belonging to the United States without charge” and without severing tribal 
status.132 
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 As at St. Peter’s and Lac Courte Oreilles, Turtle Mountain Ojibwe opposed the deal 
immediately. At Turtle Mountain, the delay between the agreement and action by Congress to 
approve and disburse the settlement—coupled with several years of drought, hard winters, and 
disease—only increased criticism. The fight against the Ten-Cent Treaty continued for the next 
eighty years, but in the interim the Turtle Mountain People had to deal with the practical aspects 
of their territorial diminishment.  
 The Dawes General Allotment Act of 1887 represented the ideology of colonial land 
policy in the United States predicated on transferring Indian land and resources to Settler control. 
Subsequent amendments to the Dawes Act and related court cases diminished protections against 
sale. For example, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock (1903) established the precedent that Congress could 
override treaty stipulations requiring tribal consent for any land sales.133 On the White Earth 
reservation in Minnesota, home to an Anishinaabe People, federal administrators, timber 
interests, land companies, and state and local municipal authorities combined to open fissures in 
Anishinaabe society and contributed to land loss.134 The Turtle Mountain People, like the 
Anishinaabeg at Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s, faced the consequences of colonial land 
policies.  
 Ninety percent of Turtle Mountain members had to look beyond the reservation for 
allotments. The allotment process proceeded slowly. Many Turtle Mountain people did not care 
to make selections, especially if that meant leaving their present homes, and only did so at the 
local agents’ urging. Little Shell and Kakenowash had both refused their consent to allotment 
during talks with the Commission, and Article III stated that all “lands, woods, and waters…shall 
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be held as common property of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.” The article 
continued, however, to call for a survey of lands “for the purpose of enabling such Indians as 
desire to take homesteads.”135 This provision, seemingly voluntary, opened the way for allotment 
of the reservation, which quickly parceled out reserved lands as individual property. The 
remaining people had to file for allotments on the public domain.  
 The Turtle Mountain People sought to direct the acquisition of lands beyond reservation 
borders rather than leaving it to United States officials. In May 1908, Kakenowash, who 
succeeded Little Shell as principal ogimaa following his death in 1901, and two other ogimaag, 
police chief Kanick and interpreter Joseph Rolette, traveled to Culbertson, Montana, to make 
selections for family and friends. Both Kakenowash and Kanick served on the twelve-person 
Turtle Mountain council, and Rolette frequently worked as official interpreter. They acted not 
only as individuals but also as representatives of their people, overseeing the process of 
allotment. They brought with them three hundred dollars to cover travel and filing fees. The 
families who authorized the ogimaag to act in their place had one member with an allotment on 
the reservation. Kaitapik, 41, and Oouchequeuesh, 52, both married to a man named 
Machipeness, sent money to find allotments for themselves, their children, and one of their 
widowed mothers. Machipeness had an allotment within the reservation boundaries, where the 
family could live while leasing western lands to Settler ranchers and farmers. Kakenowesh also 
chose allotments for a family wintering in Swan Lake, Manitoba, making sure that all of those 
who had rights as one of the People could access them.136 Selecting an allotment on the public 
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136 In line with Anishinaabeg understandings of treaties and the relationships they represented, the Turtle Mountain 
People understood the McCumber Agreement as guaranteeing access to aki not just for the present generation but 
also for their children and their children’s children. Mothers and fathers filed allotments for their children as they 
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domain was a way for families with ties to other places in Anishinaabewaki to incorporate 
expanded economic resources while remaining in the land of their ancestors, and the Turtle 
Mountain People mitigated the diminished sovereignty that came with land loss by taking an 
active role in shaping the effects.  
 Unfulfilled promises increased dispossession. Despite the McCumber Agreement’s 
guarantees, Turtle Mountain men and women struggled to secure title on public domain lands. In 
practice, Ojibweg could not obtain an allotment “without charge,” as the McCumber agreement 
guaranteed. The costs accumulated from paying for travel or to hire a proxy in Montana to make 
the selection, filing fees, notaries to witness absentee signatures, new taxes, and various fees that 
came up when a Settler filed a competing claim, not to mention the expense of moving west. In 
1909, Rolette County sent Sheriff E. F. Taylor to inform off-reservation allottees that they owed 
several years of back taxes on personal property items such as horses, cows, wagons, and farm 
implements. He seized the cattle of Antoine Paul, one of the allottees who had a small farm a few 
miles from the reservation.137 United States officials often disagreed about whether or not Turtle 
Mountain allottees had to build improvements to maintain their title, and local Indian and land 
agents provided varying answers to this question. Andrew Vandal, along with his sons-in-law 
Frank and Gregory Grant, selected an Indian homestead. All three men and their family 
possessed recognized rights in the Turtle Mountain People. Although Vandal lived near Devil’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
were born, but the federal government intervened. In 1916, the administrative decision Voight v. Bruce held that 
children born after the final approval of the McCumber Agreement on April 21, 1904, were ineligible for allotments. 
From the Turtle Mountain perspective, this represented another broken promise, and it contributed to the fracturing 
of landholdings and overcrowding on the already too-small reservation. Voight v. Bruce, Decision of the Dep’t of 
the Interior, Jan. 15, 1916, D-26880, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, Record Group 75, National Archives Kansas City, 
MO.  
137 Schwab to Ziebach, Oct. 11, 1909, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, Record Group 75, National Archives Kansas 
City, MO; Schwab to Ziebach, Apr. 10 1909, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, Record Group 75, National Archives 
Kansas City, MO.  
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Lake and the Grants resided at Belcourt on the ishkonigan, they chose allotments near Glasgow, 
Montana, after the limited land within the ishkonigan disappeared. While they went through the 
process of filing their papers—a process that included paying a non-Indian “locator” up to one 
fourth of their McCumber Agreement payment—a Welsh miner named William Morgan filed on 
the same tract of land. The Vandals and Grants then entered into legal proceedings to retain their 
land. They won, largely because of Morgan’s false testimony and negligible improvements, but 
their case was notable not because it represented the typical outcome but rather because it was a 
story of unusual success.138 
 Mrs. Allen Bourassa’s experience more accurately reflected the typical outcome in these 
cases. Bourassa, on the McCumber rolls, filed an Indian homestead claim in the Turtle Mountain 
region. She and her husband lived in a shack on the land while building a log house and barn, 
and they cleared sixty acres, brought in eight tons of hay, and dug a well. In 1907 or 1908, a 
prairie fire destroyed the hay as well as many of their farming implements, and the Bourassa 
moved to St. John while renting the land to a Settler named Marred. Another Settler, a Mr. 
Springer, moved onto the land and began to farm, and “a man came to her at St. John and 
advised her to sell the improvements, that she would loose [sic] the land any way.” She went to 
Rolla and signed “what she thought was a relinquishment to her improvements.”139 However, the 
document relinquished the land. When Mrs. Bourassa later learned that the unknown man had 
manipulated her to sell, she tried to recover her land. Bourassa contacted Schwab and the Devil’s 
Lake land office. Schwab dismissed her request based on the belief that she knew what she 
signed away. Springer, with his connections to Settler officials and greater financial resources, 
                                                 
138 Shaw, “‘In Order That Justice,’” 404-406.  
139 Schwab to Ziebach, Apr. 15, 1908, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, Record Group 75, National Archives Kansas 
City, MO. 
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won the dispute.140 Bourassa, the Vandals, and other Turtle Mountain men and women did not 
receive the protection promised by the federal government in exchange for their lands.  
 Little Shell’s followers, including many of the recently disenrolled, found securing land 
tenure all but impossible without allotments or Indian homesteads. Some filed for allotments 
anyway, but when U.S. officials discovered such cases, they cancelled the claims, even after 
Ojibweg had lived on them for five or six years. Additionally, they lost their homestead claims to 
Settlers, especially because many of the exiled continued to pursue seasonal labor patterns that 
did not fit with Settler ideas of establishing ownership.141 Many of them moved west across the 
plains to places that they and their ancestors had known for years. Little Shell III, for instance, 
had ties to Plentywood, in northeastern Montana, and Wood Mountain, Saskatchewan, where he 
had once hunted bizhiki. Their enrolled kin obtained allotments in the same part of northern 
Montana. Anthropologist Verne Dusenberry called them “the Landless Indians” or the 
“Wandering Chippewa”—an unrecognized, dispossessed Anishinaabe and Michif People who 
nevertheless continued to move through Anishinaabeg spaces and relational networks.142 Their 
fight for the United States to recognize their peoplehood had only begun.  
 Allotment threatened to separate the Turtle Mountain People from kin and resources. 
Anishinaabeg found creative solutions to intervene and prevent their dispossession. In 1908, 
Farmer-in-Charge William Schwab wrote to Superintendent C. M. Ziebach, forwarding requests 
to exchange allotments or sections of allotments. He explained, “Some have all timber and other 
[sic] have all prairie lands in which case they desire to exchange only half, so that they will have 
                                                 
140 Schwab to Ziebach, Apr. 15, 1908, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, Record Group 75, National Archives Kansas 
City, MO.  
141 Shaw, ““In Order That Justice,’” 405-407.  
142 Verne Dusenberry, “Waiting for a Day That Never Comes,” Montana: The Magazine of Western History 8 
(Spring 1958): 37-38 
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both.”143 Father and son Antoine and Louis Enno devised a strategy that allowed them to access 
diverse resources and to support each other. Antoine, 76, could no longer work for himself, and 
“he considers his son’s eighty acres of timberland would be more use to him.” Louis planned to 
build near his father’s house, “making it more convenient in looking after his father’s 
welfare.”144 By exchanging land, both men would have access to a range of resources and 
maintain kinship connections.  
 The Turtle Mountain People relied on their relationships to hold themselves together. 
Federal officials revealed the link between the reduction of the ishkonigan and the ultimate goal 
of erasing the Turtle Mountain People and their sovereignty. Promoting the agreement, Senator 
McCumber told Congress that “the result will be to destroy the tribal relations of the Turtle 
Mountain tribe, because the Indians will have to be scattered. The land is not there for them.” 
Turtle Mountain men and women disappointed the Senator’s hopes. Kinship networks protected 
the People and their land. Joseph Boyer, newly-married and in his mid-twenties, built a house for 
himself and his family on his father’s allotment rather than occupying his own allotment, 
although Superintendent Charles Ziebach warned him that anything he built belonged to the 
elder Boyer.145 The extended Granbois family relied on their relations to avoid exile. Brothers 
Alexander and Micheal Granboix, young men in 1908, lived with their uncle David Granbois on 
his allotment one winter and with their father on their cousin’s allotment the next.146 Sharing 
allotments allowed the Turtle Mountain People to honor kinship obligations, maintain 
                                                 
143 Schwab to Ziebach, 19 Feb. 1908, Letters Received, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City.  
144 Schwab to Ziebach, 14 Mar. 1908, Letters Received, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City.  
145 Schwab to Ziebach, Sept. 11, 1907, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City; Ziebach to Schwab, 
Sept. 20, 1907, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City. 
146 Schwab to Ziebach, Feb. 28, 1908, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City.  
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relationships with the aki the Creator had made for them, and, at the most basic level, to 
survive.147  
 The dispossession of the Turtle Mountain People attacked the core relationships of their 
peoplehood. The United States confined Turtle Mountain claims to a reservation that could 
contain no more than one tenth of the population and scattered the remainder over hundreds of 
miles of public domain lands, threatening ties with Anishinaabewaki. However, 
Anishinaabewaki extended further westward onto the plains as Little Shell’s exiled People and 
the other Turtle Mountain families relocated, often seasonally. They carried with them their 
aadizookanag, which now included the story of their unjust dispossession. They brought their 
ceremonies and their language, Michif and Anishinaabemowin. Kinship networks stretched 
across space and often brought people back home. The Turtle Mountain People actively 
mitigated the consequences of their dispossession, shaping the implantation of federal policies 
around the contours of their peoplehood.  
 
 If scholars generally consider 1850 to 1950 the nadir of Native American history in North 
America, the years between 1904 and 1930 must appear particularly bleak. Indeed, the 
Indigenous population declined to its lowest point.148 As with previous reservation policies, 
colonial actions during this period undermined Native peoplehood. Public and private 
development on reservations, not to mention at sites beyond reserve boundaries, threatened the 
core relationships that sustained Anishinaabe and other First Nations Peoples’ sovereignty. They 
carved up homelands, providing additional barriers to accessing sacred, ceremonial, and 
                                                 
147 Rose Stremlau discusses many similar stories in Sustaining the Cherokee Family.  
148 Wilkinson, Blood Struggle.  
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ancestral sites, and re-inscribed Indian landscapes in Settler terms. Dams could turn short walks 
to visit family into hundred-mile treks around reservoirs, and they often separated living Indian 
people from the bones of their ancestors.149 The emotional trauma further strained the 
relationships that comprised their peoplehood. 
 Settler colonial policies and schemes threatened the physical, environmental, and 
emotional health of Native Peoples. The Ojibwe Peoples of St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac 
Courte Oreilles experienced many of the worst aspects of Settler colonial policies. At Turtle 
Mountain, the federal government chipped away at the land base until only 275 quarter sections 
remained to sustain 326 families. St. Peter’s Reserve no longer existed; the Dominion 
government had coerced a fraudulent surrender of the land along with the ancestors’ graves. 
More Anishinaabe graves and thousands more acres of homeland were destroyed by the 
floodwaters of the hydroelectric dam built on the Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation. However, like 
their ancestors before them, the Anishinaabe People rebuilt and survived. Rather than a 
downward trajectory, this period reveals the tenacity and flexibility of Ojibwe sovereignty. As 
Ojibwe on their reserves and reservations throughout Anishinaabewaki maneuvered around 
incursions by federal, state and provincial, and local authorities and the exploitation of their land 
and resources, they pursued various strategies to strengthen their position as autonomous People.  
                                                 
149 Rosier, “Dam Building and Treaty Breaking,” 345-368; Lawson, Dammed Indians.  
  
273 
 
Chapter 6 
Megwaa zagaswe'idiwag:1 Governance and Leadership, 1920-1940 
 Nine hundred years ago, the Anishinaabeg ancestors left their homes on the eastern coast 
of Turtle Island. As they traveled through unfamiliar territory and faced many challenges and 
changes along the way—fighting meyaagizid such as the Haudenosaunee, incorporating new 
inawemaagan, saying good bye to Potawatomi and Odawa kin who branched off on their own – 
doodemag held the People together and expanded Anishinaabewaki throughout the Great Lakes 
region. The Creator gave the doodem system to the Anishinaabeg to provide order and balance. 
From the maang (loon) and ajijaak (crane) doodemag came the ogimaag or leaders, while the 
waabizheshi or marten doodem gave the warriors and the various fish doodemag provided 
intellectual leaders. Following the path the Creator laid for them, the Anishinaabeg journeyed 
west along the St. Lawrence River through Gichi-gakaabikaang (Niagra Falls), Manitoulin 
Island, Baawitigong (Sault Sainte Marie) until they reached the cool waters where the good 
berry, or manoomin, grew in abundance. Many of the Anishinaabeg continued beyond the final 
stopping place of the prophesied chibimoodaywin. They journeyed west, expanding into the 
woods and prairies.  
 As they moved west, the Anishinaabeg adapted their doodemag and governance system 
to meet the People’s needs. Decentralized governance and respect for individual autonomy 
meant that Anishinaabeg disliked both being told what to do and telling others how to behave in 
return, and expanding west allowed Anishinaabeg to pursue not only resources but also space to 
permit new ideas and new visions to take root. Warrior doodemag such as the makwa (bear) 
doodem led the People into new western lands where Ojibweg encountered Dakota, Cree, and 
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other Peoples. To the east, ogimaag generally came from the maang (loon) or ajijaak (crane) 
doodemag, but the warrior doodemag became the leaders of their People in the west.2 
Incorporating new inawemaagan in the Anishianabeg borderlands created new doodemag that 
filled leadership roles, such as the ogashkimanisii (kingfisher) doodem that began when an 
Anishinaabe family at Red Lake adopted a Dakota boy and his Dakota clan. Members of the 
kingfisher doodem led the way into the Turtle Mountains, where the ogashkimanisii remains 
well-represented.3 Anishinaabeg doodemag flexed as the Anishinaabeg expanded, allowing 
leadership and governance to adapt to changing circumstances.  
 In the 1920s and 1930s, leadership and governance continued to evolve as reserves and 
reservations imposed new constraints. The People faced the effects of devastating land loss, a 
damaged ecosystem, and heightened poverty while also maneuvering around Settler attempts to 
erase their existence as distinct Peoples. Anishinaabeg men and women on ishkoniganan 
throughout Anishinaabewaki took up the question of governance to defend their sovereignty, part 
of a broader conversation about Native governance in the United States and Canada. Settler 
governments considered elected, centralized councils and Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) 
constitutions as legitimate forms of government. However, Anishinaabeg Peoples, like other 
American Indians, continued to view leadership and governance through the lens of their 
peoplehood, where factors such as providing for the People, language, ceremonial and sacred 
knowledge, and relationships with both inawemaagan and meyaagizid remained essential 
                                                 
2 White Earth historian and Ojibwemowin speaker Anton Treuer locates this shift in leadership clans in the late 
eighteenth century. Anton Treuer, Warrior Nation: A History of the Red Lake Ojibwe (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
Society Press, 2015), 12-13.  
3 Treuer, Warrior Nation, 13. The young Dakota boy’s name was White Thunderbird, and the kingfisher doodem 
exists almost entirely on the western edges of Anishinaabewaki at Red Lake, Turtle Mountain, and Roseau River in 
Manitoba. Another example of a clan incorporated into Ojibwe doodemag through Dakota paternity is the ma’iingan 
or wolf clan, common at Lac Courte Oreilles. Treuer, Warrior Nation, 13; Bilban, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of 
the Ojibwe, 237.  
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criteria.4 A medal from a queen or president as a symbol of an alliance passed down from ogimaa 
to ogimaa could represent the relationships that made a leader of the People more legitimately 
than an election. A constitution could also serve as a pathway to governance, if it reflected the 
needs, networks, and knowledge of the People.  
 Anishinaabeg relied on the foundation of their peoplehood as they adapted governance 
and leadership to changing circumstances. In the 1920s and 1930s in Canada, federal officials 
increasingly interfered with Anishinaabeg control of their own People, which, coupled with the 
destructive effects of ethnic cleansing, led to a standoff between federal officials and Saulteaux 
ogimaag. In 1932, amidst the ongoing fight to revoke the fraudulent surrender agreement, 
Saulteaux lost the council election to Maškēkowak leaders. Ogimaa Naynahkawkanape, who 
served as elected chief since 1929, refused to transfer the symbolic medal of the chiefs to the 
newly-elected Maškēkowak chief. With broad Saulteaux support, Naynahkawkanape and other 
ogimaag challenged the elected council and the DIA’s authority. For the Turtle Mountain and 
Lac Courte Oreilles People, the 1930s brought a chance of greater autonomy through the Indian 
Reorganization Act, which both Peoples rejected in whole or in part in favor of alternative 
systems of organizing. In 1932, the same year as the contested St. Peter’s election, the Turtle 
Mountain Pepple voted to accept a written constitution that they hoped would both secure their 
sovereignty against Settler encroachment and advance a claim against the Ten Cent Treaty. 
Concerned about questions of land and leadership, the Turtle Mountain People rejected the IRA 
                                                 
4 As long as Anishinaabeg can remember, Anishinaabe governance occurred at a decentralized, community-based 
level. The People, both men and women, discussed and decided important issues at zagaswe’idiwinan, or council 
meetings. Zagaswe’idiwin also means “a smoking,” referring to sharing a smoke or passing a pipe. The word reveals 
the relationship between councils and ceremonies and suggests how zagaswe’idiwinan supported peoplehood. Other 
Indigenous Peoples relied on alternative criteria to legitimize leadership. Native Hawaiian leaders, for instance, trace 
their lineage to Kamehameha. Silva, Aloha Betrayed, 32-40, 91.  
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in 1935. The Lac Courte Oreilles People, meanwhile, voted to accept the IRA. Underlying the 
mixed response to the IRA was an ongoing debate about who possessed the authority to govern 
Lac Courte Oreilles land and resource and to exert Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty, an elected 
council or a general council of all the People led by hereditary ogimaag. Land rights, resource 
access, and sovereignty dominated discussions among all three Peoples, who persevered through 
Settler attempts to co-opt Indigenous power. Whether supported or hindered by Settler 
interference, Anishinaabeg continued to reconfigure governance in ways that promoted 
Anishinaabeg peoplehood.  
“We, the Indians of the Saulteaux and Ochipwa Tribes”: Peguis and St. Peter’s 
 When Angus Prince moved with his family to the new Peguis Reserve in 1909, the 
75,000 acre reserve was noopimiing or “in the bush.” There were no roads, no railroads, and the 
Fisher River crossed the reserve as “a small stream, about fifty feet wide, shallow, with a stony 
bed, scarcely of sufficient depth of water to float a canoe in the summer.”5 Woods, meadowland, 
and swamp comprised much of the reserve, and the land required clearing and draining before 
the new residents could plant gardens, let alone engage in the agriculture the architects of their 
removal envisioned.6 There were no houses and few opportunities for employment, and the 
closest store was at Fisher River, eight miles away. The trek to the nearest town, Gimli, took 
approximately five days each way.7 For Prince and his kin, their new reserve differed drastically 
from their former ishkonigan. Their homes near the Red River, a major economic thoroughfare, 
were a Saulteaux center of trade and political exchange on the northwestern edge of 
Anishinaabewaki. The Peguis Reserve was isolated.  
                                                 
5 Sessional Papers, 1910.  
6 Sessional Papers, 1910.  
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 Prince experienced the traumatic theft of his people’s ishkonigan as a young man in his 
twenties. He grew determined to use his education to fight for his People. The Saulteaux knew 
Angus Prince, the great-grandson of Peguis born in 1881, well. Prince’s family had long taken an 
active role as ogimaag for the Saulteaux. Educated in English, Angus Prince worked as a school 
teacher at St. Peter’s before the surrender. There were no schools at Peguis for the first two 
years, but he again taught when the schools eventually opened. The husband and father listed 
“labourer” as his occupation in the 1921 census, and he fished and trapped.8 Prince defended his 
People's sovereignty, which earned him a reputation as a troublemaker among DIA officials. 
Among the Saulteaux, the same reputation earned him respect as an ogimaa who used his skill 
with a pen to give voice to Saulteaux peoplehood.  
 The ethnic cleansing of the St. Peter’s People remained incomplete. Many families chose 
to remain on patented lands within the former ishkonigan. Others who like Prince had relocated 
to Peguis—some because they sold or lost their lands through taxes—simply incorporated the 
new reserve into seasonal movements, returning to camp at St. Peter’s for several months every 
year and trapping muskrats, picking berries, cutting hay, and visiting relatives. The surrender 
agreement set aside approximately 3,000 acres of hay land near Netley Creek, where the marsh 
contained abundant muskrats and plenty of easy food for livestock.9 In 1912, Chief Inspector of 
Indian Agencies Glenn Campbell reported that “a great percentage of the Indians are still living 
                                                 
8 Library and Archives Canada. Sixth Census of Canada, 1921. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Library and Archives 
Canada, 2013. Series RG31. Statistics Canada Fonds; Angus Prince, “Manitoba Elders,” edited by Vi Chalmers, 
Mary-Rose Olson, and Moses Bigness, Manitoba Indian Cultural Education Center, 1981.  
9 Surrender Agreement; Manitoba Clean Environment Commission, “Transcript of the Proceedings Held at Fort 
Garry Hotel, Winnipeg, MB, Thursday, March 19, 2015,” Lake Winnipeg Regulatory Review under the Water 
Power Act, vol. 7, http://www.cecmanitoba.ca, accessed Oct. 14, 2015.  
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there” at St. Peter’s.10 At least seven hundred of the St. Peter’s people continued to live within 
the former ishkonigan in 1912.11 
 On the new reserve, old tensions reemerged to threaten Saulteaux Peoplehood. The fight 
against the coerced surrender temporarily minimized the competing claims within the reserve, as 
Maškēkowak leader William Asham and Saulteaux ogimaa William Prince worked toward a 
clear and common goal. The aftermath of the removal, which remained incomplete, exacerbated 
the conflicting claims to sovereignty on the new Peguis Reserve. The Maškēkowak outnumbered 
the Saulteaux who moved north, and the balance of power shifted toward the Maškēkowak.12 By 
1911, the Maškēkowak dominated the council. Although forty-year-old elected chief Albert Rose 
identified as Saulteaux, all four councillours—Miles Cochrane, Isaac Asham, John James Flett, 
and Jacob Thomas, were Maškēkowak.13 
 A flurry of petitions in 1912 and 1913 demonstrates Saulteaux concerns about how the 
shifting demographics threatened their peoplehood. Angus Prince’s kin, elder John Henry Prince, 
led a campaign for an alternate ishkonigan at Sandy River.14 The petition charged that the 
inconveniently-located reserve near the Fisher River precluded “any means of making a 
                                                 
10 Glenn Campbell to the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs, Mar. 19, 1912, "Correspondence Regarding 
the Leasing of Grazing Land on St. Peter's Reserve," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, 
Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
11 Glenn Campbell to the Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs, Apr. 15, 1912; “Indians of the Old St. 
Peter’s Reserve who still have their home on the reserve,” 1917, "Correspondence Regarding the Leasing of Grazing 
Land on St. Peter's Reserve," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
12 J. Lavender to Secretary Department of Indian Affairs, Apr. 4,1932, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of 
Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
13 Library and Archives Canada. Sixth Census of Canada, 1921. Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Library and Archives 
Canada, 2013. Series RG31. Statistics Canada Fonds. 
14 John Henry Prince, et al, to J.D. McClean, May 7, 1912, “Clandeboye Agency, Correspondence Regarding the 
Removal of St. Peter's Indians to a new Reserve at Sandy River,” RG 10, vol. 4064, file 407, 730, Library and 
Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
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livelihood.”15 The Maškēkowak-dominated elected council, referring to themselves as 
representatives of the Peguis Band for perhaps the first time, wrote to disavow the Saulteaux 
request. They insisted that the Peguis Reserve was “amply sufficient.”16 The Saulteaux petition 
suggests an underlying divide. Prince wrote that he was “accustimed [sic] in fish business,” and 
suggested his “unfitness to work as a farmer.”17 He saw the Maškēkowak council as supporting 
DIA-backed peasant farming initiatives that confined Indigenous Peoples within reserve 
boundaries and marginalized Indigenous labor within the Settler economy, and the location of 
the reserve near the Fisher River and far from St. Peter’s central location may have emphasized 
how ethnic cleansing marginalized the Saulteaux in their own homeland—especially when the 
DIA supported the Maškēkowak over the Saulteaux.18 
 The Canadian Indian Affairs system revolved around two primary goals: to assimilate 
and to control the First Nations population. DIA policy in the 1920s and 1930s, for instance, 
promoted enfranchisement, designed ultimately to erase Indian as a distinct legal status.19 From a 
DIA perspective, band councils fit into these policy goals. Settler officials hoped that weak, 
Settler-dominated councils would replace Indigenous systems of government and provide 
                                                 
15 John Henry Prince to D. Hoche, Apr. 2, 1913, Correspondence Regarding the Removal of St. Peter's Indians to a 
new Reserve at Sandy River,” RG 10, vol. 4064, file 407, 730, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
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support for Department decisions.20 The Indian Act provided the mechanisms for the Settler 
government to undermine Indigenous Peoples’ traditional government. Section 62 read,  
The Governor in Council may order that the chiefs of any band of Indians shall be 
elected, as hereinbefore provided, at such time and place, as the Superintendent-
General may direct, and they shall in such case be elected for a period of three 
years, unless deposed by the Governor for dishonesty, intemperance, immorality, or 
incompetency.21 
 
Section 62 endowed the Governor with the power to create electoral, centralized councils that 
Settler officials then embodied with the ability to give “any ordinary consent” on behalf of their 
People, regardless of whether or not the People in question wanted a band council.22 The Indian 
Act also outlined a limited range of purposes for which councils could create rules and 
regulations—subject, of course, “to confirmation by the Governor in Council.”23 The Indian Act 
limited councils’ purview to topics such as promoting public health, controlling livestock, 
policing intoxication, building and maintaining roads and schools, and assigning reserve lands. 
Funds, natural resources, and the land itself all fell outside of the council’s authority, according 
to the DIA.24 Moreover, a 1914 amendment to the Indian Act asserted, “In the event of any 
conflict between any regulation made by the Superintendent General and any rule or regulation 
made by any band, the regulations made by the Superintendent General shall prevail.”25 The 
                                                 
20 In 1924, for instance, the Canadian government disbanded the Council of Chiefs of the Six Nations at Grand 
River. This marked essentially the last time the Canadian government worked with a so-called traditional Indigenous 
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273.  
21 Indian Act.  
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1914 amendment envisioned a narrow, subordinate role for band councils that undermined 
Indigenous Peoples’ ability to govern. Canadian policy aimed to stifle sovereignty in favor of 
Settler control. 
 Within these constraints, however, the Saulteaux People of St. Peter’s, like many other 
First Nations in Canada, used their band councils to promote sovereignty and maintain 
Indigenous systems of governance.26 According to DIA officials, the St. Peter’s People were the 
only People in Manitoba with an officially recognized three-year elective system.27 The St. 
Peter’s, now Peguis, chiefs and councillors had somehow avoided the requirement to obtain 
approval from the Governor in Council. Their council existed on their own authority, which the 
DIA recognized in practice since the 1880s, and as they fought to protect their peoplehood 
through the ongoing process of ethnic cleansing in the early twentieth century, Saulteaux 
ogimaag conflicted with the DIA.  
 The agents in the Fisher River district honored the DIA’s goals of assimilation and 
control. They wielded their power over the chief and councillors, first by delaying the triennial 
elections until 1912 and then in 1914 by intervening to remove newly elected councillor, Angus 
Prince.28 Prince, elected in 1912, attracted DIA ire by respecting his People’s customary system 
of governance, which derived from decentralized, consensus-driven popular participation. As 
                                                 
26 In A Fatherly Lie, Brownlie,acknowledges that Anishinaabe chiefs and councils at Manitoulin Island resisted and 
occasionally triumphed over Settler officials, especially given their unshakeable knowledge of their treaties. He 
asserts, however, that Indian agents “largely destroyed Indigenous leadership systems.” Brownlie, A Fatherly Lie, 
57-69. Kiera L. Ladner, meanwhile, argues that traditional Indigenous governments and constitutional orders persist 
and, indeed, “continue to be a driving force in many communities,” sometimes complementing or checking elected 
band councils and other times coming together in a sort of hybrid system. Kiera L. Ladner, “Indigenous 
Governance: Questioning the Status and the Possibilities for Reconciliation with Canada’s Commitment to 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (Vancouver: National Centre for First Nations Governance, 2006), no page.  
27 J.D. McLean to T.H. Carter, Oct. 5, 1916, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
28 Semmens to Laird, 20 Dec 1907, Clandeboye Agency, Correspondence Regarding the Surrender of Part of St. 
Peter’s Reserve, National Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
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more families moved north to the new ishkonigan, the Tribal Council distributed land assignment 
tickets, locating each family on its own parcel of tribally-held land. Prince believed that the 
People, not merely the council, should have a say in assigning land.29 For his refusal to 
participate in issuing location tickets, Agent T.H. Carter branded him “a nuisance on the 
Council.”30 Seeking to provide cause to depose Prince under the Indian Act, Carter wrote to his 
superiors, “Mr. Prince does not appear to have any regard for law and order, stating that the 
Peguis reserve belongs to him and that he does not care for the Indian Act.”31 Carter did not 
bother to record Prince’s exact words, leaving only the agent’s perspective. Prince, however, 
likely opposed the Indian Act. Elsewhere, he stated that the Indian Act “conflicts with the 
stipulations of our Treaty.”32 For Prince, the 1871 treaty superseded any law passed by the 
Canadian government, especially a law imposed without the consent of his People. He respected 
both law and order—the law established by Treaty 1, and the order inherent to Saulteaux systems 
of governance.  
 Carter succeeded in deposing Prince. On January 14, 1915, slightly more than halfway 
through Prince’s three year term, the Privy Council and Governor General removed Prince for 
“incompetency” under Section 96 of the Indian Act.33 Prince wrote to Secretary of Indian Affairs 
J.D. McLean to protest, refusing to recognize DIA protocol that required all correspondence to 
                                                 
29 Angus Prince to J.D. McLean, Feb. 4, 1915, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, 
Fisher River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
30 T.H. Carter to J.D. McLean, Nov. 27, 1914, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, 
Fisher River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
31 T.H. Carter to J.D. McLean, Nov. 27, 1914, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, 
Fisher River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
32 Angus Prince, “Salteaux Indians and the St. Peter’s Reserve,” 24 Sept. no year, CDIA – St. Peter’s Indian 
Reserve, Archives of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB.  
33 Certified Copy of a Report of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Royal Highness the Governor 
General on the 14th January, 1915, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher River 
Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
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filter through local agents.34 Prince claimed that most of the council, as well as the People, 
supported his stance. “It was customary aforetime since Treaty was made that anything important 
was to be brought forward to the band for consideration and come at a final decision as to what 
step the majority of the band should take upon such matter or question of deliberation offered 
towards the benefit of the people,” he wrote.35 As ogimaa, the voices of his People constrained 
Prince’s actions. His support of Saulteaux sovereignty cost him his position on the council. 
However, his actions earned him the respect of other Saulteaux ogimaag such as Alex Greyeyes 
or Nayanakawkanape and William Pahkoo, with whom he worked to protect Saulteaux 
peoplehood from both Settler and Maškēkowak encroachment. 
 Deposing Prince failed to dislodge his professed vision of Saulteaux peoplehood. The St. 
Peter’s People remained determined to fight the so-called surrender that robbed them of their 
ishkonigan.36 In 1917, the Saulteuax reclaimed reserve leadership when the People elected 
William Pahkoo. Pahkoo, approximately 80 years old, renewed the effort to reverse the St. 
Peter’s ethnic cleansing. Decisions started at the level of the council. On January 20, the St. 
Peter’s People met on the reserve “for the purpose of discussing the St Peter’s surrender 
                                                 
34 The Secretary ignored or returned letters that bypassed the local agents. This practice became not only established 
protocol but official policy in 1933. Brownlie, A Fatherly Lie, 37.  
35 Angus Prince to J.D. McLean, Feb. 4, 1915, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, 
Fisher River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
36 In 1912, they had won a legal victory against their ethnic cleansing, when the Royal Commission voided the 
surrender agreement. However, as happened to the Cherokee in the United States during the 1830s, Settler officials 
ignored the legal obstacles to their goals. In 1916, Parliament passed the St. Peter’s Reserve Act, which overrode 
The Royal Commission. The act “confirmed and made good” Settlers’ title to the lands they had purchased from 
Saulteaux and Maškēkowak individual following the fraudulent agreement in 1907 but before June 1915.For any 
lands obtained after June 1915, the act attached a one dollar per acre lien, plus five percent interest from June 1 of 
that year. The additional dollar per acre presumably sought to address the ninety dollar claim that St. Peter’s ogimaa 
continued to press from Peguis. To avoid the issue of the St. Peter’s People’s lack of consent to the surrender 
agreement, Parliament simply enacted the ethnic cleansing without any agreement or input from the St. Peter’s 
People. Their willingness to act unilaterally and despite the Royal Commission’s findings emphasizes how little 
Indigenous sovereignty meant to Settlers. St. Peter's Reserve Act, S.C. 1916, c.24. 
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question, application of game laws to Indians and school affairs in Indian reserves.”37 T.H. 
Carter, the agent at Fisher River who did not attend the meeting but spoke with councillor 
William Asham afterward, noted “great hostility toward the Department and great indignation 
against the application of game laws.”38 At the request of the council, Asham took the People’s 
concerns to Carter and demanded that he write a petition directly to the king, for they refused to 
recognize the intermediary authority of the DIA and preferred to work with the authorities with 
whom they had negotiated their treaty. According to Carter, the St. Peter’s People “were 
determined to get justice that they had tried to get through the Department.”39 Carter agreed to 
write down their grievances, but he addressed the petition to the Governor General, 
demonstrating differing views of Saulteaux-Settler relations.40  
 Under Pahkoo’s leadership, the St. Peter’s People continued to challenge their ethnic 
cleansing. In January of 1920, Pahkoo initiated a resolution to ask the Department once again to 
investigate the land sales.41 In November of 1922, the People in council resolved “to draw the 
attention of the Hon. Minister to the fact that the conditions under which the St. Peters [sic] 
Reserve was surrendered have not been fulfilled.”42 In April 1924, seventeen years after the 
surrender, they wrote to remind the DIA that the Department should have returned land with 
                                                 
37 January 28, 1919 to the Assistant Deputy and Secretary from T. H. Carter, C-8079, Land Sales Indian Affairs 
Headquarters Files, Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
38 William Pahkoo, et al, to His Royal Highness Victor Christian William, Counsellor, Duke of Devonshire and 
Governor General of the Dominion of Canada, Jan. 27, 1919, C-8079, Land Sales Indian Affairs Headquarters Files, 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
39 William Pahkoo, et al, to His Royal Highness Victor Christian William, Counsellor, Duke of Devonshire and 
Governor General of the Dominion of Canada, Jan. 27, 1919, C-8079, Land Sales Indian Affairs Headquarters Files, 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
40 William Pahkoo, et al, to His Royal Highness Victor Christian William, Counsellor, Duke of Devonshire and 
Governor General of the Dominion of Canada, Jan. 27, 1919, C-8079, Land Sales Indian Affairs Headquarters Files, 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
41 “Minutes of Peguis Council Meeting, January 24th, 1920,” Jan. 24, 1920, C-8079, Land Sales Indian Affairs 
Headquarters Files, Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
42 Chief William Pahko to Sir, Nov. 13, 1919, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, 
Fisher River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
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unpaid liens to the People, for any “buyer refusing to do this the deal was to be cancelled.”43 
Rather than failure, each renewed petition and resolution demonstrated the continued resolve of 
the St. Peter’s People and their unbroken peoplehood.  
 The 1929 election again raised the question of leadership and sovereignty on the 
ishkonigan. Former chief William Prince and rising ogimaa Naynahkawkanape both ran in the 
election against Maškēkowak candidate Rudolph Asham. The potential leaders spoke to a 
general council before the vote in April. Asham spoke about “progress”—a word beloved by 
DIA officials—and Prince made general promises, according to Maškēkowak observers, To “do 
his best for the betterment of the band.”44 Naynakawkonape, however, articulated a specific, 
incendiary platform: recovering their lost ishkonigan and the rights preserved in their treaty. 
Speaking with the force of Treaty One, he reminded his People “that a promise was made years 
ago” at the Stone Fort, and he pledged to hold the Settler government to their word.45 The 
Saulteaux responded to his call for sovereignty and to protect their homeland. Naynahkawkanape 
won the election by a slim margin of two votes.46  
 This time, the Maškēkowak contested the election. Several Maškēkowak wrote to the 
Minister of the Interior to protest that Naynahkawkanape’s “qualities are so limited that we truly 
believe that he is entirely devoid of being competent to be a leader of this band,” referring to the 
                                                 
43 To the Honorable Minister of the Interior, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs from Chief John Thomas 
Stevenson and Councillors William Asham, Thomas Whitenail, Thomas Greyeyes and George Hudson Apr. 7 1924, 
C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives 
Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
44 George Stevenson, Philip Stevenson, Morgan Thomas, GA Stevenson, GA Cook, and William Thomas to the 
Minister of the Interior, April 10, 1929, C-133150, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
45 George Stevenson, Philip Stevenson, Morgan Thomas, GA Stevenson, GA Cook, and William Thomas to the 
Minister of the Interior, April 10, 1929, C-133150, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
46 George Stevenson, Philip Stevenson, Morgan Thomas, GA Stevenson, GA Cook, and William Thomas to the 
Minister of the Interior, April 10, 1929, C-133150, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
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language in the Indian Act that would allow the DIA to remove an elected leader.47 Their 
specific charges likewise spoke to DIA assimilative goals. Naynahkawkanape did not farm. 
Instead, he “wanders off every summer.”48 Naynahkawkanape remained enmeshed in seasonal 
movements, traveling throughout his homeland to hunt, fish, and trap. Moreover, he spoke only 
Anishinaabemowin. Nayanakawkanape lived fully engaged in Saulteaux peoplehood, which 
made him a dangerous leader from a DIA perspective and a strong ogimaa in the view of his 
People. Although the DIA delayed approving the new council, by May the Department approved 
Naynahkawkanape and his fellow councillors, a mix of Maškēkowak and Saulteaux: Thomas 
Daniels, Colin Wilson, Miles Cochrane, Sr., and Robert Sinclair.49  
 Naynahkawkanape wasted no time in working to ensure Saulteaux governance for the 
future. During his three-year term as elected chief, he worked to bolster Saulteaux sovereignty, 
as promised. He pressed the DIA about the one dollar per acre liens that remained unpaid on 
most of the St. Peter’s land sales.50 In 1930, he oversaw a petition to T.G. Murphy, 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, in which the Saulteaux tried to resolve the problem of authority 
caused by frequent elections. The petition called for an end to the elected council “as this 
arrangement was never inserted in the agreement of our treaty.”51 If they could not prevent 
Maškēkowak from dominating the council, disbanding it seemed the safest strategy. To ensure 
                                                 
47 George Stevenson, Philip Stevenson, Morgan Thomas, GA Stevenson, GA Cook, and William Thomas to the 
Minister of the Interior, April 10, 1929, C-133150, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
48 George Stevenson, Philip Stevenson, Morgan Thomas, GA Stevenson, GA Cook, and William Thomas to the 
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Saulteaux governance for the future, Naynahkawkanape hired an attorney, W.A. Kenzie of 
Winnipeg, to investigate “the question of the voting powers of the half-breed and Swampies on 
the Peguis Reserve.”52 In 1932, as the next election approached, Naynahkawkanape argued 
through Kenzie that only “full blooded Indians” possessed voting rights under the treaty.53 In a 
letter to Lavender, who oversaw the election, Kenzie distinguished between “full blooded 
Indians” and “half-breeds,” which might not seem to include the Maškēkowak.54 
Naynahkawkanape, however, lumped the Maškēkowak with the mixed-descent people of 
questionable kinship and social ties. Like previous generations of ogimaag, when 
Naynahkawkanape said “Indian,” he meant Anishinaabeg. In seeking to prevent the 
Maškēkowak from voting in the upcoming election, Naynahkawkanape believed he was 
protecting his People’s sovereignty from encroaching meyaagizid.55 
 The DIA dismissed Naynahkawkanape’s appeal.56 Canadian policies erased the outlines 
of peoplehood under generic bureaucratic definitions of Indianness. Naynahkawkanape, 
supported by Angus Prince and many other Saulteaux, prepared to face off with DIA officials be 
refusing to participate in a system that undermined Saulteaux sovereignty. When Lavender made 
it clear that the election would continue, Naynahkawkanape tried a new strategy to assert his 
People’s sovereignty. Recruiting Angus Prince as a spokesman, he and Councillor Colin Wilson 
                                                 
52 W.A. Kenzie to Lavender, Jan. 7, 1932, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
53 W.A. Kenzie to Lavender, Jan. 7, 1932, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and Councillors, Fisher 
River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
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River Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON. 
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refused to acknowledge the DIA’s authority by absenting themselves from the meeting where the 
election would be announced, undoubtedly hoping by their absence to prevent the council from 
scheduling the vote.57 Cochrane, Daniels, and Sinclair, however, passed a resolution asking to 
hold the election on March 15, earlier than the usual April date.58 The election occurred as chief-
less council resolved, and Robert Sinclair won the position of chief. For councillors, the voters 
elected Thomas Daniels, Joe Thomas, Miles Cochrane, and lone Saulteaux William Prince, Jr.59 
The Saulteaux had lost control of their reserve, but they prepared to fight back.  
 Independent Maškēkowak governance threatened Saulteaux sovereignty as much as the 
DIA. According to Naynahkawkanape and his supporters, the 1932 election “consisted only of a 
part of the Peguis band of Indians, and those that did not have any voice in the treaty made with 
the Saulteaux Indians.”60 Angus Prince identified a threat to the Saulteaux treaty. He described 
the Maškēkowak as “ignorant of our agreement,” reminding both Settler officials and the 
Maškēkowak that the Maškēkowak took no part in negotiating the Stone Fort Treaty in 1871.61 
In their ignorancee or perhaps because of the lack of sufficient relationships tying them to 
Saulteaux peoplehood, the Maškēkowak became, according to Prince, “instruments" that the 
federal government used "in breaking up our treaty agreement." It seemed to the Saulteaux that 
the officials favored the Maškēkowak “while the Saulteaux were always deprived of their rights, 
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and robbed of everything else which was granted” by the treaty.62 Naynahkawkanape worried 
that the Saulteaux’s very existence as a distinct People was at stake, for the Maškēkowak 
entertained, he believed, the “foolish idea of hating to be called Indians.”63 The ogimaag 
clarified, “We herein certify we do not mean all the Swampies and halfbreeds. There is some of 
this class who have some commonsense, perfectly satisfied to share with the Saulteaux Indians in 
their treaty right.”64 Naynahkawkanape and Prince emphasized behavior and individual 
Maškēkowak and mixed-descent men and women’s position within relational networks that 
determined access to the rights inherent in Saulteuax Peoplehood as protected by the treaty, 
including in 1932 the right to govern the People.  
 Protests had followed previous power turnovers—letter-writing campaigns, petitions, 
speeches. This time—amidst the worsening economic conditions of the Great Depression and 
increasingly intrusive DIA policies regarding land, governance, and social practices—
Naynahkawkanape refused to transfer authority to the newly elected chief and council. With 
Angus Prince and his pen poised to give voice to Saulteaux arguments in favor of their 
peoplehood, Nanahkawkanape planned to withhold the medals and the flag that passed from 
chief to chief as a symbol of their right to govern the People.  
 Shortly after the election, Lavender arrived at Naynahkawkanape’s house to collect the 
flag and medals that passed from chief to chief since an aging Chief Peguis bequeathed them to 
his son and successor as ogimaa, Miskookinew or Henry Prince. One medal Peguis had received 
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from Lord Selkirk in 1817 when they agreed upon the Selkirk Treaty. The second medal and flag 
were gifts from Queen Victoria. In his will, Peguis made the connection between the medals and 
the symbolic relationships that signified his role as ogimaa. He wrote, “I hereby by these 
presents, make a Will bequeathing all my Indian Chief-ship to my beloved son Henry Prince or 
(Mis-koo Kinew) [sic] and everything connected with it. All the Medals and all the signs which 
distinguished me as a Chief of the Swampy and Saultreaux [sic] tribes.”65 The medals 
represented his authority to lead; they embodied Saulteaux sovereignty. Peguis’s will likewise 
situated this authority within his Saulteaux relational networks, ending with his hope that the 
medals along with the role as ogimaa would be “handed down through many generations of my 
family.”66 From Naynahkawkanape’s perspective half a century later, the Maškēkowak had 
become meyaagizid, and they therefore existed outside of Peguis’s family, the Saulteaux People. 
 At ten o’clock one evening shortly after the irregular election, Lavender knocked on 
Naynahkawkanape’s door.67 He demanded that Naynahkawkanape hand over the medals and 
flag, but Naynahkawkanape refused. He resisted on behalf of his People, the Saulteaux, who had 
told him to protect the items no matter what.68 Lavender left empty-handed, and he had to 
arrange a meeting with Naynahkawkanape and the other Saulteaux ogimaag, including Angus 
Prince, whom DIA officials described as having “enough education to be dangerous.”69 At the 
meeting in early April, Lavender insisted the Saulteaux relinquish the flag and medals. 
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According to Lavender, “Their contention was that the treaty was made with the Saultaux 
Indians and that none other than a Saulteaux was entitled to be a chief of the band.”70 The current 
stand-off regarding governance centered on the Maškēkowak People’s lack of authority over 
Saulteaux people and resources, but the ogimaag also challenged the Settler policies that granted 
rights to the Maškēkowak that these neighbors could not claim through relationships. Prince and 
Naynahkawkanape rejected any power Lavender claimed through the Indian Act, which they 
termed an “illegal act” while calling the DIA “an illegal body”—illegal because they violated 
Saulteaux sovereignty.71 
 The flag and medals embodied the alliance and its undergirding relationship between the 
Saulteaux and the Crown that comprised Treaty One, and Naynahkawkanape refused to 
relinquish them to Lavender. Handing over the medal was tantamount to passing off his People’s 
sovereignty. Angus Prince, writing for his People in a newspaper editorial to protest the power 
grab, clarified the medals’ symbolic significance. “The chief’s medal belongs to the Saulteaux 
Indians,” he wrote, purposefully omitting the Maškēkowak. He went on to link the medals to 
“our treaty wherein the engraving shows white men standing together with the Indians, shaking 
hands and pledging friendship.”72 Prince believed that Settler officials understood the 
relationship between medal, treaty, and Saulteaux sovereignty. He described the events that 
followed Naynahkawkanape’s initial dissent as a deliberate effort on the part of the DIA to 
destroy those relationships. After the ogimaa refused, Lavender called in the Royal Canadian 
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Mounted Police to search Naynahkawkanape’s house and threaten arrest in order to possess the 
medal because “if they had gotten the medal, our treaty would have been entirely abolished at 
once.”73 The relationships that created Treaty 1 did not exist outside Saulteaux governance, 
which had formed the treaty decades earlier. Removing the medal from Saulteaux ogimaa 
unraveled the treaty, and along with it the sovereignty the Saulteaux had worked so hard to 
preserve.  
 Amidst the controversy, Naynahkawkanape traveled to St. Peter’s as he did every spring, 
presumably to trap muskrat in the marshes of his homeland.74 Backed by the DIA in Ottawa, 
Lavender called in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. RCMP officer Mr. Grieves of Hodgson 
searched Naynahkawkanape’s home on the Peguis Reserve while the ogimaa was at his former 
ishkonigan, and Grieves confiscated the flag, which Naynahkawkanape had left in his house. 
Naynahkawkanape, however, had entrusted the medals to his fellow Saulteaux, and the items 
were not there for Grieves to find. Naynahkawkanape appears to have returned to Peguis by early 
May, more than a month after the disputed election, with the medals still eluding capture by the 
DIA. Grieves searched his house again, and Naynahkawkanape watched angrily—Grieves 
described him as“hostile”—as the unwelcome Grieves invaded his home to search.75 The officer 
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found no sign of the medals, which were where Naynahkawkanape had left them with the 
Saulteaux on the north end of the reserve.76  
 Settler officials desperately needed to quell the bold assertion of peoplehood. Grieves 
found nothing with which to charge Naynahkawkpane in the Indian Act, but Lavender wanted 
the ogimaa arrested, for he “create[d] ridicule of the officers of both the Indian Department and 
the Police.”77 In a clever act of Settler colonial displacement, the DIA claimed that the items “are 
the property of the Department,” erasing the Saulteaux and their sovereign right to govern their 
own people. Framing Naynahkawkanape’s refusal to give up the medals given to his ancestors as 
theft of DIA property allowed the RCMP to charge Naynahkawkanape with “theft by a person 
required to account” under Section 355 of the Criminal Code.78  
 Saulteaux sovereignty threatened the DIA and the Canadian Settler colonialism the 
Department represented. Inspector A.G. Hamilton cautioned the Secretary against “drastic 
action.”79 He worried, “there is a possibility that we might not obtain a conviction, and if we did 
we might even then not be able to obtain the medals,” for Hamilton recognized that 
Naynahkawkanape would willingly go to jail rather than surrender these symbols of his People’s 
sovereignty.80 If the DIA failed to obtain the medals, they risked not only embarrassment but a 
more profound challenge to the system that maintained Settler colonial hegemony. Although 
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Hamilton wrote that “Greyeyes is not deserving of any consideration,” he knew that if the 
ogimaa possessed the medals, that “fact would be sufficient for the Indians to feel that they had 
gained a victory in being able to deprive the new Chief and Department of the medals.”81 Indeed, 
Naynahkawkanape’s continued control of the medals marked a victory for the St. Peter’s People 
amidst attacks on their autonomy and system of governance. 
 From a Saulteaux perspective, governance belonged to the interest of the People as a 
whole. In June, Lavender tried again to convince Naynahkawkanape to surrender the medals. 
Naynahkawkanape, for at least the third time, refused.82 He repeated that he did not possess the 
medals, “and that if it was necessary to arrest anyone for holding the property it would be 
necessary to arrest the band,” for they all claimed the medals.83 Naynahkawkanape, Prince, and 
their fellow Saulteaux could not undo the election that transferred power to the Maškēkowak and 
threatened their peoplehood, but by continuing to act as leaders and define the scope of 
Saulteaux governance, they protected their peoplehood.  
“We have got to have a change”: Turtle Mountain  
 Kanick, thirty years old when he signed the McCumber Agreement in 1892, lived on the 
mashkode. The ishkonigan boundaries had tightened around him during the previous decades as 
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the federal government chipped away at the Turtle Mountain People’s aki, and the McCumber 
Agreement transformed his mashkode home into a 160-acre allotment. He and his wife 
Shewanepeneskik, both of whom spoke primarily Anishinaabemowin or Michif and could 
neither read nor write, shared a paper-roofed log house with children and grandchildren. 
Shewanepeneskik’s share of the ishkonigan had been “sold through the government,” but she and 
Kanick grew potatoes, carrots, rutabagas, onions, beans, and other vegetables in a two-acre 
garden on Kanick’s allotment.84 
 Kanick served as ogimaa for the Turtle Mountain People for most of his adult life. As 
early as 1908, he served as a council member, along with Kakenowash (who headed the 
Committee of Thirty-Two), Kaishpa Gourneau (novelist Louise Erdrich’s broad-shouldered and 
goateed ancestor who became a prominent leader in Little Shell III’s absence in Montana during 
the 1870s and 1880s), and nine other men from various families.85 In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, Kanick also served his community as a police officer, incorporating the paid 
work into his seasonal round. As a police officer, Kanick’s responsibilities included distributing 
rations to those too old or infirm to collect them from the agency.86  
Kanick’s work put him in a unique position to observe his People’s impoverished 
circumstances. By 1908, the federal government had delayed payments for the McCumber 
Agreement and several years of growing seasons shorted by rain and cold springs made food and 
cash scarce.87 Shortly after the new year in 1908, Kanick and the other council members wrote to 
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North Dakota Senator Henry Clay Hansbrough, “The crop failure of 1907, and the prevailing 
sickness amongst our tribe, this winter has placed many in destitute circumstances.”88 By the 
1920s, overcrowding strained limited ishkonigan resources, and a five year drought in the early 
1930s depleted lakes and reduced crops.89 Kanick’s past experiences with deadly winters, as well 
as his direct contact with those most in need, undoubtedly informed his sense of urgency as 
Kanick and his fellow council members tried to force federal officials to honor their obligations.  
 The centripedal effects of confinement on an ever-smaller sliver of their homeland and 
the centrifugal forces of allotment pulled at the relational web that comprised Turtle Mountain 
peoplehood. Territorial and jurisdictional boundaries cut through relationships with land, kin, 
ceremonial cycles, sacred stories, and language. Previously, the Turtle Mountain People 
incorporated distant mashkoden into Anishinaabewaki, relied on what land they had to support 
inawemaagan, and used their labor to reaffirm threatened relationships. In the 1920s and 1930s, 
even while carrying out the terms of the Ten-Cent Treaty—reviewing enrollment requests and 
administering allotments—Kanick and other Turtle Mountain ogimaag used their leadership to 
protect their peoplehood. The ogimaag recognized the persistent threat from intrusive federal 
policies that impeded local control.  
 The 1932 constitution grew out of an unbroken history of Ojibweg leadership.90 By 1908, 
Kanick had become the council’s “chief and chairman.” Continuously rebuffed by Farmer in 
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Charge William Schwab, the council sought to circumscribe Schwab and other local officials by 
proving its legitimacy to the federal government. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, councils throughout Indian Country faced inconsistent, opportunistic federal policies 
that sometimes denied and often manipulated their existence to further Settler goals of expansion 
and erasure.91 The Turtle Mountain ogimaag gave agency officials plenty of “evidence of a 
desire to designate policies of administration.”92 On the one hand, the council’s efforts stalled 
again and again. On the other hand, they succeeded in preserving leadership to advocate for their 
People’s sovereignty.  
 The council devoted much of its attention to pursuing a claim against the federal 
government for the Ten-Cent Treaty debacle. Ogimaag and other individuals waged a continuous 
letter-writing campaign seeking a jurisdictional bill in Congress, the first step in suing the Settler 
government protected by sovereign immunity.93 In the 1920s, several lawyers received 
permission from the Department of Indian Affairs to visit reservation ogimaag and discuss 
claims, but several jurisdictional bills died in Congress.94 In 1924, the year of the Indian 
Citizenship Act, Turtle Mountain Anishinaabeg, from the reservation to Montana, held a series 
of meetings to organize a coherent, unified claim and to send a delegation to Washington, D.C., 
                                                                                                                                                             
officials and the land cession agreement that broke up their homeland—all questions at the heart of Turtle Mountain 
sovereignty. Richotte, “Telling All of Our Stories: Reorienting the Legal and Political Events of the Anishinaabeg,” 
Centering Anishinaabeg Studies, 379-396. 
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93 See Harvey D. Rosenthal, Their Day in Court: A History of the Indian Claims Commission for the historical 
developments of the Court of Claims. Since 1863, when Congress amended the Court of Claim’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity to exclude Native Peoples from using the court, Indigenous suits required special, individual 
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to present it directly to federal officials.95 Superintendent McQuigg and Department of Interior 
officials in Washington refused to fund the trip, but Kanick and his fellow ogimaag did not 
abandon the claim.  
 The claim was about peoplehood.96 In order to protect their land base, Turtle Mountain 
People needed money. Filing fees, taxes, and legal expenses generally exceeded cash incomes, 
both on an individual and tribal level. By the 1920s, the Turtle Mountain People had already seen 
the effects of this shortage on their homelands. Meyaagizid pocked the prairies and hills created 
for the People, opening room for competing jurisdictions and exploitative agriculture, logging, 
and mining. If pursuing a claim against the federal government could not restore their original 
homeland, it could at least provide the financial resources to hold on to what remained. As the 
effort to start the claim demonstrated, they needed money to circumvent local officials—
although there was always the problem of accessing money held by the Department, and that 
raised questions of governance. Moreover, most discussions of the claim included undoing 
Voight v. Bruce, a Department of Interior administrative decision from 1916. Voight v. Bruce 
revoked allotments from children born after 1904, when Congress ratified the McCumber 
Agreement. The procedural ruling deprived 859 children of their right to an allotment. By 
pursuing a claim, the men and women of Turtle Mountain hoped that their children would have 
access to the aki and resources that were their birthright as one of the Turtle Mountain People.  
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 In 1926, Turtle Mountain ogimaag faced renewed challenge to their sovereignty from 
new superintendent James H. Hyde, who immediately clashed with ogimaag and the community 
more broadly. The list of accusations against him included forcing the sick to work for aid, 
withholding individual money accounts, limiting his office hours to one day per week, 
threatening “agitators” with a gun, and knowingly distributing spoiled pork in rations. When 
confronted with the rancid pork, Hyde replied, “It would undoubtedly save some criticism if we 
were to burn what remains of this pork and refrain from issuing it at all, but because use can be 
made of it I dislike to do so.”97 Whereas Anishinaabeg had long understood rations in the context 
of reciprocal alliance relationships, made even more essential for the Turtle Mountain People 
given the opportunistic Ten-Cent Treaty, Hyde viewed the long list of ration-seekers—only 
growing longer as the Great Depression deepened—as beggars who should be happy with 
whatever aid they received. His authoritarian, paternalistic attitude drew the council’s ire.98 
 By the end of the summer in 1931, Turtle Mountain ogimaag lost their patience. On 
September 10, the council compiled a nine-point list of priorities that fell into three main themes: 
controlling the land, accessing resources, and recognizing their autonomy as a people. While the 
claim remained an important goal for the council, their proposal sought to restore and protect 
their relationship with the aki through more direct reservation-based measures. “We also want 
the right to fish on the Little Fish Lake, situated on the Turtle Mountain Reservation,” the 
                                                 
97 James H. Hyde to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 24 Feb. 1930, Complaints, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, 
NARA Kansas City, MO.  
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council wrote, “and to hunt any game, for the purpose of making a living.”99 The council sought 
to ensure that they could access essential resources and feed their families. They also refused to 
allow Settler borders to further divide their homeland. As Superintendent Hyde explained, Little 
Fish Lake lay “not entirely within Indian country inasmuch as a large portion of the lake shore 
was acquired by white men.”100 Although the reservation’s boundaries contained the lake, the 
effects of allotment had transferred title of the lake’s shores to a muddle of individual ownership 
and competing jurisdictions. Beyond the simple Indian/non-Indian division, Hyde strictly 
separated the so-called wards from those who had received patents for their land. Hyde, with his 
typical arrogance, “repeatedly advised these people that wards of the Government are privileged 
to fish on the Lake adjacent to ward land without restriction,” while patent-in-fee landowners 
had to follow state game and fish laws, even on their own land.101 Kanick, Brien, and their fellow 
ogimaag rejected these arbitrary boundaries within Anishinaabewaki. They denied the power of 
state laws to extend to their reserved lands, and they demanded access for all members of the 
Turtle Mountain People without regard to Settler statuses, for they saw the lake and its resources 
as belonging to the People as a whole.102  
 Similarly, the council sought to control access to the resources for relief work. New Deal-
era work relief projects offered new avenues for relief, both through general Works Progress 
Administration programs and the Indian Emergency Conservation Work program (IECW) or the 
Civilian Conservation Corps-Indian Division (ICC-ID).Through labor on roads, forestry work, 
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construction and other so-called “conservation” efforts, Indigenous people—primarily men—
could access cash wages that their hungry families desperately needed.103 At Turtle Mountain, 
the opportunities were primarily roads projects. The council wanted “to give an equal share of 
the work done, at this Agency project to enrolled members of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of 
Indians, now being done by unenrolled, Indians from other reservations, which are given to them 
instead of the Indians of this reservation.”104 The council appealed specifically to the relational 
networks that bound together the People, arguing that the agency should make relief work 
available “to Indians, who are enrolled here, whether, a Trust Patent or a Patent in Fee and give 
them equal share of the work in the roads.”105 By spreading the available opportunities evenly, 
the ogimaag not only honored their obligations as leaders but also reinforced kinship 
relationships and kept families on the ishkonigan.  
 In addition to securing control over land and resources, the council argued to protect their 
sovereignty on principal. When they asked to direct relief, they were trying to reclaim power 
over daily decisions from Agency officials. They requested “an interpreter that can talk the 
Indian language, French, Cree, and Chippewa, fluently, so theat [sic] the Indians can understand 
                                                 
103 Historian Brian Hosmer provides one of the most insightful discussions of Indian engagement with New Deal 
relief programs in his study of attitudes toward work relief on the Wind River Reservation. Additionally, Brenda 
Child discusses how Ojiweg in Wisconsin and Minnesota engaged relief programs and used them to sustain 
community and seasonal labor practices. Hosmer, “‘Dollar a Day and Glad to Have It’: Work Relief on the Wind 
River Indian Reservation as Memory,” Child, Holding Our World Together, 97-120. Additional work on Indian 
New Deal work relief include Paul C. Rosier, “The Real Indians, Who Constitute the Real Tribe: Class, Ethnicity, 
and IRA Politics on the Blackfeet Reservation,” Journal of American History 18:4 (Summer 1999): 3-39; Donald 
Parman, “The Indian and the Civilian Conservation Corps,” Pacific Historical Review 40 (1971): 39-56; Calvin W. 
Gower, “The CCC Indian Division: Aid for Depressed Americans, 1933-1942,” Minnesota History 43 (1972): 3-13; 
Roger Bromert, “The Sioux and the Indian-CCC,” South Dakota History 8 (Fall 1978): 340-356.  
104 Turtle Mountain Tribe of Chippewa Indian Council, Memorandum of Reports to be presented to the Investigator, 
Sept. 10, 1931; Complaints; Turtle Mountain Subgroup; RG 75, NARA Kansas City, MO. 
105 Turtle Mountain Tribe of Chippewa Indian Council, Memorandum of Reports to be presented to the Investigator, 
Sept. 10, 1931; Complaints; Turtle Mountain Subgroup; RG 75, NARA Kansas City, MO. 
  
302 
 
themselves” and interact with Settler officials on equal footing.106 The request was not only 
practical; it also called attention to Turtle Mountain peoplehood. Hyde recognized the threat to 
his authority as the council rebuffed internal intrusions. He complained, “At the time the tribal 
council was formed, it was stated as their purpose to present and push tribal claims but since the 
council has been formed, I have had evidence of a desire on the part of the council to designate 
policies of administration.”107 Hyde correctly ascertained the council’s desire.  
 On September 15, the council held a meeting without Hyde’s knowledge. Kanick, Brien, 
and the other ogimaag narrowed their nine-point list to the topic of road work and decided to 
present their recommendations directly to Hyde. They chose four people, including Brien, to take 
their proposal to the superintendent. The delegates waited for the one day each week when Hyde 
held open office hours. In Hyde’s office, Brien explained that the ogimaag wanted “to give some 
poorer families, some work, who has had no work ever since the work has started here.”108 
According to Brien, the superintendent “sarcastically” responded, “The Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, put me here to do as I please, and I will do as I please, and you committee men has 
nothing to do about it, this is the very words our Superintendent used when we wanted to have an 
interview with him.”109 When he recounted the incident to his superiors, Hyde’s response 
appeared somewhat more measured, but in its essence the same. Hyde claimed to have “advised 
them [the council] that matters of administration would continue to be handled by this office 
without interference on the part of the council.” He consented that he would “gladly discuss with 
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them at any time matters pertaining to the tribe, or in which the tribe as a whole was interested, 
but that matters of policy and administration for which I was solely responsible, I could and 
would not make the subject of Council conferences.”110 Either way, Hyde made his intentions 
clear. He did not respect Turtle Mountain sovereignty.  
 Hyde further attacked the Turtle Mountain People’s sovereignty by disparaging their 
Indianness. “These people here are not Indians of the Sioux, Crow or Navajo type, but are the 
products of the older French voyageurs and fur traders,” Hyde dismissively wrote to his 
superiors. He claimed that no more than three hundred of the enrolled Turtle Mountain members 
had more than half blood quantum, and he blamed the “administrative problems” on “the mixed 
bloods, who are far more difficult to deal with.”111 Brien, Kanick (frequently identified as a so-
called full-blood), and the rest of the Turtle Mountain People, however did not understand their 
peoplehood as dependent on blood but rather on living relationships—relationships that the 
council strove to protect by confronting Hyde. The ogimaag and Hyde defined “tribal questions” 
in different terms.112 “[I]s this the way that an Indian Superintendent should have answer[ed] his 
Indians?” Brien asked after they confronted Hyde across his desk.113 His answer, and the rest of 
the council’s answer, was no. “The people are getting indignant,” wrote Brien following the 
encounter, adding, “we have got to have change.”114 
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 The council pursued change by going over Hyde's head to seek Department recognition. 
Some time in September, around the time of the incident with Hyde, Kanick, Brien, and the other 
members of the Turtle Mountain Tribe of Chippewa Indian Council sent a copy of their by-laws 
and a constitution to the Secretary of Interior for review.115 The Secretary of Interior rejected the 
constitution with no explanation other than that the Department found it “not satisfactory.”116 
Moreover, Hyde informed Kanick, Brien, and the other ogimaag that the Turtle Mountain 
reservation had “no legally recognized council.”117 Hyde had informed Washington officials that 
the council lacked community support, since it was elected by a mere 86 ballots. Hyde, however, 
made it seem as though the council had only existed for a few short months, despite dealing with 
Kanick and the others throughout his tenure. The council’s attempts at affecting change stalled 
against the barrier of Settler administration, but the ogimaag remained determined.  
 The next year, the ogimaag tried again to formalize their leadership. Council and 
community members continued to write letters to Department of Interior officials, lawyers, and 
Congressmen.118 In 1932, Hyde left the reservation, replaced by Charles Asbury and then Francis 
J. Scott. On October 6, the Turtle Mountain Star profiled the new superintendent, who declared 
that under his stewardship, “the progress made at Belcourt will prove an eye-opener to those 
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interested.”119 On the same page, likely of more interest to a People weary with overbearing 
superintendents, the paper announced a meeting “for the purpose of electing tribal officials and 
adopting a constitution for the tribe.”120 The People would get to decide if their ogimaag’s plan 
for a constitution promised the change they needed.  
 In October 1932, agency officials presented the constitution and bylaws to the skeptical 
but determined Turtle Mountain People. Frustrated by several decades of Settler interference that 
contributed to rising dislocation, overcrowding, hunger, and other daily struggles, the Turtle 
Mountain People gathered to consider the constitution. They met in October, when the prospect 
of another long, hungry winter loomed before them. Many families waited on payments from the 
Depression-hit Settlers who leased their lands in Montana, often one of the few sources of cash 
income that helped families make it through the winter. The meeting took place in the auditorium 
of the new elementary school in Belcourt, part of a building project completed the previous 
fall.121 Francis J. Scott, who succeeded Asbury's brief tenure as superintendent days earlier, led 
the meeting along with Stormon, but Turtle Mountain ogimaag quickly directed the conversation 
to their own purposes and concerns.   
 Scott, who had twenty years of experience in the Indian Service, opened the meeting. He 
began forcefully and declaratively, undoubtedly hoping to set the tone of his leadership over an 
Indigenous community whose activism had wrested authority from his predecessors. Scott 
explained that their meeting that afternoon had one purpose: “to consider the adoption of bylaws 
and constitution prepared for an organization to be created on the Turtle Mountain Reservation to 
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handle matters for the tribe.”122 Scott presented adopting the constitution as a bureaucratic 
formality. He called the constitution and bylaws “a course of procedure” that all Native 
American Peoples had to go through “where the tribe has matters they want to deal with.”123 And 
the Turtle Mountain People certainly had matters to deal with, as even the recently-arrived Scott 
knew. For decades, the Anishinaabeg had fought for their claim against the government, and 
word had spread that the constitution provided the means to achieve that goal. With talk of the 
claim in the air, Scott emphasized that the proposed form of organization was particularly 
important “when the tribe feels it has a claim against the Government,” largely because federal 
officials required some recognized body to sign a contract with attorneys in order to pursue a 
claim.124 Undoubtedly informed of the differing opinions among the People, Scott attempted to 
forestall debate. Standing in front of the gathered crowd, he announced, “We are not here to 
discuss the merits or demerits” of the document or the resulting organization but only to vote on 
the constitution as written.125 The Turtle Mountain People, however, proceeded to discuss.  
 First, the Turtle Mountain People wanted to hear the constitution. Few Turtle Mountain 
People could read, and many spoke only Ojibwemowin or Michif. Translating the constitution 
into Ojibwemowin may have helped some in the audience to see the document within the 
relational networks of their peoplehood. Before Scott could read the document, the people 
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attending the meeting voted to have it interpreted in Michif by Haskell-educated elder and long-
time council member Louis Marion.126 The constitution consisted of six articles, which set up a 
basic framework for an organized body subordinate to local agency officials and the Department 
of Interior. The first article established the organization’s name as the Turtle Mountain Advisory 
Committee, suggesting a supporting role. Article II listed the duties as “to promote co-operation 
of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians with the Superintendent and the plans of the 
government, and to assist the Superintendent in an advisory way in promoting social, financial, 
and industrial welfare, and the best interests of the tribe.”127 The ability to initiate action lay with 
the superintendent. According to the language of the constitution, the committee would sign 
papers but not play an active role in generating the paperwork, and the superintendent would 
decide if a “matter requires actions of the general tribal council.”128 The third article established 
procedures for elections and criteria for the nominees. The council consisted of eight “recognized 
enrolled members,” with the additional requirements of being twenty-one years or older, 
possessing no criminal record, and having at least one quarter Indian blood. Settler officials 
insisted on the blood quantum requirement for the Turtle Mountain People. While corresponding 
with lawyers and his superiors in Washington about preparing the constitution, former 
superintendent Asbury questioned the Indianness of the Turtle Mountain People, arguing that 
without a minimum degree of Indian blood, the council “might become in a very short time, a 
                                                 
126 Marion, born in 1870 in Pembina County, appeared as a council member as early as 1908. His settled in the 
Turtle Mountain region around 1886. Schwab to J. D. Scherer, August 12, 1908, Copies of Correspondence Sent by 
the Superintendent, Turtle Mountain Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Kansas City, MO; Les LaFontain, Orie Richard, and 
Scott Belgarde, “Who I Am: A Guide To Your Turtle Mountain Home,” Turtle Mountain Community College, no 
date, 9.  
127 “Constitution and By-Laws for the organization, Government and Election for an Advosiry [sic] Committee of 
the Turtle Mountian [sic] Band of Chippewa Indians,” Appendix A in Richotte, ““We the Indians,’” 326.  
128 “Constitution and By-Laws for the organization, Government and Election for an Advosiry [sic] Committee of 
the Turtle Mountian [sic] Band of Chippewa Indians,” Appendix A in Richotte, ““We the Indians,’” 326.  
  
308 
 
committee of essentially white people.”129 Article III also set council terms at two years, with 
half the council seats up for election each year.130 Article IV held that the committee would 
chose from their number a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, and treasurer and included the 
oath of office, which swore to uphold the United States constitution and “co- operate with the 
superintendent in charge of the reservation to promote and protect the best interests of the 
Indians of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians.”131 The fifth article simply stated that 
the constitution went into effect as soon as a majority vote approved it, and the final article set up 
a procedure for proposing amendments, which required the approval of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs.132 
 As soon as Scott finished reading the constitution, the discussion he had tried to prohibit 
began. Richotte explained, “Well, Nanaboozhoo must have been in the room trying to stir up a 
little trouble because everybody wanted to talk about it. Lots of folks were unhappy. This 
constitution did not come from the community, and many realized that it was a bad document 
that had the potential to take away more authority than it gave.”133 Robert Bruce, whom the local 
paper described as a “full-blooded Chippewa Indian and one of the leading coronet virtuosos in 
the United States,” started to ask questions.134 He wanted to know who wrote the document and 
why. Stormon then explained how Senator Frazier had contacted him and asked him to look into 
preparing a constitution. Stormon said that he modeled the document after “two or three 
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constitutions and by-laws from other reservations that had been approved,” and like Scott he 
emphasized that accepting the constitution was the first essential step to pursuing their claim.135 
Scott interrupted the discussion to remind the gathered crowd that they could always change the 
problematic contents later, “Unless there is something seriously objectionable, the idea would be 
to adopt this constitution and by-laws because the principal thing is to get organized.”136 
According to the meeting minutes, Scott and Stormon’s responses satisfied Bruce. He replied, 
“There is no objection against the constitution and by-laws. We realize it must be done according 
to the wishes of the Department.”137 No one else asked any clarifying questions, and the meeting 
adjourned for lunch.  
 The afternoon session opened with a vote. The People remained divided, and the 
constitution failed to gain approval. Bruce again objected. Perhaps he had discussed matters 
during the lunch break, or perhaps the meeting minutes misquoted him. Whatever the 
explanation, Bruce voiced the concerns of those who opposed the document. He got to his feet 
and said, “I feel this constitution invests altogether too much power in the hands of the 
Superintendent.”138 He objected to both tone and content, adding, “The various articles all seem 
to be so constructed as to give the balance of power to the Agency office and on these grounds I 
think the plan is not only unfair, but unjust.”139 From Bruce’s perspective, by placing power in 
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the hands of the superintendent rather than the ogimaag who would comprise a council, the 
proposed constitution threatened his People’s sovereignty. He saw little difference between the 
relationship proposed in this constitution and the intrusive authority against which Turtle 
Mountain ogimaag had struggled for decades. Speaking of justice, he expected the federal 
government to recognize his People’s autonomy. The gathered Anishinaabeg continued to 
discuss the constitution.140 
 By the time Scott called for a second vote, the opinion in the room shifted. The second 
poll resulted in 172 votes in favor of the constitution and 38 against.141 No record exists of what 
Scott said to persuade Bruce and the constitution’s other opponents. Nor is it clear whether Bruce 
voted in favor of the document. The Turtle Mountain Star reported vaguely that “the objections 
of Bruce gave way to approval,” but he may have been among the thirty-eight.142 The October 8 
meeting in the schoolhouse was only one afternoon in more than forty years of struggle. The vote 
took place within the larger context of defending Turtle Mountain peoplehood and evolving 
leadership. And, perhaps, most importantly for a hungry, struggling People, the constitution and 
Turtle Mountain Advisory Committee represented the opportunity to finally pursue their claim 
agains the United States. Those who voted yes undoubtedly remembered Scott’s words from 
before the break: “there is no way under the sun that they can get that claim before the proper 
court without following the procedure set down by the Department.”143 Approving the 
constitution was the first step of that procedure, according to Scott.  
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 The Advisory Committee elected that afternoon preserved pre-existing relationships with 
ogimaag. The new members consisted of Robert Bruce, Kanick, John Jeanotte, John Azure (No. 
1), Gregory Brien, Louis Marion, Claude Azure, Severt Poitra.144 At least Kanick, Brien, and 
Marion sat on earlier councils, and Robert Bruce led the Turtle Mountain Co-Operative 
Association, an organization intended for “mutual benefit, to educate the residents of the 
reservation in citizenship and to bring them to a full realization of their responsibilities as voters 
and citizens.”145 In the second election, Joe Wallette and Louis Gourneau, both of whom served 
previously with Kanick, joined the Advisory Committee. Kanick, who traced his ogimaa status to 
his ties to the Little Shell family, continued to head the council, although Robert Bruce had the 
highest number of votes at the October 8 meeting. Joe Wallette nominated Kanick as chairman 
because “being the only full blood Indian, I think he would be better suited to act as Chairman.” 
Wallette, meanwhile, received the vice chairmanship “for the reason that Mr. Wallette can read 
and write.” Louis Marion’s language skills made him interpreter, and John Jeannotte became 
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treasurer.146 With Kanick leading the transition, the new Advisory Council represented not a 
radical break from Anishinaabe systems of governance but a strategic adaptation intended to 
preserve the foundation of Turtle Mountain peoplehood. 
 The council began work on the claim immediately. They convened their first meeting on 
January 2 and, after swearing in the seven officers and listening to Scott speak about self-
determination, the Advisory Committee resumed the work of promoting their People’s 
sovereignty.147 Along with a large crowd of Turtle Mountain men and women that gathered for 
the inaugural meeting of the new constitutionally-recognized leaders, the Advisory Committee 
immediately took up the claims question that had driven interest in the new constitution. The 
seven-point complaint prepared at the meeting focused on land and resource rights, as well as 
compensation for the many times the Settler government violated those rights. The first item 
sought to protect future generations access to their dwindling homeland, renewing the change 
that their status as one of the People entitled children born after the McCumber Agreement to 
land via allotments. The complaint also asserted that off-reservation allotments included not only 
surface rights but also full access to the land’s resources reflecting Anishinaabeg understandings 
of land usage. They asked the federal government to compensate the people for allotment filing 
fees unfairly charged to hundreds of men and women, interest on ceded lands since the federal 
government had first asserted rights over Turtle Mountain territory following the executive 
orders that reduced the ishkonigan, and a general statement that the ten cents per acre amounted 
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to little more than theft.148 The Advisory Committee signed a contract with three attorneys to 
pursue the claim, and the first meeting adjourned with what looked like momentum and what felt 
like a strong statement of sovereignty.  
 Propelled by the promising first meeting, the Advisory Committee pursued the work of 
peoplehood that previous superintendents had blocked. They received word of a new 
jurisdictional bill introduced by Senator Frazier at the end of January.149 At the July 29 meeting, 
the Advisory Committee discussed interviewing and “Taking testimony of the elder people in 
order to have the Business Affairs, to show our Government, that our indians [sic] was not 
Properally [sic] Treated at the time.”150 Because the jurisdictional bill repeatedly failed in 
Congress, Scott would not allow them access to the necessary funds. The bill stalled, but 
meanwhile the Advisory Committee had plenty of governing to occupy their time.151  
The Advisory Committee sought to carry out ogimaag’s expected roles in allocating 
resources. In 1933, one of the Advisory Committee’s main concerns centered on providing and 
directing relief to their impoverished People. During a September meeting, Joseph Gourneau 
stated the Advisory Committee’s position “that all of the indians [sic] of the 
Reservation…should at least have a say to this Relief is put out for the tribe.”152 
 By February, the Advisory Committee had new business that cut to the heart of their 
concerns. News had arrived from Washington of a new piece of legislation. Turtle Mountain 
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ogimaag already governed their People, within Settler constraints, when they learned about a 
new policy from the most recent administration in Washington. The Turtle Mountain People 
were not the only Native Americans struggling with poverty and land loss. The 1928 Merriam 
Report revealed the failures of Settler policies in the U.S., describing education, family, health, 
and other social concerns, and made clear the need for change. Bureau of Indian Affairs 
commissioner John Collier, who has provoked strong and often competing opinions from 
congressmen, Indians, and historians alike, worked with Congress and the Department of Interior 
to present the Wheeler-Howard Act, named after Montana Senator Burton K. Wheeler and 
Nebraska Representative Edgar Howard, the bill’s sponsors in Congress. The Wheeler-Howard 
Act, also known as the Indian Reorganization Act or IRA, passed Congress in mid-June 1934. 
Only five pages remained of Collier’s original forty-eight-page opus on self-determination, and 
those few pages curtailed some of Collier’s promise for tribal sovereignty. Stronger in economic 
development than cultural or political autonomy, the IRA offered several potential solutions to 
the problems Turtle Mountain ogimaag faced. The legislation not only promised to end allotment 
but also provided a means of recuperating lost lands, a desperate need on a reservation too small 
for its population. Collier’s vision also provided for federally-recognized self-governance and 
control of tribal assets, which may have seemed a less compelling feature for a council that had 
so recently enacted its own constitution. The bill also offered access to educational resources, 
preferential employment in the BIA, and revolving credit funds.153 Turtle Mountain ogimaag 
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approached the IRA cautiously, with interest, as a potential tool to support their peoplehood, as 
they had with the 1932 constitution.154  
 The Wheeler-Howard Bill spurred concerns about land. The council members revealed at 
the February meeting that they disagreed about collective versus individual ownership of land, 
although they all shared the desire to recoup their territorial losses. The council wanted to present 
a plan so that “lands lost through patent-fee [sic] be re-allotted outside the limits of the 
reservation,” preferably in a single block.155 Gregoire Brien, who farmed his allotment near 
Belcourt, believed that tribal ownership would mean that “the people would be fighting all the 
time” over who had the rights to what land.156 Louis Gourneau responded “that this was the most 
misrepresented idea and destroyed most of the lands of the Indians.”157 Where Brien preferred to 
preserve the status quo that parceled land to individuals, perhaps thinking of his own farm, 
Gourneau critiqued the allotment system that had carved up the Turtle Mountain People’s 
reduced land base. John Azure, another council member, suggested that the lands be individually 
owned but in a single block, preserving the unity of their peoplehood and jurisdiction. The 
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ogimaag agreed, at least, that it must be “not like it is now.”158 The council members felt 
obligated to protect the aki, and they could only understand the Wheeler-Howard Bill in the 
context of this aspect of their peoplehood.  
 The council members approached the Wheeler-Howard Act cautiously as a potential 
mechanism for repairing their fractured lands, a goal toward which ogimaag on various councils 
had long struggled. The council drafted a petition, starting conservatively with forty acres of land 
for all those who had lost their allotments “through sale.” This they revised “to extend the 
reservation to an area of forty by eighty miles,” an area twice as large as the the original 
Executive Order reservation but considerably smaller than the millions of acres the Turtle 
Mountain People ceded in the McCumber Agreement, “That way all Indians would have an 
equal share.”159 Martin then raised the size of the land to 160 acres for every one of the People. 
The ogimaag specifically included not only those on the reservation but also those who had no 
choice but to take allotments on the public domain, regardless of whether they had lost their land 
or not, and they stipulated that the federal government should provide building supplies to 
resettle on the hoped-for land. The six council members present at the meeting voted in favor of 
the petition.160  
 The Advisory Committee looked into what the bill could do to promote their peoplehood. 
Aware of uncertain and dissenting views in Indian Country, Commissioner John Collier called 
for a series of meetings, the first at Rapid City, North Dakota. The council voted that all eight 
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members should attend the meeting.161 Superintendent Scott secured approval, and on March 1 
the council traveled to Rapid City by school bus for the meeting.  
 Collier opened the four-day congress with a passionate speech. The Commissioner 
promised a new era of partnership, proclaiming, “It is to be for the Indians themselves to 
determine what laws Congress shall pass for them.”162 In a narrative that likely resonated with 
Kanick and his fellow Turtle Mountain delegates as they sat in the stuffy room, Collier lamented 
the past century of land loss and poverty, noting that the United States had increased its wealth 
while “the wealth of the Indians, instead of increasing, has been melting away.”163 His solution 
echoed what the Turtle Mountain People had repeated for decades: “There must be no more land 
lost. There must be more land obtained.”164 Following speeches by officials representing the 
U.S., the forum opened to the Indigenous delegates to ask questions. Kanick and his fellow 
Advisory Committee members asked no questions but listened during four days of conversations.  
 The closing statements made by Turtle Mountain delegates reveal their cautious 
consideration of the Wheeler-Howard Bill in the context of evolving governance on their 
ishkonigan. On March 4, the third day of the gathering, John Azure stated, “At present time our 
Reservation is twelve miles long and six miles wide and in that Reservation there are more than 
three people. The better half of this Reservation is now owned by the white people. So we are 
having a hard time. Something must be done so we can get along better than this.”165 After three 
days of listening, however, Azure still had not determined whether the new legislation being 
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discussed provided the surest means of achieving his People’s goals. He continued, “Now, the 
way we understand Mr. Collier’s explanation, it sounds rather good to us delegates, but we are 
not going to say that we are in favor of the new policy or against it.”166 He resolved to return to 
the ishkonigan and share what he had learned and then “if the majority wants to take up this new 
policy it is up to them.”167 He concluded, “If the Government can work out a plan that helps us 
out, some way to get us on our feet—that is what we want. I thank you.” The statement struck a 
balance between reminding federal officials of their obligation to the Turtle Mountain People 
while also emphasizing the Anishinaabeg’s autonomy.  
 Kanick echoed Azure’s cautious consideration the next morning. After a customary 
humble greeting in which he referred to himself as “a poor man” and addressed Collier directly, 
he says that what he heard during the previous three days “is all for the benefit of the people.”168 
Like Azure, he pledged to “tell my people what this great man has told me.”169 He seemed 
optimistic about the bill’s promises to help landless and impoverished Indians. “Concerning this 
self-government,” however, Kanick admitted, “I am not quite ready to accept it yet because my 
people are not just starting.”170 The ogimaa may have been referring to the new constitution, or 
to still-pending claims. Kanick suggested that his People had already started governing 
themselves, and he hesitated to undo what progress they had made. 
 The congress concluded on Monday March 5. In closing remarks, Walter Woehlke, field 
representative for the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, promised that federal officials would 
“find out then from each tribe, from each Reservation whether you want to eat, and what kind of 
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fork you want to use,” metaphorically reaffirming that the United States intended to allow Indian 
Peoples autonomy in assessing whether the legislation matched their communities’ needs.171 The 
eight Turtle Mountain delegates boarded the school bus with five days’ worth of information and 
questions to share with their People.  
 The Wheeler-Howard Bill highlighted existing tensions surrounding the Turtle Mountain 
Advisory Committee and its externally-created constitution. Throughout the summer, fall, and 
winter, Agency officials held several meetings on the reservation to discuss the community’s 
concerns, primarily about land and the status of allotments.172 At a council meeting on February 
2, 1935, Alex Martin, chairman of the Turtle Mountain Council and the Turtle Mountain Co-
Operative Association, called for a study of the bill. The council decided to choose two people 
for each reservation district to learn about the Wheeler-Howard Act and then “be placed in the 
field for the purpose of fully acquainting all Indians as to the provisions of the Bill.”173 Each 
council member would select the representatives for their respective areas. Kanick, still a 
member of the council, noted that he expected many of the people to resist the bill. “It is going to 
be a hard problem to put this plan over to all the Indians, as practically all the full bloods still 
believe in the chief,” he said, presumably referring to Chief Little Shell, whose son was now in 
his thirties and living at Dunseith, “and it is going to be very difficult to convince those living 
around Dunseith and on the west end of the reservation that the Wheeler-Howard Bill will assist 
them.”174 The Dunseith community remained distinct from the main reservation communities. 
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L.C. Lippert, the superintendent at the Standing Rock agency who helped J.E. Balmer transition 
to superintendent after Scott transferred to Arizona in 1934, reported, “At no time since then [the 
1932 constitution] has a Dunseith Indian been on the council nor do they attempt to obtain 
representation on the council.”175 Instead, they formed their own, independent council around an 
unnamed Little Shell descendent, most likely Kanick’s now-grown adopted son Thomas.176 
 Little evidence remains from the perspective of those who opposed the bill, or at least 
those who chose not to vote for it. Advisory Committee member Alex Martin, who supported the 
Wheeler-Howard Bill, suggested that people “are all much in favor of the Self-Government.” 
The controversy came from worries that “this New proposition will effect [sic] their Claims now 
pending in Congress.”177 Cutting off the families who most needed land reform might have 
encouraged others to distrust the bill.178  
 Some members of the Turtle Mountain Co-Operative Association including Alex Martin 
took advantage of the opportunity to promote their organization and leadership, which they 
believed could better support Turtle Mountain relationships with their lands. Martin, who served 
simultaneously as chairman of the Co-Operative Association and of the Advisory Committee in 
1934, opposed the Advisory Committee even while he supported the bill. He objected to the 
constitution’s provision that “only Indians that are enrolled at the Agency of Belcourt, N.D., can 
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Vote in selecting Officers of the Tribal Council.”179 Martin preferred to define belonging more 
expansively and believed that governance on the ishkonigan should include those beyond its 
boundaries.  
 Supporters of the bill looked forward to its promises to recover aki and provide financial 
relief, both essential to advancing their peoplehood. Alex Martin supported the bill because “our 
Reservation is in bad shape.”180 The land reform and relief opportunities offered hope of 
renewal, and the Advisory Committee continued to face resistance from agency officials. At a 
meeting where they also discussed various relief efforts and community needs—a sanatorium, an 
x-ray machine and additional physician for the hospital, vocational training for children over 
sixteen, a new community building, and additional day schools—agency officials told the 
council that the bill would help the People obtain the necessary funding to achieve their goals. In 
fact, officials warned that rejecting the bill may disqualify the ishkonigan from relief. Wilson 
stated, “If you vote yourself out from under that bill it would not look very well to ask for it 
[aid]. We’ve got to take all of the bill or none of it. If we accept it, these things will be part of 
it.”181 For the supporters of the bill, as with its opponents, the decision involved more than a 
question about self government; their very peoplehood, linked to the aki and relief that could 
fulfill reciprocal kinship obligations, was at stake. 
 The vote for the bill highlighted tensions that divisive, Settler-imposed statuses caused 
within the People. Only those on the reservation could vote in the referendum, not the members 
of the People who lived on homestead allotments, regardless of their ties to the community or 
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even distance from its Settler-defined borders.182 The Turtle Mountain People voted on whether 
or not to accept the IRA on June 17, 1935. Slightly more than half of the voting population of 
1,181 men and women cast their ballots.183 The results were overwhelmingly opposed to the new 
legislation: 257 in favor and 550 against.184 
 In the 1930s, the Turtle Mountain People asked many questions about how best to 
politically defend their sovereignty in the midst of land loss and poverty. The 1932 constitution 
resolved some questions, but it left many unanswered. In some ways, the 1932 constitution 
failed. The resulting centralized governing body functioned in a primarily advisory capacity. The 
hoped-for claim still had not materialized by the 1940s. Many in the community, including the 
Turtle Mountain Co-Operative, disputed whether the constitution and the Advisory Committee 
could truly protect and promote Turtle Mountain peoplehood. Nevertheless, through debates and 
Settler interference, Kanick and other ogimaag continued to lead with the help of their People. 
Decisions and disagreements occurred within the framework of Turtle Mountain peoplehood, 
which remained vibrant and active in part because of the conversations surrounding evolving 
governance.  
“The will of the people of this reservation”: Lac Courte Oreilles  
 Near the center of the Lac Courte Oreilles ishkonigan at the western end of the new 
Chippewa Flowage, the community of Akwawewining, the place where they fish through the 
hole in the ice or Chief Lake, faced a changing landscape. Rising water levels from the Winter 
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Dam destroyed the once-rich manoomin, and logging and land-loss because of the effects of 
allotment alienated the previously dense woods. Anakwad or Pete Cloud lived on a peninsula 
that jutted out into the southwestern corner of the lake. His allotment allowed him and his 
family—his wife Akwetawegiji “Bibi” Cloud, his adult sons Frank and John Pete, and their 
wives and children—to continue to live in the oodena where his ancestors rested beneath 
jiibegamigoon (grave houses). Politically active, Anakwad served on the Tribal Council as early 
as 1916.185 Both his father and grandfather had been ogimaag for Akwawewining, and the 
community recognized Anakwad as their ogimaa in the early twentieth century. He opened the 
manoomin harvests among the families who riced at Lake Pahquahwong in ceded territory to the 
north.186 He and his family supported themselves on their allotment by raising a garden. 
Anakwad also owned several horses, chickens, and a cow and calf. Hunting, cutting wood, and 
seasonal wage labor in the logging and tourist industries provided flexible and much-needed cash 
for seeds, livestock and other expenses such as doctors.187 His economic activities also allowed 
him to live up to his reciprocal obligations as ogimaa. His goddaughter Marie Cloud Morrow 
remembered, “He was a good humored man who went around cutting wood for people in the 
area who needed help. He had three gardens in his place and would give visitors anything they 
wanted from his gardens.”188 He fought the dam alongside the Wolfs and Oshogay, and his home 
on the peninsula afforded him a close view of dwindling manoomin and the tourist cabins that 
soon lined the lake. He wanted to keep the ishkonigan whole and protect its resources for his 
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children and grandchildren, and he actively pursued governance beyond his own community to 
protect his People’s needs.  
 Several miles south and west, Zaagajiw or John Kingfisher lived with his young family. 
A member of the Name (Sturgeon) doodem, Kingfisher and his wife Lucille Mike Kingfisher 
built a home just south of Gibaakwa’igan (Billyboy Dam) on the allotment he inherited from his 
father along Couderay Creek, an offshoot of the Couderay River.189 They lived near the center of 
the now-defunct Signor logging operations, responsible for deforesting many allotments. 
Kingfisher owned a team of horses and two dozen chickens, and he raised a garden and hay on 
the fifteen acres of his allotment that he had cleared.190 A veteran of World War I, Kingfisher 
spoke both Anishinaabemowin and English, occasionally serving as interpreter at general 
councils. His bilingual skill and active presence in council meetings during the fight against the 
dam positioned Kingfisher in a leadership role.191 He was young—thirty-five years the junior of 
Anakwad—but in his life he witnessed changes that negatively impacted his people and their 
homeland: the dwindling land (Kingfisher sold his own allotment after receiving fee patent); the 
flooded woods, graves, and manoomin; and long and hungry winters made hungrier by federal 
officials’ seeming indifference.192 He wanted better for his family and the rest of his People, and 
he hoped to use his emerging role as a leader to benefit them. He and Anakwad would come to 
disagree about the details, but they shared the same goal of defending Anishinaabe peoplehood.  
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 Kingfisher and Anakwad represented the dominant perspectives about leadership among 
the Lac Courte Oreilles People. Debates about leadership entangled with the best methods for 
protecting peoplehood. In the 1930s, when the IRA presented new opportunities, Kingfisher 
promoted a reorganized system of governance that relied on regular elections and a central 
council to act as intermediary between the People and the federal government and to enact self-
determination. Anakwad, meanwhile, distrusted centralized elective governance and promoted 
broad, decentralized participation. Federal officials and even Kingfisher, Anakwad, and other 
Ojibwe cast these debates as a generational rift, with older Anishinaabe such as Anakwad 
clinging to tradition and Kingfisher’s generation rushing headlong into uncertain progress. The 
lines, however, shifted and blurred, and both perspectives remained committed above all else to 
sustaining Anishinaabe sovereignty rooted in the relationships of their peoplehood.  
 Since the end of the nineteenth century, in addition to the ogimaag who continued in their 
pre-reservation patterns, federal officials had created a Business Committee or Tribal Council. 
Much like the Business Committee at Turtle Mountain, the Lac Courte Oreilles group had 
limited, largely undefined power subordinated to the local farmer and later agent. Federal 
officials designed the Tribal Council to legitimize Settler power in Indigenous homelands, and 
they expected passive conformists.193 Many Ojibweg, frustrated with the lack of progress in 
asserting the People’s shared goals as water and Settler agendas claimed their lands, manoomin, 
and mitigoog, saw the Tribal Council as an arm of the federal government rather than the 
People.194 Even with severely truncated power, however, the Tribal Council fought for the Lac 
Courte Oreilles People’s sovereignty. The Lac Courte Oreilles Council’s refusal to accept 
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constraints frustrated Farmer David Jacobs. “They make a Council meeting of the Business 
Meeting,” he complained when he only wanted the Business Committee to approve allotment 
assignments.195 Their “speeches in Chippewa,” an undeniable expression of peoplehood, 
particularly provoked him. He wanted to appoint the committee, rather than allow oodena to 
elect their representatives, and to force them to speak in English. Elections, however, continued 
sporadically during the next two decades.196 
 New reservation challenges meant that patterns of governance continually evolved. 
Reservation boundaries redistributed power among oodena. Before the 1870s, when Settler 
officials marked Lac Courte Oreilles’ borderers, Rice Lake dominated the region’s politics. 
Nena’aangabi, Rice Lake’s primary ogimaa who earned both military and diplomatic respect, led 
the Lac Courte Oreilles delegation to La Pointe to negotiate the 1854 treaty. When Rice Lake 
ended up fifty miles southwest of the reservation’s edge, Nena’aangabi’s influence and that of 
his sons Waabizheshi and Giishkitawag (Joe White), waned, especially after most of the Rice 
Lake community faced removal to the reservation via coercive allotment policies that forced 
them to take land within the fixed bounds of the ishkonigan.197 Through at least the 1930s, 
Thomas Bracklin, Nena’aangabi’s descendant, continued to claim his role as ogimaa, but Rice 
Lake and its dwindling manoomin no longer held the same influence in the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People’s economy, and many residents had taken allotments within the reservation, primarily in 
                                                 
195 David E. Jacobs to S. W. Campbell, Nov. 20, 1908, General Correspondence, Great Lakes Agency Subgroup, RG 
75, NARA Chicago, IL.  
196 Father Gordon to R.C. Craige, Dec. 23, 1918, General Correspondence, Great Lakes Agency Subgroup, RG 75, 
NARA Chicago, IL; “Council at Pahquahwong,” Oct. 23, 1918, General Correspondence, Great Lakes Agency 
Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Chicago, IL; Superintendent to Norman Guibord, Mar. 9, 1933, 066, General 
Correspondence, Great Lakes Agency Subgroup, RG 75, NARA Chicago, IL. It is important not to overstate the 
power of the Tribal Council, either with the federal government or their own People. As the 1920s had shown, the 
federal government easily ignored Ojibwe leaders even when they donned the outward expectations of U.S. 
politicians.  
197 Redix, The Murder of Joe White, xv.  
  
327 
 
the Whitefish Lake region on the western borders of the ishkonigan.198 Rice Lake remained an 
integral part of the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s homeland, but other oodena such as 
Pahquahwong, Signor, and Akwawewining shifted toward the center. 
 Through the 1920s and into the 1930s, many Ojibweg at Lac Courte Oreilles remained 
distrustful of the Tribal Council. In 1928, the Tribal Council clashed with many of the men and 
women over a delegation to President Calvin Coolidge, who was vacationing in northern 
Wisconsin on the Bois Brule River. The Tribal Council wanted to entice President Coolidge to 
visit their ishkonigan, presumably to help the People’s claims regarding the dam and 
unauthorized logging. They decided to give him an Ojibwe name and stage a tribal induction 
ceremony, which had become part of the political theater in a tourist-driven local economy.199 
Because names have to come from a we’e, or recognized dreamer, the council approached 
Zhooniyaagiizhig or John Mink, who had named a number of children. Zhooniyaagiizhig 
responded, “You want me to dream up a name for some goddamn white man?…I don’t care 
what he is president of.”200 Zhooniyaagiizhig believed the council disrespected Ojibwe 
ceremony, and many others agreed with him preferring Zhooniyaagiizhig’s example of 
leadership rooted in his role as spiritual advisor. Instead of the spectacle of a naming ceremony, 
Peter Wolf, a member of the Tribal Council and “recognized by the tribe as a headman,” traveled 
to the Bois Brule River and presented President Coolidge with a beaded bandolier bag, belt, and 
leggings.201 The will of the People forced the Business Council to abandon their original plan, 
demonstrating not only the tensions surrounding emerging forms of leadership but also the 
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strength of community-based governance that respected essential relationships such as 
ceremony.  
 Questions about leadership often coalesced around issues of land and resources. Ogimaag 
were responsible for distributing resources, and in the context of resources made scarce by 
Settler colonialism and economic depression, that meant confronting federal, state, and local 
Settler forces to protect their besieged homelands. Money from timber sales all but stopped in 
1928, in part because of larger regional decline in the timber industry and partially because of the 
rapid clearcutting forced by the flooding of many allotments.202 The Lac Courte Oreilles tribal 
fund contained twenty-two thousand dollars, most of it from the dam project and timber sales, 
and various individual funds totaled forty-six thousand dollars.203 The men and women of Lac 
Courte Oreilles, however, could not obtain these funds, either as individuals or as a People. 
Superintendent Ryder and the government farmers who controlled most of the daily interactions 
from Reserve, restricted access. My great-great-grandmother, Julia Galien Cornelia, experienced 
what many of her contemporaries did when she wrote to the Superintendent in 1923 about the 
settlement from her flooded heirship allotment. A mother with young children including my 
great-grandmother Virginia Cornelia, four years old at the time, Julia had written unsuccessfully 
several times to inquire after money in her account that would help to feed and clothe her 
growing family.204 Layers of Settler bureaucrats who assumed they knew better than Ojibwe 
people like my great-grandmother restricted access to the People’s financial resources. Along 
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with the rising waters and downed trees, the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s sovereignty was at 
risk.  
 In 1929, Congressional officials visited reservations around the country to investigate 
conditions on Indian reservations following the Merriam Report in 1928. The tour included a 
stop in Hayward. Familiar faces including Father Gordon, William Wolf, and Thomas Bracken 
testified on behalf of their People. They focused on four areas in particular where federal 
officials and local Settlers had violated their sovereignty and threatened their peoplehood: the 
dam and the Power Company’s unfulfilled promises, especially the flooded graves; land loss and 
unauthorized logging; hunting and fishing rights; and Ryder’s failure to provide aid to sick or 
needy Ojibweg.205 Additionally, the hearings revealed how urgently Lac Courte Oreilles 
ogimaag sought to assert their leadership and the uncertainty of the federal government toward 
these leaders. Thomas Bracklin, for instance, took the stand on the first day of testimony. He 
held out a medal that dangled from a black ribbon, marked on the back with George 
Washington’s signature and the date of 1789.206 “I want to speak for the tribe, and I want the 
Indians to speak for them, because I am their chief,” he stated, presenting the medal as evidence. 
He traced his authority as ogimaag to his mother and grandfather, “the Chippewa chief from this 
district.”207 By this district, Bracken meant Rice Lake, now outside the reservation. His 
grandfather Nena’aangabi signed the Treaty of 1854 at LaPointe, and his mother, Aazhaweyaa, 
attained fame as a skilled warrior who defended her People’s territory against the Dakota.208 
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“See that medal. Nobody else here has a medal like that,” he proclaimed to the crowded room.209 
He seemed to testify primarily to make his claim as ogimaa. He answered no other questions, 
except to say that he endorsed what his fellow Ojibwe had already said.210 Bracklin’s testimony, 
however suggests the ways that the Lac Courte Oreilles validated leadership. The medal, much 
like the ones Naynahkawkanape refused to turn over to the DIA, represents the relationships 
established through negotiating alliances and treaties during the nineteenth century, and they 
evoked a chain of kin through which he made his claim. Leadership remained enmeshed in the 
relational network of peoplehood.  
 William Wolf spoke at the same meeting. Wolf, once a strong, able-bodied hunter, fisher, 
and guide, suffered from TB that would claim his life within the year and had already left hm 
pale, shrunken, and unable to raise his voice above a whisper.211 He made no claim to be chief, 
but he spoke with authority about eighteen thousand dollars worth of stolen timber that 
disappeared from tribal lands in 1926. He objected not only because no one compensated his 
People but also because no one bothered to consult them before removing the timber.212 Unlike 
Bracklin, people from Lac Courte Oreilles entrusted Wolf with their charges. He had traveled 
home from a sanitarium in Iowa to testify.213  
 Unfortunately, Wolf’s illness, itself a product of colonialism, killed him several months 
after the hearings, and, despite his symbolic relationships, Bracklin seemed to lack the 
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widespread support required of a successful ogimaa. As the testimony at the hearings reveals, the 
Lac Courte Oreilles People faced relentless encroachment by Settler forces, both on their internal 
and external sovereignty. To face those challenges to their peoplehood, they turned to questions 
of leadership and governance. The multiple ogimaag and emerging adaptations represent not 
instability but rather the continued vitality of a system of leadership that drew power from 
peoplehood.  
 Following the Congressional hearings, Anakwad and Kingfisher became increasingly 
influential. Initially, they worked together. In October, several months after the Congressional 
visit, Congress dispatched Charles Smith to visit the reservation and sort through the Lac Courte 
Oreilles People’s complaints. Anakwad and Kingfisher both played prominent roles at the 
meetings alongside Oshogay and Pete Wolf, whom Ojibweg at a meeting held on February 20 
identified as chief.214 Kingfisher stepped into the role of spokesperson, reading a previously 
prepared petition, relaying grievances from those unable to attend, and acting as interpreter.215  
 At the two general council meetings with Smith, the Lac Courte Oreilles People and their 
leaders connected what the federal government considered petty complaints to the core of their 
peoplehood. They charged Hayward Superintendent Willis T. Ryder, who earned the distrust of 
Lac Courte Oreilles men and women almost as soon as he arrived in 1924, and the federal 
government with overstepping their authority and neglecting reciprocal obligations rooted in 
treaty relationships.216 In addition to Ryder’s disregard, the people of Lac Courte Oreilles 
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focused on three major concerns: that Ryder refused to provide funds and health care, that their 
land base continued to erode, and that the state prevented them from exercising their treaty-
protected hunting and fishing rights.217 Oshogay raised the issue of treaties once the conversation 
turned to the Wisconsin Conservation Department’s arrest of Mike Gokey and Ed Blanchard for 
trapping beaver on the reservation. Oshogay told Smith that “it was a common understanding 
that they [the Ojibwe] were allowed to trap outside the reservation on ceded land.”218 Smith 
hesitated to support the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s rights, promising to check with the Justice 
Department, which led Louis Quarderer, a fifty-year-old resident of Reserve who worked in the 
woods during the winter and as a guide during the summer, to ask, “Are these Treaties still in 
force?” Again, Smith could only promise to check with the Justice Department.219 
 Anakwad rebuked Smith as a representative of the federal government. Standing before 
his People, he said, “Ever since I have been able to remember there were instances where my 
ancestors made trips to Washington. They were sitting around a table just like we are here, the 
Indians and the representatives at Washington. God hears everything that we say here today.”220 
Anakwad likened Smith’s visit to treaty negotiations, asserting that the general council gathered 
on the ishkonigan had authority that matched the nation-to-nation negotiations of the previous 
century. He went on to invoke the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s preexisting rights to the land and 
its resources, emphasizing the importance of hunting and fishing to the People. By calling on the 
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People’s relationship with the aki to establish their sovereignty, Anakwad positioned both 
himself as ogimaa and his People as a sovereign entity within Anishinaabeg peoplehood.  
 Similarly, Kingfisher advocated for his Peole’s sovereignty. Challenging Ryder’s 
authority, he portrayed Ryder as meyaagizid. He chipped away at the agent’s integrity as he 
presented numerous complaints that he had gathered from his neighbors and supported those 
who came in person. Ryder “says he is too busy” when Ojibweg made the often thirty-six mile 
roundtrip to speak with him about their individual money accounts, allotment sales, or even sick 
relations in need of a doctor. Mrs. David Belille believed that her husband died of pneumonia 
because Ryder refused her a doctor and she could not obtain one on her own for another week. 
Ryder refused Anakwad’s son Frank Cloud a doctor as well, and his wife Anna “performed the 
operation” herself in desperation.221 John White, a World War I veteran, accused Ryder of 
intimidating the Ojibweg he was supposed to serve. When he entered Ryder’s office to ask about 
his accounts, “You had a big six shooter on your desk. When somebody goes up there you chase 
them out of your office.”222 Kingfisher relayed a similar complaint from a sick elder, translating, 
“He says we may be ignorant but we are not dumb.” To the contrary, Kingfisher asserted, the 
Ojibwe could take care of their own affairs if they only had a chance.223 Kingfisher summarized 
the chargers against Ryder, “That is what he is placed here for to look after the Indians.”224 
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Ryder not only trespassed on Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty but also refused to enact the 
reciprocal relationships of an ally as representative of the United States government. From the 
perspective of Kingfisher and the other men and women at the meeting, Ryder’s failures negated 
his authority.  
 Smith’s visit accomplished few immediate changes. Ryder remained employed, and 
allotments continued to pass out of Ojibwe hands while Wisconsin game wardens persisted in 
arresting Ojibweg who exercised their treaty rights. The Lac Courte Oreilles People continued to 
meet in general council and the Tribal Council periodically convened. Meanwhile, the Great 
Depression weakened already strained economic networks, but it also presented new 
opportunities. Many Ojibwe, for instance, took advantage of CCC-ID and road project work that 
provided cash or aid to hungry families.225  
 The heavily promoted components of the IRA—land reform, financial aid, and self-
government—touched on the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s main concerns, as revealed in the 
1930 meetings with Smith. The organization component triggered more controversy at Lac 
Courte Oreilles than it had at Turtle Mountain, although once again the legislation merely 
highlighted existing questions about governance within Settler colonial constraints. Kingfisher 
and Anakwad disagreed about how the IRA might affect their People. Kingfisher found a 
practical tool to support sovereignty in the legislation, while Anakwad feared it would disrupt 
traditional patterns governance and diminish sovereignty.  
 In March 1934, the Lac Courte Oreilles People met in general council to discuss the 
Wheeler-Howard Act. Many men and women distrusted the proposed legislation. A group of 
elders led by Anakwad, John Mustache, Sr., Dan Homesky, and George James wanted to send a 
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delegation to Washington to meet with federal officials directly, as their fathers and grandfathers 
had done. They worried that the reorganization and land reform promised by the bill would 
“interfere with their treaty claims.”226 Already, state and federal officials ignored or openly 
violated treaty-protected relationships, arrested hunters and fishers, flooded their manoomin, and 
restricted manidookewin. Anakwad, Mustache, and many other Lac Courte Oreilles men and 
women, both old and young, undoubtedly worried that this new law would continue to disrupt 
relationships with the land and its resources and undermine their peoplehood. They wanted to 
force the federal government to recognize the sovereign relationships establish by earlier treaties, 
not enter into new agreements with uncertain outcomes. Kingfisher, meanwhile, felt cautiously 
optimistic about the legislation.227 When the general council elected representatives from the 
primary oodena to form a committee to explore the bill, a move promoted by Collier and also 
taken at Turtle Mountain, Kingfisher not only represented New Post but also served as chairman. 
The remainder of the representatives included several well-connected Ojibweg such as John 
Mustache, Jr., son of John Mustache, Sr., and active in the Midewiwin; fifty-year-old Mayme 
Setter Perkins, originally from Rice Lake; and mixed-descent member of the migizi (eagle) 
doodem Jim Bisonette, also in his fifties, who drummed and participated in the Midewiwin.228  
 A few weeks later, on April 16, nearly seventy Lac Courte Oreilles men and women met 
at the Whitehead Church to choose delegates for the meeting in Hayward. The “poor 
representation,” which seemed to consist primarily of people from Signor, Reserve, and New 
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Post, perhaps can be explained by the hesitant mood among the People.229 The meeting, 
however, occurred during maple sugaring season when many families had moved to their 
iskigamiziganan. Kingfisher and Perkins remained as delegates, with Jim Bisonette as an 
alternate. John Mustache, Sr., replaced his son, and the people also chose Peter Wolf, John 
Quarderer, and Frank Thayer to represent their interests at the upcoming conference with U.S. 
leaders in Hayward. The shifts in composition likely reflected changes in who attended, but 
choosing the elder Mustache and Peter Wolf may have reassured those who shared Anakwad’s 
distrust of the pending legislation. Regardless, the chosen delegates represented a variety of Lac 
Courte Oreilles interests and communities, reflecting the power of the People in decisions about 
governance.  
 Kingfisher and the rest of the delegates attended the two-day regional conference to hear 
federal officials describe the Wheeler-Howard Bill and report back to the People. On a cold 
morning in late April, the Lac Courte Oreilles delegates traveled the short distance to the 
Hayward Indian School, where many of them had likely attended as students, along with 
Ojibweg and other Indigenous Peoples from Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan. Collier did 
not attend the meeting, and Assistant Commissioner William Zimmerman, Jr., led in his absence. 
The morning opened with speeches by Zimmerman and Walter V. Woehlke, the regional field 
representative. Frank Smart, Bad River Ojibwe from Odanah, interpreted.230  
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 As he listened to the words in both his languages, Kingfisher heard aspects that reassured 
him and some that he knew would trouble his People. Zimmerman highlighted the main features 
of the bill: ending the catastrophic policy of allotment, restoring land bases, and organizing “for 
local self-government and for doing business in the modern, organized way.”231 Zimmerman 
spoke of power, telling the chilly but receptive room, “Only organized groups have power in the 
white world.”232 Kingfisher, who had seen the effects of unequal power relationships when the 
Winter dam flooded the ishkonigan and in the aftermath when the power company failed to 
compensate the Lac Courte Oreilles community as promised, may have listened hopefully to a 
plan for self-determination. When Woehlke took the stage, he emphasized the centrality of land, 
both stopping and restoring its loss. Woehlke declared that “everything else is an accessory,” 
presenting the bill as a way to protect Ojibwe lands and resources—the very topic that occupied 
so many general councils at Lac Courte Oreilles during the previous decades.233 He portrayed the 
self-government proposals as a means to this end, while taking care to point out that organizing 
remained voluntary.234 Kingfisher may have felt less receptive to Woehlke’s comment, “But, you 
must start sometime,” as if Kingfisher had not been exercising self-government as part of the 
Tribal Council, which itself extended Ojibwe governance from a time long before Settlers 
arrived to interfere with Ojibwe sovereignty.235 The meeting broke for lunch, and the subsequent 
sessions allowed Ojibweg to ask questions and raise concerns. 
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 Treaties and treaty rights consumed much of the Ojibwe delegates’ energies. Many feared 
that accepting the bill would be like entering into a new treaty, one that potentially erased the 
agreements that preceded it.236 Jerome Arbuckle, Bad River, concisely stated Anishinaabeg 
concerns, “If this bill takes away our hunting and fishing rights it takes everything away from us 
and will be of no benefit to us.”237 The Ojibweg needed to be sure that this new legislation—
presented as an agreement into which they could willingly enter—supported the treaties that 
protected their peoplehood. Additionally, as concerned the ogimaag of Turtle Mountain, the 
Ojibweg at the meeting worried that the bill would interfere with pending claims intended to 
force the federal government to honor the relationships in the treaties their fathers and 
grandfathers had signed.238 Despite repeated assurances from present officials, distrust remained.  
 When the time came for Lac Courte Oreilles delegates to ask their questions, they 
focused on issues surrounding land. They wanted to know how the government planned to 
repurchase alienated lands—what prices would the government consent to pay, for instance, and 
would lakeshore lands be included? They had raised the issue of landless families in general 
council, including at the February 1930 meetings, and the Lac Courte Oreilles representatives 
wanted to know, “Does the Government intend to purchase enough land to restore the 
reservation to its original size?”239 Zimmerman could make no guarantees, and the delegates 
undoubtedly carried the hesitant answer home.240 
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 Kingfisher and his fellow delegates questioned whether the bill before them reflected 
Ojibwe relationships with aki. The delegates listened as the Director of Forestry, Robert 
Marshall, spoke about timber as “profitable.”241 He saw continued logging of ishkonigan 
mitigoog as the future of Ojibwe resources, suggesting that “most of you could make a living on 
timberlands if you also had farms to operate.”242 On the second day, in response to a Lac Courte 
Oreilles question about economic opportunities, officials replied with a range of activities 
including hunting, fishing, and logging—“in fact any activity that can be carried on,” including 
off-reservation work. John R.T. Reeves, chief counsel for the Office of Indian Affairs, then 
returned to timber, which he said the Ojibweg “will find more profitable” once repurchased land 
consolidated solid blocks.243 The emphasis on timber likely unsettled Lac Courte Oreilles men 
and women whose experience with logging on their ishkonigan was marred by exploitation.  
 Like the majority of the Peoples in attendance, the Lac Courte Oreilles delegates 
remained undecided when the second day closed. Concern lingered about the security of their 
treaty rights if they accepted the bill, and they had information about continued logging. They 
also, however, had the promise of restoring a unified ishkonigan. They seemed most skeptical 
about the self-government portion of the bill. In one of their final questions, they asked, “What 
will become of a class of people who after this bill passes will vote themselves out of the self-
government feature of the bill?”244 Foreshadowing the final outcome, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
delegates hesitated to embrace the Wheeler-Howard Act’s version of self-government.  
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 The delegates selected Kingfisher to give the final remarks for the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People. He began by thanking Zimmerman for the meeting. Rather than limiting his speech to 
the content of the bill, however, he seized the opportunity to correct the federal government’s 
misconception about the lack of organization at Lac Courte Oreilles. After pointing out that Lac 
Courte Oreilles men and women functioned effectively in local Settler-dominated town 
governments, he rebuked federal officials such as Ryder for refusing to recognize the Lac Courte 
Oreilles People’s sovereignty.245 “There has been reason to complain of the fact that there was no 
say as to the disposition of property and funds” under the current relationship between the 
federal government and the Lac Courte Oreilles People, he stated, points which the general 
council had raised on the ishkonigan. He believed that the bill acknowledged “the right to vote 
their opinions as to what should be done with the property, both real estate and financial,” of his 
People—and to have that voice matter.246 He openly supported the bill, including the self-
government aspect. Kingfisher’s speech hinted at the resistance the bill would encounter in the 
ensuing years. To those who opposed the Wheeler-Howard Act, which included Anakwad’s 
close advisor and Kingfisher’s fellow delegate John Mustache, Kingfisher expressed hope that 
“they will be broad-minded enough to submit to the will of the majority.”247 Exactly which 
perspective included the majority of the Lac Courte Oreilles People, however, caused 
considerable debate among the men and women of the ishkonigan.  
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 During the next several months, the Lac Courte Oreilles People discussed and debated the 
IRA. Federal officials visited the reservation in October to assess the People’s attitude toward the 
bill. Lac Courte Oreilles was the first reservation they visited, and, according to clerk Frank 
Smart, who served as interpreter at the Hayward meeting, it “was the only reservation in which 
we encountered any dissension.”248 Two hundred men and women attended the meeting with 
federal officials, and Anakwad, John Mustache, Dan Homesky, and George James—“the older 
chiefs of the reservation”—spoke against accepting the act. At least part of their reluctance came 
from concerns about treaty rights and pending claims. Without identifying who spoke, Smart 
recorded their speech as follows:  
Many years ago our forefathers sat at a table in conference with government 
officials from Washington, as we are doing today. At that conference our treaties 
were negotiated with the government. The promises contained that paper were 
never fulfilled. Today we are being visited by government officials who are 
bringing with them a new law. I say that before we adopt or accept this new law, let 
government straighten out those violated treaties that were made with our 
forefathers.249 
 
They questioned the new legislation’s relationship with the alliances that previous generations of 
Ojibweg had secured to protect their peoplehood, reminding visiting federal officials that the 
rights the Wheeler-Howard Bill proposed to bestow already resided in their People’s 
sovereignty. Additionally, the men and women at the meeting expressed concern that, according 
to reports from the delegates at the Hayward conference, the federal government intended to use 
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repurchased lands “for forestry purposes and not for the Indians,” which aggravated existing 
conflicts over land usage and implicated peoplehood.250  
 On December 15, 1935, the People voted. Out of a voting population of about 870 adults, 
381 cast ballots. Kingfisher, enthusiastic in supporting the bill, drove to the surrounding towns of 
Couderay, Radisson, and Winter to collect ballots, accompanied by two Indian Service officials. 
When he learned of Kingfisher’s excursion, Anakwad found these visits suspicious and accused 
Kingfisher and the government officials of manipulating the vote.251 A margin of thirty-one votes 
determined the outcome. The Lac Courte Oreilles People had accepted the IRA, by a vote of 206 
in favor to 175 opposed. The close vote revealed the continued uncertainty within the community 
about how best to protect their peoplehood.  
 Anakwad, along with John Mustache, Sr., Dan Homesky, and George James, spoke for 
those who believed that the legislation threatened Ojibwe relatonships. Pointing to Kingfisher’s 
car tour, Anakwad questioned the legitimacy of the vote. He noted one woman in Winter who 
reported that the officials had suggested that voting yes would “give her assent towards building 
a town hall in the village of Post,” and they told a man at the newly-built Hayward Indian 
Hospital that if the bill failed to pass, his job might no longer exist.252 Moreover, although 
Washington officials instructed that absentee members could vote as long as the “retain[ed] 
[their] tribal interest,” Anakwad asserted that many of the people Kingfisher visited were “people 
whose parents or grandparents left the reservation forty years ago, or more, who abandoned their 
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tribal rights and who don't have any intention of getting back on the reservation and whose 
degree of Indian blood is less than a quarter.”253 Anakwad linked support of the IRA to lack of 
belonging in the inawemaagan networks that comprised the People.  
 Beyond accusations of fraud, however, Anakwad genuinely believed that the People 
neither wanted nor benefitted from the new legislation. The jurisdictional bill to allow the 
Ojibwe in Wisconsin to pursue their claims against the US government was pending in Congress 
at the time of the vote, and it passed the following summer. Anakwad felt that the IRA distracted 
from the more serious business of obtaining justice for broken treaties and flooded graves.254 
 While Anakwad tried to undo the vote, Kingfisher worked to help the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People by moving on the the next step: drafting a constitution. Within a year, the committee, 
appointed at a general council meeting, had prepared a draft.255 Nevertheless, the process of 
creating constitutions allowed for considerable flexibility. Kingfisher and other members of the 
constitution committee made choices that reflected existing governance relationships embedded 
in peoplehood. Aware of the ogimaag’s dissent and their widespread support, the committee 
members chose a council rooted in community leadership. Section III of the proposed 
constitution allen for a council of twenty-one, twice the size of the current Tribal Council. They 
arrived at the number by assigning roughly proportionate representation for the main 
communities of the ishkonigan: eight from Reserve, four from New Post, four from Signor, two 
from Whitefish, and one from Barber, Round Lake, and Chief Lake, respectively. Article III also 
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provided for “an Executive Tribal Council composed of the four chief officers elected by the 
Representative Tribal Council.”256 The Executive Council would posses additional authority to 
appoint committees and boards, for instance the committee to oversee the new community 
building at New Post.  
 The Representative Tribal Council’s powers, outlined in Article VII, included the 
authority to manage economic endeavors and allocate tribal funds for “public purposes,” as well 
as establishing a supervisory role regarding tribal lands and resources—all, of course, within the 
standard deference of IRA constitutions to the Secretary of the Interior’s approval. These powers 
shifted the responsibility to protect relationships with the land and its resources—foundational 
aspects of their peoplehood—from decentralized general councils to elected leadership, although 
the tribal council preserved the central role of the oodenah. Additionally, Article VI stated, “Any 
action by the Representative Tribal Council under powers given to it by this constitution and by-
laws may be subject to a referendum of the people upon a written petition signed by a number of 
eligible voters equal to 25% of the votes cast at the preceding general election of the 
reservation.”257 The referendum provision formalized a place for the general council in the 
written constitution, especially important given Cavill’s reluctant attention to the voices of the 
People. Six of the ten approved constitutions for Ojibweg Peoples in Wisconsin, Michigan, and 
Minnesota included popular referendum and, with the exception of Red Cliff, required a petition 
from thirty percent of eligible voters, not merely those who voted in the most recent election.258 
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The Lac Courte Oreilles Constitution established a significantly lower threshold to initiate a 
referendum, which amplified the opportunities for men and women to participate in governing 
their People.  
 The constitution also established procedures to keep representation accountable to the 
People. Article V, which recognized the People’s power to remove leaders, required a mere one 
hundred signatures, or approximately one-eighth of eligible voters, to call a hearing.259 Again, 
the Lac Courte Oreilles constitution’s minimum threshold was lower than the average among 
Anishinaabeg Peoples in the region, which ranged from fifty names at Keeweenaw Bay to two-
thirds of eligible voters at Bay Mills.260 Nearly half of the Ojibweg Peoples either had no 
removal procedures or assigned that power to the governing body.261 The Lac Courte Oreilles 
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constitution committee paid special attention to the role of the People as a whole, undoubtedly 
influenced by the concerns of Anakwad and many other men and women who shared his views 
that an IRA constitution would disrupt traditional relationships, thereby undermining the 
People’s sovereignty, which they saw as rooted in the people themselves. From the perspective 
of Kingfisher, who wanted to preserve his People’s sovereignty by attaching it to the scaffold of 
new federal self-determination policies, the constitution accommodated the ogimaag’s concerns 
while providing a platform for Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty that could withstand impinging 
Settler officials and inconsistent policies.  
 On July 25, 1936, the constitution faced the People. The ballot asked the simple question, 
“Shall the proposed Federal Tribal Constitution and Bylaws for this reservation be ratified?” and 
provided a box to mark for yes and one for no.262 Compared to the vote on the IRA, the People 
presented a more unified opinion. Nearly three hundred people voted, one hundred fewer than in 
December 1934, and 214 of the voters rejected the constitution. A mere 68 approved.263 The Lac 
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Courte Oreilles People would continue without a written constitution. Rather than deciding the 
question of governance, however, the vote created new questions.  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles People had rejected a constitution but accepted the IRA. The 
IRA opened new opportunities for recovering land and accessing economic development funds. 
Without a constitution or charter, however, the Lac Courte Oreilles People occupied an uncertain 
position in the eyes of Settler officials. For instance, the IRA offered access to a revolving fund, 
which allowed for a continuous pool of money for loans, but the revolving funds required a 
constitution and charter. The tribal fund, meanwhile, resided in the U.S. Treasury, and any loan 
repayment returned to the Treasury rather than the People, which meant that Congress had to 
authorize action before the funds could be loaned out again. The lack of a constitution prevented 
Lac Courte Oreilles from using the aspects of the IRA that they presumably approved when they 
voted in favor of the legislation.264Anakwad may have hoped that rejecting the constitution 
would dissolve the Tribal Council and confirm the authority of ogimaag such as himself, but the 
Tribal Council remained and officials including Superintendent J.C. Cavill and Agent Blakeslee 
used the uncertain status to undermine Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty.  
 Despite lacking official Settler recognition through a constitution, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People governed the ishkonigan through a flexible if occasionally fractious blend of elected 
council, general council, and community-based ogimaag. In 1937 and 1938, the Lac Courte 
Oreilles People continued to hold annual elections for the Tribal Council. The 1938 election took 
place on February 26. A mere 82 people attended the general council, where the election 
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followed nominations.265 The general council nominated eighteen men, including Kingfisher, 
John Mustache, Charles Wolf, John Mike, and Tom Miller. Miller, a carpenter, received the most 
votes at 70, and 68 people voted for Kingfisher, while Mustache earned a mere 17 votes and 
Charles Wolf 23. The final council of 9 consisted of Miller and Kingfisher, as well as Henry La 
Rush, Elwood LaRonge, Joe Trepania, Joe Larson, Edward Slater, Frank Setter, and Fred 
Smith.266 
 Anakwad objected. He believed the elections essentially imposed the self-government 
under the Wheeler-Howard Act, which the People had rejected when they voted against the 
constitution, and he insisted that the federal government recognize the traditional ogimaag, or 
“chiefs and headmen,” as the true representatives of the Lac Courte Oreilles People.267 The 
younger John Mustache had attended the poorly-attended general council meeting for the 1938 
election, where the attendees nominated but did not elect him, but his father, Anakwad, Dan 
Homesky, and George James abstained, in part because they refused to legitimate the Tribal 
Council and also likely in hopes of rendering the election illegitimate because of low voter 
turnout. Cavill convinced Commissioner Collier to approve a statement in the election notices 
that said a majority vote by those present would determine the outcome rather than a majority 
vote of those enrolled, and the BIA confirmed the election.268 
 Throughout the next two yeas, tensions continued to simmer regarding the contested 
visions of Ojibwe governance represented by Kingfisher and Anakwad. In their pursuit of 
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sovereignty, agent J.C. Cavill noted, the Lac Courte Oreilles People earned the distinction of 
being “one of the most trying groups I have had to work with at this jurisdiction.”269Although 
Anakwad objected, Kingfisher, the new Tribal Council president Tom Miller, and the rest of the 
Tribal Council continued to lead with their authority only tenuously recognized both by the 
People and by Settler officials. The council, helmed by Miller and Kingfisher, worked to fulfill 
the promises of the IRA that had most attracted their support: reclaiming lands and resources. 
Early in 1938, Cavill wrote to his superiors to inquire whether he could override the Tribal 
Council to grant permission for individuals to build homes on tribal lands.270 The Tribal Council 
refused to allow any new construction without seeking approval through a general council 
meeting, a position that remained consistent since the conflict regarding the LaRonges’ store in 
1928.271 Cavill wrote to Collier, “The Indians contend that this reserve belongs to them. We have 
repeatedly tried to make them understand that this is Government-owned land and not tribal 
property,” and the Ojibwe can only live there at the federal government’s will.272 The Tribal 
Council disagreed, and by insisting on holding a general council meeting before distributing land 
they recognized the source from which they drew their authority to govern: the People.273 Land, 
the foundation of their peoplehood, was a resource whose access continued to be governed by a 
particular set of relationships that could not be delegated to a central authority. 
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 In 1939, a series of disagreements related to land use and resource distribution heightened 
the conflict. In September, Agency employee William Obern threatened to remove the pump 
financed by revolving funds on John, Jr., and Nellie Mustache’s land if the Mustaches failed to 
immediately repay their loan. “This well is located at the site of the semi-annual medicine dance 
grounds and at the time provides water for many people,” the younger Mustache protested.274 
Moreover, Obern’s demands violated the agreement with the Council that deferred payments 
until the summer ceremony, when the Mustaches intended to collect money from those who 
gathered and used the well.275 Federal officials transgressed ceremonial and kinship networks by 
demanding immediate payment, and both Anakwad and Kingfisher objected to the violation of 
their peoplehood.  
 The underlying disagreement involved who had the right to spend tribal funds and for 
what purpose. Distributing resources remained a function of ogimaaaag, established by 
aadizookanag and entangled in reciprocal relationships of inawemaagan. At a special meeting on 
August 8, 1939, Cavill asked the Tribal Council to transfer unexpended balances from the past 
three years’ agriculture and domestic aid accounts to the building fund, implying that this surplus 
remained after individual Ojibweg had already received aid. They transferred a total of $711.72 
from funds originally intended to help individual Ojibweg with buying seeds and plants, 
plowing, canning, and sewing supplies.276 The next winter, during a series of open meetings, the 
men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles came up with the idea of purchasing a tractor using 
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available funds. Miller explained, “We have such a hard time here every year to get any plowing 
done.”277 The BIA released the money, three thousand dollars, and two men headed out to pick 
up the machine. At the last minute, however, the Extension Agent turned down the proposal, for 
the funds were intended strictly for private loans. Anakwad demanded to know what happened to 
the money set aside for seeds and planting—the funds that the Tribal Council had, with 
insufficient information, transferred to the building fund several months prior. According to 
Miller, “this act by the office in my opinion has retarded all that we have accomplished along 
with the other group” by undermining how the general council had decided to distribute the 
People’s money.278  
 At approximately the same time, in mid-February, Blakeslee asked the Council to 
“discuss making suggestions” about customary marriages.279 Again, Anakwad and others who 
opposed the Tribal Council saw the Council’s involvement in Anishinaabeg marriage as 
violating what little authority the Tribal Council possessed. It proved to Anakwad that the Tribal 
Council threatened the foundational relationships of their peoplehood.  
 On the evening of April 24, 1940, tensions peaked. Anakwad, both John Mustache Sr. 
and Jr., and George James, Dan Homesky, and “[q]uite a number” of community members 
crowded into the hall along with the Tribal Council.280 Lawrence Obern, the Farm and Extension 
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Agent, tried to rally support for a committee to support new farm projects. Norman Guibord 
asked from where Obern intended to obtain the money for such projects. The Extension Division 
had no money. Bern planned to draw on tribal funds—the People’s money. Guibord replied, 
“Before we appoint that Committee, I think it would be proper that we ask the people whether 
they want that money spent that way or not.”281 Tom Miller quickly agreed. At open meetings, 
the men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles had discussed purchasing a tractor with their shared 
resources, much of which came from the dam payments. The tractor would be available for the 
use of all the People, rather than benefiting a few individuals. “Instead of getting this,” Miller 
objected, “we see this big farm project being put over on us.”282  
 Anakwad went a step further. He “questioned the validity of the Council in expending 
Tribal funds,” regardless of the purpose.283 Blakeslee dismissed the ogimaa, replying that both 
the Department and Congress recognized the Tribal Council as “clothed with the authority to act 
for their Band in all matters pertaining to their interests.”284 He stated that only Congress had the 
power to release the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s funds, for they were the “official guardians of 
the Indians.” Only an act of Congress could grant access to the flowage money, deposited by the 
Northern States Power Company, formerly the Wisconsin-Minnesota Light and Power 
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Company.285 The ogimaag and the elected Tribal Council agreed in their outrage regarding this 
denial of their autonomy.  
 Both groups believed they best fulfilled the obligations of ogimaag among the People. An 
exasperated Kingfisher “pointed out the fact that if this tribe had not rejected the Constitution 
and By-laws…which would have enabled us to secure separate appropriations for the purposes 
mentioned in this request for the use of the Tribal Funds, it would not have made it necessary to 
touch the Tribal Fund.”286 He insisted that individual loans were “the next best thing” to per 
capita payments. The elder Mustache, who did most of the speaking for Anakwad’s perspective, 
accused Kingfisher and the Tribal Council of “taking food right out of the mouths of the little 
ones who have had nothing from the Government.”287 Kingfisher, who felt equally confident that 
he had the People’s collective interest in mind, retorted that “it was the old faction who have 
continuously opposed and objects every constructive program designed to better the living 
conditions of our young people who was doing the robbery of the little ones, not the council.”288 
Although their views about how to do so remained diametrically opposed, Kingfisher and 
Mustache both emphasized the importance of honoring relational obligations.  
 Both Kingfisher and Anakwad emerged from the community building seething and 
determined to protect Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty. The following day, Anakwad, Mustache, 
and several others drove one hundred miles to Centuria, Wisconsin, where their kinsman Father 
Gordon now lived and worked. Gordon described the ogimaag as “violently opposed to the 
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Reorganization set-up,” which they felt the People had rejected when they decided against the 
constitution. Anakwad enumerated several distinct complaints. First, wrote Father Gordon, “The 
Indians allege that the so-called ‘tribal lands’ are no longer tribal but ‘government’ lands. The 
Indians have been requested to vacate.”289Additionally, they protested the use of tribal funds 
without the People’s approval—and they considered the Tribal Council an illegitimate 
mouthpiece for the People. To support this point, Anakwad submitted a petition signed by one 
hundred people, more than had voted in the last election, that stated, “We the undersigned 
members of the Lac Courte Oreilles tribe of Chippewa Indians did not give the tribal council of 
the Lac Courte Oreilles Reservation the right by vote to ask Congress or Indian Department for 
tribal funds to be used on the Reservation and it is understood that this money is being used 
against the will of the people of this Reservation.”290 They demanded the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs halt all expenditures “till permission is granted by the tribe by vote.”291 Finally, 
Anakwad believed that the Superintendent refused to acknowledge his authority as an ogimaa.  
 The three complaints highlighted Anakwad’s vision of governance and its relation to 
Ojibwe peoplehood: protecting the aki and resources, respecting the reciprocal relationships set 
out by aadizookanaag that valued decentralized decision-making, and the kinship relationships 
that underwrote the power of an ogimaa. Gordon demonstrated respect for these relationships 
when he transcribed the ogimaag’s complaints with a sense of urgency, warning Collier against 
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responding with “the bureaucratic routine method.”292 Instead, he asked for a federal 
representative to visit and meet with the ogimaag and the rest of the People.293 
 The ogimaag and the Tribal Council had the opportunity to meet with federal officials a 
few months later. In 1940, Collier sent Nez Perce anthropologist, activist, and Indian Service 
field agent Archie Phinney to Lac Courte Oreilles in response to Anakwad’s petition.294 Collier 
wrote to Father Gordon that Phinney’s visit would “explain the reorganization program,” but the 
disagreements among Lac Courte Oreilles leaders derived not from questions about the IRA but 
rather from differing visions of the best form of governance to protect Lac Courte Oreilles 
sovereignty.295 Phinney investigated by conducting individual interviews and meeting with 
general councils. Kingfisher presided over the first meeting on June 20. At this general council, 
the Tribal Council members defended their leadership. Kingfisher directed the focus of the 
conflict away from the perceived factionalism to Cavill and other federal officials. He suggest 
that the feelings of neglect expressed by Anakwad arose in part “because the Superintendent 
refuses to come out and visit them, even after they have invited him.”296 Kingfisher and the other 
Tribal Council members expressed willingness to share authority with or at least to consult elders 
and the People at large, and they suggested that, rather than internal disfunction, Settler officials’ 
narrow understandings of Ojibwe peoplehood fueled the conflict on the reservation.  
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 Phinney’s investigation revealed the reasons that Anakwad opposed the Tribal Council 
emerged in sharper detail. Like the Turtle Mountain People, the ogimaa and his supporters 
insisted on a view of Ojibwe-Settler relations rooted in a long history of reciprocity and 
alliances. They objected that relief benefits required work.297 Moreover, they believed that 
Blakeslee and Cavill, representatives of the United States, were “arbitrarily denying the use of 
reserve lands to Indian families.”298 They worried that the IRA would eventually result in the 
taxation of Ojibwe lands, a direct violation of their sovereign relationships with the land they had 
reserved. The most recent iteration of federal policies that thus far had only hurt, to Anakwad the 
IRA embodied U.S. interference.  
 Later interviews and meetings with Phinney further illustrated that the questions 
surrounding governance at Lac Courte Oreilles resulted not from petty, personal factionalism but 
rather from external attacks on their sovereignty. In both interviews and general council 
meetings, Kingfisher, Tom Miller, Anakwad, Mustache, and others could not separate the 
conflict between the Tribal Council and the “older group” from complaints against BIA officials. 
At a well-attended meeting held on July 2, the group opposed to the Tribal Council spoke first. 
Anakwad stood and stated that “the old-time leadership and activity on the reservation had been 
effective and good.”299 Tom Miller agreed and blamed the problems on “the irregular manner of 
handling tribal funds in which the wishes of the Business Council and the Indians were being 
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ignored by the Indian service personnel.”300 Using the example of tribal funds and the tractor 
incident, he argued that if only Cavill and Blakeslee had “adjusted to the situations of the Indian 
people” by allowing the Lac Courte Oreilles People to spend tribal funds for community 
investments rather than individual loans, then “other difficulties would not have arisen.”301 
Mustache made a nearly identical argument. According to the meeting’s minutes, he objected 
that the BIA expended tribal money “for individual purposes (Reimbursable Funds) in disregard 
of the general welfare of the band, indicating that the funds were originally intended for per 
capita payments.”302 He spoke against the Tribal Council, which he referred to as “mixed 
bloods” and not “the real Indian element,” but he criticized the lack of protection on the part of 
the federal government against state game wardens and the fact that the federal government 
required work to access relief benefits, which resulted in Ojibwe men and women “being 
deprived of their legitimate rights on the reservation.”303 Like Miller, Mustache’s argument 
circled back to Settler officials undermining Ojibwe decision-making and sovereignty.  
 The elder ogimaag met during lunch to prepare their vision of Ojibwe governance. The 
plan they presented to the People matched their arguments throughout the past six years. The 
first two points concerned treaty rights. They wanted to send a delegation to Washington to 
resolve the matter of unfulfilled treaties in a way that would “promote tribal interests.”304 The 
ogimaag also proposed to replace the Tribal Council with the “older group” as “a reservation 
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committee,” while “the younger people” would remain “as an advisory element.”305 Finally, they 
wanted all committee meetings to be open to the People as a whole, reflecting the 
zagaswe’idiwin. Settler notions of governance constrained the IRA’s imagining of Indigenous 
self-government as too narrow and inflexible to embrace the dynamic relationships of 
peoplehood. Phinney dismissed the ogimaag system as undemocratic. “Let the voters decide who 
shall represent them,” he said, as if championing the will of the People.306 Kingfisher, however, 
knew the network of relationships that comprised the Lac Courte Oreilles People. He responded 
in a more conciliatory manner, assuring Anakwad that the Tribal Council was “more than 
anxious to bring the Indians to an united stand and cooperative effort. Anakwad and Mustache 
applauded his sentiment, and the meeting ended with talk of harmonious relations.307 
 Following Phinney’s visit, the Lac Courte Oreilles People moved forward with their 
evolving system of governance. Anakwad, Mustache, and their fellow ogimaag remained 
skeptical of the Tribal Council as the best way to promote the People’s sovereignty, and the 
Tribal Council carried on with their monthly meetings and annual elections. The meeting held on 
October 30, a few short months after Phinney left, typified the tenuous cooperative leadership 
that continued to evolve. The regular meeting, led by Kingfisher at president Tom Miller’s 
request, attracted a large crowd—large enough that Cavill remarked on the size.308 Cavill raised 
the issue of customary marriages. The Council, whether because the crowd was watching or 
because of a genuine commitment to decentralized government, responded that “it was difficult 
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for the Council at this time to give any definite answer, as it would require a meeting with the 
general public and sound off the people as to what they think about the matter.”309 They deferred 
“the people at large,” clearly acknowledging the bounds of the Tribal Council’s authority.  
 Throughout the fall, the Tribal Council assigned land, approved small appropriations for 
wells and fences, and oversaw building projects, but when significant land or financial questions 
arose they again respected the people at large. In December, Guibord asked that Superintendent 
Cavill call a general council meeting to discuss the nine thousand dollars of their tribal funds that 
Congress had made available and to consider several enrollment applications. Moreover, when 
two reimbursement loan recipients fell behind on payments, Miller suggested that the question of 
adjudicating their repayment should “be referred to the General Council of the Indians as all are 
interested in these loans.”310 Much to Superintendent Cavill’s annoyance, the Lac Courte Oreilles 
People continued to convene zagaswe’idiwinan to discuss matters of governance. In 1941, as a 
dispute between the Lac Courte Oreilles People and the state of Wisconsin regarding treaty-
protected hunting and fishing rights demanded the People’s attention, the Tribal Council agreed 
to include Anakwad or another of the ogimaag in the delegation that traveled to Madison to meet 
with state representatives. Although he remained committed to the Tribal Council, Kingfisher 
had learned that respecting the ogimaag and the People was the only way to protect Lac Courte 
Oreilles sovereignty.  
 During the first decades of the twentieth century, the Lac Courte Oreilles People 
evaluated evolving systems of governance from the perspective of their peoplehood. In the heat 
                                                 
309 “Proceedings of the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribal Council in their Regular Monthly Meeting, Reserve, Wisconsin, 
October 30, 1940,” Oct. 30, 1940, CCF 1907-1939, Great Lakes, RG 75, National Archives, 24241-1937-054.  
310 “Proceedings of the Lac Courte Oreilles Tribal Council, Reserve, Wisconsin, December 27, 1940,” Dec. 27, 
1940, CCF 1907-1939, Great Lakes, RG 75, National Archives, 24241-1937-054.  
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of the moment, fearing the destruction of their peoplehood that had already survived so much, 
Kingfisher and Anakwad overlooked their convergences. Both agreed that Ojibwe governance 
remained essential to protecting their sovereignty. While both Kingfisher and Anakwad agreed 
that the authority to govern derived from relationships with the People, they envisioned differing 
conduits for that leadership. 
 
 With the chief’s medals entrusted to the care of the People, Naynahkawkanape found a 
way to lead and to protect Saulteaux sovereignty from the Settler forces that sought to diminish 
it. The contested election propelled Naynahkawkanape into action, and in 1932 he prepared to 
lead his People back to the haylands of their former ishkonigan where they planned to reclaim 
their homeland in the face of ethnic cleansing. Similarly, Kanick, Kingfisher, and Anakwad were 
at the forefront of evolving governance on their own ishkoniganan. At Turtle Mountain, the 
People experimented with new constitutional forms of organization, favoring a written 
constitution in 1932 and rejecting the Indian Reorganization Act three years later, while 
continuing the daily work of administering and protecting land, resources, and kinship networks. 
The occasionally acrimonious debates between ogimaag like Anakwad and elected 
representatives such as Kingfisher at Lac Courte Oreilles likewise demonstrate the continued 
dynamism of Anishinaabe leadership. The men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles asked not if 
the People should lead but how, and in between federal investigations and votes about the IRA, 
both ogimaag and elected council continued to contest the intrusive authority of Settler officials. 
Throughout Anishinaabewaki, the People never stopped governing. Their active, uninterrupted 
efforts to defend their ishkoniganan positioned the Lac Courte Oreilles, Turtle Mountain, St. 
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Peter’s Peoples in the 1940s and 1950s to insist on a dynamic vision of Anishinaabe peoplehood 
enshrined in the treaty relationships of the previous century.  
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Chapter 7 
 Gaaenakowinid:1 Enacting Sovereignty, 1930-1954 
 Gitchi Manitou, the Creator, breathed life through a Sacred Shell into Anishinaabe, the 
first man from whom the People take their name, and then the Creator placed Anishinaabe into 
the world. Long ago, the Anishinaabe lived far away on the eastern shores of Turtle Island, and 
Gitchi Manitou sent seven prophets to the Anishianabeg People to tell them that it was time to 
move west to the land where there was “the food that grows on water.” It took some 
convincing—the People were prosperous and happy—but most of the Anishinaabe decided to 
go. Gitchi Manitou sent a Miigis shell to lead them home again. Finally, after four or five 
hundred years of migration, they reached Mooningwanekaaning-minis, where manoomin grew in 
abundance and fish swarmed in the waters. The maple trees provided the Anishianabeg with 
sugar, and asemaa (tobacco) offered itself in order for the People to give thanks to the Spirits and 
maintain the balance. This place, extending from the Great Lakes to the prairies, was 
Anishianabewaki, the homeland of the Anishinaabeg People. When the light-skinned newcomers 
arrived, foretold by the same prophets who initiated the chibimoodaywin, new generations of 
Anishinaabeg protected the aki, the manoomin, and the asemaa—and the manidookewinan and 
aadizookanag they invoked. The People negotiated treaties that preserved on paper, in 
aadizookanag, and in lived experiences the relationship between the Anishinaabeg and their 
homeland. 
 Anishinaabe peoplehood survived a century of Settler colonialism aimed at erasing their 
existence. By the early twentieth century, the People had survived starvation, ethnic cleansing, 
                                                 
1 Gaaenakowinid means “that which was given to anishinaabeg to live by.” Scott Richard Lyons, X-Marks: Native 
Signatures of Assent (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010), 87.  
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flooding, and divided ishkoniganan. The Anishinaabeg had done more than merely survive; the 
men and women of St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte Oreilles actively shaped their 
Peoples’ futures in ways that supported their peoplehood. Evolving systems of governance in the 
1920s and 1930s positioned Anishinaabeg communities to continue to defend their sovereignty 
against corrosive Settler colonialism. In the 1930s and 1940s, Settler governments in the United 
States and Canada pursued new strategies to erase the existence of Indigenous Peoples. The 
Anishinaabeg, however, knew that alliance-making in the previous century connected them in 
living relationships that demanded certain obligations from Settler nations. Treaties became part 
of the People’s aadizookanag. Aadizookanag comprise one of the five pillars of peoplehood, and 
in the 1930s-1950s, Anishinaabeg evoked that sacred history to claim haylands, defy 
termination, and pursue hunting and fishing rights.  
 By 1954, one hundred years following the creation of the first ishkonigan, the 
Anishinaabeg Peoples were not in decline. They faced new challenges and threats to their very 
existence from Settler colonial powers still bent on erasing Indigenous presence. On the edge of 
the northern prairie, Settler colonialism endangered the Saulteaux of St. Peter’s existence as a 
distinct People. Amidst the ongoing process of ethnic cleansing, leadership on the ishkonigan 
passed from the Saulteaux to the Maškēkowak, and ogimaag such as Naynahkawkanape and 
Angus Prince feared that an election unravel the relationship that bound together the People. 
Naynahkawkanape had refused to hand over the medals as a way to void the election, and now 
he and Prince planned to occupy their former ishkonigan and reassert their rights under Treaty 
One. They defended the treaty and the land it recognized in Settler courts, and, when that 
strategy failed, with their labor.  
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 To the south, the Turtle Mountain People likewise encountered a Settler attempt to erase 
their People: termination. The Turtle Mountain People had managed to cling to the two 
remaining townships of their homeland through a century of Settler policies that aimed to 
exterminate their peoplehood. The men and women of Turtle Mountain spoke up against 
termination, and leaders such as Patrick Gourneau represented the People in formal testimony 
before Congress to prevent the disastrous policy from erasing their existence.  
Termination policies threatened the Lac Courte Oreilles People as well, but in the form of 
a state hungry for the People’s rich resources. The fight to protect Lac Courte Oreilles 
sovereignty against the state occurred at the local level, in confrontations between individual 
Ojibweg and state officials, but the underlying questions about resources, jurisdiction, and 
sovereignty affected the People as a whole. The St. Peter’s, Turtle Mountain, and Lac Courte 
Oreilles Peoples all returned to their treaties, which had become part of aadizookanag, to hold 
Settler governments accountable for the agreements that allowed the United States and Canada to 
exist. In courtrooms, haylands, and forests, the Anishinaabeg Peoples drew on the rights and 
relationships of nineteenth century treaties, which remained living relationships that sustained 
the People.  
“Because the ground is mine”: The St. Peter’s People Reclaim Their Ishkonigan 
 
 On a cold day in the early spring of 1932, a group of about twelve Saulteaux families, 
including Angus Prince and Naynahkawkanape, led their sleighs and wagons along the high 
ground of a half-frozen marsh, trudging through patches of slush as deep as ten inches. They 
were coming home to the land that held their ancestors’ bones, the land from which the 
Dominion of Canada had illegally separated the St. Peter’s People in 1907. Saulteaux men 
traveled every spring to trap wazhashkoog or muskrats on the St. Peter’s marsh from their new 
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reserve several hundred miles north, but this year, they had hidden mowers and building material 
under their horses’ hay and other supplies. This year, they were going to stay and reclaim the hay 
lands for the St. Peter’s People.2 
 The confrontation in the haylands grew out of a century of Settler encroachment on 
Saulteaux sovereignty. When the St. Peter’s People negotiated Treaty One, or the Stone Fort 
Treaty, in 1871, they ceded much of their homeland for Settler agricultural use, but they reserved 
resource access and enough land to support themselves and future generations at their ishkonigan 
on the Red River. Despite their ethnic cleansing via the so-called surrender in 1907, the present 
generation of Saulteaux had not forgotten the promises enshrined in Treaty One. They had legal 
victories in 1912 that declared the surrender void, although the Settler government had 
implemented ethnic cleansing anyway, and for the past twenty-five years Prince, 
Naynahkawkanape, and other Saulteaux ogimaag had reminded the Canadian and Manitoban 
governments of the sovereign relationships enacted in Treaty One. Saulteaux defeat in the 
election of 1932 immediately precipitated the decision to occupy the haylands, which built on 
Naynahkawkanape’s defiant stand against turning over the medals. As the first signs of the 
March thaw began to loosen frozen waters, Naynahkawkanape, Angus Prince, and their fellow 
Saulteaux returned home.  
 The supposedly-erased ishkonigan remained part of the St. Peter’s People’s homeland. In 
addition to the families who continued to live on patented lands, Naynahkawkanape and many 
                                                 
2 Naynahkawkanape, Charles A. Thompson, John Manningway, Alfred Charles Flett, and Albert Alex to His Royal 
Highness King George V of England, 27 July 1932, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution 
of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve and Have Remained on It," 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181; “Fisher River Tribe Prepare 
For Winter at Old Reserve,” Winnipeg Tribune, Sept. 21, 1932, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve scrapbook, St. Peter’s 
Indian Reserve, Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3. 
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others camped in the marsh during the warmer months to access resources such as berries, hay, 
and muskrats. The “surrender” set aside approximately 3,000 acres of hay land near Netley 
Creek “for the members of the band having land in the present reserve or entitled to receive land 
under this agreement.”3 Current Peguis First Nation councillor Mike Sutherland, whose 
grandfather trapped near Netley Creek after the surrender, remembered, “There used to be 
hundreds of rat houses through that marsh.”4 Every spring, as the ice began to break up, 
Saulteaux trappers and their families loaded sleighs and wagons and trekked south to Netley 
Marsh. They camped on the hay lands through the fall, where they cut hay to feed their livestock 
when they returned to the new Peguis Reserve.5 Through their labor—erecting shelters, trapping 
muskrats, cutting hay—Saulteaux men and women enacted living relationships that connected 
them to their homeland and continued to practice the rights preserved in their treaty.  
 Although Saulteaux men and women used the hay lands continuously since their ethnic 
cleansing, trouble began in 1918. Five hundred sixty-one St. Peter’s men, women, and children 
still lived within the erased boundaries of their former reserve.6 Nevertheless, that spring, the 
DIA leased the hay lands to local businesses and Settlers.7 Inspector John R. Bunn informed 
those camping in the marsh that their “privileges”—as he called their access rights—had lapsed. 
                                                 
3 St. Peter’s Surrender.  
4 Manitoba Clean Environment Commission, "Transcript of the Proceedings Held at Fort Garry Hotel, Winnipeg, 
MB, Thursday, March 19, 2015,” Lake Winnipeg Regulatory Review under the Water Power Act, vol. 7, 
http://www.cecmanitoba.ca, accessed Oct. 14, 2015.  
5 Naynahkawkanape, Charles A. Thompson, John Manningway, Alfred Charles Flett, and Albert Alex to His Royal 
Highness King George V of England, 27 July 1932, "Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution 
of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on It," 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
6 “Indians of the old St. Peter’s Reserve who still have their home on the reserve,” 1917, "Correspondence 
Regarding the Leasing of Grazing Land on St. Peter's Reserve," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives 
Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
7 J.D. McLean to J.R. Bunn, 3 Apr. 1918, "Correspondence Regarding the Leasing of Grazing Land on St. Peter's 
Reserve," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
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Bunn encouraged the families to move to the new Peguis Reserve, but they replied that “they 
thought they could not go this year.”8 St. Peter’s families continued to access the marsh. By the 
early 1930s, 165 individuals lived on patented lands within the old reserve, and another 130 
squatted in the area.9 In 1931 amidst the worsening economic situation of the Great Depression, 
a group of Saulteaux living at St. Peter’s requested permission to cut additional hay to sell to 
local Settlers. The Department refused, and rumors circulated that the Department intended to 
sell the last portion of their homeland that the St. Peter’s People had reserved for themselves and 
their children.10 That winter, Naynahkawkanape lost the election to a Maškēkowak, and he and 
his fellow ogimaag led their People in a dramatic, public assertion of their sovereignty in the St. 
Peter’s haylands, using both the legal system and their labor. 
 The Saulteaux disseminated their position in a series of petitions and interviews with 
local newspapers. They refused to recognize the election of Maškēkowak leaders and instead 
retained Naynahkawkanape as their primary ogimaa, along with the Saulteaux members of his 
council, and designated English-educated Angus Prince as their speaker. In a letter to the 
Superintendent General of the Department of Indian Affairs, the Saulteaux at St. Peter’s 
declared, “We the chief, council and band of Indians have reclaimed and took possession of our 
                                                 
8 J.R. Bunn to D.C. Scott, 29 Mar. 1918, "Correspondence Regarding the Leasing of Grazing Land on St. Peter's 
Reserve," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
9 Inspector Christianson, “Inspector Christianson’s Report on the Clandeboye Agency,” 19 Jun. 1931, 
"Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 
Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on It," Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives 
Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
10 M. Christianson to Mr. Graham, 19 Jun. 1931, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of 
Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye 
Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181; D.C. Scott to Graham, 24 Jul. 1931, 
“Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 
Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives 
Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
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Reserve back.”11 They acted not as a faction or a fractured group but rather as a unified People. 
They insisted that the hay lands had not been included in the surrender, and, anyway, the 
removal agreement was “made through fraud in robbing us of our reserve and a great deal of our 
treaty rights.”12 They warned the federal government to stop leasing the hay lands because the 
“band of Indians are going to make use of the whole marsh this season.” Asserting their 
sovereignty, Naynahkawkanape wrote, “If you fail to comply with this request, proceedings will 
be taken in order to have matters adjusted.”13  
 The 1871 treaty remained central to their argument. Naynahkawkanape’s father Thomas 
Greyeyes, then ninety, had participated in the Stone Fort negotiations, and he told his son and 
grandson what he had witnessed. The relationships represented by the treaty extended back 
through aadizookanag, and Treaty One preserved the Saulteaux People’s Creator-given right to 
the aki. The elder Greyeyes carried these sacred relationships forward when he joined his son 
and grandson in the hay lands.14 Naynahkawkanape drew on his father’s knowledge when he 
addressed the living descendent of the Settler alliance-makers, the king, “We would quote the 
stipulations of our treaty: That if we ever get tired of our reserve, first of all we would lay the 
matter before the Crown of which was not fulfilled when the surrender of St Peters [sic] was 
                                                 
11 Chief Nanahkawkonape and Angus Prince to H.M. McGill, 26 Dec. 1932, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing 
Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have 
Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
12 Chief Nanahkawkonape and Angus Prince to H.M. McGill, 26 Dec. 1932, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing 
Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have 
Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
13 Chief Alex Greyeyes to A.G. Hamilton, 22 Jun. 1932, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the 
Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on 
It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
14 “Fisher River Tribe Prepare for Winter at Old Reserve,” Winnipeg Tribune, Sept. 21, 1932, St. Peter’s Indian 
Reserve scrapbook, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 
3. 
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made, of which we consider null and void.”15 In leveling his ultimatum about the haylands at the 
DIA, Naynahkawkanape acted intentionally to “make a stand for what he considered a violation 
of the treaty of 1871, by which the Indians were assured possession of lands and rights in 
perpetuity.”16 In addition to speaking and writing about the treaty, embedded in aadizookanag, 
Naynahkawkanape and the other thirty to thirty-five families lived out the sacred relationships in 
the 1871 agreement as they got to work, cutting poplar poles to erect shelters, trapping, and 
making hay to assert their inherent rights as Saulteaux to access their ishkonigan resources.17  
 The Department responded immediately, threatened by the display of sovereignty from a 
supposedly contained First Nation. Officials agreed on the need for “force,” although they 
desperately hoped to avoid press coverage. While the Saulteaux People understood that the 1907 
removal agreement protected the reservation of the hay lands, the DIA argued that only those 
who retained patented land had rights to the marsh. Inspector of Indian Agencies A. G. Hamilton 
called in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to issue eviction notices.18 After stern talking-tos 
and open threats from DIA officials failed to convince the Saulteaux to abandon the haylands, 
the R.C.M.P. arrested Greyeyes and eighteen Saulteaux men under Section 116 of the Indian 
Act, which granted the Department of Indian Affairs the jurisdiction to arrest Indians for 
                                                 
15 Chief Nayna[?] to the Governor General, May 9, 1932, C-13510, Elections and Resignations of Chiefs and 
Councillors, Fisher River Agency, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa, ON.  
16 “Fined $150 and Ordered to Move Tribe Off St. Peter’s Reserve,” no date, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve scrapbook, 
St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3. 
17 Article fragment, no date, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve scrapbook, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of 
Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3; “Chief Grey Eyes and the Peguis Election,” Winnipeg Tribune, Apr. 
13, 1932, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3.  
18 A.G. Hamilton to Secretary of the Department of Indian Affairs, Apr. 10, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding 
Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve 
and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
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trespassing on Crown lands and issue a fine of $5 per day.19 The trials were held in Exchequer 
Court between 1932 and 1934, prolonged by a series of stays and appeals. Department lawyer 
Theo A. Hunt at first agreed to suspend sentences and drop charges against anyone who moved 
off the hay lands and returned to Peguis, believing that making an example of two or three 
individuals would frighten the others into submission. Hunt was wrong. Hamilton and Fisher 
River Indian Agent G.W. Lavender, meanwhile, withheld treaty payments from the returned 
families, depriving them of the means to fund their legal defense.20 The St. Peter’s People 
continued to occupy the marsh despite threats and coercion.  
 The Saulteaux used the trials to frame the dispute as a disagreement between sovereigns. 
In a petition to Canadian Governor General Lord Bessborough, Naynahkawkanape and Angus 
Prince began by telling the story of the 1871 treaty negotiations, which confirmed that “we are 
the Saulteaux Indians, the nation which made the treaty with the British Empire.”21 Presenting 
themselves as a nation with a treaty-protected relationship with the Settler government supported 
their claim to authority over their lands and people as federal policy sought to erase their 
existence. They protected their jurisdiction by denying the R.C.M.P’s authority. Angus Prince 
demanded before the Exchequer Court, “Who has given you the authority to bring us to court 
                                                 
19 “Copy of Exhibit ‘1,’” The King vs. Alex Greyeyes, Jun. 10, 1933, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department 
of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3.  
20 R.C.M.P. Report, “Re: Indians, Peguis Indian Reserve,” Jul. 22, 1932, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing 
Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve and Have 
Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
21 Naynahkawkanape and Angus Prince to Governor General Bessborough, Jun. 4, 1933, “Correspondence 
Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s 
Reserve and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-
10181.  
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like this?”22 He argued that the 1871 treaty only allowed Dominion interference in cases of rape, 
murder, and theft.23 As 40-year-old member of the reoccupation Henry Pahkoo asserted, the 
Settlers were “doing the biggest stealing….We own that land and that is why we go and cut” the 
hay.24 Additionally, the Saulteaux refused to acknowledge the Indian Act, which officials used to 
justify their arrest. The Indian Act “conflicts with the stipulations of our Treaty.” Prince argued, 
“As we have a chief and councillors, our heads, representing the band of Indians, they are the 
men to consult before any law could be made.”25 The St. Peter’s People operated their own 
government distinct from—and equal to—Canadian institutions. With leaders such as Prince 
who studied not only Anishinaabe inaakonegewin (law) but also Settler legal systems, the 
Saulteaux strategically made the case for their sovereignty in terms Settler officials understood—
nation, jurisdiction, and democratic representation—while relying on their treaty for support.  
 By centering Treaty One, the St. Peter’s People protected an expansive, relational 
understanding of sovereignty rooted in the relationships of peoplehood. They understood their 
removal in terms of living relationships. In their formal list of complaints presented in court, in 
the press, and in petitions, Saulteaux ogimaag objected “that the new Reserve has segregated 
them away from their relatives, friends, and associates of long-standing,” straining vital kinship 
                                                 
22 Theo A. Hunt to A.G. Hamilton, Jun. 13, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution 
of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve and Have Remained on It,” 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
23 G.H. Lavender to A.G. Hamilton, Jun. 14, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution 
of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve and Have Remained on It,” 
Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181.  
24 “Department of Indian Affairs Prosecution of Indians for Trespass on Old St. Peters Reserve,” CDIA - Pegis 
Indian Reserve, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 2.  
25 Angus Prince, “Salteaux Indians and the St. Peter’s Reserve,” Sept. 24, no year, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve 
Scrapbook, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3.  
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networks.26 The Saulteaux men on trial for trespassing and the women who refused to move their 
families from their hay lands while their husbands awaited trial in jail drew on the understanding 
of ishkonigan as aki set aside for the People when they insisted that “no man under the sun could 
ever take it away from us.”27 The place where Netley Creek met the Red River held their 
ancestors’ bodies. The Creator had made it for them as their “birth-right,” as Angus Prince 
declared in a lengthy speech during Naynahkawkanape’s trial. Treaty One was more than a piece 
of paper signed by two sovereigns; an embodiment of aadizookanag, it evoked living 
relationships with ancestors, resources, and the Creator.28  
 The trial’s climax came in the summer of 1933, when Angus Prince put the federal 
government on trial for abrogating Treaty One. Prince turned a local trial about minor 
trespassing fines into a sweeping indictment of Settler colonialism and defense of Saulteaux 
sovereignty. The young Peguis descendant stood in a crowded courtroom on a hot July day and 
declared to DIA officials and the closest representative of the Crown he could find that a 
fraudulent surrender agreement could not break the living relationships embodied by Treaty One 
and inherent in Saulteaux peoplehood “as long as that sun shines and the river stream runs and 
the green grass grows.”29 Prince, whom the DIA had never charged, opened his statement “to 
argue that their ancient treaty be adhered to by the white man who have followed the 
                                                 
26 John L. Williams to Theo A. Hunt, May 25, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the 
Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve and Have Remained on 
It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
27 “Statement Made by Angus Prince,” The King v. Alex Greyeyes, Jun. 9, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding 
Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve 
and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
28 “Statement Made by Angus Prince,” The King v. Alex Greyeyes, Jun. 9, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding 
Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve 
and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
29 “Statement Made by Angus Prince,” The King v. Alex Greyeyes, Jun. 9, 1933, “Correspondence Regarding 
Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter’s Reserve 
and Have Remained on It,” Clandeboye Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
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representation of Queen Victoria in the dealings with the red men.”30 The Winnipeg Tribune, 
which had covered the case extensively during the previous year, recorded Prince’s monologue:  
“Your Worship,” he began, “I am very much surprised today in the way this court 
has been settled in regard to our question—very, very badly surprised. Never once 
did I thought ever such a thing could take place, under the sun, because as regards 
to my treaty the establishment of the treaty in 1871 still exists today as long as the 
sun shines and the river stream runs and the green grass grows. That is the emblem 
of our understanding. That is what is our defence [sic], the token which was taken 
when the late Queen Victoria—our most gracious, noble Queen Victoria—made 
treaty with the Indians. And ever since that time, after the treaty was made, 
finished, completed, everything, the book was right there. Everybody was given a 
chance to speak. The governor who represented the Queen of England at that time 
he had the book right open. Now he says, ‘if anybody wishes to say a few words it 
will be open for about n hour and whoever wants to speak, or say any more should 
come up.’ And so the book was open, and after that hour expired and it was 
closed….And now today how much amendments after amendments has been 
amended on the top of this great transaction, which is the real foundation of our 
treaty. This is the only defence [sic] we have. It is nothing else and we are going to 
speak for justice if there is any justice to go in Canada at all.”31  
 
Prince portrayed the Settler state as the criminals for violating the treaty. The courtroom heard—
and much of Winnipeg later read—how the Saulteaux “will never forget it as long as we live, the 
awful, dirty, mean way they always have treated us these last many years, ever since the winter 
of 1907 which was worse. Of course it was bad enough before that, but it was a thousand million 
times worse since.”32 Drawing on the treaty, as well as the preexisting Saulteaux “birthright,” 
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Prince claimed that the ishkonigan “exists today as our own, and everybody knows it 
everywhere.”33 Prince knew that Saulteaux sovereignty was a living and legal reality. By 
presenting a defense rooted in aadizookanag about the 1871 treaty and fraudulent 1907 
surrender, he hoped to force the court to acknowledge the reality of Saulteaux peoplehood.  
 Neither Prince’s speech nor the People’s testimony convinced the judge. With the Red 
River still flowing outside the courtroom’s windows, the court convicted Naynahkawkanape and 
the other defendants for trespassing and fined Naynahkawkanape $150 or three months in jail.34 
Magistrate Welsford, the judge who heard the case, believed that he lacked the authority to 
contradict the removal agreement, whatever arguments the St. Peter’s People and their ogimaag 
made.35 Because of the Dominion’s refusal to recognize Saulteaux calls to honor their treaty, the 
St. Peter’s People found themselves in the untenable position of defending national issues on a 
local stage. Legal remedies failed to protect the St. Peter’s People, as had happened with the 
Royal Commission and the St. Peter’s Act of 1916. Nevertheless, the St. Peter’s People used 
                                                                                                                                                             
haylands challenged the nationalist narrative that cast Canada in a benevolent role. This writer understood the 
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33 Frank T. Bownes, “Salteaux Indians Continue Fight to Retain the Lands Occupied by Forefathers,” Winnipeg 
Tribune, Jul. 1, 1933, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve Scrapbook, St. Peter’s Indian Reserve, Canada Department of 
Indian Affairs, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 3.  
34 The King v. Alex Greyeyes, Jun. 9, 1933, "Correspondence Regarding Grazing Lands and the Prosecution of 
Indians Who Have Not Accepted the 1907 Surrender of St. Peter's Reserve and Have Remained on It," Clandeboye 
Agency, RG 10, Library and Archives Canada, Microfilm Reel C-10181. 
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aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction it is binding on me and I must apply it.” His Majesty the King vs. Indians, 
trespassing on Old St. Peter’s Reserve, Manitoba, Jul. 20 and 27, 1934, and Aug. 4, 1934, Department of Indian 
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Affairs - St. Peter’s Reserve, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 2, 24.  
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other strategies of active resistance. The men and women of St. Peter’s used their labor to renew 
their claim to the ishkonigan.  
 At his trial, Henry Pahkoo, arrested for trespassing on his People’s reserved lands, 
addressed the political nature of his and his relations’ anokiiwin. The prosecutor asked Pahkoo, 
“Who does the Hay land or marsh belong to?” Without hesitation, Pahkoo replied, “It belongs to 
the Indian tribe,” clarifying that he meant the Saulteaux and not the Maškēkowak.36 Referencing 
his Saulteaux ancestors, he explained his People’s claim to the land, “My great grandfather 
owned this from the start.”37 Like Prince and Naynahkawkanape, he explicitly referenced the 
1871 treaty. Investigators asked Pahkoo whether he had a permit to cut hay from the marsh. “No, 
we don’t need any,” Pahkoo answered. He explained, “I am not trespassing because the ground is 
mine….Yes, I did cut hay and will cut more to [sic].”38 The act of cutting hay was the labor of 
sovereignty—sovereignty that remained vital despite Settler attempts to erase the St. Peter’s 
People from their homeland.  
 Supported by their labor in the marshes and hay lands, however, the St. Peter’s People 
remained in their homeland. Naynahkawkanape moved off the 3,000 acres—but only far enough 
                                                 
36 His Majesty the King vs. Indians, trespassing on Old St. Peter’s Reserve, Manitoba, Jul. 20 and 27, 1934, and 
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Manitoba, Canada Department of Indian Affairs - St. Peter’s Reserve, Archives of Manitoba, Folder 2, 42.  
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to put up a rough log structure on a road allowance over which the DIA had no jurisdiction. 
Other families relocated their tents to the road allowance or moved at least temporarily to 
surrounding Anishinaabe communities such as Brokenhead or the new Peguis reserve. Eighty-
year-old Murdo Sutherland built a shack “[i]n the bush on the bank of the river. I am not lying in 
the marsh where the grass is growing,” he told officials. It was far enough outside the DIA’s 
jurisdiction to grant him a stay.39 Some families squatted for years on the lands of relatives or 
sympathetic Settlers, and at least a dozen retained their patented land within the reserve’s former 
boundaries.40 John Pahkoo, one of the so-called trespassers, made camp on the land owned by a 
Settler named Eliott Ratt. “Never as long as I live” would he return to Peguis.41 Angus Prince 
likewise refused to accept the Peguis Reserve. He moved to Brokenhead, where he continued to 
advocate for his People and served as chief on the Brokenhead council in the 1950s.42 
 Convicted for trespassing in his homeland, Albert Pahkoo captured the attitude of his 
People at his sentencing in 1934. “We have been waiting for twenty-six years,” he said, “and I 
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guess we can fight another twenty-six years.”43 Even after the Department sold the hay lands in 
1947, the St. Peter’s People—sometimes known today as the Little Peguis People—remained in 
their homeland, unrecognized at least for the time but drawing strength from the relationships of 
their peoplehood.  
“We have our rights that we should keep”: The Turtle Mountain Fight against 
Termination 
 In the summer of 1953, David P. Delorme returned home to the Turtle Mountain 
ishkonigan. Delorme, a studious young man of 35, had been in Texas working toward his PhD in 
economics. Delorme grew up in a two-story frame house in South Belcourt, where his father 
Francis and his mother Margaret ran a small restaurant and pool hall. His parents’ business 
comfortably supported the family with an income of one thousand dollars per year, well above 
average for the impoverished, overcrowded ishkonigan.44 Francis and Margaret Delorme, who 
each had eight years in the boarding school system, valued education. David and his sisters 
attended public school and David left the ishkonigan to attend college by the time he turned 
twenty-one.45 With a loan from his sister and another from the Turtle Mountain Advisory 
Committee, David worked his way through school first in Oklahoma and then at the University 
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of Texas. In 1953, as the sun warmed the northern plains, he headed home, as so many Native 
scholars have done, to conduct fieldwork amongst his People.46  
 Delorme’s research investigated the economic and social conditions among Ojibweg on 
and around the ishkonigan.47 Perhaps sheltered by his family’s relative wealth, Delorme found 
that poverty ran deeper and opportunity much more shallow than he expected when he first 
began talking with his fellow Turtle Mountain men and women.48 In addition to the lack of 
resources, another topic alarmed both the scholar and his inawemaaganag. A few months earlier, 
word had arrived of legislation to withdraw already insufficient federal services and break up the 
reduced ishkonigan. Delorme talked to a lot of people—87 of the 692 families living on the 
ishkonigan—and they collectively opposed this new attack on their existence as a People.49 
Through his research Delorme spoke with Patrick Gourneau, a gregarious fifty-year-old with a 
dancer’s physique.50 Gourneau, who had an eighth grade education and spoke his prayers in 
Ojibwemowin, served as the current chairman of the Advisory Committee.51 He ran a successful 
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farm for twenty-three years until the Great Depression, and in 1953 he worked at the nearby 
Turtle Mountain Ordnance Plant that produced jewel bearings.52 Gourneau knew well his 
People’s challenges and hopes for the future. Gourneau, along with Delorme, emerged as his 
People’s main defender against the termination legislation that moved forward the following 
winter. They both knew, as Gourneau’s granddaughter Louise Erdrich later explained, that the 
Turtle Mountain People “had only two townships left on this tiny, tiny morsel of land, but the 
people of Turtle Mountain would not leave. They wanted their homeland.”53 In the year that 
followed Delorme and Gourneau’s conversation, they protected that homeland by proactively 
asserting their People’s inherent sovereignty.  
 By 1953, when both Delorme and rumors of termination arrived on the Turtle Mountain 
ishkonigan, the People had experienced some recent successes in their ongoing effort to protect 
their peoplehood. Overcrowding and scarce resources strained economic conditions. Nearly half 
of the 8,938 enrolled members lived on the reservation or in its immediate vicinity, and few with 
enough food on the table and even fewer with electricity or running water.54 Turtle Mountain and 
Dakota activist Leonard Peltier, currently imprisoned for the murder of two FBI agents at Pine 
Ridge in 1975, recalled the “brutal poverty” on the ishkonigan. As a child, he helped to put meat 
in the soup by killing birds and squirrels. His family was too poor to afford bread and milk, and 
Peltier grew up believing “that gnawing ache in my belly was just the way I was supposed to 
feel.”55 Despite its failures and continued questions about the organization’s legitimacy, the 
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Advisory Committee remained active.56 In the early 1940s, the Advisory Committee helped to 
direct a land recovery program, which required special legislation from the federal government 
because the Turtle Mountain People had rejected the IRA and its potential land programs.57 In 
1941 and 1942, the Advisory Committee acquired 33,700 acres of land in and adjacent to the 
reservation, which became tribal property protected by trust and which the Advisory Committee 
divided into 184 farmable units to lease to its many landless people.58 Hundreds of families 
remained without access to land, but the Advisory Committee increased tribal landholdings from 
a mere 167 acres, which Settler officials used for the agency building and school.59 The People 
recovered at least part of their ishkonigan.  
 Perhaps the most serious threat to that yet-unbroken sovereignty of the past one hundred 
years came in the form of federal termination policies in the 1950s.60 Termination extended the 
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previous century of assimilation policies to the logical conclusion inherent in Settler colonialism: 
eliminating Indigenous Peoples as distinct Peoples.61 Despite advances in land recovery and self-
governance, as at Turtle Mountain, the underfunded IRA failed to ameliorate the economic 
conditions on reservations that had prompted Collier’s reforms.62 Working from radicalized, 
politicized assumptions that reservation life—or Indigenous peoplehood—inhibited the so-called 
progress of Native Americans, Settler officials such as BIA commissioner Dillon Myer and 
Senator Arthur Watkins developed a policy to withdraw federal services, trust status, and 
recognition of Indian sovereignty, passing control to land-hungry states.63 Although termination 
involved a broad range of legislation and administrative acts, the cornerstone piece was House 
Concurrent Resolution 108. HCR 108 proclaimed that “it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as 
possible to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same 
laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of 
the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the 
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rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship….”64 It continued to list a preliminary 
group of Peoples including those in California, Florida, New York, and Texas that “should be 
freed from Federal supervision and control and from all disabilities and limitations specifically 
applicable to Indians”—“at the earliest possible time.”65 Alongside the Menominee People of 
Wisconsin and several others, Congress included the poor, hungry, and overcrowded Turtle 
Mountain People as targets to terminate.66 
 Their inclusion in HCR 108 shocked the Turtle Mountain People. The first inklings of 
termination policy had reached the ishkonigan several years earlier, in 1947. Late that summer, 
the Turtle Mountain Star reported on “the move in congress [sic] to emancipate Indians.”67 The 
Turtle Mountain People had appeared on then-commissioner William Zimmerman’s list of 
Native American Peoples “ready to be cut loose from federal control at once.”68 Zimmerman’s 
criteria included degree of assimilation, which comprised racialized factors such as blood 
quantum and “business ability,” economic conditions, willingness on the part of the People, and 
consent from the surrounding state, which would take over many of the services the federal 
government provided.69 North Dakota dissented, as did the Turtle Mountain People.70 Agent J.L. 
Diddick quickly advised his superiors that the action seemed “much too drastic” and “does not at 
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the present time fit in with the plans of the people of the reservation.”71 What the people needed 
was additional funding, not less. Diddick added that the goal of self-government and local 
control already directed his actions as agent.72 Diddick’s response reflected the statement 
released by the Advisory Committee in December. The Turtle Mountain People supported 
gradually rolling back federal involvement, but they knew that conditions on the ishkonigan 
prevent meaningful autonomy if the already scanty services disappeared. Moreover, as they 
made clear in pursuing their claim, Advisory Committee members such as Edward Jollie, Louis 
Marion, and Alex Martin believed the federal government remained obligated to support the 
“rehabilitation” of the People, who only needed rehabilitating because of Settler actions going 
back to the Ten Cent Treaty.73 After drawing attention to the Advisory Committee’s ongoing 
governance, they chastised the federal government for “the plight of this tribe,” including 
“economic distress” because of overcrowding on the two townships left to the People.74 
Undoubtedly, Jollie, Marion, and Martin believed that their statement not only reminded federal 
officials of Turtle Mountain sovereignty but also proved that Zimmerman had made a mistake in 
ever placing them on his list. 
 Termination moved forward with little regard for Turtle Mountain sovereignty. Nearly 
six years later, in 1953, the Turtle Mountain People learned that Congress had passed legislation 
to terminate their People by reading the news in local papers.75 Despite talk about Indigenous 
consent, the Settler Congress imposed termination on Indigenous Peoples, ignoring concerns like 
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those of the Turtle Mountain in 1947 and involving such little consultation that the Ojibweg only 
read about the Turtle Mountain termination bill after it had been drafted.76  
 The Turtle Mountain People acted swiftly to oppose the legislation and protect their 
People. Leonard Peltier remembers how news of impending termination swept through the 
ishkonigan. He captured the attitude of his People when he described termination policies as “an 
assault on our very existence as a people, an attempt to eradicate us.”77 Throughout the summer 
of 1953, now-chairman Patrick Gourneau and graduate student Delorme talked about the 
potentially disastrous legislation with other Ojibweg. In addition to crippling poverty, Delorme 
encountered staunch opposition among his inawemaaganag. In an appendix to his dissertation, 
Delorme included many of the responses to his questionnaire. Two thirds of the men and women 
he spoke to objected outright to ending their relationship with the federal government. Among 
the third that considered abolishing the Indian Service, many responded that federal officials had 
already broken that relationship. A typical respondent answered, “The Indian Service has never 
done me a darn bit of good. Instead, it’s been harmful.”78 The majority worried about the still-
unsettled claim. They also pointed to the threat to their peoplehood. One person stated, quite 
simply, “We have our rights that we should keep,” and another said, “I don’t want to be white.”79 
The men and women of Turtle Mountain recognized that termination threatened to undermine 
their peoplehood, which mobilized the community.  
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 One underlying argument against termination invoked the long-ignored treaty 
relationship between the People and the United States. On October 19, 1953, Patrick Gourneau 
opened a meeting in the crowded agency building, where as many as four hundred men and 
women had gathered to convince visiting federal officials to halt the legislation.80 Area director 
John M. Cooper read through the draft of the Turtle Mountain termination bill that the BIA had 
prepared in cooperation with Congress, despite his assurances that the People would have 
“amply opportunity for full expression.”81 Gourneau opened the floor to the People, who eagerly 
expressed their disdain for the legislation. Alex Martin asked the federal officials to explain, as 
simply as possible, the effects of the bill. One official summarized, “Simply, once and for all, it 
provides that there won’t be any more Indian Service for Turtle Mountain. There won’t be any 
more trust land and the Indians will be just exactly like the whites as far as the Government is 
concerned.”82 Mrs. Toby Martin rose to speak, stating, just as simply, “This bill does not suit her 
people.”83 Her People lived in poverty. Mrs. Martin then spoke of recent land agreements in 
terms that echoed generations of Ojibweg calling on their treaties: “They [the Ojibweg] were told 
the Government was buying land for them to live on as long as they lived; then it can be turned 
to their children to be in charge of it and take care of it.”84 Francis Poitra, a middle-aged Ojibwe, 
agreed. His People “want to be just as they are and so do I,” he said, reminding the audience of 
his People’s sovereignty and its inherent rights.85 He pointed to other Native American Peoples 
who had received money from the federal government, suggesting that Congress do the same for 
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the Turtle Mountain People—again emphasizing that the federal government remained bound in 
a network of obligation. Several speakers asked to postpone the legislation, to give the People 
more time to improve their circumstances—and then the requested more aid, rather than less. Eli 
Marion, recently appointed judge for the ishkonigan, suggested that the solution to the lack of 
law enforcement was not to open the ishkonigan to the state but to actually pay to support Turtle 
Mountain police and judges.86 One unidentified Ojibwe stated, “You know the only solution to 
the Indian problem—it is for the Government not to try to duck out from its obligations as 
promised to us long, long ago, but to appropriate enough money so we can live better….We 
don’t want to lose what benefits we have—we want more.”87 And the Turtle Mountain People’s 
treaty relationship with the United States obliged the United States to provide it. 
 Many men and women spoke of their ties to the aki. “We have a little place we call 
home,” one Ojibwe stated, “and we want to keep it.”88 Another unidentified Ojibwe recognized 
the legislation’s underlying Settler colonial intent, commenting, “They are just going to take our 
land away from us. In 5 years all the land on the Turtle Mountain Reservation would be in white 
hands and we would be trudging up the road with our children, trying to find a place to light.”89 
Similarly, Ojibwemowin speaker Louis St. Claire admonished federal officials, “Ever since the 
white man came to America, they have taken our riches. They have taken everything from us and 
what have they given us in return? Now they want to take this from us.”90 These speakers 
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invoked a sense of sovereignty rooted in the aki and its relationship to Turtle Mountain 
peoplehood.  
 Turtle Mountain peoplehood strengthened the Ojibweg’s resolve. Leonard Peltier, then a 
teenager who had recently returned to the reservation from boarding school, remembered 
vehement opposition and frequent meetings during this period. He contrasted this vigor with his 
own memories of constant hunger. “[T]here was hunger for everybody every day,” he recalled.91 
His hunger brought the young Peltier to a meeting one day, where he hoped to get something to 
eat afterward when the men and women discussing the fate of their People pooled groceries to 
close the meeting with a meal. The impassioned speeches of Ojibwe women, many crying from 
anger and generations of pain, drew him inside. He heard his inawemaagan Celia Decouteau. She 
rose “to speak with tears in her eyes, pleading for someone to help because her children were at 
home slowly starving to death. She asked if there were no more warriors among our men. She 
said if there was, why did they not stand up and fight for their starving children?”92 Delacourt’s 
plea revealed not only the urgency and human costs of Settler colonial policies but also the 
vitality of Turtle Mountain peoplehood, which continued to tie generation after generation of 
Ojibweg together. Peltier felt his inawemaagan’s words fill his body, which moments before had 
ached with hunger pangs. The words inspired him to realize that he, as a young Ojibwe, could 
fight for his People. “Yes,” he thought, “there was something more important than your poor 
miserable self: your People.”93 At the same time that termination threatened Turtle Mountain 
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peoplehood, the men and women who fought against the legislation reignited their peoplehood as 
they rose up in defense of their People.  
 If termination required Indigenous consent, the Turtle Mountain People’s unanimous 
resolve should have halted the process in October 1953. At the October 19 meeting, Francis 
Poitra declared, “We are going to fight it down.”94 Alex Martin warned, “The Turtle Mountains 
hold a large number of votes. We will use a little politics before we go into this.”95 Sensing the 
resolve among his People, Gourneau called for a vote. He asked, “Do you want to dispense with 
the services of the United States Government on this reservation?”96 Not a single man or woman 
answered yes.97  
 The Turtle Mountain People clearly and unanimously opposed termination, but Congress 
showed no signs of dropping the bill. Congress scheduled hearings on the legislation in March of 
the following year. Again, despite assurances to seek Indigenous input, Settler officials betrayed 
their underlying contempt of Indigenous Peoples by failing actively to seek such input.98 If the 
Turtle Mountain People wanted to testify on their own behalf, they had to pay their own way, 
and they would receive no legal representation. Delorme, who had earned his People’s trust as he 
spoke with many of them during his summer of research, secured the blessing of many in the 
community to represent their interests, and the Association of American Indian Affairs paid for 
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his trip to Washington.99 Gourneau and the Advisory Committee resorted to fundraising, 
organizing a boxing match to cover their travel expenses.100 Perhaps demonstrating the depth of 
opposition in both the ishkonigan and surrounding Settler communities, they raised the necessary 
funds, and Gourneau, Edward Jollie, and Leo Jeannotte arrived in Washington for the March 2 
and 3 hearings.101 
 Like Leonard Peltier, his People’s resolve inspired Patrick Gourneau to fight for Turtle 
Mountain sovereignty. He and Delorme were the only two Turtle Mountain people to testify 
during the hearings, although they came armed with a petition with hundreds of signatures.102 
The bulk of testimony came from Settler representatives of county and state organizations, as 
well as BIA officials including Cooper. Although their concern may have focused more on their 
own financial stability, the Settler spokesmen agreed that the Turtle Mountain People had no 
business on Zimmerman’s list and that termination would devastate the already-impoverished 
Ojibweg as well as surrounding communities tasked with absorbing them.103 Gourneau faced 
questions from Watkins and South Dakota Senator E.Y. Berry about his identity and the 
Indianness of his People. In particular, Watkins seemed obsessed with the question of whether or 
not the Turtle Mountain Ojibwe were “real Indians,” which explains why Watkins targeted the 
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Turtle Mountain People for termination despite their obvious lack of economic resources.104 
Gourneau defended his Peoplehood. In early questions before his turn to testify, Gourneau 
corrected Senator Young when he referred to the Turtle Mountain ancestors as French-
Canadians. “I believe you are talking about the Indians of French extraction,” Gourneau 
interjected, rephrasing Young’s incorrect language.105 He also pointed out that the descendants of 
these men and women spoke Michif, not French.106 Later, at the end of the chairman’s testimony, 
Watkins asked Gourneau to state his own blood quantum. Gourneau answered, “Well, one time 
during the depression years, when it was common for white-collar workers to work side by side 
with pick-and-shovel men, I worked with a guy who told me he was a genealogist. So I had him 
climb my family tree. And he figured out that it was seven-sixteenths.”107 Watkins clarified, 
“Well, less than half.”108 But Gourneau went on to say that the ditch-digging genealogist made a 
mistake, because Gourneau’s great-grandmother “was also a fullblood.”109 Gourneau, who 
questioned the accuracy of often incomplete government records, highlighted the flaws of 
defining Indianness based on blood quantum. As a practicing member of the Midewiwin who 
spoke Ojibwemowin and raised Ojibwe granddaughters, it must have seemed absurd to 
Gourneau to define peoplehood in terms of blood. His testimony before Congress defended the 
existence of his People through language and kinship.  
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 Gourneau focused on how termination would harm his People and violate the federal 
government’s obligations to his People. He started his testimony by stating that he had authority 
to speak for his People as a whole. Firmly and clearly, he repeated what his people had been 
saying for the past six years: “The Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians is strongly 
opposed to the termination measures in their present form now under your consideration.”110 He 
criticized the relocation program that formed a central tenet of the Turtle Mountain termination 
plan.111 He acknowledged that the program might help younger people, but he insisted that it left 
the older population vulnerable, “Instead of terminating its trusteeship, we feel that the 
Government should treat the economic plight of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians 
as a special problem.”112 By emphasizing his People’s needs, he reminded the federal 
government of its obligations to provide for the People in exchange for Settler access to 
Anishinaabewaki. And yet Gourneau phrased this support in terms of autonomy. He argued, 
“This self-sufficiency can be achieved only with the assistance of the Federal Government and 
over a much longer period than 5 years as provide[d] for in this bill.”113 According to Gourneau, 
the United States’ obligations were ongoing, and the relationship between the two nations 
demanded that the United States respect Turtle Mountain self-governance. Gourneau highlighted 
U.S. failures to honor these relationships without conceding Turtle Mountain sovereignty.  
 Gourneau refused to abandon his People’s ties to their homeland, suggesting as men and 
women had testified in October that many did not want to relocate. He pointed out that “there are 
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a lot that would rather go into farming.”114 Watkins responded dismissively by saying that 
Indians “just didn’t want to farm” and were more inherently suited for mechanical labor.115 But 
Gourneau refused to break with the land. He insisted, “What tillable land we have on the 
reservation is farmed by Indian farmers, the largest part of it.”116 On the surface, Gourneau’s 
testimony fell into line with earlier assimilationist visions of Indian labor. However, in the 
context of assimilation and relocation policies aimed at severing Turtle Mountain relationships 
with their already-reduced homeland, Gourneau demonstrated his People’s active relationship 
with their land as a defense against termination.  
 David Delorme likewise defended his People’s sovereignty against termination by 
drawing attention to the United States’ failures. He emphasized that the social and economic 
conditions on the ishkonigan should have inspired federal support, not termination.117 The plan 
for withdrawal, he asserted, would “result in acute distress.”118 In a prepared letter submitted 
before he testified, he criticized the federal government for underfunding the relocation program, 
as well as health and education. He blamed the lack of so-called preparation on Settler neglect.119 
Delorme rejected Watkins’ attempt to portray aid as dependency. The Senator congratulated 
Delorme on his education, adding, “That shows what an be done with when you have the 
ambition,” suggesting of course that Delorme’s People’s struggles resulted from moral 
deficiency rather than the United States’ failure to behave as inawemaagan. “Well,” Delorme 
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responded, “ambition combined with a little help.”120 He had paid for college with help from his 
sister as well as an educational loan through the Advisory Committee.121 In defense of his 
People, Delorme asserted a narrative of mutual obligations in which progress depended on 
support—the very kind of support that Watkins hoped to terminate.  
 Gourneau and Delorme supplemented the underfunded delegation by calling on friends to 
testify on behalf of their People. Before the hearing, Gourneau spoke with Martin T. Cross, a 
Gros Venture from Fort Berthold in Washington for a National Congress of American Indians 
conference. Gourneau showed Cross the petitions from the Turtle Mountain People, and he 
allocated time for Cross to testify.122 Cross explained to Congress his relationship with the Turtle 
Mountain People, which existed “through the neighbors, through good friends of two of the 
delegates, Edward Charley [Jollie?] and Pat Garner [Gourneau?], with whom I went to 
Government school. These groups of people there have intermarried with some of our members 
and some of our people have intermarried with some of their members so the relationship in that 
basis is very good.”123 These relationships also positioned Cross within Ojibwe relational 
networks that enabled Gourneau to call on his aid to represent the Turtle Mountain People. 
Before Congress, Cross admonished, “These delegates from North Dakota do not have a lawyer 
with them on their side to advise them. They are very fearful of making any open statements or 
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comments.”124 Cross implied that he and Peterson voiced what Gourneau lacked the freedom to 
express. He explained why the Turtle Mountain People fought termination from a more positive 
perspective. He said, “I know these People. I know their reservation….I believe you see some of 
the pictures of their houses and it is a mansion to them. They are happy there. Any disruption 
would indicate the abuse of some of the rights of these people.”125 Cross highlighted the strength 
that the People drew from their relationships within their homeland.  
 The advocates Gourneau recruited openly addressed Turtle Mountain peoplehood. Cross 
entered into the Congressional record a point made by Ojibwe men and women on the 
ishkonigan, that “their life and death or existence as a tribe is at stake.”126 Testimony from 
another ally, NCAI executive director Helen Peterson, reiterated Cross’s comment about “tribal 
existence.”127 Her objection to termination deviated from economic circumstances to include 
aspects “we can’t measure in terms of dollars and cents. Tribal existence, tribal life, pride in 
Indian culture are among those.”128 Gourneau might not have spoken the words, but the official 
congressional record reflected the continued vitality of Turtle Mountain peoplehood as an 
argument against termination.  
 Gourneau and Delorme may not have been the warriors that Celia Decouteau or Leonard 
Peltier envisioned. They were not Naynahkawkanape and Angus Prince camped in a half-frozen 
marsh and making defiant speeches to judges while risking jail time. Nevertheless, Gourneau and 
Delorme brought their People’s fight to Washington, and they won. Congress never terminated 
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the Turtle Mountain People. The concerns of local Settlers likely influenced a racially and 
culturally biased Congress, but the Turtle Mountain People reacted quickly and unequivocally to 
remind the federal government of their obligations to the People and to defend Turtle Mountain 
sovereignty against exterminatory Settler colonial termination polices. 
 
“That was what we were told by our forefathers”: Lac Courte Oreilles Treaty Rights and 
the State of Wisconsin  
 In the spring of 1940, John Martin and Mitchell Mustache were out fishing on Two Boy 
Lake when they noticed an unfamiliar boat with a motor. They recognized state conservation 
wardens from the state of Wisconsin. The two men, both members of the same drum, waited 
until the wardens had left, and they rowed over to the spot by the shore where they found a net in 
the water, set by the wardens to catch spawning walleye and collect the females’ eggs. Martin 
and Mustache, furious that state officials entered reservation waters and placed a net when they 
routinely confiscated Ojibwe nets, pulled the net out of the water and threw it on the shore. So 
there would be no mistake about who had removed the net and why, they wrote a note, in pencil, 
objecting to the state’s violation of Lac Courte Oreilles waters and resources. They addressed, 
“To Whom It May Concern,” and left the note with the net for the state workers to find on their 
return. Then Martin and Mustache found Anakwad to inform the ogimaa of the most recent 
incursion by state officials on Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty.129  
 The men and women of Lac Courte Oreilles had a long history with state game wardens 
limiting their rights. In 1929, many People protested violations of treaty-protected hunting and 
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fishing rights, both on and beyond the ishkonigan, at Congressional hearings in Hayward 
included. Despite arrests, Ojibweg throughout Wisconsin continued to access the resources the 
Creator had provided for them, and the state of Wisconsin built a contentious case law on broken 
treaties.130  
 The Anishinaabeg, however, remembered their rights. As at Turtle Mountain and St. 
Peter’s, generations of Ojibweg kept the aadizookanag of the treaties alive. At the general 
council meetings with Charles Smith in 1929, Anakwad rose to defend his People. Rebuking 
Smith as a representative of the federal government, the ogimaa said,  
I want to talk to you, you claim to come from Washington. That old fellow 
(Pointing to John Mink) is one of the oldest fellows we have here, I am young along 
side of him. All our fathers and mothers have died and there are only a few of us 
remaining here. Ever since I have been able to remember there were instances 
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where my ancestors made trips to Washington. They were sitting around a table just 
like we are here, the Indians and the representatives at Washington. God hears 
everything that we say here today. At that time the representatives of the Office 
informed the Indians of certain lands they were privileged to use outside of their 
reservation. That wild game is mine, it doesn’t belong to you. Ever since I have 
been able to remember and been able to hunt, we have always killed deer and wild 
game after the reservation was established and no one had any objections. That was 
the source of our living. There are agreements with the Indians that the Indian 
reserves the right to hunt fish and game. That is the reason I feel sorry to see how 
the Indians cannot hunt and kill game for their own personal use.131  
 
Anakwad’s speech, which began by deferring to his elders, called on Ojibwe relationships with 
kin, the land, and the sacred relationships with the land’s resources granted to Ojibweg by the 
Creator. He explicitly integrated treaties into aadizookanag, providing a powerful expression of 
peoplehood. Neither the federal nor the state government could disrupt these relationships, even 
as they encroached on the ishkonigan. Nor could they erase the “agreement with the Indians that 
reserves the right to hunt fish and game.”132 At a 1931 meeting with representatives of the 
various Wisconsin Ojibweg Peoples to discuss pending claims, Anakwad replicated the language 
of the 1864 petition when he insisted that “according to the knowledge received from his grand 
fathers [sic], that game and fish were reserved in the ceded territory and that only mineral was 
sold.”133  
 Anakwad knew the content of those treaties—he lived the relationships every day, as did 
men and women throughout Lac Courte Oreilles such as Frank and Frances Denasha. The young 
married couple from New Post raised four children on a diet that consisted primarily of deer 
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meat and berries from the mitigoog of the ishkonigan.134 “We grew up on deer meat,” 
remembered their daughter Delores, and they fulfilled essential kinship obligations by sharing 
deer, ducks, and fish with family and neighbors.135 Anakward’s speech and the daily labor of 
Ojibweg such as the Denashas were both linked directly to the nineteenth century treaties and 
supported the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s dynamic sovereignty.  
 An 1896 case involving two Red Cliff Ojibweg affected the Lac Courte Oreilles People’s 
relationships with the state. By the 1890s, the state already had a history of denying Ojibweg 
treaty rights and imposing state jurisdiction on Indigenous Peoples. Two years before the Red 
Cliff case, Wisconsin game wardens murdered respected Lac Courte Oreilles ogimaa 
Giishkitawag or Joe White with no consequences.136 In the 1896 case, ogimaa Antoine Buffalo 
and Michael DePerry placed their nets in Lake Superior as their fathers and grandfathers and 
great-grandfathers had done before them. In this simple action, they acted in accordance with a 
clearly articulated sense of their rights as members of an Ojibwe Nation. They went to check on 
their nets off the shore of the Red Cliff reservation in Lake Superior, only to find that the state 
game wardens had removed them. Not only did this cause Buffalo and DePerry “great 
inconvenience” because they planned to cure the fish “for their own use in the wintertime,” but it 
also inconvenienced the two further when the wardens arrested them and insisted on a trial for 
violating state fishing laws.137 Buffalo and DePerry enlisted the aid of W. A. Mercer, the acting 
agent at the Ashland agency, who obtained a lawyer and appealed to the state attorney general on 
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their behalf. Although the legal fate of Buffalo and DePerry remains unclear, the attorney 
general’s office explained the state’s position in no uncertain terms. Attorney General William 
Mylrea wrote, “the Indians in the state are amenable to state laws. The power of the state to 
regulate and control the taking of the fish and game is unquestioned.”138 Mylrea cited the recent 
United States Supreme Court case Geer versus Connecticut (1896), which granted police the 
power to constrain hunting of certain animals to a limited time frame in order to prevent their 
extermination. This case did not address Native American treaty rights, but Mylrea assumed that 
the state law superseded any rights claimed by the Ojibwe. He proclaimed the 1854 treaty moot 
because it was “abrogated by the acts of Congress creating the sovereign state. The state of 
Wisconsin being a sovereign one must have exclusive power over its territory.”139 Wisconsin’s 
concept of its sovereignty remained so absolute that statehood nullified the treaties of all Indians 
within its borders. In an extreme statement of sovereignty, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled in 
1927 that President Zachary Taylor’s Removal Order of 1850—which Bizhiki had returned from 
Washington with a promise that President Filmore would rescind—effectively revoked the 
“President’s pleasure clause of the 1837 and 1842 treaties, thereby terminating Ojibwe 
usufructuary rights.140  
 In 1938, George James, a sixty-two-year-old Lac Courte Oreilles hunter, used the 1837 
treaty to defend his People’s rights when targeted by the state. James, a friend of Anakwad who 
occasionally worked in the tourist resort industry as a guide, trapped small fur-bearing animals, 
likely muskrat and rabbit, and Wisconsin game wardens arrested him under suspicion of having 
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trapped the animals on non-Indian land.141 After his arrest, James wrote to Wisconsin 
Congressman Bernard J. Gehrmann, “I am a member of the Lac Courte Oreilles Chippewa 
Indian Band and am being held on a game charge by the Conservation Wardens.”142 He 
contended that the state had no right to confine him, for, as a Lac Courte Oreilles Ojibwe, “I do 
not think I came under state laws.”143 James referred to the 1837 treaty, but he did more than 
simply mention it. In an attempt to make the treaty that he already knew real to the Settler 
Congressman, James invoked aadizookanag and included a copy of the treaty in the letter, 
specifically Article 5 which read, “The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild rice, 
upon the lands, the river and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guaranteed to the 
Indians, during the pleasure of the President of the United States.”144 The treaty document 
represented a relationship that he expected Congressman Gehrmann to honor, one that tied 
directly to Lac Courte Oreilles peoplehood. “According to the knowledge of the Indian no one 
remembers or knows of a record as to when or if this was altered,” he wrote, and therefore the 
state had no power to charge him. Gehrmann forwarded James’s letter to the Office of Indian 
Affairs, and James received a passive reply that said state law applied beyond the ishkonigan and 
encouraged James to “observe as much as practicable the laws which have been adopted [by the 
state] to prevent wasteful destruction of fish and game.”145 James likely had to pay his fine, but 
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the copy of the 1837 treaty served as tangible evidence of Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty and 
their sacred history.  
 When state officials dropped their nets in Lac Courte Oreilles waters during the 1940 
walleye spawning season, the People reminded Settler officials of their treaty-protected rights. 
Anakwad, George James, John Martin, John Mustache, Sr., Jim Bennett, and several other of 
Anakwad’s supporters met with state conservation wardens about the incident. “They wanted to 
know,” reported Field Representative George Blakeslee, “who had given permission for the State 
Conservation Wardens to operate within the reservation,” for neither they nor the Tribal Council 
had granted that authority.146 P.E. Weaver, who worked with the state at a fish hatchery in 
Spooner, Wisconsin, explained that they “proceeded on the assumption that they had the right, 
and that their operations were for the ultimate benefit of all residents of the reservation.” 
Confronted with actual residents of the reservation who did not consider his unauthorized work 
beneficial, however, Weaver “conceded that it would have been the courteous thing for their 
department to have applied to the Indian Service for such permission.”147 Even face-to-face with 
a room full of Ojibweg, Weaver seemed unable to recognize the presence of their sovereignty, 
deferring to federal officials. Anakwad and the others believed, according to Ojibweg 
understandings of land rights and resource access, that only the Lac Courte Oreilles People 
themselves could grant permission. The state had failed to cultivate the necessary relationships. 
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“It was an infringement on their rights as a matter of principle,” the Ojibweg insisted.148 They 
refused to concede the ishkonigan to the state. 
 The delegation led by Anakwad considered the next incident part of a broader state attack 
on Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty. When explaining why they objected to the state nets, the 
Ojibweg pointed out that many among them had faced prosecution by the state for the same 
activity. For instance, John Frogg, a makwa doodem member in his sixties who supported his 
family, including eleven growing children with the ishkonigan’s resources, set a net in Squaw 
Lake. The boundary line of the reservation ran through the lake, and when a few inches of the net 
crossed that line, state conservation wardens confiscated it.149 Why, they asked, should the 
Ojibweg not do the same on their side of the line? Moreover, Anakwad complained “that arrests 
had been made from time to time of Indians found hunting or fishing outside the boundaries 
during closed seasons,” labor that the nineteenth-century treaties protected.150 George James 
experienced this extension of state authority first-hand, as had fellow delegate Mike Gokey, who, 
in 1930, had seven beaver hides confiscated although he trapped the beaver on the ishkonigan.151 
The delegates also believed that non-Indians received more benefit from the fish hatchery than 
the Ojibweg. According to Cavill, non-Indians considered the ishkonigan an “open area.”152 
“The white man years ago had no right to come into this reservation,” said John Frogg. The state 
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intruded both in terms of imposing jurisdiction and accessing resources to which they lacked 
rights.  
 The Ojibweg, especially those like James who had faced arrests, fines, and confiscations, 
also knew that Cavill and Blakeslee dismissed Ojibwe treaty rights and favored state jurisdiction. 
“State Fish and Game Laws should be extended to all lands within the Reservation boundaries,” 
Cavill wrote to his superiors the month before the meeting with state officials, although he did 
allow for “enforcement by State employed Indians.”153 Anakwad, Frogg, and the others 
considered the two nets set by the state that spring in the larger context of an encroaching Settler 
state.  
 The Ojibwe delegates defended their impermeable sovereignty in the language of treaty-
making. When Conservation Warden Leon Plante and Blakeslee read from the Wisconsin 
constitution “showing that the State was granted concurrent jurisdiction of tributaries of the 
Mississippi River”—and Little Couderay Lake drained into the Mississippi through the 
Couderay River and then the Chippewa River—John Martin objected.154 He singled out 
Blakeslee, “claiming that as an Indian Service employee it was no part of my day to refer to State 
of Wisconsin laws.”155 Blakeslee’s relationship with the People existed through the alliances 
represented by nineteenth century treaties, and the state of Wisconsin had no place in these 
relational networks.  
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 Anakwad invoked treaty relationships. He talked through an interpreter using 
Ojibwemowin. The language expressed Ojibwe peoplehood and emphasized that state officials 
remained meyaagizid as a symbolic gesture of sovereignty. “The rules are when anything goes to 
be done here on the lakes all the Indians were to be consulted first,” he said, situating treaties 
within aadizookanag, “Our forefathers tried to preserve our reservation in such a state that no 
white man was to molest them in any way. These words and laws were made in Washington 
where they are today and no one can destroy them.”156 Anakwad spoke of treaties—the actions 
of his ancestors, the words of negotiations, and the written, tangible laws—as a source of power.  
 Following the 1940 meeting between Ojibwe ogimaag and state officials, the state 
continued to override Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty as guaranteed by earlier treaties. For 
Anakwad and the other ogimaag, the May meeting had symbolic value. They wanted the state to 
recognize Ojibwe rights on the ishkonigan. At the end of the meeting, “George James spoke for 
the delegation to the effect that they would not commit themselves until they had heard from the 
Washington Office, but that they could leave their nets in place until such information was 
obtained.”157 Now that the state had asked the Ojibweg directly to permit the net, the state had 
resolved the main conflict, at least for the time being. It was, as the Ojibweg had said, a matter of 
principle.  
 A 1945 letter from Jim Bennett, one of Anakwad’s group, reflects the continued tensions. 
The letter opens, “I am writing to you as a member of the Couderay Reservation of Chippewa 
Indians regarding certain rights, privileges, and possessions which have been flagrantly violated 
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in many ways over a period of many years.”158 Much like Naynahkawkanape and Angus Prince’s 
letters and testimony that situated treaties within aadizookanag, Anakwad used the “old treaties” 
to indict the previous century of Settler colonialism and to present Lac Courte Oreilles 
peoplehood. He told of neglect on the reservation—homes “in ruins,” “destitute old people,” 
“inferior medical care” in government hospitals.”159 Bennett focused on Ojibwe relationships 
with the land and their rights to access resources. Bennett continued, “The treaties stated that we 
could hunt, fish, and trap on the Reservation without license. Also that we could do these things 
on adjacent lands to the Reservation without license.”160 Conversely, non-Indians could access 
Ojibwe resources “without permission from any tribal authority.”161 Bennett also mentioned both 
mitigoog and manoomin, arguing that because the treaties made no mention requiring permits 
neither the federal government nor the state possessed the power to impose them. Meanwhile, the 
right to manoominkwe went unenforced. “No one has ever abrogated these provisions,” he 
wrote, emphasizing the relational nature of the treaties, “and we would like to know why such 
conditions prevail.”162  
 Bennett understood federal support in similar terms as the Turtle Mountain People: an 
obligation derived from treaty relationships. Bennett included schools and health care among 
federal services required by treaties. In his lengthy response to Bennett’s letter, Commissioner 
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William Zimmerman suggested, “Mr. Bennett shares a popular misconception as to the role of 
the federal government in Indian affairs, a misconception which has produced much trouble and 
misunderstanding. Congress does not appropriate money for distribution among Indians except 
in fulfillment of specific treaty obligations.”163 Zimmerman separated education and health care, 
as well as money for roads, law and order, and other forms of aid from specific treaty 
obligations, and he presented them as charitable extras, the kind of services “white communities 
pay for” via taxes.”164 Bennett, however, saw the money for such programs as no different from 
“tribal money,” and he believed his People deserved a say in how the money was spent—
ishkonigan-based schools versus more distant schools, for instance.165 The treaties that granted 
Settlers access to Anishinaabewaki while guaranteeing Ojibwe resources also created this 
relationship of obligation with the federal government. 
 Impending termination policies threatened that relationship. Lac Courte Oreilles 
remained safe from Zimmerman’s list, but related administrative actions brought termination to 
the Lac Courte Oreilles People. In 1947, the Department of Interior began restructuring the 
Office of Indian Affairs. Along with changing the name to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the 
Department proposed consolidating local agencies into five regional offices. The same year, 
Commissioner William Brophy opened his Annual Report by declaring that the BIA was 
responsible for managing Indian resources in a way that would allow the Bureau to “remove 
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itself as trustee and withdraw the public services which it now provides for the Indian 
population.”166 The restructuring aimed to reduce BIA services.  
 When the Lac Courte Oreilles People heard that the BIA intended to withdraw the Field 
Representative and Indian Police from the ishkonigan, they fought the decision. “If the plan to 
abolish our Sub-Agency goes through trouble and strife will prevail most of the time,” the People 
declared in general council. As much as the men and women complained about local BIA 
officials and Superintendent Cavill in Ashland, they feared that a more distant authority would 
be even less responsive tot he People’s needs. That was why complaints such as the 1945 letter 
so often insisted that Cavill attend council meetings on the ishkonigan.167  
 As at Turtle Mountain, rumors of termination brought out large crowds in protest. Two 
hundred people attended a general council meeting on July 14, 1947. The meeting resulted in a 
resolution asking Cavill to “appear before the Department or person in authority and represent 
out [sic] Tribe to have our Field Representative and our Indian Police restored. We are being left 
without any Representation on our own Reservation.”168 From the perspective of treaty as rooted 
in relationships, that representation remained essential to protecting Lac Courte Oreilles 
sovereignty. Some the People’s concerns involved practical issues, such as when they pointed 
out that withdrawal “means our people with 1,760 enrolled members here are going to have to do 
business directly with the Minnesota Office where many of our problems which are local ones 
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cannot be taken care of.”169 More importantly, the People suspected an underlying threat to their 
very existence as a People. “Our people do not come under State Law and Order,” they reminded 
Cavill, highlighting the fear that when the federal government withdrew, the state—
unencumbered by treaty relationships—would step in.170 “All trouble and grief to our Tribe can 
be prevented if the present set-up is allowed to continue,” the People declared.171 The present 
set-up remained in place, at least for the moment.172  
 The Lac Courte Oreilles People continued to enact their treaty rights and the state of 
Wisconsin continue to try to eliminate Ojibwe peoplehood. Ojibwe and Settler sovereignty 
clashed again in the woods along the ishkonigan’s border when state game wardens lying in wait 
arrest Frank Denasha on three charges: “killing game out of season, transporting game out of 
season, and carrying a loaded gun in the car.”173 As a guide for nearly two decades, Denasha 
would have known which parts of the reservation were trust land and under Lac Courte Oreilles 
jurisdiction and which had passed out of his People’s control. In 1942, Frank and Frances 
Denasha moved to Chicago. Both Frank and Frances found jobs—Frank in a defense plant and 
Frances in a candy factory and later in an airplane parts factory.174 The Denashas, however, 
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preferred the lakes and woods of their ishkonigan to Chicago’s summer heat, and returned in 
1944. Frank resumed his work as a hunter, fisherman, and guide while Frances maintained “a 
cellar full of canned venison and bear steaks, vegetables, and berries.”175 Frances worried about 
her husband on the water. Frank had heart trouble, and he had once collapsed in his boat.176 State 
conservation wardens presented another risk. On August 13, 1950, Denasha went out into the 
woods within the boundaries of the ishkonigan. He shot and killed two deer in a good day of 
hunting. He loaded the deer in his car. To return home, he had to use state highways and cross 
non-trust, non-ishkonigan land. Game wardens stopped him before he reached home. Frank “was 
arrested on a highway between two parts of the reservation where the highway runs outside of 
the reservation,” he wrote to the judge involved in his case, “I had two deer in the car and I was 
fined $114.50 and my car was confiscated.”177 Frank attempted to explain that he had killed the 
deer on Ojibwe land and was just trying to return home. He had treaty-protected rights to the 
deer, but the wardens refused to listen and claimed that “it didn’t make no difference as long as 
they caught me on the outside of the reservation.”178 Denasha knew “that he is protected by the 
treaty of 1837, 1842, and 1854 allowing the Chippewas to hunt, fish and trap on ‘ceded 
territory.’”179 He decided to fight the penalties and defend his People’s rights.  
 Denasha entered a guilty plea, but he relied on his People’s treaties to argue for the return 
of his gun and car. According to Superintendent Cavill, a sort of “gentleman’s agreement” 
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existed between the state and the BIA “that as long as the deer were killed on restricted lands, 
there would not be too many arrests.”180 The “gentleman’s agreement,” however, should actually 
have been a treaty-protected right that resulted in no arrests, which Frank Denasha knew as he 
demonstrated when he referred to specific treaties. Denasha objected to the practice that 
essentially abrogated the resource rights that his People protected in treaties by deferring to state 
jurisdiction. 
 Denasha lacked the power in Settler state courts to undo his conviction. State officials 
maintained that the 1850 executive order that led to the Sandy Lake Tragedy abrogated the off-
reservation rights in the 1837 and 1842 treaties, and they held that the 1854 article protecting 
resource rights did not apply at Lac Courte Oreilles because the ceded lands lay in Minnesota 
and not Wisconsin. Legal strategies failed to free Lac Courte Oreilles sovereignty from a state 
intent on erasing the Ojibwe people.181 Denasha, however, returned to his work as a guide and 
providing game and fish for his family.182  
 While the Turtle Mountain People defended themselves against termination, Lac Courte 
Orville faced a different iteration of termination policy: Public Law 280. Unlike the state of 
North Dakota, Wisconsin actively pursued an expanded role regarding Indian affairs and 
Indigenous resources, as demonstrated in its role in the Winter Dam.183 In an official memo from 
the Governor’s office in 1952 in regards to the “Status of Indians in Wisconsin,” the executive 
branch of the state government praised the “positive gains” it had made toward making Ojibwe 
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and other resident Natives equal members of its state.184 Segregated schools had disappeared, the 
state regulated health conditions and sanitation on the reservations, and a fair employment law 
had recently been passed. Impoverished conditions and high drop-out rates persisted, but the 
Governor’s office shifted blame onto the federal government. The solution, they argued, was 
increased state oversight. The “explanation of such facts can well be related to federal policies 
and practice.” Discrimination on the part of whites existed, but that could be explained by “[t]he 
fact that most Indians pay no property taxes and thus do not contributed to the support of the 
locality in which they reside,” which in turn was “a source of ill feeling against them” because 
local Indian populations strained county resources.185 By referring to reservations as 
“segregated,” the state once again drew on its doctrine of “equal treatment” to deny the 
sovereignty of Indian nations. The executive branch then asked for “clearcut [sic] legal 
jurisdiction,” both civil and criminal, over Wisconsin’s Natives.186 The following year, Congress 
passed P.L. 280 and Wisconsin received its wish.  
 Part of the larger federal program of termination, P.L. 280 represented an assault on tribal 
sovereignty.187 With this legislation, Congress extended state criminal and civil jurisdiction to 
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reservations, replacing Indigenous People’s laws and practices with Settler laws and practices.188 
P.L. 280 initially applied to five states, including Wisconsin, without requiring Native consent. 
Paradoxically, Congress justified the statute by claiming reservations lacked law and order at the 
same time they used the language of “acculturation and development.”189 The contradictory 
reasoning reveals the law’s underlying intent: granting states additional control of resources and 
people. P.L. 280 also challenged Ojibwe sovereignty and the treaties that protected it by 
undermining a century of case law extending back to Cherokee Nation v. Georgia and Worcester 
v. Georgia that established Native Peoples in a sovereign position above state jurisdiction.190 The 
statute essentially erased the government-to-government relationships from which treaties 
derived. 
 By 1953, the State of Wisconsin expressed confidence in its ability to assume 
responsibility for—and control over—the Ojibweg. The state had reason to feel up to the task. 
For the past century, state and local governments, often in cooperation with the federal 
government, could boast a long history of extending their jurisdiction to Indigenous Peoples. The 
Lac Courte Oreilles People claimed an equally length record enacting their sovereignty. Like 
Frank Denasha, Anakwad, and Jim Bennett, they fought in courts, in general councils, in 
meetings between leaders, and with their labor in woods and waters.  
 Denasha’s heart failed in 1953, but his People lived on. His body rests in the aki at New 
Post, binding future generations to the recently-settled oodena created by families that the 
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Chippewa Foliage displaced. Frances helped to carry the People forward, presiding over births 
and deaths and, as fellow New Post resident Art Tainter rembered, “preparing the bodies for 
burial and conducting Ojibwe ceremonies.”191 France continued to provide for her children, 
supported by a network of doodem. Bill Denasha, son of Frank and Frances, remembered, “She, 
Anna Homesky, Aunt Peggy Tainter, and other women in New Post always made sure there was 
enough to eat when food was scarce. Everybody took care of each other to survive.”192 Frank and 
Frances’s great-grandchildren call her “Koobide,” which means great-grandmother in 
Ojibwemowin.193 The one hundred year anniversary of the 1854 Treaty of La Pointe may have 
passed unmarked in Frances Denasha’s kitchen in the village of New Post on the Lac Courte 
Oreilles ishkonigan, but the dynamic peoplehood it protected continued to thrive.  
  
 From courtrooms to Congress, from woods to marshes, Anishianabeg Peoples pursued a 
variety of strategies to enact their dynamic sovereignty in the mid-twentieth century. Angus 
Prince addressed the court with a different tone from the one Patrick Gourneau used to speak to 
Congress. Anakwad made speeches, while Frank and Frances Denasha fed their family. 
Aadizookanag informed them what was in their treaties, and Prince, Gourneau, Anakwad, and 
Denasha repeatedly told Settler officials what they seemed to forget. These strategies to carry 
Anishinaabeg peoplehood into the second half of the twentieth century met with varying degrees 
of success. Legal remedies failed at St. Peter’s, whose ethnic cleansing remained law if not 
reality. The result of legal efforts at Lac Courte Oreilles remained mixed, while the Turtle 
                                                 
191 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the Ojibwe, 75.  
192 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the Ojibwe, 75.  
193 Balbin, Bailey, and Nayquonabe, Spirit of the Ojibwe, 75-76.  
  
414 
 
Mountain People successfully leveraged their political influence and popular opinion to halt 
termination. When Settler courtrooms proved unreceptive to Anishinaabeg arguments, the People 
enacted their sovereignty through aadizookanag, labor, and other living relationships with the 
land and its resources. Sovereignty did not always mean success, and victory sometimes meant 
continued existence. In 1954, Anishinaabeg peoplehood remained dynamic and unbroken. The 
People had kept themselves, their treaties, and their sovereignty alive.  
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Chapter 8 
Apane1 
 The Anishinaabeg know who they are, where they came from, and where the People are 
going. Long ago, between 600 and 700 A.D., the ancestors lived far away near a great body of 
saltwater, the Atlantic Ocean, that stretched toward the unreachable dawn. One day, seven 
prophets visited the People, each sharing a vision of an ishkode (fire), or a period of time. The 
prophets told of the coming westward chibimoodaywin that the People must undertake—the 
miigis shell that would guide them, the challenges and seven stopping places along the way, and 
the manoomin and homeland at its end. They foretold the light-skinned people who would come 
from across the sea, wearing the two faces of niikonisiwin (brotherhood) and nibowin (death), 
and the struggles and changes as the newcomers promised prosperity in exchange for abandoning 
Anishinaabeg peoplehood. The seventh prophet, who appeared with glowing eyes, offered hope 
in the seventh ishkode, when Anishinaabeg would heal the aki and their families, reclaim 
Ojibwemowin, enact ceremony through the Midewiwin, and give new voice to aadizookanag. 
The seventh fire offered renewed opportunities for niikonisiwin with the newcomers, which, if 
accepted, would usher in an eighth ishkode of peace and prosperity for the People.  
 The People left their homes nearly nine hundred years ago when the Miigis shell rose 
from the water. The Miigis guided the People through changing seasons along ziibiwan and 
zaga’iganan. They passed through each of the seven stopping places and faced the challenges of 
war, hunger, and lost hope. With each obstacle, the People found renewed strength and continued 
the journey until they found the western Great Lakes and the northern plains. Here manoomin 
sprouted in abundance, clear blue waters teemed with namewag and other fish, and the forests 
                                                 
1 Always or continuously. 
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grew thick with ziinzibaakwad and game. As envisioned, their westward migration strengthened 
the People. When the European newcomers arrived, bringing their two faces and a turbulent, 
uneven relationship, the Anishinaabeg did not abandon their peoplehood for the promise of 
prosperity. Ogimaag protected the People and the sources of the homeland that had required so 
much sacrifice, negotiating alliances with Settler missionaries and government officials. Through 
the generations, with the seventh ishkode glowing in the future, Anishinaabeg acted to protect 
the aki and its resources against dams, Settler industries, and artificial borders drawn on maps 
meant to divide Anishinaabewaki. They spoke Anishinaabemowin whenever possible, sustained 
doodem networks and Anishinaabeg understandings of belonging, practiced the Midewiwin and 
other manidookewin, and continued to compile and share the aadizookanag that gave life to the 
People.  
 The aadizookanag of the chibimoodaywin binds the People together. The story persists in 
speech, rock, shell, and paper—retold by generations of storytellers, depicted in petroglyphs and 
wampum, on birchbark scrolls, and in books by Anishinaabeg writers. It thrives in the lived 
experiences of generations of Anishinaabeg throughout the Great Lakes and northern plains. The 
aadizookaan resides in the history of Anishinaabeg expansion, treaty-making, and the continued 
strength of the Anishinaabeg People. The Anishinaabeg, as storyteller John Borrows notes, 
“were good at taking themselves with them.”2 
 The chibimoodaywin aadizookanag generates and sustains sovereignty. Today, within the 
confines of shallow-bottomed jiimaan in the middle of manoomin beds elders remind younger 
generations how their ancestors came to this place. As the stalks of manoomin sway around 
them, elders go on to talk of the warriors and ogimaag who fought to protect Anishinaabewaki 
                                                 
2 Borrows, Drawing out the Law, 150.  
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through wars and treaties. They recount times of plenty and explain other strategies to assert 
sovereignty leading up to the present day, when elders and students harvest the same manoomin 
that signified to the People that they had arrived at their home. The migration aadizookanag 
unites Anishinaabeg of the past, present, and future in a continuous narrative of challenges, 
losses, and renewal—of movement and creation.  
 For the Anishinaabeg, the period between 1854 and 1954 carried forward this narrative. 
For the Lac Courte Oreilles People, the 1850s began with a duplicitous, deadly attempt by Settler 
officials to ethnically cleanse them from their homeland south of Lake Superior. The traumatic 
experience failed to eliminate the Lac Courte Oreilles People. In 1854 they and many of their 
neighboring Ojibweg succeeded in negotiating a treaty that protected their relationship with the 
aki, its resources, and sustained bonds among themselves. The Lac Courte Oreilles People helped 
to create their ishkonigan, with which their active peoplehood remained more than a site of 
Settler erasure. When allotment policies targeted the reservation in the 1880s, opening the 
ishkonigan to exploitative logging, they protected essential resources and the relationships they 
sustained by limiting meyaagizid’s access via tribal rolls and enacting their sovereignty in the 
woods through anokiiwin. In the 1910s, the Ojibweg gathered in zagaswe'idiwinan to defend 
mitigoog, manoomin, and their ancestors’ graves from a proposed dam. Although the dam 
flooded much of the ishkonigan, the Lac Courte Oreilles remained committed to their 
sovereignty. They mobilized relationships with aki, Anishinaabemowin, doodem, 
manidookewin, and aadizookanag through the mid-twentieth century to maintain Ojibweg 
systems of governance beyond the Indian Reorganization Act and its constitutions. In 1954, one 
hundred years after the treaty that created the ishkonigan, the Lac Courte Oreilles People 
articulated a consistent vision of peoplehood bolstered by treaties embedded in aadizookanag.  
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 The Turtle Mountain People likewise advanced an unbroken arc of sovereignty between 
1854 and 1954. The westward-moving Ojibweg, part of a diverse and mobile borderland, 
controlled an expansive territory on the mashkoden, as recognized by the Old Crossing Treaty in 
1863. In the 1870s, when Settler colonial encroachment threatened their homeland, the Turtle 
Mountain People sent delegations to Washington, led by hereditary ogimaag Little Shell III. 
Little Shell and his fellow ogimaag secured an ishkonigan, although the federal government 
quickly reduced its boundaries from millions of acres to a mere two townships. Even after the 
1892 Ten Cent Treaty and the resulting reduction of tribal rolls, the Turtle Mountain People 
maintained kinship networks that spanned the U.S.-Canadian border and defied racialized 
notions of blood quantum in favor of belonging rooted in peoplehood. Throughout the early 
twentieth century, the Ojibweg pursued a claim against the federal government for the coerced 
sale of their lands. The men and women of Turtle Mountain rejected the IRA in favor of the pre-
existing 1932 constitution and the council that the federal government recognized as authorized 
to advance the People’s claim. Before resolving the claim, however, the federal government 
targeted the Turtle Mountain People for termination. In 1954, two Turtle Mountain Ojibweg, 
elected chairman Patrick Gourneau and young scholar David Delorme, testified against 
termination before Congress. The men and women of Turtle Mountain, along with Indigenous 
and Settler allies, prevented the federal government from terminating the People, and the Turtle 
Mountain People lived on.  
 At St. Peter’s, a thriving trading center in the 1850s, the Saulteaux negotiated the 1871 
Stone Fort Treaty that created the ishkonigan along the Red River. They shared the ishkonigan 
with Maškēkowak. The former allies became potential threats in the context of Settler colonial 
reserve polices such as allotment that strained already reduced resources. The ogimaag, who 
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served through an elected zagaswe'idiwin, defended Saulteaux sovereignty against 
encroachments from both Settlers and Maškēkowak while the men and women enacted 
Saulteaux peoplehood through their labor in the waters surrounding the ishkonigan. In 1907, the 
St. Peter’s People faced ethnic cleansing in the form of a coerced agreement that ceded the entire 
ishkonigan and relocated the People to a new reserve on the western shores of Lake Winnipeg. 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the Saulteaux fought the so-called surrender 
and continued to assert Saulteaux sovereignty. When Naynahkawkanape refused to turn over the 
chieftainship and its symbolic medals in the 1930s, and when he, Angus Prince, and several 
dozen Saulteaux families returned to the haylands of their former ishkonigan, they drew strength 
from an unbroken history of sovereignty and peoplehood.  
 Anishinaabeg history—Anishinaabeg peoplehood—remains ongoing. The Anishinaabeg 
whose stories I told here carry the People forward. In the 1960s, activism surged throughout 
Anishinaabewaki. Leonard Peltier, who witnessed his inawemaagan’s impassioned call to defend 
the People during the fight against termination in the 1950s, became the warrior for his People 
that his relations furiously demanded. He joined the American Indian Movement, an activist 
organization co-founded by another Anishinaabe, Dennis Banks.3 In 1969, the same year that a 
pan-Indian organization occupied Alcatraz Island with heavy media coverage, Canadian 
Anishinaabeg responded to the White Paper, which sought to eliminate the “special status” of 
First Nations just as termination was accomplishing in the United States. Albert Edward 
Thompson, Peguis’s great-great-grandson, established the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood, now 
                                                 
3 Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Warrior, Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded Knee 
(New York: New Press, 1996), 99, 276-279.  
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the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, in the 1960s.4 The Manitoba Indian Brotherhood’s 1971 
position paper Wahbung: Our Tomorrows declared Thompson’s vision of Indigenous 
sovereignty rooted in the long history of Saulteaux peoplehood that stretched unbroken to his 
great-great-grandfather: “The Indian Tribes of Manitoba are committed to the belief that our 
rights both aboriginal and treaty emanate from our sovereignty as a nation of people.”5 In 1974, 
Lac Courte Oreilles brothers Fred and Mike Tribble set up on the frozen surface of Chief Lake 
just over the ishkonigan’s boundary and began to spearfish through the ice. In addition to their 
spears, the Tribble brothers carried with them a copy of the 1837 treaty negotiated by their 
ancestors. As they expected, a state game warden ignored the treaty document the brothers 
showed him, arrested the two young men, and opened nearly two decades of conflict regarding 
treaty rights between Ojibweg and Settlers known as the Walleye War.6  
                                                 
4 Thompson actually began to work toward organizing the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood as early as 1934 when he 
lived at Fort Alexander. Thompson resigned from the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood in 1967 due in part to declining 
health, but he remained involved in the organization and the Brotherhood appointed him a Senator in the 
organization in 1969. Thompson, Peguis and His Descendants, 63-66.  
5 See also John Courtney and David Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010), 346; Lawrence Hauptman, The Iroquois Struggle for Survival: WWII to Red Power 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986); Sally Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy: The Hidden Agenda, 
1968-1970 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981).  
6 Nesper, Walleye War, 68; Rick Whaley and Walter Bresette, Walleye Warriors: An Effective Alliance Against 
Racism and for the Earth (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1998). The Tribble brothers’ case made its way 
through the court system. In 1983, in Lac Courte Oreilles v. Voigt, the United States Court of Appeals upheld the 
Ojibwe interpretation of their treaties. The St. Peter’s People eventually received their victory in court. In 1998, after 
91 years of continuing to fight as Pahkoo promised, the Canada Special Claims Commission agreed both that the 
1907 surrender was invalid and that the initial St. Peter’s Reserve and subsequent Peguis reserve failed to fulfill the 
government’s obligations under the Stone Fort Treaty of 1871. The Peguis People received $126 million as well as 
$64 million to purchase an additional 166,794 acres of land, more than double the size of the approximately 77,000 
acre Peguis Reserve and making Peguis the largest reserve in Manitoba. The very first land selected by the Peguis 
People included 15,000 acres of the former St. Peter’s Reserve—the haylands now owned by the province of 
Manitoba. Peguis First Nation, “Negotiation of a Settlement: Treaty Land Entitlement of Peguis First Nation,” 
Peguis First Nation Newsletter, May 2006, 3; Peguis First Nation Treaty Land Entitlement Implementation, “2012 
Annual Report,” 2012, http://www.peguisfirstnation.ca/about/treaty-land-entitlement-trust/ (accessed Mar. 20, 
2016). The Turtle Mountain People pursued the claim that had shaped conversations about leadership and 
termination, and in 1979, the Court of Claims awarded $52 million. Richotte, “‘We the Indians,’” 241-280.  
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 The Tribble brothers, Peltier, and Thompson’s activism did not emerge suddenly and 
unexpectedly from an Indigenous wasteland. They built on the work of their ancestors, who 
enacted Anishinaabeg sovereignty through peoplehood. When the Tribble brothers went to their 
ice house, treaty tucked in pocket, they repeated the actions of previous generations. The Tribble 
brothers knew about the treaty from their father, who learned about it from their grandfather, 
who knew the old men who negotiated the terms. The Tribble brothers were Frank Denasha, 
quoting the 1837 treaty to a judge in 1951. They were Anakwad and Kingfisher, who told 
visiting Settler officials what they needed to know about treaties and Ojibwe sovereignty. They 
were the men and women speaking to protect the manoomin against a dam, men and women who 
had to carry their ancestors’ remains to dry ground in overflowing buckets. They were Ojibweg 
in the 1880s who testified about stolen mitigoog. The Tribble brothers continued a legacy of 
peoplehood that extended back beyond Akiwenzii, who walked the borders of the reservation to 
ensure his People had access to manoomin.  
 At St. Peter’s, the activists in the second half of the twentieth century echoed the Pahkoos 
camped in the middle of a marsh defying DIA officials and Naynahkawkanape standing in his 
door while the RCMP searched his house for the chief’s medals. They were the crowded 
schoolhouse arguing against surrendering the ishkonigan, the men and women who crossed 
ishkonigan boundaries to fish on Lake Winnipeg’s waters, and ogimaag writing petitions about 
where to hold elections so the Saulteaux could remain a distinct People.  
 At Turtle Mountain, activists such as Peltier paralleled Patrick Gourneau, who passed a 
knowledge of the treaties on to his granddaughter. They were Kanick pursuing claims against the 
federal government and distributing rations to hungry kin. They were families welcoming 
inawemaagan on overcrowded allotments, the Council of Thirty-Two allowing McKay to make 
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hay, Little Shell refusing to abandon his inawemaaganan and his homeland. The Tribble brothers 
could show Settler game wardens their treaty because previous generations of Anishinaabeg had 
kept that treaty—and the relationships with aki, Anishinaabemowin, doodem, manidookewin, 
and aadizookanag it embodied—alive even in the midst of a century of policies designed to 
break those relationships and destroy Anishinaabeg existence as a People.  
 Settler colonialism was not a nineteenth-century phenomenon. It continued into the 
twentieth century, renewing policies of ethnic cleansing, flooding reservations to power Settler 
homes and businesses, and abrogating treaty obligations. Although Americans and Canadians 
prefer national narratives extolling ever-expanding opportunities for freedom, both functioned as 
empires between 1854 and 1954. In the United States and Canada, Settler governments, 
espousing a modern, Settler colonial form of imperialism based on hegemonic control of land 
and resources as well as the “hearts and minds” of Indigenous populations, confined Native 
Peoples to reservations or reserves.7 These reduced territories, with borders carefully mapped out 
in treaties and legislation, promised to provide concentrated, controlled sites for economic, 
political, and cultural coercion to facilitate Settler expansion. Like attempts at genocide, reserves 
and reservations failed as sites of detribalization. Instead, for the Anishinaabeg, they remained 
ishkoniganan—the lands that we reserved for our People. As the three intertwining 
dibaajimowinan in this dissertation demonstrate, Anishinaabe men and women continuously 
defied reservation limits, both territorial and mental, and therefore challenged Settler colonialism 
in both subtle and profound ways. The Anishinaabeg whose lives appear, however briefly, on 
these pages expose the nation-building, expansionist narratives that support United States and 
                                                 
7 Barker, “The Contemporary Reality of Canadian Imperialism,” 328. 
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Canadian colonial hegemony. More importantly, from an Anishinaabe perspective, they reveal a 
counternarrative of active, purposeful survival.  
 The persistence of the Anishinaabeg People reveals the fiction behind North American 
empires. Until at least the 1850s, American and Canadian control in the Great Lakes region 
existed only on paper and in the imaginations of political and military leaders and not on the 
ground, which remained Anishinaabewaki.8 Dominant narratives portray the mid-nineteenth 
century as a reversal of fortunes, a time when Settler empires became inevitable and declining 
Indigenous Peoples scrambled to maintain even a corner of their homelands.9 Indeed, after the 
mid-nineteenth century, the Anishinaabeg no longer dominated the Great Lakes region, but 
neither did they retreat to its margins.  
 Even after Settler numbers increased and they extended their influence via treaties and 
legislation, many aspects of empire—for example, the superiority of American civilization—
remained fictions, continuously contested by Anishinaabeg. Anishinaabeg Peoples continuously 
enacted their peoplehood—zigging and zagging around manoomin beds to shape the boundaries 
of the Lac Courte Oreilles ishkonigan, crowding ishkonigan allotments to sustain expansive kin 
networks that would have been fragmented on public domain allotments, camping and cutting 
hay in supposedly alienated marshes. These actions, often mundane but recognized by the 
People, protected essential land, guarded ceremonial, kin, and sacred relationships that 
comprised their peoplehood, and thwarted Settler policies designed to disrupt those relationships 
and erase Indigenous sovereignty. Recognizing that empire was as much a state of mind as a 
                                                 
8 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations.  
9 Witgen, An Infinity of Nations; Hämäläinen, Comanche Empire; Hoxie, A Final Promise; West: The Last Indian 
War.  
  
424 
 
political reality in Anishinaabewaki offers a perspective that can help challenge hegemonic 
presumptions of empire throughout the world. 
 Peoplehood provides the framework to illuminate dynamic Anishinaabeg sovereignty.  
Sovereignty, inherent in being a People, originates neither from territory nor political 
centralization, and it remains independent from relationship with outsiders. Rather, sovereignty 
derives from relationships with land, language, sacred history, ceremonial cycle, and kinship. 
Reimagining sovereignty from Indigenous perspectives moves sovereignty beyond Settler 
colonial constructs. Exposing the sovereignty—the thriving matrix of relationships with land, 
language, ceremony, sacred history, and kin—inherent in being a People directly contradicts the 
narratives of decline that underwrite Settler theft of land and resources and erasure of Indigenous 
existence. Settler colonialism seeks to limit sovereignty. Peoplehood defies limitation.  
 Peoplehood empowers Indigenous Peoples. The Turtle Mountain, St. Peter’s, and Lac 
Courte Oreilles Peoples experienced their peoplehood in different ways. Some Anishinaabeg 
harvested manoomin every dagwaagin and ziinzibaakwad each ziigwan. The Turtle Mountain 
People and St. Peter’s People hunted mashkode-bizhkiki, and the Turtle Mountain People had a 
closer relationships with the mashkoden than the St. Peter’s People or the Lac Courte Oreilles. 
Anishinaabemowin sounds different in Saulteaux dialects and in Michif than on 
Mooningwanekaaning-minis. The Turtle Mountain People enact manidookewin through the Sun 
Dance, which did not make its way east to Lac Courte Oreilles. Nevertheless, all three remain 
Anishinaabeg, the People. Turtle Mountain peoplehood did not deny Lac Courte Oreilles or St. 
Peter’s peoplehood, nor did Lac Courte Oreilles and St. Peter’s peoplehood deny the Turtle 
Mountain People. Peoplehood resides not in an arbitrary checklist of static cultural 
characteristics but in lived relationships. Indigenous sovereignty is a thriving tangle of 
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relationships, and yet these dynamic relationships support and enact peoplehood and offer a 
powerful tonic for dismantling Settler colonialism.  
 Dibaajimowinan can be many things. The events at the heart of this narrative—the St. 
Peter’s surrender, the flooding of Paquauhwang, the Ten Cent Treaty—comprise a story of 
unjust, traumatic dispossession fueled by the darkest impulses of Settler colonialism. Individual 
Anishinaabeg experienced this trauma in intensely personal ways. I think of my grandfather, who 
lost his young mother to tuberculosis in the 1940s and who went to bed with an empty stomach 
more often than he went to bed with a full one. Survival might not have felt particularly 
triumphant to an Ojibwe such as Henry Pahkoo up to his knees in half-frozen mud and waiting 
for a jail sentence, to an empty-bellied Leonard Peltier lurking at the edges of grown-ups’ 
meetings in hopes of extra food, or to Frances Denasha who had hungry children to feed while 
she mourned her husband’s early death and paid his fine for carrying deer across ishkonigan 
boundaries. From the perspective of Anishinaabe peoplehood, however, it is indeed a story not 
only of survival but also of continuity.  
 When Henry Pahkoo told the court that the land belonged to him and his People—when 
he drove a team through the marsh and cut the hay—he felt confident in his People’s 
sovereignty. His labor in the marshes of his ishkonigan remained enmeshed in the nexus of 
peoplehood, evoking the aadizookanag that connected the aki to the People. The Turtle Mountain 
People, crowding kin onto allotments meant for single families, remained equally confident in 
their sovereignty as they resolved to protect what aki they had left against termination. They 
testified to their peoplehood in meetings on the ishkonigan, and, at a time when many struggled 
to feed their families, they raised money to send representatives to share this testimony with 
Congress. Frank Denasha, who offered tobacco for the deer that resulted in his arrest, and 
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Anakwad, who addressed Settler officials in Ojibwemowin, likewise knew that their sovereignty 
persisted undiminished. Despite decades of ethnic cleansing and Settler policies designed to 
erase the Anishinaabeg and other Indigenous Peoples, Anishinaabeg lived out relationships with 
aki, Anishinaabemowin, manidookewin, doodem or inawemaagan, and aadizookanag in their 
daily lives and thereby reinscribed Anishinaabeg sovereignty in their homeland. 
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Appendix: Glossary of Anishinaabemowin 
aki・land 
agamiing・by the water 
Anishinaabemowin ・Anishinaabe/Ojibwe language (see also Ojibwemowin)  
Anishinaabewaki・Anishinaabe territory (some Anishianabeg prefer Anishinaabe-aakiing) 
Anishinaabewi ・he/she is Anishinaabe 
apane・always, all the time, continuously 
asemaa・tobacco 
aadizookaan・(plural: aadizookanag) traditional story, sacred history  
biboon・winter 
chibimoodaywin ・migration or long journey  
dagwaagin・fall  
dibaajimowin・(plural: dibaajimowinan) history, news, story  
doodem・(plural: doodemag) clan or extended family group. Below are some common 
doodemag included in this text.  
 
 ajijaak: crane 
 awaazisii: bullhead  
  
428 
 
 ma’iingan: wolf  
 makwa: bear 
 maang: loon  
 migizi: eagle 
 name: sturgeon  
 ogashkimanisii: kingfisher 
 waabizheshi: marten  
 waawaashkeshi: deer 
gichi・big (as a prefix)  
gitige・s/he gardens, agriculture  
inawemaagan・relatives, allies  
ishkode・fire, era/time period  
ishkonigan・(plural: ishkoniganan) reserve or reservation 
iskigamizigan・sugar bush, sugar camp 
manidoo・spirit, manitou, power  
manidookewin・ceremony  
manoomin・wild rice 
mashkode・(plural: mashkoden) prairie  
  
429 
 
mashkodeng・on the prairie 
meyaagizid・stranger, outsider, enemy 
Midewiwin・Medicine Lodge Society  
mino-bimaadiziwin ・the good life 
mitig・wood, stick (mitigoog: woods, trees) 
miigis・Mide shell 
miigwech・thank you 
name・(plural: namewag) sturgeon 
noopiming・in the woods 
niibin・summer  
ogimaa・(plural: ogimaag) leader, hereditary civil leader 
wayeshkad・at first, in the beginning 
wiigiwaam・(plural: wiigiwaaman) wigwam, domed birchbark lodge 
zagaswe’idiwag ・councils, general councils 
zaaga’igan ・(plural: zaaga’iganan) lake 
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ziibi・(plural: ziibiwan) river 
ziigwan・spring 
ziinzibaakwad・maple sugar
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